

Order

Analysis.

I.—OPENING OF PROCEEDINGS, ELECTION OF SPEAKER, SITTINGS, &c.

II.—RULES OF DEBATE, DIVISIONS, AMENDMENTS.

III.—MESSAGES.

IV.—LAPSED QUESTIONS.

V.—COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL.

VI.—SELECT COMMITTEES.

VII.—PETITIONS.

VIII.—BILLS.

IX.—COMMITTEE OF SUPPLY.

X.—STRANGERS.

XI.—CONTEMPT.

XII.—STANDING ORDERS.

Vignette

Standing Orders of the Provincial Council of Otago,

I.—OPENING OF PROCEEDINGS, ELECTION OF SPEAKER, SITTINGS, &c.

1. In all cases not hereinafter provided

- Speaker to decide in cases for which no rules are made.
 for, Mr. Speaker shall decide, taking for his guide the rules, forms, and usages of the House of Commons, as far as the same can be applied to the proceedings of the Provincial Council.
- Election of Speaker; first meeting of new Council
2. On the first day of the meeting of a new Council, the Clerk shall read the Superintendent's Proclamation convening the Council, also the names of members returned to serve in such Council, and the Council shall immediately thereafter proceed in manner following to the choice of some proper person to be its Speaker.
- A member proposed as Speaker.
3. A Member addressing himself to the Clerk may propose another member, then present, to the Council for its Speaker, and move that such member "do take the Chair of this Council as Speaker."
- When unopposed such member declared elected.
4. Such motion being seconded, if no other member be proposed as Speaker, the member so proposed shall be declared by the Clerk duly elected without a question being put.
- Procedure when more than one member proposed.
5. In the event of more than one member being proposed as Speaker, a motion may be made and seconded regarding each such member that he "do take the Chair of this Council as Speaker," upon which a debate may take place. A question shall then be put by the Clerk, that the member first proposed "do take the Chair," &c., which shall be resolved in the affirmative or negative, like other questions; if in the negative, a question shall be put that the member next proposed "do take the Chair, &c.
6. In the event of a division being called
 In event of division for election of Speaker or Deputy Speaker.
 for upon motion for appointment of Speaker, or Deputy-Speaker, and the Tellers reporting that the "numbers are equal," the Clerk shall order the doors to be unlocked, and take a second division in manner provided by Standing Orders; and shall, if necessary, repeat the process till the Division Lists show a majority either in favor of "Aye" or "No."
7. The member elected shall be conducted
 Mr. Speaker elect conducted to the chair
 to the Chair by his proposer and seconder, and after having, whilst standing beside the Chair, expressed his acknowledgments for the honor conferred upon him, shall take his seat in the Chair.
8. The proposer and seconder of the
 Deputation to receive His Honor's confirmation of Election.
 member so elected shall be a deputation to wait upon the Superintendent for His Honor's confirmation of the election, and shall forthwith act as such.
9. The Election being confirmed, Mr.
 Superintendent Introduced.
 Speaker shall read the usual prayer. His Honor the Superintendent is then introduced for the purpose of opening the proceedings of the Session, as provided in order No. 14.
10. Should the office of Speaker become
 Vacancy in office of Speaker.
 vacant during the existence of any Council, the same mode of procedure shall be adopted in the election of a successor as in the case of first election.
 Chairman of Committees may preside in the absence of Mr Speaker.
11. Whenever the Council shall be informed by the Clerk of the unavoidable absence of Mr. Speaker, the Chairman of Committees shall take the Chair for that day only; and, in the event of Mr. Speaker's absence continuing for more than one day, the Chairman of Committees shall, if the Council think fit and shall order it, take the Chair in like manner on any subsequent day during such absence. Should the
 Deputy Speaker
 Chairman of Committees be also absent, the Council shall forthwith proceed to the election of a Deputy Speaker to act during the remainder of the sitting, or during the absence of Mr. Speaker.
- Opening of ordinary Sessions.
12. On the first day of the meeting of any Council subsequent to the first meeting thereof, Mr. Speaker shall take the chair at the hour appointed for such meeting, and after the reading by the Clerk, of the Superintendent's Proclamation convening the Council, shall read the usual form of prayer.
- Return of new members.
13. Mr. Speaker shall then intimate the return of new members, if any; and such members, if in attendance, shall thereupon be presented to Mr. Speaker.
 His Honor the Superintendent introduced opens proceedings
14. Mr. Speaker shall then direct the Clerk to acquaint His Honor the Superintendent that the Council is

prepared to receive him, for the purpose of opening the proceedings of the Session.

15. In the event of anything transpiring

If Superintendent unable to attend at time appointed.

to prevent the attendance of His Honor the Superintendent, or his Deputy, at the time appointed for the opening of the Session, on such being intimated to Mr. Speaker, it shall be competent for the Council to order an adjournment until such time as may be deemed expedient or necessary.

16. The Council shall sit from day to day,

Sittings.

except Saturdays and Sundays, during Session, subject to alteration by resolution; and on Wednesdays and Fridays Government business shall have precedence, as provided by Order No. 29.

17. At the first sitting each day the Council

Each sitting to be opened with prayer.

shall be opened with prayer, read by Mr. Speaker; and during the reading of the prayers the doors shall be closed.

18. Mr. Speaker shall take the chair at

Hours of meeting and rising each day.

two o'clock in the afternoon, unless otherwise appointed by the Council; and if after prayers there be not present a quorum (one-third of the members) Mr. Speaker shall adjourn the Council until the

Quorum.

following sitting day at the usual hour; and if at any time after prayers notice be taken, or, on the report of a division by the Tellers, it appear that one-third of the members be not present, Mr. Speaker shall adjourn the Council without a question first put; and the Council shall rise daily at half-past five p.m., and resume its sittings at seven p.m.

Adjournment for want of quorum.

19. Whenever Mr. Speaker is obliged to adjourn the Council for want of a quorum, the hour at which such adjournment is made, and the names of the members then present, shall be inserted in the Journals of the Council.

While Council counted members to retain their seats.

20. During the counting of the Council (or Committee of the whole) each member present shall resume his seat, and keep the same till the result of the counting is announced.

Minutes to be read. Presentation of petitions, &c.

21. After prayers, the minutes of the preceding sitting shall be read for confirmation. Thereafter Mr. Speaker shall call for the presentation of Petitions, Notices of Questions, Notices of Motions, Papers and Bills.

Order Paper

22. The Council shall then proceed to consider the business as set down on the Order Paper, Notices of Questions being first called. The answers, or an abstract of the answers given to questions shall be inserted in the Journals.

Council to resume at 5.25 p.m.

23. When the Council is in Committee, at twenty-five minutes past five p.m. Mr. Speaker shall resume the Chair, and the Chairman of the Committee shall report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

24. If all motions shall not have been

Motions not disposed of before half-past five p.m.

disposed of at half-past five o'clock, the consideration thereof shall stand adjourned, and on the Council resuming at seven o'clock p.m., the Orders of the Day shall be taken in rotation; but if there should be no Order of the Day, the consideration of motions may be continued. The consideration of motions may be resumed after the Orders of the Day are disposed of, on motion to that effect being put and agreed to.

25. No notice of motion for the next sitting

When notices of motion to be given.

day shall be received after the Council shall have proceeded to the Orders of the Day, and no notice of motion shall be received for a period extending over more than four sitting days, and all notices for next day's Order Paper shall be given in before nine p.m. A member may give notice for any other member not present.

26. No member shall make any motion

Notice to be given before motion discussed.

initiating a subject for discussion, but in pursuance of notice given at a previous sitting of the Council.

27. It shall be competent, on the presentation

Motions for printing documents, petitions, &c.

of any document, except a petition, to move without notice that it be printed, and to appoint a day for its consideration.

Motions to take precedence of Orders of the Day.

28. Motions shall take precedence of Orders of the Day, except on Government days as hereinafter provided, and he moved in the order in which they stand on the Order Paper, and if not so moved, shall be expunged therefrom.

Government days.

29. Unless the Council shall otherwise direct, Orders of the Day for Wednesdays and Fridays shall be disposed of before the Council proceeds with any motions of which notice shall have been given; and on such days Government Notices of Motions shall take precedence of all others.

Form of motion for information emanating from Superintendent

30. Motions for the production of despatches or other correspondence addressed to the Superintendent, or for any information emanating from the Superintendent, shall be in the form, "That an Address be presented to His Honour the Superintendent," to that effect.

Form of motion for other official information.

31. Motions for the production of Returns or other information from the several departments of the Provincial service shall be in the form, "That there be laid upon the table, &c."

Motion or Bill rejected not to be introduced the some session without leave.

32. When a motion or Bill shall have been rejected by the Council, no motion or Bill involving the same argument or matter shall be brought forward during the same Session without leave.

33. A motion which has been by leave of

A motion withdrawn may be renewed.

the Council withdrawn may be made again during the same Session on motion upon notice

34. A Resolution or other vote or order

A resolution may be rescinded.

of the Council may be read over and rescinded on motion upon notice.

35. All Addresses to the Superintendent

Addresses to Superintendent by whom to be presented.

shall be presented by or forwarded through Mr. Speaker, unless otherwise ordered by the Council.

36. All papers and documents laid upon

Papers, &c. laid on the table to be considered public.

the table of the Council shall be considered public (unless otherwise ordered), and may be printed.

37. On a motion made and passed "That

Call of the Council

the Council be called over" on any day therein named, Mr. Speaker shall cause circular letters to be addressed to all the members, requiring their attendance on that day.

38. No order for a call of the Council

Order for the same.

shall be made for any day earlier than fifteen days from the date of such order.

II.—RULES OF DEBATE, DIVISIONS, AMENDMENTS.

Members to address the chair

39. Every member desiring to speak shall rise in his place, uncovered, and address himself to Mr. Speaker, or, in Committee, to the Chairman.

Motions must be seconded.

40. All motions shall be duly seconded before being proposed from the Chair (except in Committee of the whole); and if not so seconded, shall be forthwith dropped, and no entry be made thereof in the Journals.

When read a motion to be deemed in possession of the Council.

41. After a motion shall have been proposed from the Chair, it shall be deemed to be in possession of the Council, and shall not be withdrawn or altered without the unanimous consent of the Council.

Question of order or privilege to supersede original motion.

42. A motion having been moved and seconded, and the question thereupon proposed from the Chair, any question of order, or any matter of privilege, which may arise, shall supersede the consideration of the original question, and must be first disposed of.

Interruptions.

43. While Mr. Speaker is putting a question, no member shall walk out of, or across the House; nor while a member is speaking, shall any member hold discourse to interrupt him, nor pass between him and the Chair.

44. Whenever Mr. Speaker rises during a

When Mr Speaker rises Council o be silent.

debate, any member then speaking, or offering to speak, shall sit down, and the Council shall be silent, so that Mr. Speaker may be heard without interruption.

45. A member called to order by Mr.

Call to Order.

Speaker shall sit down, unless permitted to explain.

46. If, in consequence of highly disorderly

Member called upon by name after explanation to withdraw.

conduct, Mr. Speaker shall call upon any member by name, such member shall withdraw as soon as he has been heard in explanation; and after such member's withdrawal, the Council shall at once take the case into consideration.

47. In the case of a charge against a

Breach of order by a member: procedure.

member for any breach of the Orders of the Council, or on account of any matter that has arisen in debate, the charge shall be stated, and the question moved before the member accused withdraws; he shall then be allowed the opportunity of explaining to the Council the motives of his conduct in the matter alleged against him, and, after having so done, he shall withdraw.

48. Any member may of right require

A member may request that any question under discussion be read.

the question or matter in discussion to be read for his information at any time during the debate, but not so as to interrupt a member speaking.

Member not to speak twice on the same question. Exceptions.

49. No member shall speak twice (except in Committees of the whole Council) on the same question, unless in explanation on some material point of his speech on which he had been misrepresented or misunderstood, and without introducing any new matter; but the mover of any question, not being an amendment, shall be allowed the liberty of reply; and after such reply, it shall not be competent to any member to speak to the subject in debate. And it shall be competent to a member, when he seconds a motion or amendment without speaking to it, to address the Council on the subject of such motion or amendment at any subsequent period of the debate.

Questions of privilege-

50. Whenever any matter of privilege arises, it shall immediately be taken into consideration.

Motion "That this Council do now adjourn."

51. In course of a debate upon a question, any member who has not spoken on the original question, may move (except when a member is in possession of the Chair) "That this *Council* do now adjourn;" but no discussion shall take place on the original question; and if this second question is resolved in the affirmative, the original question shall be held to be entirely superseded; and the Council shall immediately adjourn till the next usual hour of commencing a sitting; and if the motion for adjournment be negatived, it shall not be competent to propose it again without some intermediate proceeding.

52. In like manner, in course of a debate,

Motion "That this debate be now adjourned"

any member who has not spoken on the original question, may move (except when a member is in possession of the Chair) "That this *debate* be now adjourned:" but Mr. Speaker shall confine the discussion as nearly as may be to the question of adjournment, and if such motion be carried, its effect will be merely to defer the decision of the Council on the original question; and if the motion for adjournment be negatived, it shall not be competent to propose it again without some intermediate proceeding.

53. When the motion for the adjournment

Resumption of debate.

of a debate has been agreed to, the Council shall forthwith fix a day for the resumption of such debate.

54. The member upon whose motion any

Mover of such motion to be titled to preaudience

debate shall be adjourned, shall be entitled to pre-audience on the resumption of the debate.

55. A question may be superseded: (1) By

Questions superseded.

the adjournment of the Council, either on

1. By adjournment.

the motion of a member "That this Council do now adjourn;" or, on notice being taken, and it appealing that a quorum is not present: (2) By a motion "That the

2. By considering orders of the day.

Orders of the Day be now considered;" which motion, however, is restricted to days on which Notices have

precedence of Orders

3. By previous Question.

of the Day: (3) By the previous question, viz., "That this question be now put," being

4. By Amendment.

proposed and negatived (but this cannot be proposed in Committee); and (4) By amendment.

If previous question resolved in the affirmative.

56. If the previous question ("that this question be now put") be resolved in the affirmative, the original question is to be put forthwith, without any amendment or debate.

Previous Question superseded by adjournment

57. A question for considering the Orders of the Day, and also "the previous question" may be superseded by the adjournment of the Council.

Debates interrupted.

58. The debate upon a question may be

1. Privilege.

interrupted: (1) By a matter of privilege

2. Words of heat.

suddenly arising; (2) By words of heat between members; (3) By questions of

3. Points of order.

order; (4) By a message from the

4. Messages.

Superintendent; (5) By a motion for reading an

5. Reading documents.

Act of Parliament, an entry in the Journals or other public document, relevant to the question before the Council.

Complicated questions may be divided.

59. The Council may order a complicated question to be divided.

Question "put" and again stated.

60. So soon as a debate upon a question is concluded, Mr. Speaker *puts* the question to the Council; and if the same should not be heard, will again state it to the Council.

61. A question being put, is resolved

Question determined by majority of voices.

in the affirmative or negative by the majority of voices "Aye," or "No."

62. Mr. Speaker states whether, in his

Mr Speaker states whether ayes or noes have it

opinion, the "Ayes" or the "Noes" "have it," and unless his opinion is acquiesced in by the minority, the question is determined by a division.

63. Immediately after a call for a division

Procedure on call for division.

the bell shall be rung, and at the expiration of three minutes, denoted by a sand-glass, the doors shall be locked, when Mr. Speaker shall again put the question, and if a division still be insisted on, direct the "Ayes" to go to the right and the "Noes" to the left, and appoint two tellers for each side. If on one of the sides there be not two tellers, Mr. Speaker shall declare the resolution as previously decided on the voices.

64. An entry of every division list shall

Divisions to be entered in journals.

be made by the Clerk in the Journals.

65. In case of an equality of votes, Mr.

Casting vote.

Speaker shall give a casting vote; and any reasons stated by him may, if he so desire and shall order it, be entered in the Journals.

No member to vote if personally interested.

66. No member shall be entitled to vote upon any question in which he has a direct pecuniary interest, either in the Council or Committee, and the vote of any member so interested will be disallowed.

Different forms of amendment.

67. A question having been proposed may be amended: (1) By leaving out certain words only; (2) By leaving out certain words in order to insert or add other words; or (3) By inserting or adding words.

Amendments to be seconded.

68. An amendment proposed but not seconded will not be entertained by the Council (except in Committee), nor entered in the Journals.

Amendments to leave out words.

69. When the proposed amendment is to leave out certain words, Mr. Speaker puts a question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question," which is resolved by the Council in the affirmative or negative, as the case may be.

Amendment to leave out words and insert or add others.

70. When the proposed amendment is to leave out certain words, in order to insert or add other words, Mr. Speaker puts a question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question," which if resolved in the affirmative, disposes of the amendment; but if in the negative, another question is put, that the words of the amendment be inserted or added instead thereof, which is resolved in the affirmative or negative, as the case may be.

71. When the proposed amendment is to

Amendment to insert or add words.

insert or add certain words, Mr. Speaker puts a question that such words be inserted, or added, which is resolved in the affirmative or negative, as the case may be.

72. No amendment may be proposed in

When latter part of question has been amended or proposed to be amended.

any part of a question, after a latter part has been amended, or has been proposed to be amended, unless a proposed amendment has been by leave of the Council withdrawn.

73. No amendment may be proposed to

No amendment to be made to words already agreed to.

be made to any words which the Council has resolved shall stand part of a question, or shall be inserted in or added to a question, except the addition of other words thereto.

74. A proposed amendment may be, by

Proposed amendment withdrawn.

leave of the Council, withdrawn.

75. Amendments may be proposed to a

Amendments to proposed amendment.

proposed amendment, whenever it comes to a question whether the Council shall agree to such proposed amendment.

76. When amendments have been made,

Question as amended put.

the main question, as amended, is put.

When amendments proposed but not made.

77. When amendments have been proposed, but not made, the question is put as originally proposed.

III.—MESSAGES.

From Superintendent when announced other business to be suspended.

78. Whenever a message from the Superintendent shall be announced, the business before the Council shall be immediately suspended, and the bearer of the message introduced into the body of the Council to deliver the message to Mr. Speaker.

To be immediately read.

79. Mr. Speaker shall immediately read the message to the Council, and, if necessary, a day shall be fixed for taking the same into consideration.

And members to be uncovered.

80. During the reading of a message from the Superintendent, members shall remain uncovered.

Notice of proposed reply to be given.

81. When an address is to be moved in reply to a message from the Superintendent notice of the proposed reply shall be given as provided for motions (see 25 and 26).

IV.—LAPSED QUESTIONS.

How debates when superseded by counting out, &c. may be resumed.

82. If a debate on any Motion or Order of the Day be superseded by the Council being counted out or adjourned, such Motion or Order may be restored to the paper for a future day, on motion upon notice, and then such debate shall be resumed at the point where it was interrupted.

83. If the discussion on any question in a

Procedure if interrupted by motion being carried to "report progress" or "to leave the chair."

Committee of the whole Council be interrupted by a motion being carried "That the Chairman report progress," he shall, on reporting progress, ask leave to sit again; and if the discussion be interrupted by a motion being carried "That the Chairman do now leave the Chair," the Council may order the resumption of such Committee on a future day, on motion upon notice; and in either case the discussion of such question shall be resumed at the point where it was so interrupted.

84. All Notices of Motion and Orders of Motions and orders not called on, how dealt with.

the Day not called on during the day for which they are set down, shall be placed before the Motions and Orders of the Day for the next day on which the Council shall sit, subject to the provisions made in Order No. 29.

85. When a debate on any Motion is interrupted

When debate interrupted by adjournment at half-past five.

by the adjournment of the Council at half-past five p.m., then if the Orders of the Day are proceeded with at seven o'clock p.m., such interrupted debate shall, unless otherwise ordered, have precedence of the Motions for the following day; but such debate may, by leave of the Council, be resumed either on the Council resuming at seven o'clock, or after the Orders of the Day have been disposed of.

V.—COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL.

Quorum.

86. In Committees of the whole Council, one-third of the members of Council, inclusive of the Chairman, shall be a quorum.

Procedure when not a quorum.

87. If, during the progress of business, notice be taken that there are not present one-third of the members of Council, inclusive of the Chairman, the Chairman shall announce that there is not a quorum present, and immediately leave the Chair; and Mr. Speaker shall resume the Chair for the purpose of adjourning the Council.

Procedure on committee breaking up for want of quorum.

88. When Mr. Speaker shall have resumed the Chair on the breaking up of the Committee owing to the requisite number of members not being present, the Chairman shall inform Mr. Speaker thereof, but make no further report. If the Council be then complete it shall again resolve itself into a Committee of the whole Council; but if not, Mr. Speaker shall forthwith adjourn the Council, and the question under consideration shall lapse.

89. The Rules of the Council shall be

Rules to be observed in com.

observed in a Committee of the whole Council, except the rule limiting the number of times of speaking, and the rule requiring that motions be seconded.

VI.—SELECT COMMITTEES.

90. At the commencement of every Session,

Sessional committees.

the following Committees are appointed viz.:—House Committee, Printing Committee, and Private Petitions Committee.

91. No Select Committee shall consist of

Number of members.

less than three or of more than seven members, without leave from the Council on motion upon notice.

92. It shall not be compulsory on Mr.

Not compulsory on Speaker to serve on committees.

Speaker to serve on any Select Committee.

93. Any member upon whose motion a

Member proposing committee to be member thereof.

Select Committee shall be appointed shall be one of the Committee without being named.

94. Every notice of motion for the appointment

Notice of motion for select committee to contain names of proposed members.

of a Select Committee shall contain the names of the members proposed by the mover to serve on such Committee.

Mode of electing select committees.

95. Upon a motion for a Select Committee, any number of the Council may require such Committee (the

Council having first decided that a Committee shall be appointed) to be elected by ballot in manner following. viz.:—Each member shall give in to the Clerk a list of the members proposed by him to serve on such Committee, not exceeding the number originally proposed, exclusive of the mover himself; and if and such list contains a larger number of names it shall be rejected; and the members reported by the Clerk to have the greatest number of votes shall be declared by Mr. Speaker to be, with the mover, the members of such Committee; and in case of two or more members having an equality of votes, Mr. Speaker shall decide by lot which shall serve on such Committee.

Addition, &c. to select committee, how to be made. May sit during adjournment.

96. Any notice of motion for discharging, adding, or substituting members of a Select Committee, shall contain the names of such members; and Select Committees shall have leave to sit after any adjournment of the Council, notwithstanding that such adjournment shall be for a longer period than till the next day.

Quorum.

97. In all Select Committees three shall be a quorum unless otherwise provided in the Order of Reference. Chairman.

98. Every Select Committee, previously to the commencement of business, shall elect one of its members to be the Chairman, who shall have a deliberative as well as a casting vote.

99. The examination of witnesses before

Mode of examining witnesses.

every Select Committee shall be conducted as follows, viz:—The Chairman shall first put to the witness, in uninterrupted series, all such questions as he may deem essential. The Chairman shall then call upon the other members severally by name in the order of their sitting, to put further questions. All questions and replies, or either, at the discretion of the Committee, shall be reduced to writing and signed by the witness, and the name of every member interrogating a witness shall be prefixed to the question asked.

100. Every Report of a Select Committee

Report.

shall be signed by the Chairman thereof.

101. A list shall be affixed in some conspicuous

Lists of committees to be posted.

place in the Council Chambers, and also in the Lobby, of all members serving on Select Committees.

102. Whenever it may be considered necessary

Power to call for evidence to be asked for.

to examine witnesses, special application shall be made to the Council for power to call for papers, persons, and reports, and for leave to report from time to time.

Chairman to report to Mr. Speaker in cases of special expenditure.

103. It shall be incumbent upon the Chairman of each Select Committee to report to Mr. Speaker, for the information of the Council, any case calling for special expenditure for attendance of witnesses, &c., previous to the summoning of such witnesses.

Day to be fixed for reporting.

104. On the appointment of every Committee a day shall be fixed for reporting the proceedings to the Council, and on or before such day the final report of the Committee shall be brought up, unless further time shall be moved for and granted.

No discussion to be on presenting report.

105. Upon the presentation of a report, no discussion shall take place; but the report shall be laid upon the table, and may, on question put and passed, be printed, together with the appendix and reported evidence.

Specific motion on report.

106. If any measure or proceeding be necessary upon the report of a Committee, such measure or proceeding shall be brought under the consideration of the Council by a specific motion, of which notice must be given in the usual manner.

VII.—PETITIONS.

When to be presented. mittee.

107. No petition shall be presented during any debate, nor after the Council shall have proceeded to the Orders of the Day.

108. It shall be incumbent upon every

Member presenting to acquaint himself with contents.

member presenting a petition to acquaint himself with the contents thereof, and to ascertain that it does not contain language disrespectful to the Council.

109. Every member presenting a petition
And to affix his name thereto
shall affix his name at the beginning: thereof.
110. Every petition shall be in writing,
Form of petitions.
or print, or partly in writing and partly in print, and shall contain, at the end thereof, the prayer of the
petitioners, and shall be in the English language.
111. No letters, or affidavits, or other
No documents to be attached thereto.
documents, shall be attached to any petition.
112. No petition shall make reference to
Nor is a petition to contain reference to any debate.
any debate in the Council, or to any intended motion.
113. No petition shall pray directly for a
Nor to pray for grant of money
grant of public money.
114. Any member presenting a petition
Procedure on presenting a petition.
shall confine himself to a statement of the description and numbers of the petitioners, and of the material
allegations contained in the petition, and to the reading of the prayer thereof. It may be read upon motion
without notice, and the only question which shall be entertained on the presentation of any petition shall be
"that the petition be received."
- To be received as the petition of the parties signing.
115. All petitions shall be received only as the petitions of the parties signing the same.
Private petitions to stand referred to Private Petitions Committee
116. All private petitions shall stand referred to the Private Petitions Committee, unless otherwise ordered
by the Council.
Copies of petitions to be forwarded to Government before presentation.
117. Copies of all petitions making any claim upon the Government, or making any complaint against any
Government officer, shall be forwarded to the Government before being presented to the Council.

VIII.—BILLS.

- Bills, how to be introduced.
118. Every Bill, except such as are transmitted by the Superintendent in pursuance of the Constitution Act,
by message or by members of the Executive Council, shall be introduced either by a motion for leave
specifying the title and object of the Bill, or by a motion to appoint a Committee to prepare and bring it in, or
by an order of Council on the report of a Committee.
119. The member having leave to bring
Member having leave to bring in a Bill to prepare it.
in a Bill, shall prepare the draft of such Bill, with the necessary blanks to be filled up in Committee; and
shall on an early day, present a fair copy thereof to the Council.
120. No clause shall be inserted in any
Clauses in a Bill not to be foreign to its title.
Bill, which shall be foreign to what the title of such Bill imports; and such matters as have no proper
relation to each other shall not be intermixed in one and the same Bill.
121. No perpetual clause shall be inserted
Bills for temporary objects not to include anything perpetual.
in any Bill, the provisions of which are intended to be temporary; and the temporary character of the Bill
shall be declared in the title, and the precise duration mentioned in a distinct clause at the end thereof.
122. Immediately on the presentation of
Motions on presentation of Bill.
any Bill a motion shall be made, "That this Bill be now read a first time," which, if agreed to, shall be
followed by another motion, "That this Bill be printed."
123. At the first and second reading of
First and second reading.
any Bill, the title only shall be read by the Clerk; and the first reading shall take place without discussion.
124. Every Bill read a first time, and ordered

Bills read a first time to be printed.
to be printed, shall be printed with as little delay as possible, and two copies shall be provided for each member.

Direction for second leading.

125. After the first reading of a Bill, its second reading shall be made an Order of the Day for some future convenient day.

Question on second reading.

126. On the Order of the Day being read for the second reading of a Bill, the question put shall be, "That this Bill be *now* read a second time."

Amendments to question for second reading.

127. Amendments may be moved to such question by leaving out "now," and at the end of the question adding "this day three months," or six months, or any other time; or that the Bill be rejected.

Amendments to be relevant.

128. No other amendment may be moved to such question, unless the same be strictly relevant to the Bill.

Bills read a second time to be committed.

129. After a Bill shall have been read a second time, the Council shall resolve itself into Committee for the consideration of it in detail, unless it be deemed expedient by the Council that it be referred to a Select Committee; in which case, a committee for that purpose may be at once appointed with the requisite instructions.

Procedure in Committee.

130. Bills in Committee of the whole Council shall be debated clause by clause, the question being put upon each, "That this clause stand part of the Bill," or as amended stand part of the Bill, leaving the preamble and title to be last considered.

131. Any additional clauses must be

Additional clauses.

added after the other clauses have been considered.

132. At the close of the proceedings of a

Bills reported with amendments.

Committee of the whole Council on a Bill, the Chairman shall report the Bill forthwith to the Council, and when amendments have been made thereto, the same shall be received without debate, and a time appointed for taking them into consideration.

133. Amendments merely of a verbal or

Amendments verbal or formal

formal nature may be made on motion in any part of a Bill at any time during its progress through the Council or Committee.

134. Clerical and typographical errors

Correction of errors.

may be corrected in any part of a Bill by the Chairman of Committees.

135. When a Bill shall have been reported

Bill reported without amendment.

without amendment, it may thereupon be read a third time and passed.

136. When a Bill shall have been reported

Bills when reported with amendments may be printed. Notice of motion for third reading Recommitment.

with amendments, it may be ordered to be printed as amended; and notice shall be given of a motion that it be read a third time on a convenient day; and when the motion shall be made for the Bill being read a third time, it may, on a motion without

Re-commitment

notice, be re-committed for further amendment; and when again reported with amendments, a day may be fixed on motion without notice, for its being read a third time.

Certificate of Chairman of Committee required before Bill read a third time.

137. Before a Bill shall be read a third time, the Chairman of the Committee shall certify that the amended copy is in accordance with the Bill as reported.

Procedure on third reading.

138. On the third reading of the Bill, Mr. Speaker shall announce that the amended copy has been so certified by the Chairman of Committees, and the title only shall be read, unless on motion, without notice, made and seconded, that the Bill be read at length.

No motion to be made for amendment on third reading: Exception.

139. No alteration or amendment not being merely verbal, shall be made in any Bill on the third reading, the question simply being that the Bill, in its then shape, be read a third time; but the addition of a clause may

be made, and if passed, shall be added to the Bill.

What if a clause be proposed to be added.

140. If the clause proposed to be added to the Bill has for its object to impose a pecuniary fine, the Council shall not entertain it with Mr. Speaker in the Chair. In order to fill up the blanks in such case the clause must be read twice, and then committed to a Committee of the whole Council; after which, Mr. Speaker shall resume the Chair, the clause shall be reported, read a third time, and passed with the Bill, if approved by the Council.

141. When a Bill shall have been read a

Question "that this Bill do now pass."

third time, it shall be delivered by the Clerk to Mr. Speaker, who shall put the question "That this Bill do now pass."

142. When a Bill shall have passed the

Bill passed, how to be authenticated.

Council, Mr. Speaker shall sign the same, and the Clerk shall forthwith certify the date of its passing at the foot of the Bill.

143. All Bills, when passed, shall be presented

To be presented to the Superintendent.

by or forwarded through Mr. Speaker to the Superintendent for assent and transmission to the Governor.

IX.—COMMITTEE OF SUPPLY.

144. The Estimates of Expenditure for

Estimates transmitted by message.

the service of the Province are transmitted by message from the Superintendent and taken into consideration in Committee of Supply.

145. On the Order of the Day being read

Committee of Supply.

I for Committee of Supply, Mr. Speaker puts the question "That I do now leave the Chair," &c.

Omitting or reducing items.

146. When a motion is made in Committee of Supply, to omit or reduce any item of a vote, a question shall be proposed from the Chair for omitting or reducing such item accordingly, and members shall speak to such question only, until it has been disposed of.

Proposed in order of printed Estimates.

147. When several motions are offered, they shall be taken in the order in which the items to which they relate, appear in the printed Estimates.

No motion to be made relating to any prior item.

148. After a question has been proposed from the Chair for omitting or reducing any item, no motion shall be made or debate allowed upon any preceding item.

Question put on the original or reduced vote.

149. Where it has been proposed to omit or reduce items in a vote, the question shall be afterwards put upon the original vote, or upon the reduced vote, as the case may be.

Adoption of resolutions agreed to in Committee.

150. Resolutions of the Committee of Supply reported to the Council are, on motion to that effect, put to the Council for adoption, or may be amended, postponed, recommitted, or disagreed to.

151. No amendment, whereby the charge

Reported resolutions not to be amended so as to increase charge upon the people.

upon the people will be increased, may be made to any such resolution, unless such charge so increased shall not exceed the charge already existing by virtue of any Act of Parliament or Ordinance of the Council.

152. Motions for Addresses to the Superintendent

Motions for sums to be placed on Estimates to be considered in Committee.

requesting that sums be placed on the Estimates are considered in Committee of Supply.

X.—STRANGERS.

153. On the request of any two members,

To withdraw when requested by Speaker.

or in his own discretion, Mr. Speaker shall at any time order strangers to withdraw, and such strangers shall immediately withdraw.

154. If any person not being a Member

Liable to fine & imprisonment for certain acts.
of the Council shall, within the place of assembling of the Council, refuse or neglect to obey the order of Mr. Speaker, or shall otherwise wilfully disturb the Council, such person shall be liable to pay such penalty, not exceeding Twenty Pounds, as shall be imposed by this Council, and in default of payment thereof, shall be liable to be imprisoned in some common gaol, or other convenient place to be named by Mr. Speaker, for a period (not exceeding one month) to be fixed by this Council, or until such fine be paid.

XI.—CONTEMPT.

By absence after call of Council.

155. Any member not attending in compliance with an order for the call of the Council, without reasonable excuse, shall be held guilty of contempt.

By absence for more than three days.

156. No member shall absent himself for more than three days at a time without leave; and any member infringing this order, and not excused, shall be held guilty of contempt.

By disobedience of orders.

157. Any member who shall wilfully disobey any order of the Council, and any member who shall wilfully and vexatiously interrupt the orderly conduct of the business of the Council, shall be guilty of contempt.

Penalty for contempt.

158. Any member adjudged by the Council for any of the causes hereinbefore mentioned guilty of contempt, shall be fined in a penalty at the discretion of the Council, not exceeding Twenty Pounds; and in default of immediate payment, shall be committed by warrant of Mr. Speaker, to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, or some officer appointed by Mr. Speaker, to detain the said member in his custody for the period directed by the Council, unless sooner discharged by the order of the Council, or unless the amount of the fine imposed shall be sooner paid.

XII.—STANDING ORDERS.

159. Any Standing Order or Orders of
How Standing Orders may be suspended.

the Council may be suspended on motion duly seconded, made without notice, provided that two-thirds of the members be present, and provided also that two-thirds of those present consent; but notice shall always be given when practicable.

160. No proposal for altering or annulling
Alteration, &c. of Standing Orders.

any Standing Order or Orders of the Council shall be entertained, except when two-thirds of the whole number of members are present, and when notice extending over at least four sitting days has been given.

161. The whole of these Standing Orders
Duration of Standing Orders

shall continue in force only until the expiration of six sitting days after the opening of the first Session of the next Council.

Adopted by the Provincial Council May 5, 1874

JOHN L. GILLIES, Speaker.

WM. E. SESSIONS, Clerk of Council.

MESSAGE NO. 4.

The Superintendent has approved of the Standing Orders adopted by the Provincial Council on fifth day of May current.

J. MACANDREW, Superintendent of Otago.

6th May, 1874.

Dunedin, New Zealand.

Printed under the Authority of the Provincial Government of Otago, by Coulls and Culling, of Rattray-street, Printers to the Provincial Government for the time being.
Standing Orders and Forms of Proceeding of the House Of Representatives,
Relating to

Standing Orders, etc.

I.—PROCEEDINGS ON THE MEETING OF A NEW PARLIAMENT.

1. On the first day of the meeting of a
List of Members delivered to the Clerk of the House.
new Parliament, for the despatch of business, pursuant to the Governor's Proclamation, the Clerk of the
Writs delivers to the Clerk of the House a List of the names of the Members returned to serve in such
Parliament.
2. Members assemble at the time and
Members assemble in the House.
place appointed, and await a Message from the Commissioners for opening the Parliament.
3. On receiving such Message, the House,
House goes up to Legislative Council.
with the Clerk, goes up to the Legislative Council.
4. The Commissioners having intimated
The Governor's wish signified that the House elect their Speaker.
that it is His Excellency's wish that the Members of the House shall proceed to the choice of some proper
person to be their Speaker, and present such person on the following day for his approval, the House returns.
5. A Commissioner, duly authorized by the
At the commencement of a New Parliament, Commissioner appointed to administer the Oath to Members.
Governor to administer the Oath to Members, is then introduced into the House, and his Commission is
read by the Clerk.
Members take the Oath.
6. Members then take the Oath prescribed by the Constitution Act.
House proceeds to elect a Speaker.
7. The House then proceeds to the election of a Speaker.
A Member proposed as Speaker.
8. A Member addressing himself to the Clerk (who, standing up, points to him and then sits down) proposes
another member, then present, to the House for their Speaker, and moves that such Member "do take the Chair
of this House as Speaker."
When unopposed, such Member called to the Chair.
9. Such motion being seconded and supported, if no other Member be proposed as Speaker, the Member so
proposed is *called* by the House to the Chair without any question being put.
He submits himself to the House.
10. The Member, on being called to the Chair, stands up in his place, and expresses his sense of the honor
proposed to be conferred upon him, and submits himself to the House.
And is conducted to the Chair.
11. Being again unanimously called to the Chair, he is taken out of his place by the Members who proposed
and seconded him, and by them conducted to the Chair.
When election of Speaker is opposed.
12. If more than one Member be proposed as Speaker, a Motion is made and seconded regarding each such
Member, "That he do take the Chair of this House as Speaker" and each Member so proposed addresses himself
to the House.
Question that the Member first proposed do take the Chair.
13. A Question is then put by the Clerk that the Member first proposed "do take the Chair of this House as
Speaker," which is resolved in the affirmative or negative like other Questions.
14. If the Question be resolved in the
Question that the next proposed do take the Chair.
affirmative, the Member is conducted to the Chair (*see* No. 11); but if in the negative, a Question is then
put by the Clerk that the Member next proposed "do take the Chair of this House as Speaker," and if it be
resolved in the affirmative, the Member is conducted to the Chair.

15. Having been conducted to the Chair,
Mr. Speaker elect takes the Chair, and the Mace is laid upon the Table.
the Member so elected, standing on the upper step, returns his humble acknowledgment to the House for the great honor they have been pleased to confer upon him, and thereupon sits down in the Chair; and then the Mace (which before lay under the Table) is laid upon the Table.
16. A Member, having then congratulated
Mr. Speaker elect is congratulated, and the House adjourns.
Mr. Speaker elect, moves that the House do now adjourn; and some other Member having also congratulated Mr. Speaker elect, the House accordingly adjourns till tomorrow.
17. Before the next meeting of the House,
Mr. Speaker presents himself to the Governor, who approves of the choice of the House.
Mr. Speaker elect, attended by his proposer and seconder, presents himself to the Governor for His Excellency's approbation; and the Governor signifies his approbation of the choice of the House.
18. Mr. Speaker then, on behalf of the
Mr. Speaker lays claim to the privileges of the House of Representatives.
House of Representatives of New Zealand, lays claim to all their privileges; and especially to freedom of speech in debate; and to free access to His Excellency whenever occasion may require it; and that the most favourable construction may be put on all their proceedings.
Mr. Speaker reports his approval.
19. The House being met, Mr. Speaker reports that he had waited upon the Governor, who had been pleased to approve of the choice the House had made of him to be their Speaker.
During the remaining term of the Parliament, Mr. Speaker holds a Commission, authorizing him to administer the Oath.
20. During the remaining term of the Parliament, the Speaker holds a Commission from the Governor authorizing him to administer the Oath to Members.
21. If any Member desire to be sworn in
Business interrupted to enable Member to take the Oath.
at any time, a debate or other business is interrupted, and he is called to the Table for that purpose.
New Members introduced.
22. New Members returned after a general election are introduced to the Table between two Members, and presented to Mr. Speaker.
Vacancy in the office of Speaker during a Session.
23. When the office of Speaker become vacant during a Session of Parliament, the House proceeds forthwith to the election on a new Speaker, according to the accustomed forms.
When Speaker does not claim privileges.
24. When the Speaker so elected is presented for the Governor's approbation, he does not lay claim to the privileges of the House.
Unavoidable absence of Speaker.
25. Whenever the House shall be informed by the Clerk at the Table of the unavoidable absence of Mr. Speaker, the Chairman-Chairman of Committees is to perform the duties and exercise the authority of Speaker in relation to all proceedings of the House, as Deputy-Speaker, until the next meeting of the House, and so on from day to day, on the like information being given to the House, until the House shall otherwise order; provided that if the House shall adjourn for more than twenty-four hours, the Deputy-Speaker shall continue to perform the duties and exercise the authority of Speaker for twenty-four hours only after such Adjournment.

II.—OPENING OF PARLIAMENT.

26. On being summoned to attend the
Mr. Speaker with the House, goes up to the Legislative Council.
Governor in the Council Chamber, Mr. Speaker, with the House, goes up there to hear the Governor's Speech.
27. Mr. Speaker and the House then
House retires, and adjourns during pleasure.
retire from the Council Chamber; and Mr. Speaker having taken the Chair, the House may then adjourn during pleasure.
28. Before the Governor's Speech is reported
A Bill read *pro forma*.
to the House by Mr. Speaker, some Bill is read a first time *pro formâ*.

29. Mr. Speaker reports that the House
Mr. Speaker reports the Governor's Speech.
had this day attended the Governor (or had been in the Council Chamber at the desire of the Commissioners for opening Parliament), and that His Excellency was pleased to make a Speech to both Houses of Parliament, or that the Commissioners had made a Speech to both Houses of Parliament, of which Mr. Speaker says he had, for greater accuracy, obtained a Copy, which he reads to the House.
Motion for an Address in answer.
30. The said Speech having been read, notice of a Motion for an Address to the Governor is given.
Select Committee appointed to draw up an Address.
31. The Resolution for presenting such Address having been agreed to by the House, with or without amendments, a Select Committee is appointed to draw up an Address to be presented to His Excellency upon the said Resolution; and His Excellency's Speech is referred to the said Committee.
Address reported and agreed to.
32. On the Address being reported by the said Committee, the House resolves to agree to the same, with or without amendments.
Address to be presented by the whole House.
33. The Address in reply to the Governor's Speech is ordered to be presented to the Governor by the whole House.
Governor's Speech to be taken into consideration.
34. The Governor's Speech (or the Speech of the Commissioners) is ordered to be taken into consideration on some future day.
Governor's Speech considered, and
35. The House, on the day appointed, according to order, proceeds to take the said Speech into consideration; and so much of the same as was addressed to the Members of the House of Representatives is again
Motion made that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty.
read by Mr. Speaker; and a Motion being made that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty, a Resolution is agreed to, that the House will to-morrow, or on a future day, resolve itself into Committee to consider that Motion.

III.—PROCEEDINGS ON THE PROROGATION AND FURTHER PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT.

36. When Parliament is to be prorogued
Prorogation by the Governor in person.
by the Governor, after a Session for despatch of business, a Message is brought from the Governor, desiring the attendance of the House. Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, with the House, goes up to the Chamber of the Legislative Council; and if there be any Money Bills awaiting the Royal Assent, Mr. Speaker, in presenting the same, addresses His Excellency concerning the Bills passed during the Session, after which the Royal assent is signified to such Money Bills and to any other Bills which have not yet received the Royal assent; and after a speech from the Governor, Parliament is then prorogued to a day named.
37. When Parliament is to be prorogued
Prorogation by Commission.
by Commission, after a Session for despatch of business, a Message is brought from the Commissioners, requesting the attendance of the House; and accordingly, Mr. Speaker, with the House, goes up to the Chamber of the Legislative Council, where the Commission is read, and the Royal assent is declared to such Acts (beginning with the Money Bills taken up by Mr. Speaker) as have not yet been assented to; and Parliament is then prorogued to a day named.
38. Other and further prorogations of Parliament
Farther prorogation.
are effected by Proclamations issued from time to time by the Governor in the *New Zealand Gazette*.

IV.—SITTING AND ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE.

Sitting Days of the House.

39. Unless otherwise ordered, the sitting days of the House are Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.
Hours of meeting.

40. Unless otherwise ordered, the House meets each day at half after Two o'clock p.m., and continues to sit

until half after Five o'clock (unless previously adjourned), when Mr. Speaker leaves the Chair, resuming it at half after Seven o'clock p.m.

Prayers.

41. On taking the Chair, Mr. Speaker reads the Prayer appointed by the House.

Doors closed during Prayers.

42. The doors of the House are closed during Prayers.

Notice of Prayers to be given to Committees.

43. The Sergeant-at-Arms is from time to time, when the House is going to Prayers, to give notice thereof to all Committees, and all proceedings of Committees, after such notice, are declared to be null and void.

House counted after Prayers.

44. After Prayers, Mr. Speaker counts the House; and unless he counts 20 Members,

Quorum.

inclusive of himself, no business is proceeded with; and he adjourns the House, without a Question first put, till the next sitting day.

House not counted when met according to Proclamation.

45. When the House meets for the despatch of business, pursuant to Proclamation by the Governor, the House is not counted.

House not counted when summoned to attend the Governor or the Commissioners.

46. When the attendance of the House in the Council Chamber is desired by His Excellency (or the Commissioners), the House is not counted; and on its return proceeds with business, although less than a Quorum be present, until notice be taken thereof.

47. If, after the business of the Session

House adjourned if 20 Members be not present.

has commenced, it appear at any time, on notice being taken, or on the report of a Division of the House by the Tellers, that 20 Members, inclusive of the Speaker, are not present, Mr. Speaker adjourns the House, without a Question first put, till the next sitting day.

48. If it appear, while the House is in

Quorum in Committee of the whole.

Committee of the whole, on notice being taken, or on the report of a Division, that 20 Members, inclusive of the Chairman, are not present, the Chairman of the Committee reports the same to Mr. Speaker; when Mr. Speaker counts the House, and if 20 Members, inclusive of himself, be not present, he adjourns the House, without a Question first put, till the next sitting day.

49. The doors of the House are unlocked

Doors open while House is counted.

whenever Mr. Speaker is engaged in counting the House.

50. Whenever Mr. Speaker is obliged to

Names of Members present inserted in Journals.

adjourn the House for want of a Quorum, the hour at which such adjournment is made, and the names of the Members then present are inserted in the Journals of the House.

51. If on the days on which Motions have

Debate on Motions adjourned at half after Five o'clock.

precedence, all Motions shall not have been disposed of when the House rises at half after Five o'clock, the Debate on any Motion under discussion is adjourned by Mr. Speaker, and the House on resuming at half after Seven o'clock proceeds to the Orders of the Day. If there be no Order of the Day, the discussion on Motions may be continued. The Debate on Motions may be resumed after the Orders of the Day are disposed of, on motion to that effect being put and carried.

Business not disposed of.

52. The business under discussion, and any other Motions not disposed of at the hour of going to the Orders of the Day, are set down in the Order Paper after the List of Motions for the next day on which the House shall sit.

No new business after half after twelve at night.

53. No Order of the Day or Notice of Motion shall be called on after half after Twelve o'clock at night.

House adjourns itself except in certain cases.

54. Except in the cases mentioned in Nos. 44, 47, and 48, when Mr. Speaker adjourns the House, without putting any Question, the House can only be adjourned by its own Resolution.

Strangers to be taken into custody if in parts of the House appropriated to Members.

55. The Sergeant-at-Arms is from time to time to take into his custody any stranger whom he may see, or who may be reported to him to be in any part of the House or Gallery appropriated to the Members of the

House, and also any stranger who, having been admitted into any part of the House or Gallery, shall misconduct himself, or shall not withdraw when strangers are directed to withdraw, while the House or any Committee of the whole House is sitting; and no person so taken into custody is to be discharged out of custody without the special order of the House.

56. No Member is to bring any stranger

No Member to bring a Stranger into such parts of the House.

into any part of the House or Gallery appropriated to the Members of the House while the House or a Committee of the whole House is sitting.

V.—ATTENDANCE AND PLACES OF MEMBERS.

57. Every Member is bound to attend the

Every Member to attend the Service of the House.

Service of the House, unless leave of absence be given to him by the House.

58. Notice is to be given of a Motion for

Notice to be given of Motions for Leave of Absence.

giving leave of absence to any Member, stating the cause and period of absence.

59. A Member is excused from service in

Members excused from Service.

the House or on any Committee so long as he has leave of absence.

60. Any Member having leave of absence

Leave of Absence forfeited.

forfeits the same by attending the service of the House before the expiration of such leave.

61. When an order is made that the

Calls of the House.

House be called over on a future day, Mr. Speaker shall cause Circular Letters or Telegrams to be forwarded to all the Members of the House requiring their attendance on that day. No order for a call of the House shall be made for any day earlier than seven days from the date of such order.

62. When the Order of the Day for calling

Order in which Names are called.

over the House is read, the names of the Members are called over by the Clerk alphabetically.

Members not present but subsequently attending.

63. The names of all Members who do not answer when called are taken down by the Clerk, and are subsequently called over a second time; when those who answer, or afterwards attend in their places on the same day, are ordinarily excused.

Members not attending.

64. Members not attending in their places are dealt with for their default, as the House may think fit.

Entering and leaving the House.

65. Every Member is to be uncovered when he enters or leaves the House, or moves to any other part of the House, and is to make obeisance to the Chair in passing to or from his seat.

Members leaving their Seats.

66. No Member is to pass between the Chair and any member who is speaking.

Members not to read Newspaper, &c.

67. No Member is to read any newspaper, book, or letter in his place.

VI.—ORDERS OF THE DAY AND NOTICES OF MOTION: MOTIONS AND QUESTIONS.

Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions.

68. The ordinary business of each day consists of Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions.

Orders of the Day defined.

69. An Order of the Day is a Bill, or other matter, which the House has ordered to be taken into consideration on a particular day.

Orders of the Day on Tuesdays and Fridays.

70. Unless the House shall otherwise direct, Orders of the Day for Tuesdays and Fridays are to be disposed of before the House will proceed upon any Motions of which Notice shall have been given.

71. When the House proceeds to the

Clerk to read the Orders of the Day without Question being put.

Orders of the Day, on days on which Orders have precedence, and after the Notices of Motion have been disposed of on all other days, or on the House resuming at half after Seven o'clock, as the case may be, Mr. Speaker is to direct the Clerk at the Table to read the Orders of the Day, without any Question being put.

72. The Orders of the Day are to be disposed

Government Orders to have precedence on certain Days.

of in the order in which they stand upon the Paper; the right being reserved to Ministers of placing Government business at the head of the list, in the rotation in which it is to be taken, on the days (Tuesdays and Fridays) on which Government business has precedence; but such business, if not disposed of on those days, shall revert to that position on the Order Paper which it would have occupied if it had not been advanced as Government business.

73. All dropped Orders of the Days are to

Dropped Orders.

be set down in the Order Book after the Orders of the Day for the next day on which the House shall sit.

74. The House proceeds each day with: 1.

Order of Business.

Private Business; 2. Public Petitions; 3. Giving Notices of Motion; 4. Motions for Leave of Absence; 5.

Questions and unopposed Motions for Returns; 6. Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions, as set down in the Order Paper. Notices of Motion for unopposed Returns and for Leave to Introduce Bills are called out of their turn before the commencement of the regular business of the day.

Questions to Ministers or other Members.

75. Before the Public Business is entered upon, Questions are permitted to be put to Ministers of the Crown relating to public affairs; and to other Members relating to any Bill, Motion, or other public matter connected with the business of the House, in which such Members may be concerned.

Such Questions not to involve argument.

76. In putting any such Question, no argument or opinion is to be offered, nor any facts stated, except so far as may be necessary to explain such Question.

In answering a Question, the matter not to be debated.

77. In answering any such Question, a Member is not to debate the matter to which the same refers.

Notices of Motion.

78. Every Member, in giving Notice of Motion, is to deliver at the Table a copy of such Notice fairly written, together with his name, and the day proposed for bringing on such Motion.

Notices may be given for absent Members.

79. A Member may give notice for any other Member not then present.

Restrictions upon Notices.

80. No notice may be given for any day beyond the period which shall include the four days next following on which notices are entitled to precedence; due allowance being made for any intervening adjournment of the House, and the period being in that case so far extended as to include four notice days falling during the sitting of the House.

81. Notices of Motions take precedence

Notice take precedence on Wednesdays and Thursdays.

of Orders of the Day on Wednesdays and Thursdays, unless the House shall have otherwise directed.

82. Any Notice containing unbecoming

Notices may be expunged.

expressions will be liable to be expunged from the Notice Paper by Order of the Speaker.

83. A Member desiring to change the day

Notices postponed.

for bringing on a Motion may give notice of such Motion for any day subsequent to that first named, subject to the same rules as other Notices of Motions.

84. After a Notice of Motion has been

The terms may be altered.

given, the terms thereof may be altered by the Member, on delivering at the Table an amended Notice.

85. Motions will have precedence on each

Precedence of Motions.

day according to the order in which the Notices for the same were given.

86. An urgent Motion, directly concerning

Questions of Privilege.

Privileges of the House, will take precedence of other Motions, as well as of Orders of the Day.

87. Precedence is ordinarily given by

Vote of Thanks.

courtesy to a Motion for a Vote of the Thanks of the House.

88. A Motion may be made, by consent
Motions without notice.

of the House, without previous notice.

89. When a Motion has been made and
Questions proposed.

seconded, a Question thereupon is proposed to the House by Mr. Speaker.

90. Any Motion not seconded may not
Motions not seconded.

be further debated, but is forthwith dropped, and no entry thereof is made in the Journals.
Motions withdrawn.

91. A Member who has made a Motion may withdraw the same by leave of the House, such leave being
granted without any negative voice.

Questions superseded:

92. A Question may be superseded: 1

1. By adjournment;

By the Adjournment of the House, either on the Motion of a Member, "That this House do *now* adjourn," or
on notice being taken, and it appearing, that a Quorum is

2. By reading the Orders of the Day;

not present; 2. By a Motion, "That the Orders of the Day be now read," which Motion, however, is
restricted to days on which Notices have precedence of Orders of

3. By Previous Question;

the Day; 3. By the Previous Question, viz., "That this Question be now put," being

4. By Amendment.

proposed and negatived; and, 4. By Amendment.

Previous Questions resolved in the affirmative.

93. If the Previous Question be resolved in the affirmative, the Original Question is to be put forthwith,
without any amendment or debate.

Previous Questions, &c., superseded by adjournment.

94. A Question for reading the Orders of the Day, and also "the Previous Question," may be superseded by
the adjournment of the House.

Debates interrupted.

95. The Debate upon a Question may be interrupted: 1. By a matter of Privilege suddenly arising; 2. By
words of heat between Members; 3. By Question of Order; 4. By a Message from the Governor or his
Commissioners; 5. By an Answer to an Address; 6. By a Message from the Legislative Council; 7. By the time
being come for a Conference; 8. By a Member appearing to be sworn; 9. By the swearing of an Election
Committee; 10. By a Motion for the Adjournment of an Election Committee, under s. 28 of "The Election
Petitions Act, 1858"; 11. By a Motion for reading an Act of Parliament, an entry in the Journal, or other public
document, relevant to the Question before the House; 12. By a Motion that Strangers be ordered to withdraw.

96. The House may order a complicated

Complicated Questions may be divided.

Question to be divided.

97. So soon as the Debate upon a Question

Question "put" and again stated.

is concluded, Mr. Speaker *puts* the Question to the House; and if the same should not be heard, will again
state it to the House.

98. A Question being put is resolved in

Question determined by a majority of voices.

the affirmative or negative by the majority of voices, "Aye" or "No."

99. Mr. Speaker states whether, in his

Mr. Speaker states whether Ayes or Noes have it.

opinion, the "Ayes" or the "Noes" "have it," and unless his opinion be acquiesced in by the minority, the
Question is determined by a Division.

100. No Question or Amendment may be

Same Question not to be proposed again.

proposed which is the same in substance as any Question which, during the same Session, has been
resolved in the affirmative or negative.

101. A Motion which has been, by leave
A Motion withdrawn may be made again.
of the House, withdrawn, may be made again during the same Session.
Resolution or Vote rescinded.
102. A Resolution or other Vote of the House may be read and rescinded.
An Order discharged.
103. An Order of the House may be read and discharged.

VII.—AMENDMENTS TO QUESTIONS.

Different forms of Amendment.

104. A Question having been proposed, may be amended by leaving out certain words only; by leaving out certain words in order to insert or add other words; or by inserting or adding words.

Amendments to be seconded.

105. An Amendment proposed, but not seconded, will not be entertained by the House, nor entered in the Journals.

Amendment to leave out words.

106. When the proposed Amendment is to leave out certain words, Mr. Speaker puts a Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," which is resolved by the House in the affirmative or negative, as the case may be.

Amendment to save out words, and insert or add others.

107. When the proposed Amendment is to leave out certain words, in order to insert or add other words, Mr. Speaker puts a Question that the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question; which, if resolved in the affirmative, disposes of the Amendment; but if in the negative, another Question is put, that the words of the Amendment be inserted or added instead thereof, which is resolved in the affirmative or negative, as the case may be.

108. When the proposed Amendment is

Amendment to insert or add words.

to insert or add certain words, Mr. Speaker puts a question that such words be inserted or added, which is resolved in the affirmative or negative, as the case may be.

109. No Amendment may be proposed in

When later part of a Question has been amended, or proposed to be amended.

any part of a Question after a later part has been amended, or has been proposed to be amended, unless a proposed Amendment has been, by leave of the House, withdrawn.

110. No Amendment may be proposed to

No Amendment to be made to words already agreed to.

be made to any words which the House has resolved shall stand part of a Question, or shall be inserted in or added to a Question, except the addition of other words thereto.

111. A proposed Amendment may be, by

Proposed Amendment withdrawn.

leave of the House, withdrawn.

112. Amendments may be proposed to a

Amendments to proposed Amendments.

proposed Amendment whenever it comes to a Question whether the House shall agree to such proposed Amendment.

113. When Amendments have been made,

Questions as amended put.

the main question, as amended, is put.

114. When Amendments have been proposed,

When Amendments proposed but not made.

but not made, the Question is put as originally proposed.

VIII.—RULES OF DEBATE.

115. Every Member desiring to speak is

Members to address Mr. Speaker.

to rise in his place uncovered, and to address himself to Mr. Speaker.

116. By the special indulgence of the

Indulgence to Members unable to stand.

House, a Member, unable conveniently to stand, by reason of sickness or infirmity, will be permitted to speak sitting and uncovered.

Speaking to Order during a Division.

117. Members can only speak to a point of Order, while the House is dividing, by permission of the Speaker, and while speaking, are to sit covered.

No Member to speak after a Question has been "put."

118. No Member may speak to any Question after the same has been put by Mr. Speaker, and the voices having been given in the affirmative and negative thereon.

Mr. Speaker calls upon Members to speak.

119. When two or more Members rise to speak, Mr. Speaker calls upon the Member who first rose in his place.

Motion that a Member "be now heard."

120. A Motion may be made that any Member who has risen "be now heard," or "do now speak."

Members to speak to the Question.

121. A Member may speak to any Question before the House, or upon a Question or Amendment to be proposed by himself, or upon a Question of order arising out of the Debate; but not otherwise.

Personal explanation.

122. By the indulgence of the House, a Member may explain matters of a personal nature, although there is no question before the House; but such matters may not be debated.

No Member to speak twice.

123. No Member may speak twice to a Question, except in explanation or reply, or in Committees of the whole House.

Except to explain his words.

124. A Member who has spoken to a Question may again be heard to explain himself in regard to some material part of his speech, but is not to introduce any new matter.

125. A reply is allowed to a Member who

Or to reply in certain cases.

has made a substantive Motion to the House, but not to any Member who has moved an Amendment, the "previous Question," or any Instruction to a Committee.

126. Any Member may rise to speak "to

Speaking "to Order."

Order," or upon a matter of Privilege suddenly arising.

127. No Member is to allude to any Debate

Debates of same Session not to be alluded to.

of the same Session, upon a Question or Bill not being then under discussion, except by the indulgence of the House, for personal explanations.

128. No Member may reflect upon any

Reflections upon Votes of the House.

Vote of the House, except for the purpose of moving that such Vote be rescinded.

129. No Member may allude to any

Allusion to Debates in the other House.

Debate in the other House of Parliament.

130. No Member may use offensive words

Offensive Words against either House.

against either House of Parliament, nor against any statute, unless for the purpose of moving for its repeal.

131. No Member may refer to any other

No Member to be referred to by "Name"

Member by *Name*.

132. No Member may use offensive or

Offensive Words against Members

unbecoming words in reference to any Member of the House.

133. When any Member objects to words

Words taken down by direction of Mr. Speaker.

used in debate, and desires them to be taken down, Mr. Speaker, if it appear to be the pleasure of the House, will direct them to be taken down by the Clerk accordingly.

134. In a Committee of the whole House

Words taken down in Committee.

the Chairman, if it appear to be the pleasure of the Committee, will direct words objected to to be taken down, in order that the same may be reported to the House.

Words to be objected to when used.

135. Every such objection is to be taken at the time when such words are used, and not after any other Member has spoken.

Members not explaining or retracting.

136. Any Member having used objectionable words, and not explaining or retracting the same, or offering apologies for the use thereof to the satisfaction of the House, will be censured, or otherwise dealt with as the House may think fit.

House will prevent quarrels.

137. The House will interfere to prevent the prosecution of any quarrel between Members arising out of Debates or proceedings of the House, or any Committee thereof.

No noise or interruption to be allowed during a Debate.

138. No Member of this House is to presume to make any noise or disturbance whilst any Member is orderly debating, or whilst any Bill, Order, or other matter is being read or opened; and in any case of such noise or disturbance, Mr. Speaker is to call upon the Member by name making such disturbance; and every such person will incur the displeasure and censure of the House.

Rules of Debate in Committee.

139. The several rules for maintaining order in Debate are to be observed in every Committee of the whole House.

Order maintained by Mr. Speaker, and Chairman of Committee.

140. Order is maintained in the House by Mr. Speaker, and in a Committee of the whole House by the Chairman of such Committee; but disorder in Committee can only be censured by the House on receiving a Report thereof.

141. Whenever Mr. Speaker rises during

When Mr. Speaker rises. House to be silent.

a Debate, any Member then speaking, or offering to speak, is to sit down, and the House is to be silent, so that Mr. Speaker may be heard without interruption.

142. Every Member against whom any

Member to withdraw while his conduct is under debate.

charge has been made, having been heard in his place, is to withdraw while such charge is under Debate.

IX.—DIVISIONS.

143. Every Member present in the House

Every Member present must vote.

when the Question is put will be required to vote; and in case he should not have heard the Question put, Mr. Speaker will again state it to him.

144. When a Division is called for, the

Doors not to be closed until two minutes after Division called for.

Clerk is to turn a two-minute sand-glass, kept on the Table for that purpose, and the doors are not to be closed until after the lapse of two minutes, as indicated by such sand-glass.

145. The doors are to be closed so soon

Doors to be closed after the lapse of two minutes.

after the lapse of two minutes as the Speaker or the Chairman of a Committee of the whole House shall think proper to direct.

146. When the doors have been locked,

Mr. Speaker puts the Question, and appoints two Tellers for each party.

and all the Members are in their places, Mr. Speaker puts the Question, and after the voices have been given, declares whether, in his opinion, the "Ayes" or the "Noes" "have it;" which, not being agreed to, he directs the "Ayes" to pass to the right and the "Noes" to the left, and appoints two Tellers for each party.

If not two Tellers, no Division allowed.

147. In case there should not be two Tellers for one of the parties, Mr. Speaker forthwith declares the resolution of the House.

Members counted, and their names taken down.

148. Every Member is counted by the Tellers, and his name is also taken down.

Tellers report the Numbers.

149. When all the Members have resumed their places, the Tellers on either side come to the Table and

report the numbers to Mr. Speaker, who declares them to the House.

In case of error, House again Divides.

150. In case of confusion or error concerning the numbers reported, unless the same can be otherwise corrected, the House will proceed to a second Division.

Mistakes corrected in Journals.

151. If the numbers have been inaccurately reported, the House, on being afterwards informed thereof, will order the Journals to be corrected.

Where Votes equal, Mr. Speaker gives casting voice.

152. In case of an equality of Votes, Mr. Speaker gives a casting voice, and any reasons stated by him are entered in the Journals.

Division Lists printed in Journals.

153. The names of Members who have voted on Divisions are entered in the Journals.

Divisions in Committee.

154. Divisions are taken in a Committee of the whole House in the same manner as in the House itself.

No Member to vote if personally interested.

155. No Member is entitled to vote upon any Question in which he has a direct pecuniary interest, either in the House or Committee; and the vote of any Member so interested will be disallowed.

X.—COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE HOUSE.

156. A Committee of the whole House

House resolves itself into a Committee.

is appointed by a Resolution "That this House will resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House."

157. When such a Resolution has been

Mr. Speaker leaves the Chair.

agreed to, or an Order of the Day read for the House to resolve itself into Committee, Mr. Speaker puts a Question "That I do now leave the Chair," which being agreed to, he leaves the Chair accordingly.

158. When a Bill or other matter (except

When Committee has reported Progress.

Supply or Ways and Means) has been partly considered in Committee, and the Chairman has been directed to report Progress and ask leave to sit again, and the House has ordered that the Committee shall sit again on a particular day, Mr. Speaker, when the Order for the Committee has been read, is forthwith to leave the Chair without putting any Question, and the House thereupon resolves itself into such Committee.

159. So soon as Mr. Speaker has left the

The Mace is placed under the Table.

Chair, the Mace is placed under the Table, and the Chairman takes the Chair of the Committee at the Table.

160. The Chair is ordinarily taken by the

Chair taken by Chairman of Committees.

Chairman of Committees.

In case of difference, House appoints Chairman.

161. If any difference should arise in Committee concerning the election of a Chairman, Mr. Speaker resumes the Chair, and a Chairman is appointed by the House.

Committee to consider matters referred.

162. A Committee may consider such matters only as have been referred to them by the House. [See also No. 201.]

Questions decided by a majority.

163. Every Question in Committee is decided by a majority of voices; and, in case of an equality of voices, the Chairman gives a casting voice.

A Motion is not seconded.

164. A Motion made in Committee is not seconded.

"Previous Question" not allowed.

165. No Motion for the Previous Question can be made in Committee.

Members may speak more than once.

166. In Committee, Members may speak more than once to the same Question.

Order in Debate.

167. The same order in Debate is to be observed as in the House itself.

Disorder arising.

168. If any sudden disorder should arise in Committee, Mr. Speaker will resume the Chair, without any

Question being put.

Mr. Speaker resumes the Chair in certain Cases.

169. Mr. Speaker will also resume the Chair if the time be come for holding a Conference with the Council, or if a Message be brought to attend the Governor, or the Commissioners, in the Council Chamber.

When 20 Members not present.

170. If notice be taken, or it appear upon a Division in Committee that 20 Members inclusive of the Chairman are not present, the Chairman leaves the Chair, and Mr. Speaker resumes the Chair.

House counted by Mr. Speaker.

171. If there be 20 Members inclusive of himself when the House is counted by Mr. Speaker, the House again resolves itself into the Committee of the whole House.

172. When all the matters referred to

Report.

a Committee have been considered, the Chairman is directed to report the same to the House.

173. When all such matters have not

Report of Progress.

been considered, the Chairman is directed to report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.

174. A Motion may be made during the

Motion to report Progress

proceedings of a Committee, that the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.

175. A Motion, that the Chairman do now

Motion that the Chairman do now leave the Chair.

leave the Chair, will, if carried, supersede the further proceedings of a Committee.

176. Every Report from a Committee of

Report to be brought up without Question.

the whole House is to be brought up without any Question being put.

177. The Resolutions reported from a

Resolutions of Committee.

Committee are read a first and second time, and are agreed to or disagreed to by the House, or agreed to with Amendments, or recommitted to the Committee, or the further consideration thereof postponed.

XI.—SELECT COMMITTEES.

178. No Select Committee shall consist of

Committee to consist of not less than Five nor more than Ten Members.

less than Five or of more than Ten Members, without leave from the House, on Motion with notice.

179. Every Member intending to move

Notice of Nomination to be given.

for the appointment of a Select Committee is to place on his Notice the Names of the Members intended to be proposed by him to be Members of such Committee.

List, of Members serving.

180. Lists are to be posted in some conspicuous place in the Clerk's Office, and in the Lobby of the House, of all Members serving on each Select Committee.

Names of Members asking Questions to be entered in Minutes.

181. To every Question asked of Witness under examination, in the Proceedings of any Select Committee, is to be prefixed in the Minutes of the Evidence the Name of the Member asking such Question.

Names of Members present.

182. The Names of the Members present each day on the sitting of any Select Committee are to be entered on the Minutes of Evidence, or on the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committee (as the case may be), and reported to the House on the Report of such Committee.

Divisions to be entered.

183. In the event of any Division taking place in any Select Committee, the Question proposed, the Name of the Proposer, and the respective Votes thereupon of each Member present, are to be entered on the Minutes of Evidence, or on the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committee (as the case may be), and reported to the House on the Report of such Committee.

When Quorum not present.

184. If, at any time during the sitting of a Select Committee of this House, the Quorum of Members fixed by the House be not present, the Clerk of the Committee is to call the attention of the Chairman to the fact, who is thereupon to suspend the Proceedings of the Committee until a Quorum be present, or to adjourn the

Committee to some future day.

185. Members may be afterwards discharged

Members discharged and added.

from attending a Select Committee; and other Members appointed after previous notice given.

186. The House appoints the Quorum of

Quorum appointed by House.

each Committee; and where no Quorum is appointed, all the Members are to attend.

187. The Quorum of a Joint Committee

Quorum of a Joint Committee

shall consist of Three Members of each House.

188. Whenever it may be necessary, the

Power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

House gives a Committee power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

189. When a Committee is examining

Admission of Strangers to Committees.

Witnesses, it admits or excludes Strangers at its pleasure; but always excludes them when deliberating.

190. Members of the House may be

When Members of the House may be present.

present when a Committee is examining witnesses; but withdraw, by courtesy, when the Committee is deliberating.

191. No strangers or Members, not being

Secret Committees.

of the Committee, are admitted at any time to a Secret Committee.

192. The Chairman of a Select Committee

When Chairman votes.

an only Vote when there is an equality of voices.

193. A Select Committee may adjourn

Committee adjourns.

from time to time, and, by leave of the House, from place to place.

Not to sit during sitting of the House without leave.

194. Except by leave of the House, no Select Committee may sit during the sitting of the House.

Evidence, &c., not to be published until reported.

195. The Evidence taken by any Select Committee of this House, and Documents presented to such Committee, and which have not been reported to this House, ought not; to be published by any Member of such Committee, nor by any other person.

Copies of Evidence delivered to Members of Committee only.

196. Proof copies of the Evidence shall be distributed to Members of the Committee only.

Report from time to time.

197. By leave of the House, a Committee may report its opinions or observations from time to time, or report the Minutes of Evidence only, or Proceedings, from time to time.

Day fixed for bringing up Report.

198. On the appointment of every Select Committee, a day shall be fixed for the bringing up of their Report; on which, or on some earlier day, their final Report shall be brought up, unless further time be previously moved for and granted.

Report brought up.

199. The Report of a Committee is brought up by the Chairman, and is ordered to lie on the Table of the House, and may, on Questions put and passed, be read, and ordered to be printed, or is otherwise dealt with as the House may direct.

Powers of Committees limited to reporting opinions to the House.

200. Committees have only power to report their opinions to the House. If it is desired by a Committee that the Government should take action in any matter connected with their proceedings or on their Report, the Chairman should be instructed to move in the House to that effect.

XII.—INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMITTEES.

201. An Instruction empowers a Committee

Effect of an Instruction.

of the whole House to consider matters not otherwise referred to them.

202. It is an Instruction to all Committees

Committees on Bills to make Amendments relevant to subject-matter.

of the whole House to whom Bills may be committed, that they have power to make such Amendments therein as they shall think fit, provided they be relevant to the subject-matter of the Bill; but that if any such Amendments shall not be within the Title of the Bill, they do amend the Title accordingly, and do report the same specially to the House.

203. An Instruction to a Committee on

What Instructions may not be moved.

a Bill empowers the Committee to make provision therein; and may not be moved, if they already have power to make such provision.

204. An Instruction should ordinarily be

When to be moved.

moved after the Order of the Day has been read, and not as an Amendment to the Question that Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair.

205. An Instruction to a Select Committee

Instruction to a Select Committee.

extends or restricts the Order of Reference.

XIII.—WITNESSES.

Summoned by Order of the House.

206. Witnesses are summoned by the House in order to be examined at the Bar of the House, or before a Committee of the whole House, or a Select Committee, by Orders of the House signed by the Clerk.

Witness in custody.

207. Where a Witness is in the custody of the Keeper of any Prison, such Keeper is ordered to bring the Witness, in safe custody, in order to his being examined, and so from time to time as often as his attendance shall be thought necessary; and Mr. Speaker is ordered to issue his Warrant accordingly.

Summoned by Committees.

208. A Committee having power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records, summons Witnesses by its own Orders, signed by the Chairman.

When Witness does not attend a Committee.

209. If any Witness should not attend, pursuant to the Order of a Committee, his absence is reported, and the House orders him to attend the House; but such Order is usually discharged in case the Witness shall have attended the Committee before the time appointed for his attending the House.

Neglect or refusal to attend.

210. In any case, the neglect or refusal of a Witness to attend in obedience to an Order of the House, or of a Committee having power to summon Witnesses, or in obedience to a Warrant of Mr. Speaker, will be censured or otherwise punished, at the pleasure of the House.

211. When the attendance of a Member

Attendance of Members to be examined

is desired, to be examined by the House, or a Committee of the whole House, he is ordered to attend in his place.

212. If a Committee desire the attendance

By a Committee

of a Member as a Witness, the Chairman writes to request him to attend.

213. If any Member of the House refuse,

If Members refuse to attend

upon being sent for, to come to give evidence or information as a Witness to a Committee, the Committee ought to acquaint the House therewith, and not summon such Member to attend the Committee.

214. If any information come before any

Committee to acquaint House of charges against Members

Committee that chargeth any Member of the House, the Committee ought only to direct that the House be acquainted with the matter of such information, without proceeding further thereupon.

215. When the attendance of a Member

Message for attendance of Legislative Councillors

of the Legislative Council, or of one of its Officers, is desired, to be examined by the House, or any Committee thereof (not being a Committee on a Private Bill), a Message is sent to the Legislative Council requesting it to give leave to such Member or Officer to attend, in order to his being examined accordingly

upon the matters stated in such Message.

216. Witnesses may be examined by the

Witnesses examined pursuant to Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865

House, or any Committee thereof, pursuant to" The Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865."

217. If it shall appear that any person

Tampering with Witnesses

hath been tampering with any Witness, in respect of his evidence to be given to this House, or any Committee thereof, or directly or indirectly hath endeavoured to deter or hinder any person from appearing or giving evidence, the same is declared to be a high crime and misdemeanour; and this House will proceed with the utmost severity against such offender.

False evidence

218. If it shall appear that any person hath given false evidence in any case before this House, or any Committee thereof, this House will proceed with the utmost severity against such offender.

Witnesses entitled to protection

219. All witnesses examined before this House, or any Committee thereof, are entitled to the protection of this House in respect of anything that may be said by them in their evidence.

Evidence of proceedings not to be given without leave

220. No Clerk or Officer of this House, or short-hand writer employed to take Minutes of Evidence before this House, or any Committee thereof, may give evidence elsewhere, in respect of any proceedings or examination had at the Bar, or before any Committee of this House, without the special leave of the House.

What corrections may be made in evidence of Witnesses

221. When the evidence of a Witness examined before a Select Committee is taken down in short-hand and ordered to be printed, a copy of his own examination is sent to each Witness for his revision, with an instruction that he can only make verbal corrections—as corrections in substance can only be effected by re-examination. The corrected copy signed by the Witness should be returned without delay to the Committee Clerk, who will submit it to the Chairman, and if the corrections are approved by him it will be retained by the Clerk as record copy of the evidence.

222. When a Witness is to be examined

Examined by the House

by the House, Mr. Speaker conducts the examination, the Mace being on the Table; and any questions addressed by Members are taken to be put through Mr. Speaker.

223. In Committee of the whole House,

By Committee of the Whole House

any Member may put questions directly to the Witness.

224. When a Witness is in custody at the

Witness in custody

Bar, the Mace being on the Serjeant's shoulder, he is examined by Mr. Speaker alone, and no Member is to speak.

225. If any question be objected to, or

Witness withdraws if question objected to

other matter arise, the Witness is ordered to withdraw, while the same is under discussion.

226. A Member of the House is examined

Member examined in his place

in his place.

227. Legislative Councillors and Judges

Legislative Councillors and Judges, how examined

are introduced by the Sergeant, and have chairs placed for them within the Bar.

XIV.—MESSAGES BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES.

228. Bills and Messages from the Legislative

Messages from Legislative Council, how received

Council may be received from any Member of the Council by the Speaker in full House, or at the Bar of the House by a Clerk of the House, through a Clerk of the Council.

How communicated to the Legislative Council

229. The Clerk of The House of Representatives may communicate Messages to the Clerk of the Legislative Council, at the Bar of the Council, in order that they may be communicated to the Speaker at the earliest opportunity, without interrupting the public business. But Messages may also be sent by any Members

named thereto by the House. Messages from one House to the other shall be in writing, and may be communicated by the Clerk-Assistant of each House respectively, unless the House transmitting the Message shall otherwise direct.

Message communicated by Mr. Speaker

230. So soon as any business proceeding when a Message from the Legislative Council is received has been disposed of, Mr. Speaker communicates such Message to the House.

XV.—CONFERENCES.

Matters communicated at a Conference

231. The House may communicate Matters to the Council, or have Matters communicated by the latter at a Conference.

Conference desired by Message.

232. A Conference is desired by Message.

Subject to be stated.

233. In desiring a Conference, the subject-matter thereof is to be stated.

Conferences.

234. When a Conference is desired on a Bill, in consequence of Amendments made by the Legislative Council being objected to by the House of Representatives, the Message desiring the Conference shall specify the Amendments objected to, and the reasons for such objections.

235. In cases in which the Legislative

Reasons may be communicated by Message

Council disagrees to any Amendments made by the House of Representatives, or insists on any Amendments to which the House has disagreed, the House of Representatives is willing to receive the reasons of the Legislative Council for its disagreeing or insisting, as the case may be, by Message without a Conference, unless at any time the Legislative Council should desire to communicate the same at a Conference.

236. Any Message from the Legislative

Message, when considered

Council desiring a Conference, or giving reasons for disagreeing to Amendments made by the House of Representatives, or insisting on Amendments to which the House has disagreed, shall, on motion without notice, be taken into consideration by the House, either immediately or on a future day to be appointed for considering the same.

237. It is the sole duty of the Managers of

Duties of Managers

the one House to read and deliver to the Managers of the other House the resolutions of the other House on Bills, with reasons for insisting upon Amendments, or disagreements to Amendments, or otherwise.

238. After two Conferences, or Messages

Free Conferences

without Conferences in the place of Conferences, a Free Conference may be desired, at which the difference between the two Houses may be discussed.

Report from a Free Conference, when considered

239. After a Free Conference the Managers shall bring up a Report, which shall, on motion without notice, be taken into consideration by the House, either immediately or on a future day to be appointed for considering the same.

Agreed to by Message

240. When a Conference is agreed to, such Agreement is communicated by Message.

Council appoints time and place

241. The Council appoints the time and place for every Conference.

Managers

242. The Managers are named by the House.

Names of Managers called over

243. The time for holding a Conference being come, the names of the Managers are called over, and they repair to the Conference Chamber.

Conferences may be held, although neither House sitting

244. Conferences between the two Houses may be held, although neither the House of Representatives nor the Legislative Council shall be sitting at the time.

XVI.—MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNOR.

Message from the Governor

245. Whenever a written Message from the Governor shall be announced, the business before the House shall be immediately suspended, and the bearer of the Message introduced into the body of the House, to deliver the Message to Mr. Speaker.

To be read, and time fixed for its consideration

246. Mr. Speaker shall, unless a previous Message be then under consideration, immediately read the Message to the House, when, if necessary, a time shall be fixed for taking the same into consideration.

247. A Message in writing from the Governor

Message in writing from the Governor, how brought
is brought to the House by a Minister of the Crown, being a Member.

248. During the reading of a Message

Members uncovered during reading
from the Governor, Members remain uncovered.

249. A verbal Message from the Governor

Verbal Message from the Governor.
is communicated to the House by a Minister of the Crown, being a Member.

250. The recommendation or consent of

Recommendation of the Governor, how signified
the Governor to any Motion or Bill is signified to the House by a Minister of the Crown, being a Member.

XVII.—ADDRESSES TO THE GOVERNOR.

251. Addresses to the Governor are presented

Addresses to the Governor, how presented
by the whole House, or by such Members as the House may name for that purpose.

252. When an Address is presented by

When Address presented by the whole House
the whole House, Mr. Speaker, with the House, proceeds to His Excellency's residence, and being introduced, Mr. Speaker reads the Address to His Excellency, the Members who moved and seconded such Address being on his left hand.

253. The concurrence of one House in an

Concurrence of Houses signified by Message
Address communicated by the other is signified by Message.

Joint Addresses

254. Joint Addresses of both Houses are presented to the Governor by both Houses, or in such other manner as may be agreed upon.

Legislative Council learns His Excellency's pleasure

255. The Legislative Council learns His Excellency's pleasure when he will receive a Joint Address, and communicates the same to the House of Representatives.

Form of presenting Joint Address

256. When a Joint Address is presented to the Governor by both Houses, the Speaker and Members of the Council, and Mr. Speaker, with this House, proceeds to His Excellency's residence, and being admitted to the Governor's presence, the Speaker of the Council (with Mr. Speaker on his left hand) reads the Address to the Governor.

Governor's answer reported by Mr. Speaker

257. The Governor's answer to any Address presented by the whole House is reported by Mr. Speaker.

Or, by one of the Members who presented the Address

258. The Governor's answer to any Address presented otherwise than by the whole House, is reported to the House by one of the Members who presented the Address.

XVIII.—PUBLIC PETITIONS.

Time for presenting Petitions

259. No Petition shall be presented during any Debate, nor after the House shall have proceeded to Motions or Orders of the Day, unless it be a Petition referring to the Question before the House, which may be received immediately upon the reading of the Order of the Day or Notice of Motion.

260. Every Petition is to be fairly written,

Petition to be written, lithographed, or printed

lithographed, or printed.

261. Signatures to every printed or lithographed Petition are to be written or properly

Signatures to be written

attested, as provided by Standing Order 266.

262. No printed or lithographed Petition

No erasure or interlineation in printed or lithographed Petition

will be received if it contains any erasure or interlineation.

263. Every erasure or interlineation in a

How erasures or interlineations may be made in written petition

written Petition must be signed or initialed at each end of such erasure or interlineation by the person or persons signing the Petition, and all such erasures or interlineations must be indorsed and duly signed and attested on the back of every such Petition by the Petitioner or Petitioners.

264. Every Petition is to be signed at

To be signed on the same skin

least by one person on each skin or sheet on which the Petition is written, printed, or lithographed.

265. Every Petition is to be written,

To be in English or Maori.

printed, or lithographed in the English or Maori language; and every Maori Petition shall be translated by a Maori Translator appointed by the Speaker from time to time for that purpose before it shall be presented to the House.

266. Every Petition is to be signed by the

To be signed by the parties

persons whose names are appended thereto, except in the case of incapacity or sickness; and in that case the signature or signatures must be witnessed by at least two persons.

267. The signatures are required to be

Signatures not to be transferred

written upon the Petition itself, and not pasted upon or otherwise transferred thereto.

Common seals of Corporations

268. Petitions of Corporations aggregate are required to be under their common seal; or in the case of bodies incorporated elsewhere than within the colony, then under the hand of duly authorized attorneys of such Corporations.

No letters, affidavits, &c., to be attached

269. No letters, affidavits, or other documents may be attached to any Petition.

Debates not to be referred to

270. No reference may be made in a Petition to any Debate in Parliament, nor to any intended Motion, unless notice of such Motion shall have been duly given and printed in the Order Paper.

Petitions for compounding debts to the Crown

271. This House will not receive any Petition for compounding any sum of money owing to the Crown upon any branch of the revenue, without a certificate from the proper officer or officers annexed to the said Petition, stating the debt, what prosecutions have been made for the recovery of such debt, and setting forth how much the Petitioner and his security are able to satisfy thereof.

Forgery of signatures

272. It is highly unwarrantable, and a breach of the privileges of this House, for any person to set the name of any other person to any Petition to be presented to this House, except as provided in Standing Order 269.

Members to affix their names

273. Every Member presenting a Petition to the House is to affix his name at the beginning thereof.

274. Every Member presenting a Petition

Members to peruse Petitions

is to take care that the same is in conformity with the Rules and Orders of The House.

275. Every Petition is to be respectful,

Petitions to be respectful

decorous, and temperate in its language.

276. Petitions in the nature of Election

Petitions in the nature of Election Petitions

Petitions will not be received unless the forms required by the Election Petitions Act have been complied with, the same being certified by the proper officer.

277. Every Election Petition shall be presented

Time for presenting Election Petitions

to the House within fourteen days from the commencement of the Session, unless when the Member petitioned against shall have been elected during the Session, and then within thirty days next after his election.

278. Petitions can only be presented to

Petitions presented by Members

the House by a Member.

279. A Member cannot present a Petition

Petitions from Members

from himself.

280. Every Member offering to present a

Members confined to statements of certain facts

Petition to the House, not being a Petition for a Private Bill, or relating to a Private Bill before the House, is to confine himself to a statement of the parties from whom it comes, of the number of signatures attached to it, and of the material allegations contained in it.

281. Every such Petition not containing

Not to be debated

matter in breach of the Privileges of this House, and which, according to the rules or usual practice of this House can be received, is brought to the Table by the direction of the the Speaker, who cannot allow any debate or any Member to speak upon or in relation to such Petition; but it may be read by the Clerk at the Table, if required.

Petitions complaining of grievances

282. In the case of such Petition complaining of some present personal grievance, for which there may be an urgent necessity for providing an immediate remedy, the matter contained in such Petition may be brought into discussion on the presentation thereof.

Petitions referred to Committee on Public Petitions

283. All other such Petitions, after they shall have been ordered to lie on the Table, are referred to the Committee on Public Petitions, without any question being put; but if any such Petition relate to any matter or subject with respect to which the Member presenting it has given notice of a motion,

And in certain cases ordered to be printed

and the said Petition has not been ordered to be printed by the Committee, such Member may, after notice given, move that such Petition be printed.

Petitions against taxes

284. Subject to the above regulations, Petitions against any Resolution or Bill imposing a tax or duty for the current service of the year may be received.

Petitions from Maoris

285. Petitions from persons of the Native race may be received without regard to the foregoing forms.

Reports on Maori Petitions

286. All Reports of the Public Petitions Committee on Petitions of aboriginal Natives shall be translated into the Maori language, and printed as soon as possible after such Reports are brought up.

XIX.—PUBLIC BILLS.

287. Every Bill (unless sent down by the

Bills ordered

Governor) is ordered to be brought in upon Motion made, and Question put, that leave be given to bring in such Bill.

288. Every Bill (except as before) is

Members appointed to bring in Bills

ordered to be prepared and brought in by certain Members named by the House.

289. Members may be added to those

Members added

originally ordered to prepare and bring in a Bill.

290. Instructions may be given to such

Instructions

Members to make further provision in any such Bill, before the same is brought in.

291. There shall be a Joint Committee of

Joint Committee on Private Bills

both Houses, to consist of three Members of the Legislative Council and three Members of the House of Representatives, to be nominated by the respective Houses at the commencement of each Session, of whom

four shall be a Quorum, whose duty shall be to consider and report respecting every Bill that may be referred to them by either House, upon the question whether it is a Private Bill or not.

292. Private Bills shall be understood to
private Bills

be Bills which are promoted for the private interest of individuals or companies, or which, by their provision, directly interfere with the private property of individuals; and the Private Bills Committee should give a liberal interpretation to the Standing Orders in favour of Bills of a public nature.

Bills relating to Religion

293. No Bill relating to Religion, or the alteration of the Laws concerning Religion, is to be brought into this House, until the proposition shall have been first considered in a Committee of the whole House, and agreed unto by the House.

Bills relating to Trade

294. No Bill relating to Trade, or the alteration of the Laws concerning Trade, is to be brought into the House until the proposition shall have been first considered in a Committee of the whole House, and agreed unto by the House.

Grants of money

295. The House will not proceed upon any Petition, Motion, or Bill, for granting any money, or for releasing or compounding any sum of money owing to the Crown, except in a Committee of the whole House.

Bills ordered to be withdrawn

296. Every Bill not prepared pursuant to the Order of Leave, or according to the Rules and Orders of the House, will be ordered to be withdrawn.

Bill presented

297. A Bill is presented by one of the Members ordered to prepare and bring in the same, who appears at the Bar for that purpose, and is desired by Mr. Speaker to bring it up.

First Reading

298. The First Reading of every Bill is proposed immediately after the same has been presented.

First reading, and printing, without debate

299. When any Bill shall be presented by a Member, in pursuance of an Order of this House, or shall be sent down by the Governor, or shall be brought from the Legislative Council, the Questions, "That this Bill be *now* read a first time," and "That this Bill be printed," are to be decided without amendment or debate.

300. A Bill having been read a first time,

Bill ordered to be read a second time

is ordered to be read a second time on a future day.

301. On the Order of the Day being read

Second reading

for the Second Reading of a Bill, a Motion is made, and a Question put, "That the Bill be *now* read a second time."

302. Amendments may be moved to such

Amendments to Question for Second Reading

Question by leaving out "now," and at the end of the Question adding "Three months," "Six months," or any other time; or that the Bill be rejected.

303. No other Amendment may be moved

Amendments to be relevant

to such Question, unless the same be strictly relevant to the Bill.

304. A Bill having been read a second

Bill committed

time, is ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole House; or, in certain cases, to a Select Committee.

305. Every Bill affecting the Waste or

Waste Lands Bills

Public Lands of the Colony shall be submitted to the Waste Lands Committee immediately after the second reading of the Bill, and the Report of such Committee shall be submitted to the Legislature before the Bill is committed.

306. On the Order of the Day being read

Committee of the Whole House on the Bill

for the Committee on a Bill, a Motion is made, and Mr. Speaker puts the Question, "That I do now leave the Chair;" which being resolved in the affirmative, the House resolves itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Bill; but where the Committee has reported progress, the Speaker leaves the Chair without putting

any question.

Amendments on Mr. Speaker leaving the Chair

307. Amendments may be moved to the Question for Mr. Speaker to leave the Chair, by leaving out all the words after the word "That," in order to add the words, "this House will on this day Three Months (or Six Months), (or other time), resolve itself into the said Committee;" or in order to add other words relevant to the Bill.

Instructions to Committee

308. An instruction may be moved to the Committee on the Bill, but cannot conveniently be moved by way of Amendment.

Bills may be considered in Committee together

309. Bills which may be fixed for consideration in Committee on the same day, whether in progress or otherwise, may be referred together to a Committee of the whole House, which may consider on the same day all the Bills so referred to it, without the Chairman leaving the Chair on each separate Bill: Provided that, with respect to any Bill not in progress, if any Member shall object to its consideration together with other Bills, the Order of the Day for the Committee on such Bill is to be postponed.

Preamble postponed

310. The Chairman puts a Question, "That the Preamble be postponed," which being agreed to, every clause is considered by the Committee *seriatim*.

Amendments to Clauses

311. Any Amendment may be made to a Clause, provided the same be relevant to the subject-matter of the Bill, or pursuant to any Instruction, and be otherwise in conformity with the Rules and Orders of the House; but if any Amendment shall not be within the Title of the Bill, the Committee are to amend the Title accordingly, and report the same specially to the House.

312. It shall be competent to any Member

Supplementary Order Paper

proposing to introduce Amendments in a Bill while going through Committee, to place such proposed Amendments on a Supplementary Order Paper.

313. A Question is put that each "Clause

Clauses to stand part of the Bill

stand part of the Bill," or "as amended stand part of the Bill."

314. In going through a Bill, no questions

Proceedings upon blanks

are to be put for the filling up of words already printed in *italics*, and commonly called "blanks," unless exception be taken thereto; and if no alterations have been made in the words so printed in *italics*, the Bill is to be reported without Amendments, unless other Amendments have been made thereto.

315. Any Clause may be postponed, unless

Clauses postponed

the same has already been considered and amended.

316. After every Clause and Schedule has

Preamble agreed to

been agreed to, and any clauses added which are relevant to the subject-matter of the Bill, or pursuant to any Instruction, the Preamble is considered, and, if necessary, amended; and a Question is put, "That this be the Preamble of the Bill."

317. No notice may be taken of any Proceedings

Proceedings in Committee not to be noticed until report

in a Committee of the whole House, or a Select Committee on a Bill, until such Bill has been reported.

Report of Progress

318. When all the Clauses of a Bill have not been considered, the Chairman is directed to report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.

Bill reported

319. The Bill having been fully considered, the Chairman is directed to report the Bill without amendment, or report the Bill with the amendments, to the House. A copy of the Bill as passed through the Committee is signed by the Chairman, and by him presented to Mr. Speaker, when the Bill is reported.

Bill as amended to be considered

320. When Amendments have been made the same are to be received without Debate, and a time appointed for taking the same into consideration.

Bill reported without Amendment

321. A Bill being reported without Amendment is ordered to be read a Third time, at such time as may be

appointed by the House.

Clauses offered in Committee, or on consideration of Report

322. On a Clause being offered in Committee, or on the consideration of Report, Mr. Speaker, or the Chairman, is to desire the Member to bring up the same, whereupon it is to be read a First time without Question put; but no Clause is to be offered on consideration of Report without notice.

A clause with Penalties, &c

323. A clause containing any Rates, Penalties, or other blank, after having been read a Second time, is also to be considered in Committee before it is made part of the Bill; and if any such Clause be for increasing any burthen upon the people, the Bill is re-committed, and the Clause proposed in Committee on the Bill.

324. On consideration of the Bill as

Bills recommitted

amended, the Bill may be ordered to be recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House, or to a Select Committee.

325. The order for the Third Reading of a

Order for Third Reading discharged

Bill may be read and discharged, and the Bill ordered to be re-committed.

326. The Order of the Day being read for

Third Reading

the Third Reading of a Bill, a Motion is made, and Question put, That the Bill be *now* read a Third time, to which Amendment may be moved as on the Second Reading.

327. No Amendments, not being merely

Amendments on Third Reading

verbal, shall be made to any Bill on the Third Reading.

328. After the Third Reading, and further

Bill passed, and Title agreed to

proceedings thereon, a Question is put, "That this Bill do pass;" after which, the Title of the Bill is agreed to, or amended and agreed to.

329. The further proceedings on a Third

Further proceedings on Third Reading adjourned.

Reading may be adjourned to a future day.

330. Bills of an urgent nature are sometimes

Bills passed with unusual expedition

passed with unusual expedition through their several stages.

331. The precise duration of every temporary

Temporary Law

Law is to be expressed in a distinct Clause at the end of the Bill.

332. When a Bill has passed the House,

Mr. Speaker signs the Bill

Mr. Speaker signs the same, and the Clerk forthwith certifies the date of its passing at the foot of the Bill.

Speaker to certify on fair print

333. Every Bill shall be printed fair immediately after it shall have been passed in the House in which it originated; and the Speaker of the House in which the Bill shall have passed shall certify the passing thereof on such fair print, together with the day upon which the Bill did pass.

And forwards it to the Legislative Council

334. When all the proceedings on a Bill have been concluded, the Clerk (or in some cases a Member or Members of the House) is ordered to carry the Bill to the Legislative Council, and desire its concurrence.

Bill agreed to by other House without Amendments

335. When a Bill sent from one House is agreed to by the other House without Amendments, a Message is sent back acquainting the former House thereof, and the Bill then remains in the House in which it was last passed for transmission to the Clerk of Parliaments.

When Amendments made by either House

336. When Amendments are proposed in either House, in a Bill sent from the other, the Bill is returned in the form in which it was sent, together with a Message stating such Amendments.

Amendments of Legislative Council considered on a future day

337. Amendments made by the Council in Public Bills are ordered to be considered on a future day, unless the House shall order them to be considered forthwith. They are then twice read and agreed to, or agreed to with Amendments, or disagreed to, or the further consideration thereof put off for Three or Six Months.

If Amendments agreed to, Message sent

338. If the Amendments made by one House in a Bill sent by the other be agreed to, a Message is sent acquainting the other House thereof, and the Bill, as amended, remains with the House in which it originated for transmission to the Clerk of Parliaments.

339. If the Amendments made by one

If Amendments disagreed with, a Conference may be requested

House in a Bill sent by the other are not agreed to, the Bill must drop, unless the difference between the two Houses can be adjusted by means of Message or Conference. If the originally proposed Amendments, or a modification thereof, be ultimately adopted, the Bill, as amended, remains in the House in which it originated for transmission to the Clerk of Parliaments.

340. When such Bill shall have passed

Bills to be printed fair on vellum

both Houses of the Legislature, it shall be fair printed by the Government Printer, who shall furnish three fair prints thereof on vellum to the Clerk of the Parliaments.

341. Such three fair prints of each Bill

Bill authenticated by Clerk of Parliaments

shall be duly authenticated by the Clerk of the Parliaments.

342. The three fair prints of all Bills,

Bills presented to the Governor

except the Appropriation Bill, when passed, shall be presented to the Governor for Her Majesty's Assent by the Clerk of the Parliaments.

343. The Royal assent is signified to every

Royal assent.

Bill by His Excellency in person, or by Commission, the attendance of the House of Representatives in the Council Chamber having been desired for that purpose, or by Message.

344. Amendments proposed by the Governor

Amendment of the Governor to be considered

in Bills presented by him for Her Majesty's Assent are sent to the House by Message, and a time is fixed for taking them into consideration, unless the House should prefer to consider them forthwith.

Governor's amendments to be indorsed on Bills

345. In case of amendments to Bills, made upon a Message from the Governor, pursuant to the fifty-sixth clause of the Constitution Statute, after such Bills shall have passed the two Houses of Parliament, the Clerk of the Parliaments shall indorse the same on the original Bill, and shall order three fair prints of the Bill on vellum as amended, and shall authenticate the same before they are presented for Her Majesty's Assent.

Forwarded to the Legislative Council, if agreed to

346. The Governor's Amendments, if agreed to by the House, are forwarded to the Legislative Council for its concurrence.

Vellum copies, where to be deposited

347. When the Governor shall have assented in the name of Her Majesty to any Bill, one of the fair prints thereof, on vellum, shall be deposited by the Clerk of the Parliaments with the Registrar of the Supreme Court, another shall be delivered to the Private Secretary of His Excellency the Governor for transmission to one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, and the third shall be retained in the Record Office of the Parliament Houses.

XX.—ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS.

Accounts, &c., ordered

348. Accounts and Papers are *ordered* to be laid before the House.

349. Motions for the production of despatches,

Addresses for papers

or other correspondence, addressed to the Governor, or for any information to be furnished by His Excellency, are in form, "That an Address be presented to His Excellency, praying that he will be pleased to forward copy of the despatch or other information sought."

350. Other Papers are presented pursuant

Papers presented by command

to Statute, or by command of the Governor.

351. Accounts and other Papers which are

Deposited with the Clerk of the House

required to be laid before this House by any Act of Parliament, or by any Order of the House, may be

deposited in the office of the Clerk of this House, and the same will be laid on the Table, and a List of such Accounts and Papers read by the Clerk.

352. Every Account and Paper is ordered
Accounts to lie upon the Table
to lie upon the Table, or is referred to a Committee.

353. Accounts and Papers are ordered to
Ordered to be printed
be printed, whenever it is expedient.

354. At the commencement of each Session,
Printing Committee
a Select Committee is appointed to assist Mr. Speaker in all matters which relate to the Printing executed by Order of the House; and for the purpose of selecting and arranging for Printing Returns and Papers presented in pursuance of Motions made by Members.

355. Speeches addressed to the House by
Speeches by Governor, and Bills specially affecting the Maoris, translated, and printed in Maori
His Excellency the Governor, and Bills introduced into the House specially affecting the Maoris, are translated and printed in the Maori tongue for the information of Her Majesty's subjects of that race.

Certain Sessional Papers printed in Maori

356. Mr. Speaker will make a selection of such Sessional Papers as may appear to him of the greatest interest to the Native race generally, and have them translated and printed.

Papers to be accompanied by a Maori translation in certain cases

357. When the Government lays Papers on the Table of the House, such of them as may be considered of most interest to the Maoris should, unless inconvenient delay result, be accompanied by a translation in the Native language.

Other Papers are translated only by order of the House upon Motion

358. All other Papers are translated into and printed in Maori only by Order of the House upon Motion.

XXI.—SUPPLY AND WAYS AND MEANS.

Aids and supplies not to be altered by the Legislative Council

359. All Aids and Supplies, and Aids to Her Majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the House of Representatives; and all Bills for the granting of any such Aids and Supplies are to begin with the House of Representatives; and it is the undoubted and sole right of the House of Representatives to direct, limit, and appoint in such Bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants; which may not be changed or altered by the Legislative Council.

Penalties, forfeitures, and fees

360. By Standing Order, 4th October, 1860, with respect to any Bill brought to this House from the Legislative Council, or returned by the Legislative Council to this House, with Amendments, whereby any pecuniary penalty, forfeiture, or fee shall be authorized, imposed, appropriated, regulated, varied or extinguished, this House will not insist on its undoubted Privileges in the following cases:—

- When the object of such pecuniary penalty or forfeiture is to secure the execution of the Act, or the punishment or prevention of offences.
- Where such fees are imposed in respect of benefit taken or service rendered under the Act, and in order to the execution of the Act, and are not made payable into the Treasury or Exchequer, or in aid of the Public Revenue, and do not form the ground of public accounting by the parties receiving the same, either in respect of deficit or surplus.
- When such Bill shall be a Private Bill, for a Local or Personal Act.

361. This House will not insist on its Privileges

Tolls and charges in Private Bills

with regard to any Clauses in Private Bills sent down from the Legislative Council, which refer to tolls and charges for services performed, and are not in the nature of a tax.

362. This House will receive no petition

Application for Public Money

for any Sum of Money, relating to Public Service, or proceed upon any Motion for granting any Money but what is recommended from the Crown.

Grant of Money

363. This House will not proceed upon any Petition, Motion, or Bill for granting any Money, or for releasing or compounding any Sum of Money owing to the Crown, but in a Committee of the whole House.

Motions not to be presently entered on

364. If any Motion be made in the House for any public Aid, or Charge upon the people, the consideration and Debate thereof may not be presently entered upon, but is to be adjourned till such further day as the House shall think fit to appoint, and then it is to be referred to a Committee of the whole House before any Resolution or Vote of the House do pass therein.

Address for Money

365. The House will not proceed upon any Motion for an Address to the Governor, praying that any Money may be issued, or that any expense may be incurred, except in a Committee of the whole House.

The Governor's Speech considered

366. On The House proceeding to take into consideration the Governor's Speech according to Order, so much of the same as was addressed to the House of Representatives is again read by Mr. Speaker, and a Motion being made, "That a Supply be granted to Her Majesty," the House resolves that it will, to-morrow, or on a future day, resolve itself into a Committee to consider that Motion.

Committee on Motion for Supply

367. The Order of the Day being read for the House to resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Motion that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty, His Excellency's Speech to both Houses of Parliament is ordered to be referred to the Committee. Then the House resolves itself into the Committee, and the Governor's Speech being read, the Committee resolves that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty, which Resolution is ordered to be reported.

368. Mr. Speaker resumes the Chair, and

Report from Committee

the Chairman reports that the Committee had come to a Resolution; and the Report is ordered to be received on a future day.

369. The said Resolution, on being reported,

Supply granted

is read, and being read a second time, the House resolves, *nemine contradicente*, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution, that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty," and, "That this House will, upon a future day, resolve itself into a Committee, to consider the Supply granted to Her Majesty;" which Committee is the Committee of Supply.

370. The Order of the Day being read

Committee Supply

for the Committee of Supply, Accounts and Estimates are referred, and the House resolves itself into the Committee, and the Committee proceeds to consider the matters to them referred.

371. When a motion is made, in Committee

Questions for omitting or reducing items

of Supply, to omit or reduce any item of a Vote, a Question shall be proposed from the Chair for omitting or reducing such item accordingly; and Members shall speak to such Question only, until it has been disposed of.

Proposed ill order of Printed Estimates

372. When several Motions are offered, they shall be taken in the order in which the items to which they relate appear in the Printed Estimates.

No Motion to be made relating to any prior item

373. After a Question has been proposed from the Chair for omitting or reducing any item, no Motion shall be made or Debate allowed upon any preceding item.

Question put upon the original, or reduced Vote

374. Where it has been proposed to omit or reduce items in a Vote, the Question shall be afterwards put upon the original Vote, or upon the reduced Vote, as the case may be, without Amendment.

Reports from Committees of Supply, and Ways and Means

375. Any Report of Resolutions from the Committees of Supply, and Ways and Means, is ordered to be received on a future day.

Leave to sit again

376. The Chairman acquaints the House that he was directed to move that the Committee may have leave to sit again; and the House appoints a day accordingly.

Committee of Ways and Means appointed

377. When the first Resolutions of the Committee of Supply have been read a Second time and agreed to, it is resolved, "That this House will, on a future day, resolve itself into a Committee, to consider of Ways and Means for raising the Supply granted to Her Majesty;" which Committee is the Committee of Ways and Means.

Chairman of Committee of Supply, and Ways and Means

378. The Chairman of Committees takes the Chair of the Committee of Supply, and of the Committee of Ways and Means. In case of his absence, the Committee elect their Chairmen.

If difference arises

379. In case any difference should arise in electing a Chairman, Mr. Speaker resumes the Chair, and the House appoints a Member to take the Chair of the Committee.

380. Resolutions of the Committees of

Resolutions of Committees agreed to

Supply, and Ways and Means, reported to the House, are read a First and Second time, and agreed to; or may be amended, postponed, re-committed, or disagreed to.

381. No Amendment whereby the charge

Tax not to be increased on report

upon the people will be increased may be made to any such Resolution, unless such charge so increased shall not exceed the charge already existing by virtue of any Act of Parliament.

XXII.—MISCELLANEOUS.

382. In all cases not hereinbefore provided

Speaker to decide in cases not provided for

for, Mr. Speaker shall decide, taking for his guide the rules, forms, and usages of the House of Commons, so far as the same can be applied to the proceedings of this House.

383. It is contrary to the law and usage

Members not to engage in the management of Private Bills

of Parliament that any Member of this House should be permitted to engage, either by himself or any partner, in the management of Private Bills before this or the other House of Parliament, for pecuniary reward.

384. It is contrary to the usage, and derogatory

Members not to promote measures for fee or reward

to the dignity of this House, that any of its Members should bring forward, promote, or advocate in this House any proceeding or measure in which he may have acted or been concerned, for or in consideration of any pecuniary fee or reward.

Strangers ordered to withdraw

385. Strangers may at any time even during debate be ordered to withdraw either from the body of the House or the Galleries, on a Motion without notice to that effect being put and carried; but no Amendment or Debate shall be allowed on that Question; and in his own discretion Mr. Speaker may at any time order strangers to withdraw.

Members not to be absent for more than a week

386. No Member shall absent himself from the service of the House for more than one week at a time without leave; and any Member infringing this order shall be held guilty of contempt.

Not to disobey Orders of the House, or interrupt its proceedings

387. Any Member who shall wilfully disobey any Order of the House, and any Member or other person who shall wilfully or vexatiously interrupt the orderly conduct of the business of the House, shall be held guilty of contempt.

Penalties for contempt

388. Any Member adjudged by the House for any of the above-mentioned causes guilty of contempt shall be fined in a penalty, at the discretion of the House, not exceeding £50, and in default of immediate payment shall be committed by the warrant of Mr. Speaker to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, or such other person or persons as Mr. Speaker shall appoint, for a period not exceeding Fourteen Days; and it shall be lawful for the said Sergeant-at-Arms, or such other person or persons, to detain the said Member in his custody for the period directed by the House, unless sooner discharged by Order of the House, or unless the amount of fine imposed shall be sooner paid.

389. All fines are applied to "The Library

Fines applied to Library Fund

Fund."

390. Any Standing Order or Orders of

Standing Orders suspended

the House may be suspended on Motion, without notice: Provided that two-thirds of the Members be present, but notice shall always be given when practicable.

391. No proposal for altering or annulling

Standing Order to be altered or annulled, only when two-thirds of the House are present

any Standing Order shall be entertained, except when two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and when notice extending over at least four sitting days shall have been, given.

Index.

[N.B.—In this INDEX the Figures refer to the Numbers of the RULES and ORDERS.]

A.

Absence of Members. Notices of motion may be given by a Member, for any other Member being absent, 79—No Member to absent himself for more than a week without leave, 386—Guilty of contempt, *ib.* See also *Leave of Absence.*

Absence of Speaker. Chairman of Committee of Ways and Means to perform his duties, 25.

Access to the Governor. Privilege of free access to His Excellency, 18.

ACCOUNTS AND PAYEES:

Ordered to be laid before the House, 348—When Addresses presented for them, 349—Papers presented by Command, 350—In what cases deposited with the Clerk of the House, 351—Accounts and Papers ordered to lie upon the Table, 352—Ordered to be printed when expedient, 353—Printing Committee, its functions, 354—Speeches by the Governor to the House, and Bills introduced into the House specially affecting the Maoris, to be translated and printed in Maori, 355—also, Papers selected by Mr. Speaker, 356—to be accompanied by translations in certain cases, 357—Other Papers printed by Order of the House upon Motion, 358—Accounts and Estimates referred to the Committee of Supply, 370.

ADDRESSES:

Modes of presenting, 251—Form when presented by the whole House, 252—Concurrence of the other House, how signified, 253—Joint Addresses, 254—The Legislative Council learn His Excellency's pleasure when he will receive the same, 255—Form of presenting joint Address, 256—His Excellency's Answer to Address presented by the whole House, how reported, 257—The like, to other Addresses, 258.

Motion for Address in answer to the Opening Speech given, 30—Select Committee appointed to draw up the Address, 31—Speech referred, *ib.*—Address reported and agreed to, 32—When presented by the whole House, 33—Speech to be taken into consideration, 34.

In what cases Accounts and Papers are procured by Address, 349—Motion for and Address to the Crown for the issue of public money not entertained except in Committee of the whole House, 365.

Adjournment of the House. After choice of Speaker, 16—Rules and Orders relative to the Sitting and Adjournment of the House, 39-56—Except in cases mentioned, the House can only be adjourned by its own Resolution, 54—Questions superseded by Adjournment of the House, 92-94—When House adjourned for want of a Quorum, the hour and the names of Members present entered in the Journals, 50.

Adjournment of Select Committees. When Quorum not present, 184—May adjourn from time to time, 193—And (by leave) from place to place, *ib.*

Amendments to Bills. See *Bills, Public.*

AMENDMENTS TO QUESTIONS:

Questions superseded by, 92,94—Different forms of Amendment, 104—If not seconded, will not be entertained, 105—Amendment to leave out certain words, 106—To leave out words, and insert or add others, 107—To insert or add words, 108—Amendments to the former part of a question may not be proposed after a later part has been amended, 109—No Amendment to be made to words already agreed to, 110—Proposed Amendment may, by leave, be withdrawn, 111—Amendments to proposed Amendments, 112—When Amendments made, the main question as amended is put, 113—When Amendments proposed but not made, the question as originally proposed is put, 114.

Application for Public Money. Will not be entertained unless recommended by the Crown, 362—Nor proceeded upon except in a Committee of the whole House, 365.

Attendance of Members. Rules and Orders regulating the same, 57-67.

"Ayes" and "Noes." Questions determined by majority of voices, "Aye" or "No," 98—Speaker states which has it; if his opinion not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99.—See also *Divisions.*

B.

Bar of the House. Witnesses examined at, 206—Practice when witness in custody at the Bar is examined, 224—Chairs placed for Legislative Councillors and Judges within the Bar, 227—Member appointed to prepare a Bill appears with it at, 297.

BILLS PUBLIC:

How ordered to be brought in, 287—Certain Members named to prepare and bring in each Bill,

288—Members added to those originally named, 289—Joint Committee to determine what are Private Bills, 291—Definition of Private Bills, 292—Instructions to make further provision, 287—Bills relating to Religion, 293—To Trade, 294—For granting money, or releasing or compounding any sum of money owing to the Crown, 295—If not prepared pursuant to Order, or to the Rules of the House, will be ordered to be withdrawn, 296—Bills specially affecting the Maoris are translated and printed in the Maori tongue, 355.

Manner of presenting a Bill, 297—First Blading, 298—First Beading of a Bill *pro formâ*, 28—Questions for First Beading and Printing to be decided without Amendment or Debate, 299—Ordered to be read a Second Time, 300—Question for Second Beading put, 381—Amendments to Question for second Reading, 302—Amendments to be strictly relevant, 303—Commitment, 304—Question put for Speaker to leave the Chair, 306—When Committee has reported Progress, Speaker leaves the Chair without putting any Question, *ib.* Amendments to Question for Speaker to leave the Chair, 307.

Instructions to Committee on the Bill; not to be moved by way of Amendment, 308—Several Bills may be considered together, on the same day, without the Chairman leaving the Chair on each separate Bill, 309—Preamble postponed; every clause considered *seriatim*, 310—Amendments to clauses; limitations thereto, 311—Question put on each clause, That it stand part of the Bill, 313—Proceedings in regard to filling up blanks, 314—Clauses postponed, 315—When Preamble considered and agreed to, 316

No notice taken of Proceedings in Committee until Report, 317—Report of Progress, and leave asked to sit again, 318—Bill reported, 319—Report to be received without debate, and a time appointed for considering same, 320—Where Bill reported without Amendment, 321—Clauses offered in Committee, or on consideration of Report—322 Notice required in certain cases, *ib.*—Course pursued with clauses containing Rates, Penalties, or other blank, 323—Bills re-committed, 324—Order for Third Reading discharged, and Bill re-committed, 325.

Third Reading; Amendments to Questions for, 326—Amendments on Third Reading to be merely verbal, 327—Bill passed, and Title agreed to, 328—Further proceedings on Third Reading adjourned to a future day, 329—Unusual Expedition, 330—Duration of temporary Laws to be expressed, 331—Bill to be signed by the Speaker, and date of passing certified by the Clerk, 332—Bill sent to Legislative Council with a Message, 334—If the Bill be agreed to, it remains in the Council for transmission to the Governor, 335—If amended, Bill returned to the House, with a Message stating the Amendments, 336—Day to be appointed for the consideration of the Amendments made by the Council; same agreed to or disagreed to, 337—If agreed to, Message to be transmitted to the Legislative Council acquainting them thereof, 338—If Amendments disagreed to, a Conference may be requested for the Adjustment of the Questions at issue; if accommodated, the Bill remains in the House in which it originated for transmission to the Governor, 339—Fair print of Bill to be certified by Speaker, 333—Bills to be printed on vellum when passed by both Houses of the Legislature, 340—Authenticated by Clerk of Parliaments, 341—Presented to the Governor by Clerk of Parliaments, 342—Governor's Amendments to be indorsed on Bill, 345—Vellum copies of Bills, where deposited, 347—Royal Assent, how signified, 343—Amendments by the Governor are transmitted by Message, and a time is fixed for their consideration, 344—If agreed to, to be forwarded to the Legislative Council for their concurrence, 346.

Blanks (Public Bills). Course pursued in regard to filling up, in Committee, 314.

Business of the House. Of what the ordinary business of each day consists, 68—Order in which taken, 74—No New Business to be taken after half after Twelve o'clock at night, 53.

See also Bills, Public. Notices of Motions. Orders of the Day.

C.

CALL OF THE HOUSE:

When Order for a Call made, Circular Letters to be sent to the Members requiring their attendance, 61—Manner in which the Call is proceeded with, 62—Members not at first present, but subsequently attending, 63—Members not attending at all during the day, 64.

Casting Votes. In case of Equality of Votes (on a Division), Speaker gives a casting voice; any reasons stated by him being entered in the Journals, 152—In Committee of whole House, Chairman gives a casting vote, 163—The Chairman of a Select Committee can only vote when there is an equality of voices, 192.

Chair. Member, when elected Speaker, conducted to to the Chair, 11, 14, 15—When Speaker unavoidably absent, the Chairman of Committees takes the Chair, 25—Speaker, when he takes the Chair, reads the appointed Prayer, 41—After Prayers, Speaker counts the House, and if a Quorum is not present, he adjourns the House, 44.

CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE HOUSE:

To perform the duties of Speaker on unavoidable absence of Speaker, 25—Takes the Chair of the Committee of Supply, and of the Committee of Ways and Means, 378—On a Division in Committee of the

whole House, if there is equality of voices, he gives a casting vote, 163—In the absence of the Chairman of Committees, the Committee elect their Chairman, 378—If difference arise in Committee concerning election of Chairman, he is appointed by the House, 161, 379—Chairman leaves the Chair if 20 Members not present, 170—Chairman directed to report, 172—To report progress, 173, 174—Motion that Chairman do now leave the Chair; its effect, 175—Signs Bills and presents them to Mr. Speaker, 319.

Chairman of Select Committees. The Chairman can only vote when there is an equality of voices, 192.

Claim of Privileges. Made by Speaker, 18—Exception thereto, 24.

Clerk at the Table. To read the Orders of the Day (after notices have been disposed of) without any Question put, 71.

CLERK OF THE HOUSE:

List of Members delivered to, on the opening of a new Parliament, 1—Goes up with the House to the Legislative Council on the opening of a Parliament, 3—Reads the Commission of the Commissioner appointed to administer the oath to Members, 5—Clerk addressed by Members when House proceeds to choice of Speaker, 8—Puts Question on choice of Speaker, 13, 14—The names of Members called over by the Clerk alphabetically, on a Call of the House, 62—Names of those not answering taken down by the Clerk, 63—Clerk to take down words objected to, when directed by Speaker, 133—On a division, turns a two-minute sand-glass, 144—Clerk signs Orders of the House for the attendance of Witnesses, 206—To read Petitions when presented, if required, 281—Accounts and Papers deposited with the Clerk of the House, 351.

Commission for Opening Parliament. Course of proceeding, 2 *et seq.*

Commission for Administering Oaths to Members, 5, 20.

Commission for Proroguing Parliament. Course pursued in regard to, 37.

Commission for giving Royal Assent to Bills, 343.

COMMITMENT OF PUBLIC BILLS:

After Second Reading to a Committee of the whole House, or to a Select Committee, 304—Committee of the whole House; Question put for Speaker to leave the Chair, 306—When the Committee has reported progress, Speaker leaves the Chair without any question, *ib.*—Amendments that may be made to Question for Speaker to leave the Chair, 307.—Instructions to Committee on the Bill, 308—Several Bills may be considered together on the same day, except on objection by a Member in regard to any Bill not in progress, without the Chairman leaving the Chair on each separate Bill, 309.

COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS:

Preamble postponed; clauses considered *seriatim*, 310—Amendments to clauses, 311—Question put on each clause, that it stand part of the Bill, 313—Proceedings in regard to blanks, 314—Clauses postponed, 315—Preamble considered and agreed to, 316—No notice to be taken of Proceedings in Committee until Report, 317—Report of Progress, and leave asked to sit again, 318—Bill reported, 319.

Committee on Public Petitions. All Petitions referred to, without Question put, 283.

COMMITTEES SELECT:

Number of Members of which composed, 178—On the appointment of every Select Committee, a day to be fixed for their report, 198—Notice of nomination required to be given, 179—Lists of Members serving on Select Committees posted up, 180—Names of Members asking questions of witnesses prefixed thereto in the Minutes, 181—Names of Members present each day to be entered, 182—Particulars in regard to Divisions required to be entered, 183—When quorum not present, 184.

Members discharged from attendance, and others added, 185—Quorum appointed by House, 186—But if no Quorum fixed, all to attend, *ib.*—Quorum of a Joint Committee, 187—Power to send for persons, papers, and records, 188—Admission of strangers to Committees, 189—When Members of the House may be present, 190—Secret Committees, 191—Chairman only votes when voices are equal, 192.

Adjournment of Committees, 193—Not to sit during sitting of the House without leave, 194—Proceedings void after notice of House going to Prayers, 43—Evidence taken and documents produced before any Committee not to be published, 195.—Proof copies of Evidence to be distributed to Members of Committee only, 196—Report from time to time, 197—Report brought up and laid on the Table, 199—Committees have only power to report opinions to the House, 200—Instructions to Committees, 201, 205—Power of Committees to summon witnesses, 208—How summoned, *ib.*—Course pursued when a witness does not attend a Committee, 209—What corrections may be made in evidence of witnesses, 221.

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE HOUSE:

When Twenty Members not present, the Chairman reports same to the House, 48—Words used in Committee to which objection is made will be taken down, 134—Words to be objected to when used, 135—Rules of Debate in Committee, 139, 167—Disorder in Committee can only be censured by the House, 140—Divisions in Committee taken in the same way as in the House itself, 154.

Form of appointing a Committee of the whole House, 156—House resolves itself into Committee,

157—When Committee, after reporting progress, is ordered to sit again on a particular day, Speaker, when Order for the Committee read, is to leave the Chair without a Question put, 158—The Mace placed under the Table when Speaker leaves the Chair, 159—Chair taken by the Chairman of Committees, 160—If difference in Committee concerning Chairman, Speaker resumes, and Chairman appointed by House, 161.

Committee is to consider only such matters as are referred to them, 162—Every Question decided by a majority of voices, 163—When equality of voices, Chairman gives casting vote, *ib.*—A Motion in Committee is not seconded, 164—Motion for Previous Question cannot be made, 165—Members may speak more than once, 166—Order observed in Debate, same as in the House, 167.

If sudden disorder arise, Speaker will resume the Chair, 168—Speaker also resumes the Chair in other cases, 169—If Twenty Members not present, Speaker resumes the Chair, 170—If Twenty present when the House is counted, the House again resolves itself into Committee, 171—Report made when all the matters referred have been considered, 172—Report of Progress, 173—Motion made during Committee to Report Progress, and ask leave to sit again, 174.

Motion that Chairman "do now leave the Chair," will supersede proceedings of Committee, 175—Report brought up without Question, 176—Proceedings in the House on Resolutions from a Committee, 177—When witness examined before a Committee of the whole House, any Member may put Questions, 223.

Complicated Questions. House may order them to be divided, 96.

CONFERENCES: 231 to 244.

Consent of the Crown. To any Motion or Bill, how signified, 250.

See also Grants of Public Money.

CONTEMPT:

Any Member absenting himself for more than a week without leave held guilty of contempt, 386—Or wilfully disobeying any Order of the House, or wilfully and vexatiously interrupting the orderly conduct of the business of the House, 387—Penalties for Contempt, 388—Pines applied to Library Fund, 389.

COUNTING THE HOUSE:

House counted after Prayers, and if Twenty Members are not present, Speaker adjourns the House, 45—When Chairman of Committee of the whole House reports that Twenty Members are not present, Speaker counts House, and adjourns, 48—Doors unlocked while Speaker is counting, 49—House not counted when it meets for the despatch of business pursuant to Proclamation, nor when summoned to the Council Chamber by His Excellency or Commissioners, 45, 46.

D.

Debates:

Privilege of freedom of speech in Debate, 18—Questions allowed to be put to Ministers of the Crown, &c., 75—Such questions not to involve argument, 76—In answering any question, the matter to which it refers not to be debated, 77—How Debates may be interrupted, 95—Every Member speaking is to address Mr. Speaker, standing and uncovered, 115—Indulgence extended to Members unable to stand, 116—Speaking to order during a Division, sitting and covered, 117—No Member to speak after a Question put and voices given, 118—Speaker calls upon Members to speak, 119—Motion that a Member "be now heard," or "do now speak," 120—Members to speak to the Question, 121.

Explanation of personal matters, 122—No Member may speak twice, except in explanation, or reply, 123-125—Speaking "to order," or upon a matter of privilege, 126—Debates of same Session may not be alluded to, except by indulgence, for personal explanations, 127—Reflections upon Votes of the House not allowed, except for rescinding such Vote, 128—Allusions to Debates in the other House not allowed, 129.

Offensive words against either House, or any Statute not allowed, 130—One Member not to refer to another by name, 131—Not to use offensive words in reference to another, 132—Words taken down, 133-135—Members not explaining or retracting, censured, 136—Interference of House to prevent quarrels, 137—No noise or interruption to be allowed during a Debate, 138—Rules of Debate in Committee of the whole House, 139, 167—Means of maintaining order in the House and in Committee of the whole House, 140—House to be silent when Mr. Speaker rises, 141—Member to withdraw whilst his conduct is under debate, 142—In Committee Members may speak more than once, 166.

Debts due to the Crown. Certificate required to be annexed to Petition for compounding, 271.

Disallowance of Votes (on Divisions). If personally interested, 155.

Discharge of Orders. An Order of the House may be read and discharged, 103.

Disorder. If sudden disorder arise in Committee of the whole House, Speaker will resume the Chair, 168—Members wilfully and vexatiously interrupting the orderly conduct of the business of the House guilty of contempt, 387.

See also Noise and Disturbance.

Divisions:

If the Speaker's opinion that the "Ayes" or the "Noes" "have it," be not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99—Members speaking to a point of order during a Division to sit covered whilst speaking, 117—Every Member then present must vote, 143.

Doors not closed till after two minutes, as indicated by sand-glass, 144—Doors closed after lapse of two minutes, 145—Question then put, and the "Ayes" and "Noes" go respectively to the right and the left, and Tellers appointed, 146—If not two Tellers for one of the parties, no Division allowed, 147—Every Member counted, and names taken down by Tellers, 148.

Tellers report the numbers to Mr. Speaker, who declares them to the House, 149—In case of confusion or error, House again divides, 150—Numbers inaccurately reported, corrected in the Journals, 151—On equality of votes, Speaker gives casting voice, 152—Any reason stated by him being entered in the Journals *ib.*—Division Lists printed in the Journals, 153—Member not entitled to vote if personally interested, 155.

Divisions in Committee of the whole House taken in the same manner as in the House itself, 154.

Manner of taking Divisions in Select Committees; entry made in the Minutes, 183.

Doors of the House. Closed during Prayers, 42—The doors unlocked whenever House is being counted, 49—Doors locked during Divisions, 145—But not to be closed until after the lapse of two minutes, 144.

Dropped Motions. A Motion not seconded is forthwith dropped, and no entry made in the Journals, 90.

Dropped Orders of the Day. To be set down in the Order Book, after the Orders of the Day for the next day on which the House sits, 73.

E.

Election Petitions. Petitions in the nature of, not received unless the requirements of the Election Petitions Act complied with, 276—Time for presenting same, 277.

Entering and Leaving the House. Members to be uncovered; or when moving to any other part of the House, 65—And to make an obeisance to the Chair, *ib.*

Equality of Votes. See *Casting Votes*.

Evidence. Taken before a Select Committee not to be published until reported, 195—Proof copies to be distributed only to Members of Committee, 196—Instructions as to revision of, 221.

See also *False Evidence. Officers of the House.*

Tampering with Witnesses. Witnesses.

Expedition. See *Unusual Expedition*.

Explanation of Words. A Member who has already spoken may be again heard, to explain his words, 124.

See also *Personal Explanations*.

F.

False Evidence. Penalty for giving False Evidence to the House or Committee, 218.

Fines. For Contempt, 388—All Fines are applied to the Library Fund, 389.

First Reading of Public Bills:

Is proposed immediately after presentation, 298—Questions for First Reading and Printing to be decided without Amendment or Debate, 299.

Forgery of Signatures to Petitions. A Breach of Privilege, 272.

Freedom of Speech. Privilege of freedom of speech in Debate, 18.

Further Prorogations. By Proclamation in the *New Zealand Gazette*, 38.

G.

Government Business. Right reserved to the Government to place Orders at the head of the list of the Orders of the Day on days on which the Government have precedence, 72.

Governor, His Excellency, The:

His Excellency's pleasure signified that the House elect their Speaker on the opening of a new Parliament, 4—Governor's approbation of Speaker signified, 17—Privilege of free access to the Governor, 18—Opening of Parliament by the Governor in person, 26—Prorogation by him in person, 36—His Excellency addressed by Mr. Speaker concerning the Bills passed during the Session, *ib.*—Accounts and Papers presented by command of His Excellency, 350.

Grants of Public Money:

Applications for, not entertained unless recommended by the Crown, 362—Nor proceeded upon, except in a Committee of the whole House, 295, 363—Motions not to be presently entered upon, but adjourned to a further day, 364—Address to the Crown for issue of Money, not proceeded upon except in Committee, 365.

I.

Instructions:

To Committees of the Whole House.

Effect of an Instruction to a Committee of the whole House, 201—General Instruction to Committees on Bills to make Amendments relevant to the subject-matter of the Bill, 202—But if Amendments not within the Title of the Bill, to make special Report, *ib.*—When Instructions may not be moved, 203—How and when an Instruction should be moved, 204.

Select Committees:

Effect of an Instruction to a Select Committee, 205.

On other Matters:

To Members appointed to prepare and bring in Bills, 290—Instructions to the Committee on a Bill, 203, 308—Should not ordinarily be moved by way of Amendment, 308.

Interruption of Debates. See *Debates.*

Introduction of Members. Form of, when returned after a General Election, 22.

J.

Joint Addresses. How such concurrence signified, 253—Mode of presenting joint Address, 254, 256.

Joint Committee on Private Bills, 291.

Joint Committees. Quorum of, 187.

Journals. A Motion not seconded is dropped and no entry made in the Journals, 90—An amendment to any Question not seconded will not be entered in the Journals, 105—Mistakes in Division Lists corrected in the Journals, 151—When Speaker gives his casting vote, any reasons stated by him are entered in the Journals, 152—Names of Members who have voted on Divisions are entered in the Journals, 153—When House adjourned for want of a Quorum, names of Members present entered in the Journals, 50.

Judges. Manner in which examined at the Bar, 227.

K.

Keepers of Prisons. When a Witness is in the custody of a Keeper of a Prison, how brought up, 207.

L.

Leave of Absence. Notice to be given of Motions for leave of Absence, 58—Members having leave excused from all service during such leave, 59—Leave forfeited by attendance before the expiration of such leave, 60—No Member to absent himself for more than a week without leave, 386.

Legislative Council. Allusion to Debates in, not allowed, 129. See *Conferences. Joint Addresses. Messages.*

Legislative Councillors. Means by which their attendance for examination by the House or Committees is secured, 215—Manner of examining a Legislative Councillor at the Bar, 227.

Library. All fines are applied to the Library Fund, 389.

M.

Mace. Laid on the Table when Speaker chosen, 15—Is placed under the Table when House is in Committee, 159—Mace on the Serjeant's shoulder when Witness is in custody at the Bar, 224.

Managers of Conferences. Nomination of Managers, 242—Duty of Managers, 237.

Maori Petitions. Reports on, to be printed and translated, 286—Certain Papers to be printed in Maori, 356, 358.

Meeting of the House. Half after Two the time for the ordinary meeting of the House, 40.

Members:

List of, delivered to the Clerk on the opening of a New Parliament, 1—Members assemble in the House awaiting Message, 2—New Members how introduced, 22—Members not to bring strangers in, 56—No Member to absent himself for more than a week without leave, 386—Guilty of contempt, 386—Rules and Orders regulating the attendance and places of Members, 57, 67—No Member may refer to another by name, 131—Nor use offensive words in reference to any Member, 132—Disorderly Members called upon by Speaker by name, 138—Member against whom a charge is made to withdraw while his conduct is under debate, 142.

How the attendance of a Member to be examined as a witness is to be secured, 211, 212—Course pursued if Member refuse to attend, 213—If any information come before a Committee charging any Member, the Committee is to acquaint the House, 214—A Member is examined in his place, 226—Members uncovered when Message from the Crown read, 248.

A Member not to present a Petition from himself, 279—No Member to engage by himself or partner in the management of Private Bills for pecuniary reward, 383—Nor to promote measures in which he has been concerned, for fee or reward, 384.

Members vexatiously interrupting the orderly business of the House guilty of contempt, 387.

Messages:

From the Governor:

Message from the Governor, how brought, 245, 247—Read by Speaker, Members being uncovered, 248—Verbal Messages, how communicated, 249—Recommendation or consent of the Crown, how signified, 250, 343.

From Commissioners:

From Commissioners on opening of a New Parliament brought by the Private Secretary, 3.

Between the Two Houses:

A Member or one of the Clerks of either House may be the bearer of Messages, 228—Messages to be received by the Clerk at the Bar without interrupting the Business, 229—Message communicated to the House by Speaker, 230.

Messages in lieu of Conferences. See *Conferences*.

Minutes of Evidence and Minutes of Proceedings (Select Committees). What required to be entered therein, 181, 183.

Money Bills. Any such awaiting the Royal Assent at the end of the Session presented by Mr. Speaker, who addresses His Excellency concerning the same, 36.

See also *Supply and Ways and Means*.

Motions:

Rules and orders regulating the giving Notices of Motions, 78, 84—Precedence of Motions, 85—Urgent Motions concerning Privileges, 86—Motions for Vote of Thanks, 87—Motions made, by leave, without notice, 88—Question proposed when Motion made and seconded, 89—Any Motion not seconded, dropped, and no entry made in the Journals, 90—Motions may be withdrawn by leave, 91—A Motion withdrawn by leave may be made again during the same Session, 101—A Motion in Committee of the whole House is not seconded, 164.

N.

Names of Members. No Member to refer to another by name, 131—Members disorderly called upon by Speaker by name, 138—See also *Call of the House*.

Natives. Petitions from Maoris may be received without regard to the ordinary rules of the House, 285—And may be in Maori, but must be accompanied by a certified English translation made by a Translator duly appointed by Mr. Speaker, 265—Speeches by the Governor to the House, and Bills introduced into the House, specially affecting the Maoris, to be translated and printed in the Maori tongue for the information of the Natives, 355—All other Papers are only translated and printed in Maori by order of the House, upon Motion, 358—Reports on Petitions from, to be printed, 286.

New Members. How introduced, when returned after a General Election, 22.

New Parliaments. Proceedings on the opening of a new Parliament, 1, 24—Form of Prorogation, and of further Prorogation of a new Parliament by Proclamation, 38.

Newspapers. No Member to read any newspaper, book, or letter in his place, 67.

"Noes." See "Ayes" and "Noes."

Noise and Disturbance. Not allowed during a debate 138. See also *Disorder*. Members wilfully and vexatiously interrupting the orderly conduct of the business of the House guilty of contempt, 387.

Notice. Notice required to be given of Motions for leave of absence, 58—Notice required to be given of the names of Members proposed to be placed on the Committee, 179—Notice of considering Amendments of the Council to Bills, 337.

Notices of Motions:

Relative precedence of Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions, 70, 71—Every Notice to be in writing, and delivered at the Table, 78—One Member may give Notice for another who is absent, 79—Restrictions imposed upon giving Notices, 80—Notices take precedence of Orders of the Day on Wednesdays and Thursdays, 81.

Notices containing unbecoming expressions expunged, 82—Postponement of Notices, 83—Alteration of the terms of Notices, 84—Precedence of Motions according to the order in which the Notices were given, 85—Urgent Motions concerning Privileges, 86—Motions for Votes of Thanks, 87—Motions may be made by leave without Notice, 88.

See also *Motions*.

O.

Oaths. At the commencement of a new Parliament a Commissioner is appointed by the Governor to administer the Oaths to Members, 5—During the remaining term of the Parliament Mr. Speaker holds a commission authorizing him to administer the Oath, 20—Members sworn, 6—Business interrupted to enable Members to take Oath, 21.

Obeisances. Made by Members to the Chair in passing to or from their seats, 65.

Offensive Words. Against either House or any Statute not permitted, 130—Nor offensive or un-becoming words in reference to any Member, 132—If words used in debate be objected to, the Speaker will direct them to be taken down by the Clerk, 133—The like in regard to a Committee of the whole House, 134—Objection to words to betaken at the time such words are used, 135—Members not explaining or retracting censured or otherwise dealt with, 136.

Officers of the House. No Clerk or Officer, or Short-hand Writer, employed to take Minutes of Evidence, may give evidence elsewhere in respect of any proceedings, &c., without leave, 220.

See also Clerk of the House.

Opening of Parliament. Proceedings on the opening of a new Parliament, 1-24—The like when not a new Parliament, 26-35.

"Order." Any Member may rise to speak "to Order," 126—A question of Order may interrupt Debates, 95—Speaking to question of Order whilst House is dividing, 117.

Orders of the Day:

Defined, 69—Relative precedence of Orders and Notices, 70—Orders of the Day have precedence on Tuesdays and Fridays, 81—Speaker to direct the Clerk to read the Orders of the Day without any question put, 71—Orders are disposed of in the order which they stand upon the Paper, 72—Government Orders to have precedence on certain days, *ib.*—Dropped Orders, how provided for, 73—No Order of the Day or Notice of Motion to be called on after half after Twelve o'clock at night, 53.

Notices take precedence of Orders on Wednesdays and Thursdays, unless House otherwise directs, 81—Questions superseded by Motion for now reading the Orders of the Day, 92—This however restricted to days on which Notices have precedence, *ib.*—The Question for reading the Orders of the Day may be superseded by the Adjournment of the House, 94.

Orders of the Souse. May be read and discharged, 103.

Order Paper. *See Supplementary Order Paper.*

P.

Papers. In certain cases to be translated into Maori and printed, 356-358.

Penalties, Forfeitures, and Fees. By Legislative Council Amendments, to Bills relating to; in what cases the House waive their privileges, 360—Penalties for contempt, 388—Applied to the Library Fund, 389.

Personal Explanations. Members allowed to make, although no Question before the House, 122—But such matters not debated, *ib.*

See also Explanation of Words.

Personal Interest. Disentitles a Member to vote, 155.

Persons, Papers, and Records. Power given to Select Committees to Bend for, 188.

Petitions, Public:

Time for presenting Petitions, 259—To be fairly written, printed, or lithographed, 260—Signatures to printed or lithographed Petitions to be written or properly attested, 261—No erasure or interlineation in printed or lithographed Petitions, 262—How erasures or interlineations may be made in written Petitions, 263—To be signed on the same skin on which Petition is written, 264—To be in English or Maori, accompanied by an English translation, made by a Translator appointed by the Speaker, 265—To be signed by the parties, and no one else, except in case of incapacity, 266—Signatures to be on the Petition itself, and not pasted upon or otherwise transferred thereto, 267—Common Seals of Corporations, 268—Or under the hand of the attorneys of bodies incorporated out of the colony, 268—No letters, affidavits, &c., to be attached, 269—Debates, or any intended Motion, not to be referred to, 270.

Petitions for compounding debts due to the Crown; certificate required, 271—Forgery of signatures, 272—Members presenting Petitions to affix their names at the beginning thereof, 273—And to take care they are in conformity with the rules of the House, 274—Language of Petitions to be respectful and decorous, 275.

Petitions in the nature of Election Petitions, 276—Time for presenting Election Petitions, 277,—Petitions to be presented by Members only, 278—A Member not to present a Petition from himself, 279.

Members presenting Petitions confined to statement of certain facts, 280—No debate allowed, 281—But

Petition may be read by Clerk if required, *ib.*—Exceptions in favour of petitions complaining of personal grievances urgently requiring immediate remedy, 282—Petitions referred to the Committee on Public Petitions, 283—In certain cases ordered to be printed, *ib.*—Petitions against taxes may be received, 284—Petitions from persons of the Native Race may be received without regard to the foregoing forms, 285—Reports on, to be printed and translated, 286.

Places of Members. Rules and Orders regulating the same, 57-67.

Prayers:

Read daily by the Speaker, 41—Notice thereof given by Serjeant to all Committees, 43—Their proceedings after such Notice void, *ib.*—Doors of the House closed during, 42—House counted after, 44.

Preamble (Public Bills). Consideration thereof in Committee postponed to the last, 310—Considered, and if necessary amended, and agreed to, 316.

Previous Question. Questions superseded by the, 92—The Question for the Previous Question may be superseded by the adjournment of the House, 94—If Previous Question resolved in the affirmative, 93—Motion for the Previous Question cannot be made in Committee of the Whole House, 165.

Printing Committee. Appointed at the commencement of each Session; its functions, 354.

Private Bills. Definition of, 292—Waiver by the House of their Privileges in regard to Legislative Council's amendments affecting penalties, forfeitures, and fees, 360—And in regard to Tolls and Charges in Private Bills, 361—No Member to engage by himself or partner in the management of Private Bills for pecuniary reward, 383—Joint Committee on, appointed, 291.

Privileges. Speaker lays claim to Privileges; their nature, 18—Reports his making such claim, 19—When Speaker elected on a vacancy during a Session he does not claim privileges, 24—Motions concerning Privileges take precedence of other motions, as well as of other Orders of the Day, 86—A matter of Privilege may interrupt a Debate, 95—Forgery of signatures to Petitions a breach of Privilege, 272.

Prorogation of Parliament:

Prorogation by the Governor in person after a Session, 36—The like by Commission, 37—Further Prorogation by Proclamation, 38.

Protection of Witnesses. Rule as to, 219.

Public Bills. Rules and Orders relating to, 287-347.

See also Bills, Public.

Public Petitions. See *Petitions, Public.*

Q

Quarrels. House will interfere to prevent Quarrels between Members, 137.

Questions:

When Member proposed for Speaker is unopposed he is called to the Chair without any Question put, 9—Questions on the choice of Speaker, how and by whom put, 13, 14—Question proposed when a Motion has been made and seconded, 89—No Member to speak to a Question after the same has been *put*, and voices taken, 115—Members must always speak to the Question, 118—No Member to speak twice to the same Question, 123.

Questions superseded, viz.: By adjournment, 92, 94—By reading the Orders of the Day, 92—By the Previous Question, *ib.*—Course pursued if Previous Question resolved in the affirmative, 93—Debates on Questions interrupted, and how, 95—Complicated Questions ordered to be divided, 96—Question put by Speaker when Debate is ended, 97—If Question not heard, Speaker will state it again, *ib.*—Question determined by the majority of voices, 98—Speaker states whether "Ayes" or "Noes" have it; but if this is not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99—The same Question may not be proposed twice in the same Session, 100.

Amendments to Questions. Different forms of Amendments to Questions, 104—If Amendments not seconded they will not be entertained, 105—Amendment to leave out words, 106—To leave out words and insert or add others, 107—To insert or add words, 108—When a later part of a Question has been amended no Amendment can be proposed to a former part, 109—No Amendment to be made to words already agreed to, 110—Proposed Amendment may, by leave, be withdrawn, 111—Amendments to proposed Amendments, 112—Question as amended put, 113—When Amendments proposed, but not made, 114.

Questions put by Members. Rules as to Questions put to Ministers of the Crown and others, 75-77.

Quorum:

House, and Committees of whole House. House counted after Prayers, and if 20 Members, including Speaker, be not present, no business proceeded with, and Speaker adjourns the House, 44—If notice taken after business commenced 20 Members not present, House adjourned, 47—When the House is summoned by His Excellency it is not counted, and proceeds to business although not a Quorum, 47—When Chairman of Committees of the whole House reports that 20 Members are not present, House counted, and if 20 Members

not present, House adjourned, 48—If 20 Members are present, Committee resumes, 171—When House adjourned for want of a Quorum, the hour of the adjournment and the names of the Members present are inserted in the Journals, 50.

Select Committees. Course to be pursued when Quorum not present, 184—The Quorum of each Committee appointed by the House, 186—When no Quorum appointed, all are to attend, *ib.*—Quorum of a Joint Committee, 187.

R.

Reading. Members not to read newspapers, books, or letters when in their places, 67.

Recommendation of the Crown. To any Motion or Bill how signified, 250.

Religion. Order as to Bills relating to, 293.

Replies (in Debate). Permitted in certain cases, 125.

Reports of Bills (Public Bills). Proceedings in Committee not to be noticed until Report, 317—Report of Progress, and leave asked to sit again, 318—Bill reported, and proceedings thereon, 319—324.

Reports from Select Committees. Powers of reporting given to Select Committees, 197—Manner in which Report is brought up, 199.

Reports from Committees of Supply and Ways and Means. How made and dealt with, 367, 368, 375, 380.

Reports from Committees of the whole House. Every Report to be brought up without Question put, 176.

Resolutions of Committees of Supply and Ways and Means. Reported; how dealt with, 367, 368, 375, 380.

Resolutions rescinded. A Resolution or other vote may be rescinded, 102.

Returns. Motions for Returns, Despatches, &c., how made, 349—Rules and Orders relating to Accounts and Papers, 350, *et seq.*

See also Accounts and Papers.

Royal Assent to Bills. How signified, 333.

Royal Speech:

Speaker, with the House, goes up to the Legislative Council to hear the Royal Speech, 26—A Bill read *pro forma* before Speech is reported, 28—Speaker reports Royal Speech 29—Address in answer, how prepared and presented, 30—33—Speech ordered to be taken into consideration, 34—Considered accordingly, 35—And Motion that a supply be granted to Her Majesty, *ib.*

S.

Sand Glass. Used on Divisions, 144.

Second Reading of Public Bills:

Bills ordered to be read a Second Time on a future day, 300—Question for Second Reading put, 301—Amendments to such Question, 302, 303—Read a Second Time, and afterwards committed, 304.

Secret Committees. No strangers or Members admitted to, at any time, 191.

Select Committee. See *Committees, Select.*

Serjeant-at-Arms:

Gives notice of House going to Prayers, to all Committees, 43—To take strangers into custody if in parts of the House appropriated to Members, 55—Introduces Legislative Councillors and Judges when attending to be examined, 227—Duties of Serjeant when Prisoner in custody at the Bar is examined, 224—To keep custody of Members adjudged guilty of contempt, 388.

Service of the House. Every Member bound to attend, unless leave of absence be given, 57, 59.

See also Attendance of Members. Leave of Absence.

Shorthand Writers. See *Officers of the House.*

Sickness or Infirmary. Members unable to stand from, allowed to speak sitting, 116.

Signatures to Petitions. See *Petitions, Public.*

Sitting of the House. Rules and Orders relative to the sitting and adjournment of the House, 39-56.

Speaker:

Absence of Speaker. On unavoidable absence of Speaker, the Chairman of Committees to perform his duties, 25.

Addresses. Duty of Speaker, when Address presented by whole House, 252, 256, 257.

Business of the House. Speaker, after Notices of Motion have been disposed of, to direct Clerk to read the Orders of the Day, without any question put, 71—Desires Members appearing at the Bar with Bills to bring them up, 297.

Committees of the Whole House. Leaves the Chair on House going into Committee, 157, 158—The Mace then put under the Table, 159—Resumes the Chair in certain cases, 161, 168, 169, 170—Puts Questions for

leaving the Chair, on House going into Committee on a Bill, 306—Amendments that may be moved to such Question, 307—Resumes the Chair when difference arises in election of Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, 379.

Counts and adjourns House. Speaker counts the House after Prayers, and if Twenty Members not present, no business proceeded with, and he adjourns the House, 44—If after the business of the Session has commenced, it appears on notice taken that Twenty Members are not present, he adjourns the House, 47—When Chairman of Committees reports that Twenty Members are not present, Speaker counts the House, and adjourns, 48—If on the count, it appears Twenty Members are present, the Committee resumes, 171—The doors of the House unlocked when Speaker is counting, 49—House not counted when it meets pursuant to Proclamation for despatch of business, 45—House not counted when summoned to attend His Excellency or the Commissioners, and on its return proceeds to business, although less than a Quorum present, until notice taken thereof, 46.

Delates. Members whilst speaking to address themselves to Speaker, 115—Speaker calls upon Members to speak when more than one rises, 119—Not to allow any Debate on the presentation of a Petition, 281.

Decisions. In cases not provided for herein, Speaker to decide according to the usage of the House of Commons, 382.

Divisions. When Question is put, Speaker states whether in his opinion the "Ayes" or the "Noes" "have it," 99—If his opinion not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, *ib.*—On a Division, puts the Question, and directs the "Ayes" and "Noes" to go to the Right and Left respectively, 146—If not two Tellers for one of the parties, Speaker forthwith declares the Resolution of the House, 147—The numbers reported to Speaker, who declares them to the House, 149—When equality of Votes, Speaker gives casting voice, 152.

Election of Speaker. Royal pleasure signified that House elect their Speaker on the opening of a new Parliament, 4—House proceeds to the Election of Speaker; course pursued, 7—16—Proceedings subsequent to choice of Speaker, and up to his approval, 17—19—After the commencement of a Parliament, holds a Commission, authorizing him to administer the Oath to Members, 20—Proceedings on vacancy in the office of Speaker during a Session, 23—Speaker so elected, when presented for Royal approbation, does not claim privileges, 24.

Goes to the Legislative Council; Royal Speech. With the House goes up to the Legislative Council, to hear the Royal Speech, 26—What done on returning from the Council, 27—Speaker reports, and reads the Royal Speech, 29—Part thereof again read by Speaker on House proceeding to consider the same, 35.

Messages. Reads Messages from the Crown, 246—And from the Legislative Council, 230.

Money Bills. Presents Money Bills for the Royal Assent on a Prorogation, addressing His Excellency, 36.

Order. Speaker will direct words objected to, to be taken down, 133—Speaker calls upon disorderly Members by name, 138—Speaker maintains Order in the House, 140—When Speaker rises during a Debate, House is to be silent, 141.

Questions put; Amendments to Questions. Puts the Question to the House, 143—If not heard, will again state it, *ib.*—Manner in which Speaker proposes Amendments to Questions, 106, 107, 108.

Warrants. Speaker issues his Warrant for bringing up a Witness in custody of the Keeper of any Prison, 207.

Witnesses. Examines Witnesses at the Bar, 222, 224.

Speeches. See *Debates. Reports of Speeches.*

Standing Orders. Suspended, 390—To be altered or annulled only when two-thirds of the House are present, 391.

Statutes. Offensive words against any Statute not permitted unless in moving for its repeal, 130.

Strangers. To be taken into custody, if in any part of the House appropriated to Members, 55—Or if guilty of misconduct, or not withdrawing when directed, *ib.*—Such persons not to be discharged out of custody without Special Order, *ib.*—Members not to bring Strangers in, 56—May at any time be ordered to withdraw, 385—Admission of Strangers to Select Committees, 189, 191.

Supply and Ways and Means:

Motion that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty, made on the Governor's Speech being considered, 35—All Aids and Supplies the sole gift of the Representatives, 359—And may not be altered by the Legislative Council, *ib.*—Cases in which the House will not insist on its Privilege, 360, 361—Applications for granting Public Money not entertained unless recommended from the Crown, 362—Nor proceeded upon, but in a Committee of the whole House, 363—Motions relating to money not to be presently entered upon, but a future day appointed, 364.

Motion for an address to the Crown for Money, not to be entertained except in a Committee of the whole House, 365—The Governor's Speech considered, and Motion for a Supply made, 366—Committee of the whole House on the said Motion; Speech referred, and being read, Resolution for a Supply, 367—Resolution

reported; further Resolution thereon, and Committee of Supply thereby constituted, 368, 369—Accounts and Estimates referred to the Committee; its functions commence, 370.

Questions for omitting or reducing Items, 371—Proposed in order of Printed Estimates, 372—No Motion to be made relating to any prior Item, 373—Question put upon original, or reduced Vote, 374.

Reports from Committees of Supply and Ways and Means ordered to be received on a future day, 375—Leave asked to sit again, and day appointed accordingly, 376—Committee of Ways and Means; period when, and how appointed, 377—Appointment of Chairman, 378—If difference in electing a Chairman should arise, 379—Course of Proceeding when Resolutions of the Committees reported, 380—No Amendment to any such Resolution permitted, whereby the charge upon the people will be increased, 381.

Supplementary Order Paper. Proposed Amendments may be printed on, 312.

T.

Tampering with Witnesses. Penalty for, 217.

Taxes or Duties. Petitions against any Resolution or Bill imposing, may be received, 284.

Tellers. Two Tellers on a Division appointed for each party, 146—If not Two Tellers for one of the parties, no Division, 147—Every Member counted by the Tellers, 148—Tellers come to the Table and report numbers, 149.

Temporary Laws. The precise duration thereof to be expressed in a distinct clause, 331.

Thanks of the House. Precedence given to Motions for, 87.

Third Reading of Public Bills:

Proceedings thereon, 321, 325, 326—Further proceedings on Third Reading may be adjourned to a future day, 329.

Titles of Bills. Settled and agreed to, after Bill read third time and passed, 328.

Trade. Order as to Bills relating to, 294.

U.

Unusual Expedition. Bills passed with, 330.

V.

Verbal Messages from the Crown. How communicated to the House, 249.

Voices. Questions determined by majority of voices, "Aye" or "No," 98—Speaker states which has it; if his opinion not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99.

Votes (Resolutions) of the House. Reflections on any Vote not allowed, except in moving that such be rescinded, 128—*See also Resolutions rescinded.*

Votes of Thanks. Precedence given to Motions for, 87.

W.

Warrants. Speaker issues Warrants for bringing up Witnesses in custody of the Keeper of any Prison, 207.

Ways and Means, Committee of. Rules and Orders relating thereto, 359-381.

See also Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means. Supply and Ways and Means.

Withdrawal of Motions. Is permitted, if leave be granted, without any negative Voice, 91.

Waste Lands Bill. Referred to Select Committee on, after second reading, 305.

Witnesses:

How summoned, 206—How brought up when in the custody of the Keeper of any Prison, 207—How summoned by Committees, 208—Course pursued when a Witness does not attend a Committee, 209—Penalty for neglect or refusal to attend, 210—Attendance of Members to be examined, 211, 212—If Member refuses to attend, 213—Message sent to Legislative Council when the attendance of a Legislative Councillor or Officer of that House is desired, 215.

Witnesses examined pursuant to "The Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865," 216—Punishment for tampering with Witnesses, 217—And for false evidence, 218—Protection extended to Witnesses, 219—Evidence of any proceedings or examination at the Bar, or before any Committee, not to be given elsewhere without leave, 220—Mode of conducting an examination at the Bar, 222-225—Members are examined in their place, 226—Legislative Councillors, Judges, &c., how examined in the House, 227.

Words of Heat. Debates interrupted by, 95.

Words taken down. *See Offensive Words.*

A Reply to the Question,

Is a Miracle Opposed to Reason?

By Octavius,
Bishop of Wellington.
Printed by Lyon and Blair Wellington Lambton Quay. 1875

Preface.

I HAVE been induced to write the following pages from having had my attention called to some correspondence on Miracles, which recently appeared in the *New Zealand Times*, and which was rather suddenly stopped. I do not now intend to notice what was then said. I merely wish to offer a few remarks on a fallacy that seems to have obtained some currency—That miracles are opposed to reason.

O. W.

June 9th, 1875.

Is a Miracle Opposed to Reason?

I DO not propose to offer any arguments in support of the reality of the miracles recorded in the Bible. The divine authority of the Bible, and the consequent truthfulness of the sacred narrative, rests on its own proper evidence. Those who believe in the divine authority of the Bible accept all its statements. In making this broad assertion, I do not mean to imply that errors have not, through the carelessness of copyists, crept into ancient manuscripts, and that there is not in some instances a difficulty in determining the true reading. Errors, or imaginary errors, of this class are acknowledged by all to be fairly open to candid criticism. The correction of these must be left to scholars and learned men. But it must be borne in mind that the question of miracles is very slightly if at all affected by various readings. Those who do not acknowledge the divine authority of the Bible cannot, of course, be expected to believe the scripture miracles. Evidently the first step to be taken in reference to such persons is to convince them that the Bible is the Word of God. When convinced of this, they can hardly fail to see that miracles are an inseparable part of the Christian religion. It is, however, no part of my present object to enter into an investigation of the evidences on which Christians rely for their belief in the divine authority of Holy Scripture.

What I propose is to endeavour to show that the objection commonly advanced by persons laying claim to some intellectual superiority over their neighbours against miracles—that they are repugnant to reason—is untenable. I state the matter thus baldly and abruptly, because I wish to bring it before those who may read what I am about to say, divested of all extraneous matter, and of all that is calculated to confuse or prejudice the mind. I purposely leave out of consideration all collateral questions—all questions of greater or lesser probability. I wish to raise the simple issue—Is a miracle, as such, incredible, or, in other words, impossible?

Much confusion of thought on the subject of miracles has been occasioned by ambiguous statements made in reference to them by those who thoroughly believe in them. We read of higher laws superseding lower laws. And other expedients of the same kind are proposed to obviate objections supposed to rest on scientific or intellectual grounds. I wish, therefore, to make my own meaning perfectly clear. I contend that a miracle, that is to say, a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose, is neither incredible nor repugnant to reason. I have preferred the words, *interruption* or *suspension*, to *violation*, sometimes used, merely because this word usually involves the notion of *injury*. I have used *order of nature* in preference to the more common expression, *laws of nature*, because the latter involves an ambiguity. Strictly speaking, law implies a law-giver, and an agent whose actions should be regulated by it. When applied to nature, law can only have a figurative meaning. *Laws of nature* can express nothing more than observed facts in their highest generalisation. If used in this restricted sense, the expression becomes equivalent to *order of nature*, and is perfectly admissible. It is objected that a miracle as above defined ought not to be accepted as true; that inductive science having shown that the order of nature is uniform and invariable, any interruption of it is impossible; in fact, that such an interruption is repugnant to reason. Now, it will be necessary, before I proceed, to fix the precise meaning to be attached to the word, *reason*. Few things are more remarkable than the readiness with which most persons, when they meet with an alleged fact or an argument which they are unable to answer or refute, avail themselves of the stock phrase, that it is contrary to reason. And yet not one in a hundred will give a rational explanation of what he means by reason, or indicate in any intelligible manner wherein the contrariety consists. If reason be used in its only legitimate sense, as the faculty by which men reason, that is, carry on the reasoning process, it is absurd to say that anything can be contrary or repugnant to

this. What certainly might be shown is, that there is a flaw in the process, that some step is illogical; but the process itself could not possibly be contradictory to anything. I take it for granted that nobody will venture to contend that reason implies a repertory of all knowledge, and that every possible fact ought to find its counterpart or representative there. Contrary to reason, then, must be intended to mean contrary to facts, the truth of which has been established by means of a process of reasoning.

It is important, then, that it should be made quite clear what is meant by a miracle being contradictory to reason; it will not do to leave this question in any state of doubt or ambiguity. A miracle cannot be contradictory to an intuition of reason, for the mind can only have one intuition at a time, and there can be no contradiction between successive intuitions. For instance, I had an intuition of a house, a moment after I had an intuition of a tree; but there was no repugnancy between these intuitions, one was as real as the other. But this is not all. A miracle, as already defined, is much more than an intuition, and cannot possibly be contradictory to what belongs to a different class or category. A miracle, then, I suppose, must by the objectors be deemed contradictory to a deduction of reason—to the result, that is, of a process or chain of reasoning. But the validity of a conclusion, assuming the reasoning to be legitimate, must always entirely depend on the facts that constitute the premises; and these are only obtainable either by observation and experience, or through testimony. But it is evident that knowledge so acquired can lay no claim whatever to be an absolute truth of reason, and, as such, preclude the possibility of the reality of a miracle to which it is, or is assumed to be, repugnant.

There are, however, as is generally admitted, certain necessary truths of reason. Are miracles contradictory to these, or any one of them? If they are, there can be no possible ground on which any rational being can defend them. To contradict a necessary truth of reason, would be to stultify reason, to render all use of reason impossible. That miracles are absolutely contradictory to necessary truths of the reason, and therefore impossible, has been boldly, though somewhat rashly, asserted and maintained by objectors. A great modern writer on science has said—"No amount of attestation of innumerable and honest witnesses could ever convince any-one versed in mathematical and mechanical science that a person had squared the circle," &c. It is strange that a really great thinker and able writer should have been guilty of such an unaccountable blunder as that involved in these words. Every thinker, one might have supposed, would have been aware that the question involved in squaring the circle was a purely intellectual one connected with abstract truth; to talk, therefore, of the "attestation of innumerable and honest witnesses" in reference to it is pure nonsense. It would almost appear that scientific disbelievers in miracles are incapable of maintaining their usual mental equilibrium where a question concerning miracles is concerned.

The only necessary truths of which the human reason is cognisant are the proper *axioms* of geometry. These are not dependent for their recognition as necessary truths on anything external to the mind, that is, on any observed outward fact. Their validity as necessary truths depends on the power the mind possesses of constructing for itself the objects to which they refer, without recourse to any extraneous matter. The axioms of geometry are the result of the imagination of possible objects, corresponding to actual notions. They are simple modifications of space, itself an essential condition of thought or form of the human intellect. For obvious reasons, I feel I must touch only very briefly on this subject. However necessary to my argument, it is not an aspect of the question which the general reader would care to have expanded. But the proof of the view here maintained was established nearly a century ago by Kant in his masterly *Critique of the Pure Reason*. If such axioms are the only necessary truths of the reason (together perhaps with conclusions legitimately drawn from them), it might be thought scarcely needful to show that inferences from observed facts, or, in other words, the results of inductive science, cannot establish a claim to be such, even though exalted and magnified by the high-sounding title of invariable and immutable laws.

Note A, Appendix.

But this subject must be considered.

It seems to be very usually taken for granted, and asserted most positively, that the order of nature is absolutely invariable and immutable, and that this being established by reason, any interruption of it is impossible. It will, therefore, be advisable to inquire carefully into the ground of this conviction so very generally entertained. Has this conviction any foundation in reason? The only answer to be given is, that it has no foundation in reason. By no process of reason can it be shown that the order of nature is immutable. That man does believe in the immutability of nature is certain; he has no doubt whatever upon the subject; he acts upon this belief every day of his life. Everything he undertakes rests on his belief that the future will be like the past. His whole conduct is guided by this conviction. He is perfectly justified in so doing; as a practical principle to guide him in life, he may place the most implicit confidence and undoubting reliance on it. But if, leaving the practical aspect of the subject, it is asked what reason can be given for our conviction that the future will resemble the past, we have no answer to give. All we can say is, that previous past recurrence of facts leads to the expectation of a similar recurrence in the future. This is quite true. But an expectation—a mere blind

expectation—is not a rational answer; it is not a rational solution of the difficulty; such an expectation rests on no ground of reason, and cannot satisfy the requirements of reason. That the sun has risen every day throughout past ages leads to the expectation that it will rise to-morrow, and we all act on this belief and expectation. But if a reason is asked for this expectation, what reason can be given? None. Turn and revolve it in our minds as we may, and think of it under every conceivable aspect, still we can perceive no conceivable connection between the premises—the sun has risen for a million successive days, and this—the sun will rise to-morrow. We believe it, we expect it, and we act upon the belief and expectation. But it is not a truth of reason.

"When it is asked," says the philosopher Hume, "what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning the relation of cause and effect, it may be replied in one word, 'experience.' But if we ask, 'what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?' this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution. . . . Experience can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time which fell under its cognisance; but why should this experience be extended to future times and other objects? It must be acknowledged that here is a consequence drawn by the mind, that there is a certain step taken, a process of thought and an inference which wants to be explained. . . . All inferences from experience *suppose* as their foundation that the future will resemble the past; it is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that for the future it will continue so. As an agent, I am quite satisfied on the point; but as a philosopher I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no inquiry, has yet been able to remove my difficulty."—(*Enquiry*, &c., § iv.)

Mr. Mill practically admits the same truth. "This *assumption* with regard to the course of nature, and the order of the universe is involved in every case of induction."—(*Logic*, vol. i., p. 316.) "The belief we entertain in the universality through- out nature of the law of cause and effect is itself an instance of induction; we arrive at this universal law by generalisation from many laws of inferior generality."—(*Vol. ii.*, p. 97.)

Canon Mozley in his unanswered and unanswerable *Bampton Lectures*, observes in connection with these admissions made by these philosophers: "Thus step by step has philosophy loosened the connection of the order of nature with the ground of reason, befriending in exact proportion as it has done this, the principle of miracles. In the argument against miracles, the first objection is that they are against *law*; and this is answered by saying that we know nothing in nature of law in the sense in which it prevents miracles. Law can only prevent miracles by *compelling* and making necessary the succession of nature, *i.e.*, in the sense of causation; but science has herself proclaimed the truth, that we see no causes in nature, that the whole chain of physical succession is, to the eye of reason, a rope of sand, consisting of antecedents and consequents, but without a rational link or trace of necessary connection between them. We only know of law in nature in the sense of recurrences in nature, classes of facts, *like* facts in nature—a chain of which, the *junction* not being reducible to reason, the *interruption* is not against reason. The claim of law settled, the next objection in the argument against miracles is, that they are against experience; because we expect facts *like* to those of our experience, and miracles are *unlike* ones. The weight, then, of the objection of unlikeness to experience, depends on the reason which can be produced for the expectation of likeness; and to this call philosophy has replied by the summary confession that we have *no* reason. Philosophy, then, could not have overthrown more thoroughly than it has done, the order of nature as a necessary course of things, or cleared the ground more effectually for the principle of miracles."—(*Lectures on Miracles*, p. 50.)

It seems almost unaccountable that writers who profess to deal with questions most intimately connected with the profound subjects involved in the preceding extracts, should either be ignorant of them, or purposely ignore them. Many opponents of the possibility of miracles on the ground of their repugnancy to the inductive principle and the laws of nature, seem, if we may judge from their bold unqualified assertions, to be hardly aware that their information is not abreast of modern scientific thought on this subject. Few philosophical thinkers of the present day would venture to maintain that induction did more than establish a general or universal law; they would not contend that a universal proposition could be proved. An able writer, while reviewing a late edition of Hume's works, says in reference to induction—"It does not warrant a universal affirmation. No doubt there are a great many affirmations which we practically find it worth while to treat as universal; but that is a different matter, and we look back thankfully to Hume as the master who clearly pointed out the difference. The ground of all scientific affirmation is the *supposition* that the future resembles the past—in modern language, the uniformity of nature. *Now this is itself an assumption incapable of proof.* We make it because we find . . . that it enables us to guide our conduct in life and get what we want."—(*Sat. Review*, Nov. 7, 1874.) Some of the writers I am referring to do not seem to know that this very fact—that "the uniformity of nature is an assumption incapable of proof"—has actually been converted by sceptical controversialists, in their present straits, with a versatility and facility for changing their front which is remarkable, into an argument against the possibility of miracles. "Mr. Ruskin maintains that the uniformity of

nature *not* being established, the most startling apparent departures from it would be attended by *no* evidential effect."—(*Illustrated London News*, March 15, 1878.)

The author of *Supernatural Religion* is one of the most remarkable instances of the versatility and levity just mentioned. After having based an elaborate argument for the destruction of miracles on repeated assertions as to the invariable uniformity of nature, he seems to manifest some uneasy misgivings as to whether he is not lagging behind the scientific thought of the day. But before we proceed, it may be well to see what he says as to the laws of nature. "Suspensions of the order of nature, which are also contrary to reason"—(p. 81.) "It is brought into existence by the operation of immutable physical laws"—(p. 27.) "There is no instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose effects are opposed to the ultimate riding of the laws of nature. The occurrence of anything opposed to those laws is incredible"—(p. 28.) "Our highest attainable conception of infinite wisdom and power is based upon the universality of law, and inexorably excludes, as unworthy and an-thropomorphic, any idea of its fitful suspension"—(p. 29.) "Throughout the whole inquiry into the question of miracles, we meet with nothing from theologians but mere *assumptions*, against which the invariability of the known order of nature steadily opposes itself"—(p. 23.) Christianity "is emphatically contradicted by the glorious perfection and invariability of the order of nature"—(p. 31.) "Universality and invariability of law . . . exclude the idea of interruption or occasional suspension of law for any purpose whatever"—(p. 33.) Having made these assertions, which seem to indicate with tolerable clearness what his real convictions are, he goes on to say—"Any argument which could destroy *faith* in the order of nature would be equally destructive to miracles. If we have no right to believe in a rule, there can be no right to speak of exceptions. The result in any case is this—that whether the principle of the order of nature be established or refuted, the supernatural pretensions of miracles are disallowed"—(p. 39.)

Here, then, the writer, feeling the ground to be slipping away from under his feet—feeling convinced that the invariability of the laws of nature, as a universal proposition, could no longer be maintained—feeling that this was a worn-out weapon which must henceforth, in controversy with educated men, be discarded and cast away, with inconceivable levity coolly says—"If we have no right to believe in the rule, there can be no right to speak of exceptions." His argument seems to be this—a determined sceptic must not believe in miracles. The immutability of the order of nature has hitherto seemed a good argument against them. We are now driven to admit that this is no longer philosophically tenable. Never mind; the mutability of the laws of nature will suit the sceptic just as well, in fact, better, because then an interruption of the uniformity of that which has no such characteristic, becomes impossible, and consequently no evidence can be given of a divine intervention.

But the writer seems to have completely lost sight of the subject he has undertaken to deal with. Dr. Mozley's position which he professed to refute was this—"That miracles, or visible suspensions of the order of nature for a providential purpose are not in contradiction to *reason*." But instead of attempting fairly to grapple with this proposition and refute it, he contents himself with recording the very obvious platitude that men are quite right in exercising "faith in the order of nature;" that any argument that should "destroy" this would be a great calamity. Dr. Mozley does not only admit this, but argues at great length to show that all men daily act on this faith. What the writer ought to have done, if his reasoning was to accomplish anything, was to shew that Dr. Mozley's argument is not conclusive against the assumption, that the order of nature, or invariable law, is a truth established on grounds of reason, which he never attempts to do. It would seem almost incredible that this writer should be unable to perceive the distinction maintained by Dr. Mozley, namely, that to believe in a fact, as all men do in reference to the order and stability of nature, is something quite different from assuming its necessity as an absolute truth of reason. Dean Mansel says—"My *belief* in the continuance of the observed order of natural phenomena may be perhaps explained by some law of my mental constitution; but as thus explained, it is a law of mind and not of matter." Even this understates the case, for a law of matter is not a necessary truth of reason.

The author of *Supernatural Religion* in his at-tempts to discredit the reality of miracles, without professing himself to be an atheist, frequently denounces the "assumption" of the existence of a "personal God." He says—"Dr. Mozley is well aware that his assumption of a deity is not susceptible of proof." He objects to this "assumption" *passim*. This must strike a thoughtful reader as a very novel mode of opposing miracles. Does he for a moment suppose that any supporter of the reality of miracles would waste one further thought on their defence, or that any meaning whatever could be attached to them from a Christian's point of view unless he believed in a personal God? Or does he imagine that any believer would enter into a serious discussion about miracles with an avowed atheist? On the ground of the "assumption" referred to, he disparages the works of Butler and Mansel and Mozley. Does he think that any one of these great writers addressed his arguments on miracles to atheists? Both James Mill and J. S. Mill admitted that the argument of Butler's *Analogy* as addressed to the deist was complete; they, as atheists, rejected it. But what is the meaning of calling this belief in a personal God an "assumption"? Or what is meant by the assertion that such a belief "is not susceptible of proof"? Man cannot be more conscious of his own personal existence than he is of the existence of God.

Note B, Appendix.

His assurance as to the existence of an external material world is not so certain. "The *belief* in conscious life in other than his own individual life, and consequently in a real world common to his life and others ... is now deeply rooted in every man's mental organism. We frankly concede that it is impossible by mere force of logic to *prove* to any one that there is anything real out-side his own mind."—(*Sat. Review*, Oct. 31, 1874). Readers not accustomed to reflect on the laws of thought, should be exceedingly cautious in dealing with these subjects, and should bear in mind that when it is admitted that we cannot "prove" the existence of a personal God, this admission is made just in the same sense, and in no other, in which it is admitted that we cannot "prove" our own existence or that of an external world. If any one should dispute this, it would be interesting to see how he would set about the task of defending the ground he maintained.

An objection to a miracle urged by Voltaire, and since frequently repeated by others, may require a passing notice. It can scarcely be said to lay claim to any basis in reason, but it evidently appears to some persons to have such a basis. The objection is, that according to human conception of a perfect machine, that will be deemed most perfect which requires least guidance and superintendence from the mechanist who designed and made it—that the need of divine interference with the order of nature, implied in a miracle, would manifest imperfection either in the design or the performance of the works of creation, and would therefore be derogatory to the wisdom of God. It is strange that those who advance this argument seem to have altogether missed the purpose for which miracles are alleged to have been wrought. I certainly am not aware that any believer in miracles ever imagined that a miracle was performed for the purpose of rectifying some imperfection or supplying some deficiency in nature. It is not easy to understand how such an extraordinary misconception could have arisen on this subject—a misconception not very creditable to professed thinkers. A miracle, according to its definition, is alleged to have been wrought for a providential purpose—for the sake of the moral beings who inhabit the earth. Nature, that is the material world, needed no remedial measures. No believer ever defended miracles on the ground that it did. It was rather man who had abused the freedom given him, who required a remedy. Of the works of nature it is written, "God gave them a law which cannot be broken." But He, while

—"*Binding nature fast in fate,
Left free the human will.*"

It was in connection with human redemption that miracles became necessary. In elucidation of this truth, I will venture to cite (having never seen the passage cited) some weighty words of that great genius, Bacon:—"I believe . . . that at the first, the soul of man was not produced by heaven or earth, but was breathed immediately from God; so that the ways and proceedings of God with spirits are not included in nature, that is in the laws of heaven and earth, but are reserved to the law of His secret will and grace; wherein God worketh still and resteth not from the work of redemption, as He rested from the work of creation, but continueth working till the end of the world; what time that work also shall be accomplished, and an eternal Sabbath shall ensue. Likewise, that whensoever God doth transcend the laws of nature by miracles, which may ever seem as new creations, He never cometh to that point or pass but in regard of the work of redemption, which is the greater, *and whereto all God's signs and miracles do refer.*"—(*Bacon's Works*. Montagu. Vol. vii., p. 13.)

Note C, Appendix.

I have said above that the objection referred to can scarcely be allowed to lay claim to any basis in reason. If any pretence to such a basis is made, it must be on the assumption that man has an absolute knowledge of the Divine Nature and attributes, and is quite competent to determine *a priori* how the Almighty ought to have created the world and all it contains. Only on such a presumptuous hypothesis could man be entitled to pronounce on the right of the Supreme Being to exercise again on earth creative power. For it is clear for reasons already given, that no observed facts or accumulated experiences could lead up to such a generalisation as would authorise man to criticise God's mode of procedure in governing the world. The conditions under which alone human thought is possible, namely, the forms of time and space, and the categories, preclude such a conception of the infinite nature of God as would justify the assumption referred to.

There is an argument occasionally relied upon that I must not be supposed to have ignored, although it has been implicitly answered in what has been already said, I allude to what is usually called "the correlation of forces." It is contended that the actual forces of nature are so correlated and mutually inter-dependent, that no intervention of any power can be conceived which would not utterly disturb and subvert the whole equilibrium of nature. But surely such a miraculous intervention as that implied for the purpose of suspending and interrupting some law or laws of nature, could as certainly provide against the supposed collateral and consequent disturbances arising out of that intervention, as affect the direct and primary object which constituted the miracle. If the one has been shown not to be repugnant to reason, it is perfectly clear no valid argument can be established against the other. And here, it may be remarked, that such an interference with the equilibrium of nature is not even beyond the province and power of man's free will and actions. Let me

illustrate what I mean by a local circumstance. A Forestry Statute was recently enacted by the Legislature of this country on the express ground that without it man might *wilfully* destroy the forests, and thereby lessen the rain-fall, and thus alter and possibly permanently injure the climate of this country. But according to the principle of immutable law, what would this be but a disturbance of the atmospheric status over the whole earth?

I conclude with repeating what I began by saying, that it is no part of my present object to enter into the consideration of any questions connected with the *evidence* on which the miracles recorded in Holy Scripture are accepted and believed by Christians. That would have led far beyond my present scope or purpose. I desire to guard myself from any misunderstanding on this head. If a miracle had never been wrought, or even pretended, my argument would remain substantially the same; "the scientific question relates to the possibility of supernatural occurrences *at all*." What I have endeavoured to maintain is, that a miracle, that is to say, a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose, is neither incredible nor repugnant to reason. The task that I set before me though a difficult, was a very limited one; it was to obtain an answer to the question—"Is a miracle repugnant to reason?" I have briefly endeavored to show that it cannot be contradictory to any intuition of reason, which is concerned only with individual objects; nor to any necessary truths of reason, because these are only necessarily true within the mind itself; nor to any deduction of reason from observed facts, because the mind possesses no absolute criterion of the conformity of intellectual notions to such observed facts. I have further striven to make it clear that the invariability of the order or laws of nature, although a practical regulative truth, cannot be converted into, and established as, a universal proposition, in the sense of a truth of geometry, so that its denial should involve either a contradiction or an obvious absurdity. I have incidentally pointed out that some of the greatest modern thinkers support these views.

I would here as it were parenthetically remark, that I have not thought it needful to consider Schelling's claim for the absolute truth of that which he imagines is grasped by the "intellectual intuition" out of ordinary consciousness. This has indeed been accepted by some English writers; but the acute criticism of this doctrine by Sir William Hamilton—that, even if true, it could be made no use of in argument but by means of ordinary consciousness and ordinary reasoning—with which by the hypothesis it could have no connection—is decisive as to the impossibility of its being made available as a criterion or test of the truth of any concrete subject-matter.

I have no confidence in the potency of arguments such as I have used, even though advanced with ten-fold the ability to which I could lay any claim, to draw any human heart from scepticism to believe in the Christian religion, and therefore in miracles. All that I have ventured to hope I might do in these few pages is, to guard the young and unwary against being led away from the faith of the Gospel by the positive assertions, made with such astonishing audacity by many modern writers, as to the contradiction they allege exists between miracles and the human reason. The arrogant manner in which physicists and physiologists, whose writings make patent their very imperfect acquaintance with mental science, practically assert their own infallibility on psychological and metaphysical questions, although it may appear almost ludicrous to some persons, not unfrequently staggers the young, and too often leads them to acquiesce in their dogmatical assertions. My object has simply been to show that the positive statements referred to are not altogether trustworthy. If through the blessing of God, what I have written should produce even this effect in the mind of any one of my readers, "I commend him to God and the Word of His grace" for His thorough confirmation in the faith.

Appendix.

Note A.—Page 8.

"The question now is as to the criterion by which we can securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience teaches us, indeed, that something is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not be otherwise. In the first place, therefore, a proposition is met with which is conceived of at the same time with its necessity, it is then a judgment *a priori*; and if, besides this it is not deduced from any other, and, as itself, again holds true as a necessary proposition, it is thus absolutely *a priori*. In the second place, experience never gives to its judgments certain and strict universality, but only *assumed* and comparative (by induction); so that, strictly speaking, it must be said, *so far as we have hitherto perceived*, there is no exception to this or that rule."—(*Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason*, pp. 2, 3.)

Note B.—Page 16.

"If therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of *believing* that the mind, or *Ego*, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of

accepting the paradox, that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as series."—(Mill. Ex. Sir W. H.'s Phil., pp. 212, 213.)

"Belief in the reality of self is indeed a belief which no hypothesis enables us to escape. . . . But now, unavoidable as is this belief—established though it is, not only by the assent of mankind at large, endorsed by divers philosophers, but by the suicide of the sceptical argument, it is yet a belief admitting of *no justification by reason*; nay, indeed, it is a belief which *reason*, when pressed for a distinct answer, *rejects*—(H. Spencer's *Principles*.)

The proof of the existence of a personal God comes from within man's own soul. The following passage from Jacobi is given by Sir W. Hamilton (*Lect. Metaph.*, vol. 1, pp. 40, 41.) "But is it unreasonable to confess that we believe in God, not by reason of the nature (in contrast to the world of intelligence) which conceals, but by reason of the supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves Him to exist?

"Nature conceals God: for through her whole domain Nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes, without beginning and without end, excluding with equal necessity both providence and chance. An independent agency, a free original commencement within her sphere and proceeding from her powers, is absolutely impossible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the good nor of the beautiful; creating nothing, she casts up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself, un-consciously and without an end; furthering with the same ceaseless industry, decline and increase, death and life—never producing what alone is of God, and what supposes liberty—the virtuous, the immortal. Man reveals God: for man by his intelligence rises above nature, and in virtue of this intelligence is conscious of himself as a power not only independent of, but opposed to, nature, and capable of resisting, conquering, and controlling her. As man has a living faith in this power, superior to nature, which dwells in him, so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of His existence. As he does not believe in this power, so does he not believe in God; he sees, he experiences nought in existence but nature, necessity, fate."

Note C.—Page 18.

Hume, while writing against miracles, states the matter thus:—"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."—(*Philosophical Works*, vol. iv., p. 133.) But it has been seen that the "firm unalterable experience" is an assumption. Let J. S. Mill reply to this—"But in order that an alleged fact should be contrary to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct inter- position of an act of the will of some Being who has power over nature; and in particular of a Being whose will, being assumed to have endowed all the causes with the powers by which they produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them. A miracle (as was justly remarked by Brown) is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect, it is a new effect supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause. Of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no doubt; and the only antecedent improbability which can be ascribed to the miracle, is the improbability that any such cause existed."—(*Logic*, vol. ii., p. 159.)

Vignette

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Critique on a Bishop's Reply to the Question,

"Is a Miracle Opposed to Reason?"

By Willlliam,

Burgess of Wellington.

James Hughes, Printer Wellington Lambton Quay. 1875

Preface.

I AM induced to write the following critique from having had my attention called to a pamphlet by the Right Reverend the Anglican Bishop of Wellington upon the subject of miracles.

My objects in doing so are:

- To point out the fallaciousness of his Lordship's definitions of miracles.
- To show that the arguments advanced to prove that miracles are not against reason are fallacious.
- To show that an acceptance of all the statements of the Bible is not, as implied by the author, necessary for a belief in the Divine authority of that book.

In the course of this work I shall endeavour to show that science, in place of being antagonistic to religious emotions, absolutely promotes and guides them aright; that she only arrays herself against those errors and absurdities ingrained in every system of belief which is built up in gross ignorance of God's works.

Before going over the Bishop's work I feel it necessary, for the sake of the large human interests I attempt to subserve and promote, to notice in general terms the character of that correspondence, which, as his Lordship indicates, led him to publish his views, as it shows the spirit in which, unfortunately, this kind of correspondence is usually carried on.

The correspondence cited rose out of a chance sentence of a reviewer, intended to support the idea that some of our highest scientific knowledge was known to the ancients, which is quite true, without being discreditable to modern scientists, as will be seen. The sentence to which I refer described the alleged miracle of the sun standing still at Joshua's command as an "eclipse."

Forthwith a letter from one signing himself (as it seems incorrectly) "A Christian" appeared, combating the reviewer more by force of abuse than of logic. The question was therefore left about where it was; but the letter remains, "even to this day," a choice sample of the true anti-Christian spirit, and of nonconformity of practice with profession. Afterwards we had the advent on this mimic battle-field, in a peaceful character, of an astronomical theologian of high standing, who, boldly stepping one foot out of orthodoxy, explained the miracle nearly away by assuming that the appearance of the sun and moon standing still was in fact simply an optical illusion. The ghost of this miracle so left he re-embodied in a kind of meteorological forecast, from which harmless position I apprehend none of us wish to displace it. In support of this novel view the Biblical statement in question was manipulated with that freedom and skill which long practice gives. Amendments and compromises of this nature, however, carried out upon the Bible as a whole, would tend very much towards staying that feeling of unbelief in it unfortunately so prevalent, and I should be glad to see a commentary of this sort undertaken, or even to assist in those portions requiring any professional knowledge which I can give.

I cannot, by the way, avoid thinking that the objects of his Lordship's present work are the reconversion of this erring brother to the true, the immutable faith, and the counteraction of any influence which this heretical rendering of the "Word may have had.

Besides the above-mentioned letters, several able ones appeared representing the various opinions upon the matter of those who will neither have thought enslaved, nor spare others who allow it. With the exception of the one letter by "A Christian," all are very courteous in their tone; so much for the spirit of Modern Christianity as represented in this correspondence.

I write under the thin disguise taken here, not that I fear to avow my opinions, but that they may go forth for a time free from personal considerations. It would have been more in my usual style to act otherwise, for surely no one should be ashamed to father his opinions upon debatable points, and, indeed, such a course is only due to a gentleman who has stepped out in the manful way the Bishop has done to champion popular opinion.

Should my name, however, be necessary to any one desirous to controvert this brochure, I shall be happy to furnish such an one with it. At the same time, I express my determination not to bind myself to answer anybody who, under such a disguise as the one I have taken, discards that gentle-manly deportment which Christianity inculcates.

His Lordship has begun well, and it is for the interest of every one that such combatants be not driven from the field by cowardly abuse, or abuse indeed of any kind, nor yet by unfair hitting;—let us have nothing below the belt, nor raise one angry emotion to blind our judgment. In the following critique I believe I have faithfully observed the bounds which courtesy imposes.

W. W.

Critique on a Bishop's Reply to the Question,

"Is a Miracle opposed to Reason."

FOR the assistance of those who have not had the opportunity of reading the pamphlet I am about to criticise, I will state, as briefly as possible, the grounds upon which its author contends for a negative answer to the question, "Is a Miracle opposed to Reason."

The reverend author commences the argumentative portion of his pamphlet very appropriately by defining miracles and the more important terms used in his argument, the discussion of which will form the subject of Part I.

The argument itself is prosecuted by admitting that, if miracles are contrary to necessary truths, no rational being can defend them; then, if I understand the author correctly, he argues as follows:—

- That miracles are not against necessary truths.

- That immutability of the order of nature cannot be shown by any "process of reasoning," and so is not a necessary truth.
- Therefore the order of nature is not against miracles—a proposition equivalent to saying that a miracle is not opposed to reason.

This conclusion, with all possible courtesy and respect for the learned author, I shall in Part II. endeavour to refute.

Part I.

First, then, I observe that a miracle is defined as "a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose." In regard to this I would ask, why has a phenomenon to be visible ere it can be a miracle? In what sense is the term "visible" used here? Is it objectively, and if so, is man to be considered the only agent by which a miracle can be completed, or may some inferior organism, say a monkey or a mollusc, share with him the power necessary for such an operation and compete with him for a dignity so great and exalted?

Or is the term "visible" to be used in the more obscure and general sense, "*that it may be seen?*" If so, then by its vagueness or futility, it is useless here, and worse than useless, it is a dummy that cumpers the ground and makes progress difficult; for what indeed is this, if anything at all, but requiring a certain magnitude as a necessary quality of a miracle. But, if a miracle is possible at all, might we not have one on so minute a scale as to be incapable of recognition in any way by a finite being?

I cannot but consider the term "visible" useless here, though no doubt there are reasons for inserting it.

The next term of the definition is, that the event must be for a "*providential purpose*" in order to be a miracle.

I can only take this qualification as an attempt, in a spirit of weak but pardonable jealousy, to imply that creeds other than the author's own have not, as assigned, the usual miraculous basis, for I suppose that this term is used with a compound meaning—first, in the sense as implying that God is the agent, next that the event itself must be for a purpose useful to us. Indeed, this last meaning is denoted for it as I find further on, and is stated as follows:—

"A miracle, according to its definition, is alleged to have been wrought for a providential purpose—that is, *for the sake of the moral beings who inhabit the earth.*" Not to make light of so serious a matter, I cannot avoid thinking the word *moral* is not chosen with a proper regard for those unfortunate people who are liable to be troubled in their readings with suggestions arising out of, but foreign to, the idea sought to be conveyed. One naturally conceives that any miracle would be performed more for the sake of *immoral* than *moral* beings. Now, the word "human" would have kept such unfortunate people to the correct idea without, as I think, taking anything from the force with which it is intended to strike them.

However, we will let this pass, and proceed with the necessary examination. Why, I would ask, why is it necessary that this visible suspension of order before it can be considered a miracle must be for a "providential purpose"? Surely if a miracle with it, it is one without it. Again, is it not evident that, if we insist upon making up the definition of a miracle with this term included, we have a condition imposed which we can never know has been complied with, so that if a miracle happened before us we could never determine it to be one? Allowing, however, that one may judge whether an event is a miracle or not, by appearances in a general way, I would ask answers to two questions for my guidance.

First: Would it not be a miracle (audible in part) were a donkey to address his rider in human speech, and to be gifted for the nonce with spiritual sight, and so be able to save his rider's life, and thus to secure his blessing for a "chosen people"?

Second: Would it be a miracle were a serpent to address in like manner a woman for her moral down-fall?

According to the term of the definition I am examining, it appears to me that the one is a miracle, the other is not. But if not, what is it? Or, to take a recorded case of unnatural development—that of serpents from rods, performed by jugglers and by a deistical priest respectively—is such to be classified as a conjuring trick or a miracle according to the purpose for which it was wrought? and does the nature of this purpose distinguish the wizard from the inspired miracle-worker?

Of course our author, by assuming that an event has to be for a providential purpose so that it may be a miracle, by implication recognises that a suspension of the order of nature may occur which is not for providential purposes. May I ask, then, how such phenomena might be defined? Does it not seem better for us to drop these qualifications altogether? If we do so we have the residue—a miracle is an interruption or suspension of the order of nature.

Taking now of this residue of the definition the term "*interruption or suspension of the order of nature,*" I cannot feel sure of the meaning intended to be conveyed by the word "*order.*" I cannot see how it can be

"suspended." It appears easier to conceive of law being thus affected, perhaps though the author intends "order" to be used only in the sense of law, I look forward that I may get the sense in which it is used here, and find that "order of nature" is used as an equivalent for laws of nature, which latter, as owned, is the "more common expression"; and this change is effected professedly to escape ambiguity, "law of nature implying a *law-giver* and an agent whose action should be regulated by it." But, to my mind, order of nature implies an order-giver and an agent, etc.

However, this does not much matter now. What has to be done is to ascertain if this equivalence is observed and kept up in the argument, for I cannot get rid of the idea that law means, or can mean, something different from what order can—that order in its usual sense denotes a regular succession (say of events), which law in its proper scientific use does not, but rather continuity, persistence. Turning to page 9, I find a very clear illustration of the meaning here attached to the word "order" in the premise uselessly manufactured for us to show that the sun will rise again. In it we find that the idea of *regular succession* is the sole meaning attached to the word order, as will be shown in due course. It is of vital importance to distinguish between this meaning of order, and that of law as used in the exact sense it should be for any controversy of this nature. Law, as I apprehend its meaning, is simply "the formulæ of phenomena which have a *constant* tendency to occur," and it is failing to appreciate or overriding this difference that has, as I conceive, led the author astray. It cannot be denied he is in first-rate company, but this only makes it the more necessary for me to notice the matter. For instance, a law of matter is that it has a continuous tendency to rush to matter: we here imply no *succession* of events, but a *continuous* event, no regularity, no periodicity of incidents, but a regular immutable tendency.

It is confounding these two terms with each other, neglecting to observe this difference, and using them indiscriminately, that spoils many of the extracts appearing in the pamphlet.

"A law of nature is not an agent or an agency by which substances are coerced; it is not a creator of phenomena, but their formulæ." To argue for immutability of the order of nature in the sense of immutable periodicity of events is so excessively foolish that we cannot be expected to do it.

The author has dropped the term law, as "commonly used," to avoid an apparent ambiguity, and, in his choice of a substitute, has got hold of a real one, or at any rate has one several sizes larger than the one he boggles at. He has strained out a gnat, only to swallow a camel.

Possibly this shirking of the term law is occasioned by a knowledge of the Biblical text, "God gave them (the works of nature) a law which cannot be broken," as it would obviously be very inconsistent for a champion of such statements to argue that this law may be broken.

So far, I think, I have clearly shown that the author's definition of a miracle is too rigorous, too exclusive a one, to be of any use. The task of identifying an event as a miracle, which seems even now an impossible feat, is, with such qualifications for it as he lays down, an infinitely more difficult one.

For man to be able to recognise an event as a miracle, does it not occur to the learned author that he must possess infinite knowledge, or else (leaving these new qualifications alone) how is he to know that the order of nature has been suspended? He can only be assured that what little he knows of this order appears to be so.

Upon logical grounds, therefore, does it not seem absurd to argue for the possibility of what we can never prove, when all scientific experience and every deduction from this points to its impossibility?

I can assure the author that were the strangest event to happen, scientific people—that is, all those who use their reason for discovering or knowing natural laws or truth—would never admit it to be a miracle. Supposing, for instance, anyone were to take a cock Moa, put him into a mesmeric trance, then remove a rib from him, and, presto! a fine adult hen bird is produced from it, completely equipped to obey the Biblical injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply." We might be very much astounded; some might lose their heads over it, but those who did not would only endeavour to ascertain the *cause* of the *phenomenon*.

Theologians may continue arguing that what appears as the most impossible jugglery to us can be performed if a providential purpose is the object. It is all very well, however, to talk of providential purposes; but is there not always one on the way? This, however, is, as far as science tells us, not effected by sudden, by miraculous interventions, but by the cumulative effects of infinitely little movements over immense periods of time, and it is here, that all which is truly miraculous, or at least wonderful, lies. Are we not, in our blind eagerness for miracles, passing real wonders by in order to take up with illusions?

In concluding this part I have to notice the definition of another term, not so much in a critical spirit, but only that in the introduction to this a slur is cast upon the common sense of a large number of persons. Thus, in defining the precise meaning of the term reason, the author commences by saying: "Few things are more remarkable than the readiness with which most persons, when they meet with an alleged fact, or an argument which they are unable to answer or refute, avail themselves of the stock phrase—that it is contrary to reason."

Now, is it not clear that this is an elliptical expression, one authorised by long usage on account of brevity, and as indicating, when filled in as common sense dictates, the precise and the full idea intended to be conveyed by it.

The author is quite right in defining this term of the question he discusses, but I do not see why those who use it should be spoken of in this somewhat contemptuous tone. Using the short term in this manner can hardly indicate ignorance or a lapse of judgment. If I might make an observation here, I would say that the filling in of the elliptic expression "opposed to reason," is not completed by the author. I would amplify thus—the *conception* of a miracle is against a deduction of reason: I conceive the author's amendment makes this one necessary. Considering he frequently expresses himself elliptically in his pamphlet, we may be sure that this shorthand way of imparting our ideas has not gone out of fashion yet; but, if he intends to indicate that the degree of this ellipse is here too great, all I would say is, that he himself makes use of a phrase exhibiting this property to a far greater extent than the one objected to does. For instance, we have in his pamphlet "the axioms of geometry are simple modifications of space"—surely this requires considerably more "padding" than the one to which he takes exception.

Part II.

In the part of the Bishop's pamphlet now reached, the method employed in the argument begins to be disclosed, and the way is prepared for it by the admission that miracles cannot be "contradictory to necessary truths of reason."

Now, these truths are, as stated, "the result of the imagination of possible objects corresponding to actual notions."

Therefore, a miracle cannot affect what is, as we know, very easily affected, namely, the imagination still what appears most impossible is a mere plaything to it. Surely the author has not defined the necessary truths properly, or is it that miracles are thus limited, in order that the human will may be free; that is, both the possibility of free will and of miracles is desired, but they must not interfere with each other. If this is the object of thus limiting the scope of miracles, all I will say is, that for a believer in the literal sense of the word to maintain that free will cannot be thus affected is a very singular anomaly indeed. What was the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, and Divine Inspiration generally, but the exercise of a Divine Influence upon man's free will? Does not this limitation, imposed upon miracles, taken along with the qualifications put upon them a little way back, hedge and cut them down in such a way that few of the alleged Biblical ones will stand? To my mind, to abide by such definitions carries a person out of orthodoxy altogether.

There is a point connected with the limitations thus imposed upon miracles which I must treat of: the author's admission as to the impossibility of miracles contradicting necessary truths of reason, if followed up, seems to involve him in strange dilemmas, one of which I will take the liberty of showing. It appears as a deduction from the following series of axioms or propositions, however we like to name them, which just occur to me.

- *O=O*: A triviality, mere reiteration, it may be said, but so are some of our much vaunted geometric axioms when worked down to their simplest terms.
- *A Universe is:*
Next I have two, which being theological ones will of course pass for axiomatic truths or something more.
- *God is:*
- *The Universe is God made:*

Therefore, as nothing can come from nothing, God made the Universe out of Himself.

Of course this conclusion is wrong, palpably wrong. I know, we all know it to be so, and for the very sufficient reason it that, is against all reason and common sense and no doubt Christians are dazed to know this for in truth it is not bringing God too close to us, besides is it not allowing Him too much, giving Him all the Praise, the Glory and the Power. Such a tremendous abnegation of self, and such a trial of faith as this involves and requires is too much for us, too reverential to God, too humiliating to ourselves. Fortunately for us it is wrong; but the point is this, the author having stated that miracles cannot be contrary to necessary truth, seems placed in this dilemma, he must either allow they can be, or accept the obnoxious conclusion cited; for, surely, to change the axiom $0=0$ into $0=1$ requires a miracle, and one as big or bigger than to change that of $1=1$ into $1=2$, thus a necessary truth *has* to be contradicted by a miracle, or else Pantheism stares us in the face, becomes in fact a stern necessity; but as this doctrine is evidently absurd, miracles *can* contradict necessary truths, or something even bigger, so taking the author's own description of the dreadful consequences of this, our "reason is stultified, and all use of it is impossible." Thus we are brought to a truly sad state—the prospective loss of reason from disuse of it.

This position may of course be escaped by denying the correctness of proposition 2, that is, by assuming we have no evidence of the existence of a universe. In the author's own words it is alleged that this "cannot be proved;" but, any way, the Bishop either keeps in a dilemma, or, if he avoids this, it is only to occupy the absurd

position of sagely arguing about what either does not or is not known to exist.

It surely will not be contended that truth is confined to abstract notions, and that whenever we take concrete quantities the very shadow of truth goes: what is this but affirming that truth is only of the mind. However, I leave the question just raised, at this interesting point, as it is sufficient that I have shown the curious consequences which follow when one sets out as a believer in the possibility of miracles with the funny idea of their having bounds which they cannot pass.

We now approach the second stage of the author's argument. He has admitted that a miracle cannot be against a necessary truth, all therefore that is wanted, all that the argument has to do, is to show that there are no necessary truths in the way of a miracle (no easy task), but in place of this we have only the bare affirmation that, "The only necessary truths of which the human reason is cognizant are the proper axioms of geometry."

Now, as the author is so particular to stick to "*necessary truths*" for his side, it is only proper he should do so for the other. What should have been done in place of making this useless affirmation, was to prove that these axioms are the only necessary truths; the author would then have closed the argument victoriously and done something which would have worthily associated him as a discoverer with those "*great men*" I shall presently allude to: but in fact the author I find further on himself restates the case more favourably for us, and with some little "versatility" affirms that in effect "*there may be others (necessary truths) legitimately drawn from them.*"

In accordance with what has been admitted, it is clear that, until it is proved that miracles cannot be against reason, it must be shewn as a necessary truth that there are no other necessary truths than those expressed in the axioms of geometry, or legitimate deductions from them excepting, of course, the limiting one then found. This of course must be exceedingly difficult to do, and I shall hazard in their appropriate places the few I shall require for the object in view: meanwhile, let us go on and see what these axioms are, which a miracle cannot affect—how they differ from what are considered as truths, truths which cannot be proved to be otherwise.

We find that truths, other than these axiomatic ones are alleged to "rest upon knowledge acquired by experience," and the author avers that "knowledge acquired in this manner cannot lay any claim whatever to be an absolute truth of reason," so, by implication, axiomatic truth is not acquired by experience. Either, the author is not himself "abreast of modern scientific thought" (to use the language he applies to sceptics) or he pooh-poohs the opinion of numerous able thinkers that experience *is* necessary for the attainment of axiomatic truth.

Any way it is certain that, the controversial stage being that in which this subject is, it is not right that in a work professedly logical and treating a question of great interest, the fact of the premises used in it being of a very doubtful and so debatable nature is left unnoticed; rather, I think, this should have been stated, and those reasons have accompanied the statement which induced the author to look upon the matter in the light he does; thus the public would have been placed in a position to form an opinion on the subject. As it is, the chain of logical argument is, as I conceive, completely broken off at this point.

It is not my place of course to demonstrate that experience is the basis of necessary truths, it is sufficient for me to state here my firm belief that it is so. It is a question, which is, perhaps, best left to each man to decide for himself.

I meet statements with statements, possibly quite as reliable as those I controvert; so before absolute progress can be made, it is necessary, I think, to test these, but, a controversy of this nature is not for me to initiate; the onus of proof resting as it does upon the one who first asserts. To properly state either side I should have to give numerous pages of extracts, a course which would stretch this work to undue dimensions, and besides take from it that coherence and directness it is my object to give it I shall, however, be very happy to give my utmost attention to any argument upon this subject with which the learned author may favor the public, while, to show that even among the clerical party here experience *is* deemed requisite to the attainment of necessary truth, I quote two passages from an able paper by the Rev. R. Kidd, L.L.D., on "Induction and Necessary Truth.

Transactions and Proceedings of the N.Z. Institute, vol, vii

"It is from experience that we acquire the conception of things; so that without experience we could not form any proposition whether inductive or necessary it is fitting and requisite that recourse should be had to experience in order to *verify* our judgments."

Returning now to the position taken up by our author in limiting necessary truths to those expressed in the geometric axioms and deductions from them, it is apparent that if experience is their common basis it will be very difficult to prove that some of the other scientific truths are not also necessary ones, considering that they also have experience for their basis. Take for instance, the one held to be axiomatic, "every effect has a cause;" this is based on experience, as it is experience which indicates that every effect we know of has had a cause, and we cannot conceive of this being contradicted when we make out of it a universal proposition, and consequently an axiom. But, if it is not an axiomatic truth, how can we distinguish it from one?

It must be considered that the Bishop's position is such, that if even *one* necessary truth lies outside those he cites (that is in nature) his argument fails utterly; for instance, to apply the one just stated, (an undeniable one I believe) it is in the order of nature "that every effect has a cause," but as "necessary truth" a miracle "cannot contradict it," therefore, a miracle is opposed to reason, and the general proposition that a miracle is not opposed to reason is incorrect.

There are many other truths of nature which appear valid as necessary ones, and so will be opposed to miracles, but as sufficient has I believe been adduced to overthrow the author's position, I forbear citing any of them now.

Ere I quite leave this subject however, I will just consider that portion of the pamphlet which professes especially to grapple with the question of immutability of the order (laws) of nature. The author commences his labours here by saying:—"It seems very usually taken for granted and asserted most positively, that the order of nature is absolutely invariable and immutable, and that this being established by reason, any interruption of it is impossible."

Now, this is not by any means the position a sceptic would take up; he would certainly object to making immutability of the order of nature contingent upon its "being established by reason;" but I let this pass without further comment, and proceeding, I find with feelings of great relief, that I am perfectly justified in believing that the order of nature is immutable: how then can I believe in miracles? Again, if I am to believe in them, how am I "justified" in believing the future will be like the past, how can I be justified in supposing that miracles will happen again, so that the future will be like the past? Does not the author wish to show that laws or supposed laws cannot be depended on?

I merely ring these changes to show what meshes we are involved in, when we take leave of experience, and introduce a conception of a disturbing element by assuming Divine interference with the order of nature.

But going back to the argument as regards immutability of the order of nature, I find, as has been shown in my analysis of terms, that *order* is used generally, if not always, by the author as an equivalent for *regular recurrence*, so our own proper argument does not appear, and therefore, is not met. Thus we are placed in a false position and the ridicule hurled at us falls harmless.

Possibly the Bishop's idea of a "straw man" having been set up by Zetales is a reminiscence of the one to which I here call attention.

But as I have already pointed out, this sense of the term "order" in its present application is not the proper one, it is *law*, and we use it, in a sense implying its unchangeableness, which of course, is quite a different thing, and why the term order should have been substituted for that of law, I cannot yet comprehend. For this reason, we should never think of adopting as a premise, for showing the sun will rise to-morrow, the one supplied us, "he has risen a million successive days," or even that he has risen daily for a million years, which is nearer the mark. That he has risen such a number of days successively at any time is with us an argument that he will *not* rise to-morrow, (or, perhaps I should say, again); knowing well the mutability of nature as regards succession of events, we consider him in reality less likely to rise again, than if he had only just turned up.

The kind of argument furnished to us here, would have been the only possible one about the time of the Reformation, but we have better ones now, thanks to the unhallowed and anathematized but glorious labors of the philosophers of that epoch, in bringing to light again the precious thoughts of ancient times, from under the vile accumulations which, during centuries of religious violence, superstition and ignorance had heaped upon them.

Some of these I will now state. In doing so I take what appears to me impossible to conceive of other than as necessary truths:—

- That matter is, as regards ourselves, force.
- That force is indestructible.
- That force acting in any direction requires force to divert it.
- That force acts in the same way at all times under similar circumstances.
- That all possible force is at present in existence.

1. As to the first we only know matter by its operations, that is, as manifested to us experientially, and these operations are nothing more to us nor ever will be than the play of forces. It cannot be deemed that we know anything in regard to matter except as force, and the laws or some of the laws which it observes. Further views respecting the constitution of matter are given in Note A. of the appendix to this.

2. In regard to the alleged indestructibility of force we cannot conceive of any force being absolutely lost. That any given force may be less apparent to us after another force has run counter to it, is undeniable, but in such a case the force is merely as it were spread out, or cut up, has passed into other forms, has been coerced into different directions or self-involvements. We can follow it with the eye of faith as we may a drop of water in the "ocean; we may conceive a universal degradation, as it were, of force, as regards operant power in relation to ourselves, or to any particular object, but we cannot imagine its annihilation.

3. That force requires force to affect it or divert it is undeniable. Force can neither change its mode of action nor even its direction without the determining effect of another force.

4. In regard to the fourth proposition, time surely cannot be supposed to be a factor in any kind of result; but when it appears to be so it is because natural operations have become factors in regard to what we are contemplating. If, however, anybody thinks differently, he cannot conceive of it but as a constant factor, that is, of the same value for the past, present, or future.

5. And, lastly, whatever number or kinds of forces there are, we cannot imagine, but that all possible force is as it were out, that is, in present existence, and that these have been so from all eternity. We cannot conceive of a latent force locked up for emergencies, say for the interruption or suspension of present force as would be necessary for miracles. To go further, we can never think that God himself is in any way latent. He must ever be infinitely active, He has "made all things" and "in Him we live and move and have our being;" surely this requires omnipotent *action*.

Science has long given up her idea of a latent power, in the sense of one gagged, repressed or concealed, and only uses it now to express a power *working* in a manner not so perceptible to us as when working in another manner, and science must still persist in this rendering of the term, *whatever* is in view. Thus we cannot conceive that any of God's power is *latent* in the sense stated, but must hold, as I say, that it is all in operation. What this amounts to is, that there can not be any creation of force, that all present and future results are, or will be due, at bottom, to force now in existence.

If, now, the above stated propositions are necessary truths, the legitimate deductions from them will likewise be so.

I quote from Lewes to sustain these views:—"The laws of motion have the same certainty and self-evidence when their terms are apprehended as the axioms of Geometry; *neither* have these characters when the terms are imperfectly apprehended; *both* demand that the mind should already be in possession through experience of the specified relations."

Using now these propositions, and those deductions from them which are necessary for our purpose, I maintain that the earth having at this instant a determinate axial motion, will preserve this not only for another day, but for a great number of days, and, that further, she will keep her relative position in respect to the sun, and so sunrise will be an event of the morrow. In all this, we, of course, use calculations based upon those laws of force, which we have up to this time ascertained.

We do not contend, in this as implied by the Bishop, that it is a necessary truth of reason that the sun will rise to-morrow, but merely that the chances of this happening are as a number almost infinite is to one. We further contend as a necessary truth, that were he not to rise to-morrow say, not till the day after, some *physical cause* would have prevented him, a cause certain to be discovered by one or other of those who retained their heads under the circumstances, and thus kept aloof from the insensate superstition which would be sure to attack the weak at such a time. If it is urged that God can surely arrest or re-direct that which he sustains and orders, we answer that this requires an absolute creation of force; and, if it is further urged that this might be accomplished by a mere withdrawal of God or His power, we would ask where the power thus withdrawn can be placed, or how it can be disposed of.

Is it not certain that God can only be present where His power is! and to imagine this power neutralized or removed, is to suppose, that the Omnipresent is not in this case present, which leads us evidently into an absurdity.

In this part I have only now to notice two or three points in the pamphlet of minor importance. In answer to the argument against miracles, "that they would utterly disturb and subvert the whole equilibrium of nature," the author alleges that this "collateral disturbance could as certainly be provided against as the primary object carried out," which, is of course undeniable; but in order to make still surer he remarks that "such an interference with the equilibrium of nature is not beyond the province and power of man's free will," and then follows an illustration of the meaning of this, from which it is plain our author considers and maintains that man can perform acts which in their educement may precisely comply with the terms he employs for defining a miracle—Consequently these acts or their resultant may, in the exercise of our free will, be miraculous or not according to the nature of the purpose involved in them, that is, if for "the sake of moral beings who inhabit the earth" they are miracles, if not for them they are simply I suppose common events—mere phenomena. Now, as many acts of our free will are for moral purposes, we have no doubt if all this be true, that miracles are performed daily. Really then what is the use of arguing for the possibility of miracles (or what is the ultimate end—the truth of the sacred miracles) when we have them turned off by the thousand now, when at every determinate action of the human will for our moral welfare, pop goes a miracle.

Surely it would have been the more direct process, and more likely to result in the conversion of our "youth" to the true faith, if one of these miracles had been critically examined, and the result published than to argue for an abstract principle. But at this rate of manufacture, would not miracles lose their prestige? and then

what would become of those ancient writings embellished and made piquant by the recital of them, and which as to their doctrinal truths receive such support from them: surely a contemplation of the possibility of miracles being common will lead to disastrous results. This aspect of the case, however, seems not to have been considered.

Seriously, however, what is meant by this bugbear, man, interfering with the equilibrium of nature? And what of the equilibrium of nature itself, that which, in spite of our belief in it, is yet so easily and sensibly disturbed.

First, as to the term, equilibrium of nature, I learn that the construction put on it is that of static condition—thus the "atmospheric status" is written of as if it were always in a condition of static equilibrium—whereas, the truth is, its condition is ever being constantly disturbed.

In this sense the sun, conjointly with other powers, is constantly disturbing atmospheric equilibrium. Does the writer wish to imply that when man disturbs this, he introduces a power outside of nature? if so we have a vast subject and one which I cannot examine here.

The results of scientific knowledge, now to hand, are taken by "learned men" to indicate, if not to demonstrate, that we modify nature only by nature; that as in the case of physical exertion, so in that of mental exertion, chemical changes in our bodies are involved, and in fact, are absolutely necessary.

I merely state this theory to show that the idea thrown out about man modifying nature by something outside it, is not one upon which an argument can be constructed in a logical manner, and I therefore deprecate the introduction of it here.

After having for so long been at variance with the Bishop, it is with great pleasure I now discover statements in which I heartily concur. They are these, "that a man cannot be more conscious of his own personal existence than he is of the existence of God;" and, further, that "we cannot prove our own existence, or that of an external world." These statements, coupled with, and fully interpreted by, the extracts headed B in the appendix to the pamphlet in question, clearly show how little as regards ourselves is, in the logical mind, taken as "*necessary truth*," or even as truth at all; the question seems to be all God or no God, and science, together with logic, holds to the former. Truly fashion and thought change along with the use of things. Formerly, faith was required in *God*—now it is in *ourselves*, or rather, I should say, in our hypothetical selves—it is hard, indeed, to find how to put it.

The quotations in the pamphlet, with one or two exceptions, do not require any notice; it would be, of course, a very easy matter in those cases where they show apparently good arguments for the author's side, to neutralize such by an insertion here of counter quotations, but I forbear taxing the reader's patience.

I observe some of the doctrines advocated by the author of *Supernatural Religion*, are duly advertized; and I will ask if this is not a piece of inadvertence on the Bishop's part. Who should be more fully aware than he of the fatality, to our unfortunate race, of fruit forbidden, especially when it hangs in rich clusters amidst fruit of less inviting aspect.

But this author is, I find, described as "feeling the ground to be slipping away from under his feet," because for the nonce he assumes that the order of nature is not immutable, so that he can work this position out as he has the other.

But this is certainly not a retreat, it is merely a change of front, turning the enemy's guns on him; it is not, therefore, "versatility" as alleged. Again, in reference to this, I do not suppose the author alluded to would really make such a deduction as the one attributed to him, viz., "because then an interruption of the uniformity of that which has *no such characteristic* (uniformity) becomes impossible." The impossibility of affecting what does not exist, hardly requires stating.

The Bishop quotes "weighty words" from Bacon in elucidation of the supposed truth, that, as he affirms, "it was in connection with human redemption, that miracles became necessary," but, on looking up this extract, I find, the whole weight of the words lies in their being the utterance of a great man, they are simply a confession of faith, in the form of undemonstrated propositions.

I should like to have had Lord Bacon's explanation as to how Adam and Eve, and the earth, etc., before them, were formed, if not by a miracle. Redemption was not surely the object of their production; therefore, we have the singular phenomena of *unnecessary* miracles, performed by One who would surely not perform an *unnecessary* act. If any one has the hardihood to affirm that human redemption was the ultimate end of all this, let him turn to the second version of the creation of man, in the "sacred narrative," to that giving the origin of Eve, when, if I mistake not, he will find that this was evidently an after-thought, occasioned by the sight of Adam moping about in single cursedness. This shows that redemption as we have it, that is to children *born* in sin, or indeed, any kind of redemption, could hardly have been the current idea of that time, consequently, the miracles I have cited were, if Lord Bacon is correct, *unnecessary* ones. If, however, such a one is still perverse, let him explain the miracle of the talking serpent, by Lord Bacon's idea of the purpose of miracles, to my satisfaction, and I'll believe with the author, "they first became necessary in connection with human

redemption." Surely, to say that the fall of Eve was necessary for human redemption, is just about the same as saying a man must be knocked down before you can pick him up.

The Bishop concludes his pamphlet by asserting that he has no confidence in the potency of his arguments, even though advanced with ten-fold his ability, to draw sceptics to believe in the Christian religion, and, therefore, in miracles. Now, as the learned author's ability is, as I am happy to admit, undoubted, does it not seem that the arguments themselves are, in his own estimation, very feeble; that is, comparatively so—feeble compared with what may be adduced against them.

But it is not the old hardened incorrigible sceptic, nor indeed the sceptic at all, whom the author is writing for, but the "young and unwary" one, he who can be led away to another belief by the "arrogance" of the tone in which it is sought to be inculcated. For in what but arrogance can the power of a book consist, if "the very imperfect acquaintance" of the writer with the subject is "patent" in it. I will not think so poorly of our youth, or at least our thoughtful youth, as to suppose they can be converted by mere "*arrogance*" and dogmatism. Youth is more likely to be drawn from a proper creed by this, than charmed to a *bad* one.

But is it not undeniable that anyone so easy to entice or convert is not worth "powder and shot," or else the tenets the Bishop condemns, are so adapted to the form of his mind, so suited to his intellectual cravings, that it would be an uncharitable and foolish act to disturb him. God forbid that any trap should be laid for enterprising youths in their search after truth, from which traps, if they should fall into them, ten times his Lordship's power could not extricate them: His goodness forbid that the chance of reading these works should entail upon such unwary youths those dreadful and eternal consequences, which, in the Bishop's opinion, must (as I think) attach to a belief in the doctrines they inculcate. For what is this but signifying that heaven may be lost by a fluke and hell be gained in like manner; for surely this uncomfortable place can hardly fail to be the lot of any unwary youth, who (perhaps inadvertently) takes up a work of this description, and then gives way to the arrogance of him who has written it. How hardly indeed may such an one be brought back to the true faith, when even the largely multiplied power indicated cannot effect it.

In this connection I would fain ask the author if to fish, as he does, in the open water for small fry, *i.e.*, the "young and unwary," is not rather an unwise act? For is there not a great probability that some one or other of the wary ones will for the interest of their kind, or in mere playfulness, so maul his net about, so work it into holes, as to render it perfectly useless. Does it not appear that the best way would have been, for the object as stated, to have cast this net in some quiet pool "where only minnows are." To leave the figurative, would not an encyclical letter addressed to those he wishes to guard from what is conceived of as a danger, have been a safer course. Owing to the re-searches and arguments of Zetaethes,

This paragraph has been inserted since the appearance of Zetaethes's Reply to the Bishop *re* Miracles and of the newspaper correspondence which ensued.

regarding our author's pamphlet, (apart from any influence my own work may have,) I think next time the Bishop "would a fishing go" and takes to troubled waters, he should use a stronger and a more carefully constructed net than this one.

It is no use keeping a net dangling about and vowing it to be quite sound while all the fish are just playing and popping about as if neither a net nor a Bishop were in the road, passing folks only shrugging their shoulders and laughing. I most sincerely advise the author to mend this net, or what is better still prepare a new one; on the general principle that practice makes perfect, such an one might catch *something*. No one can rightly expect much from a first trial, and really I cannot avoid thinking that for one of the Bishop's well known courage, skill and calibre, larger game than what he is now hunting might be sought for. I promise for one to pay all due attention to any effort he may make in this direction. Like the young lady who wants kissing I will try and get caught if only for a few blissful moments. In all seriousness, I really wish to be caught in this way, so that I can experience again that delightful and elevating state of wonderment with which, as a boy, I used to con over those miraculous tales as related in the "sacred narrative" and our nursery books. Were this to happen, how pleasantly we could exchange compliments—his rare logical power, and great knowledge of God's ways with nature, my judgment, soundness of heart, lively faith "which hopeth all things, believeth all things," and my inceptive capacity for the vast and harmonious truths of theology as grounded on miracles. It would altogether be so nice!

I conclude this part by summing up what I conceive to have been demonstrated in it:—

1. That (supposing miracles possible) their scope must be unbounded, or we are involved in very gross absurdities indeed, and, besides, certain alleged Biblical miracles are degraded to mere phenomena, or something very much the same.

2. That the Bishop's implication as to experience *not* being necessary to the acquisition of axiomatic truths does not carry any weight with it; many eminent thinkers considering that experience *is* necessary to us here, and, this being so, I point out the absolute need there is, before the Bishop can rightly prosecute his argument, that he should demonstrate the truth of what he has implied.

3. That the Bishop's allegation as to the only necessary truths being the "proper geometric axioms and correct deductions from them," also, has little if any weight, and requires proof of correctness before it can be rightly used *here*, numerous and very able "scholars and learned men" thinking quite differently from him on this point also.

Further, I state a natural truth outside these axioms which appears taken on all sides for a necessary one, and thus so far, to upset the author's argument, that a miracle is not against reason.

4. In regard to the immutability of the order of nature, which as to its truth, or rather, I should say, as to our knowledge of it as necessary truth, I show that the Bishop misinterprets our argument for this, by using the term "order" as synonymous with regular succession, in which sense it does not convey our meaning.

I show, further, the premises debited to those who would sustain the proposition, that the sun will rise to-morrow, is the very reverse of what they would take; and just to meet this case, and generally to show that the *laws* of nature are immutable, I venture a series of propositions for such tests as the Bishop may deem necessary to subject them to.

In all this I have adhered rigidly to the course prescribed by the Bishop for the argument, and thus many of our strongest points do not appear. I have endeavoured to popularize what is a very dry subject, indeed, as it seems to me, a very useless and absurd one. The results of my attempt I leave for a discriminating public, for whom I write, to determine.

There is one aspect of the question, "is a miracle opposed to reason" which I have not hitherto considered. As necessary truth is acknowledged by the Bishop to be miracle-proof, and as the human mind is certainly developing, may we not at *any* future time be able to know some law of nature as a necessary truth of reason, and so learn that a miracle *is* opposed to reason. I still of course maintain that we have such necessary truths *now*; but I just point out this aspect to show that even had we not such truths, a negative answer to the question proposed, is never safe to swear by, that is, at any time it might have to be changed for a positive one.

I append another short extract from a church dignitary, bearing upon the above. "If we thoroughly understood the nature of what we call matter, we should doubtless perceive that the supposition of matter devoid of gravitation or of other experienced qualities would be self-contradictory."

Kidd on "Induction and Necessary Truth."

Part III.

I now go on to discuss what the Bishop implies in the opening paragraph of his pamphlet regarding the Bible itself, viz., that it is necessary for a Christian to believe every statement of it. The subject is one which should hardly have been dragged by the Bishop into a work which is professedly a logical discussion of a different matter: but, as it is there raised, I am surely quite right here in giving my views of it also. In fact the case absolutely demands this, as it is evidently owing to the strong views which the Bishop has on this subject, that he is induced to consider the idea that miracles are against reason, is a fallacious one.

Proceeding then, I find in the words of the author it is averred that, "those who believe in the Divine authority of the Bible accept all its statements": he maintains, therefore, that a belief in the Divine authority of the Bible is contingent on a belief in all its statements; consequently to disbelieve any statement of it is to disbelieve in the Divinity of the book. Now, I cannot avoid thinking that this statement, bearing as it does upon it the mark of a Bishop's high authority, will drive numbers of people to heresy; as a belief in all these statements is impossible to many, a great many, and so these will conclude from the Bishop's opinion, thus expressed, that they do not believe in the divinity of the work containing them; and then in the panic, bewilderment of mind and anger resulting, will throw the whole over. Thus scepticism will, unfortunately, be brought about by the very means taken to prevent it.

The statement is no doubt intended to enforce belief in miracles, but surely for so insignificant an object, it is not required. The object is defeated by the means taken to effect it. I venture here to infer that, had miracles been confined to heathen faiths, we should have his Lordship fighting not for them, as now, but against them; and had nobody been foolish enough to believe he had seen one, we should not have had this question raised at all, to the exclusion of more important ones; but, of course, we must pass through all the trials and phases of our progressive life.

On proceeding, I find the Bishop himself shows signs of uneasiness about these sweeping statements, shall I say in his own words, that he—"feels himself upon slippery ground;" but, any way, knowing it is a matter of notoriety that numerous errors have crept into the Bible, and are openly allowed by his party, to be so, he says "I do not mean to imply that errors have not through the carelessness of copyists, crept into ancient manuscripts," . . . "The correction of these errors, or imaginary errors, must be left to scholars and learned men." I suppose it is allowed that "error" applies to statements, as any other application of it here is trivial, and does not set forth the case. Here then, a gentleman who wishes to save his soul is placed in a pretty pickle. The

Bible is handed him with the injunction that he must believe all its statements, some being absolutely false, and as a false belief involves a disbelief in truth corresponding with it, he is set to disbelieve truth that he may believe in the divinity of the Bible and so save himself; or, he may have to run after a "scholar or learned man" to help him at those portions his sagacity has spotted for such a procedure. But as, I suppose, scholars differ as well as doctors, he might not get the rights of the thing then. Besides the question present itself—what is the Bible? is it that book we have so named? Is it something as yet hypothetical? or, is it that collection of writings which has been selected from a large stock similar in every respect but that of being inspired as we suppose, or not? Really it seems the Bishop is demanding of us what we cannot give, for want of the proper material, or a knowledge of what the proper material is: and he is besides positively calling upon us to believe every statement of the book we have for the Bible, notwithstanding that he knows, and owns, that parts of it are probably false, or, as I may more truly affirm are positively so. But, this aspect I leave with the remark that, errors in the Bible are not alone those made in the work of copying, as is to be inferred from his mode of speaking of them; but, there is besides a much larger quantity, arising from that of translating these copies into our language.

But all this is nothing to the contradictory affirmations implied or direct, which appear (in the Bible) not to be referable in any way to such causes: these are so gross and palpable that it impossible believe both sides. They violate necessary truth, or else necessary faith, and thus "stultify human reason," or theological belief. For instance, it is either necessary truth or necessary faith that God is omnipotent, but he is alleged in this book to have "sought to kill Moses by the way," and we cannot help inferring from what follows this statement that he did not succeed in the design imputed to Him; but how can we reconcile Omnipotent exertion with want of success? The free will of the man had not to be touched, only his poor frail body? Surely to have Omnipotence bounded in this way, is plainly a miracle of miracles, one that towers head and shoulders above those of the common variety; it is a miracle fully equal in size to what is required for the falsification of an axiomatic truth. Has the Bishop understated their power, when he affirmed they *cannot* contradict necessary truth? or is it that they can contradict necessary faiths in the Biblical statements, It clearly is one or the other.

I will close this part by observing, it appears to me in connection with the late newspaper correspondence here, on miracles, that the statement I have thus examined, is one intended especially for the behoof of those dignitaries of the Church, whose scientific knowledge in asserting itself leads them to make heterodoxical amendments on the Bible, when public opinion demands them. And now to digress a little here, it has been said that an honest man struggling with poverty is the *noblest* of God's works; well, I think, a scientific clergyman struggling with Biblical facts is the most *ludicrous* of His works.

It is seldom I laugh, seldom indeed that I want to, and this partly from laziness, partly from the sobering effects of the fear I have of being in the large percentage of the damned, but when I find one absolutely necessary for my health, which is about once a week, when I have leisure to enjoy one and benefit by it, I take a book suitable to the day, that is a theological work, one which attempts to reconcile the Mosaic cosmogony with scientific facts, this is a stimulus which I find from repeated experiments never fails to produce the desired effect upon me, as also upon others whose minds are sufficiently developed and stocked with scientific truths to enable them to realize the impossibility of such an attempt, and so to appreciate the fun of the thing. A person trying to square the circle, or even a grimacing clown in contortions, is as nothing to it for this purpose.

I have, in conclusion, to make a few remarks concerning the action I have taken in this matter. The above has been written with the utmost consideration and courtesy for the reverend gentleman whose pamphlet I have here examined; if in the earnestness of any conviction and the excitement almost inseparable from controversy, I have accidentally given pain to any one, I here express my sorrow, and would assure such that nobody can have a greater regard for moral and intellectual worth than myself, and I gladly take this opportunity of tendering my most loyal respect to those who, having the fortune to possess these qualities, have further those dignities and substantialities which are their proper accompaniments. It is *opinions* I am alone combatting, and not individual ones either, but the opinions of a class, which are being constantly forced upon us, and at last has culminated in the production of the Bishop's pamphlet. I do this, as I have freely, because fully possessed of the feeling that errors cannot lessen moral worth, but rather enhance it by contrast; and, as regards intellectual worth errors and inconsistency are so largely and immutably associated with it in the region of *orthodox* theology, that really such goes for nothing to the man who has taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the benumbing effect, which as a "cold shadow falls" upon those unfortunate beings who are obliged, or choose, to traverse and confine themselves to it.

And now as regards myself more particularly. In attempting to controvert this pamphlet, I have had to combat the author's idea as to the propriety of a belief in every statement of the Bible, and so as the Bishop would argue, I am an unbeliever in its Divinity. This is a position I neither seek nor want to maintain, for I really desire the very reverse; but a counter reply to the pamphlet could hardly have been made without involving a person in this very unpleasant and unenviable position. It becomes necessary therefore, for such an

one if he declines (as I positively do) to have this position forced upon him, to affirm his full and unreserved belief of what the Bible is, to show that as regards his own feelings, the inference of non-belief in the Divinity of this book, from disbelief of particular portions of it, is not a legitimate one. Lest, therefore, anyone should make a mistake in following the Bishop's lead, and so do me a grievous wrong, I here distinctly and emphatically state myself upon this point.

Regarding this book then in its literal sense, I consider, that in greater part, it simply treats of historical matters such as cruel wars, bloody massacres, and curious pedigrees, having little or no interest now, except to Jews; that it is in part a collection of professed wonders, and of broad guesses in cosmogony, all absurdly false; that it is in some parts fearfully immoral, "dangerous to youth:" in other parts blasphemous, if the act of crediting the Holy One with our base passions is blasphemy.

But, on the other hand, and here most of its present vivifying influence resides, it exhibits in its first part the yearnings of a superstitious and semi-civilized people after righteousness and the wages of it. It shows, on the part of the best of this people, that intensity to know and to love God for His own sake, which is characteristic alike of the true hearted poet, and the large souled philosopher. It gives the thoughts, crude and futile, absurd and erroneous, (as many of them are, both scientifically and theologically) still the thoughts of ancient men striving to break through the ignorance of our race's childhood at a bound, striving to cognize God through the emotions alone, and to realize in life the distorted image thus obtained.

It besides exhibits the behaviour of a warlike, amorous, superstitious and poetic people, progressing from a state of semi-barbarism, by aid of Monotheism, to the civilization of their neighbours, and, consequently, showing on its pages in strange contrast, sometimes appropriate, sometimes grotesque, the sacred song and the sentimental song, the war song and the song of peace, the triumphant song of victory and the wailing melancholy song of despair, in its useless invocations of the supernatural.

This part of the book really is one long history of a family amplifying to a nation by fructification and conquest, and then declining from this, and in their decline ever looking, but unsuccessfully, for a supernatural-deliverer to arrest it, and make them the dominant nation of the earth, in fact, the petted child of the universe.

The second part is infinitely superior, both in tone and structure, to the first, but still is sadly deficient in consistency, and unfortunately for the present age is thickly interspersed with miraculous tales. But all this can never obliterate the brightness of that glorious spirit of humanity which runs through it—can never to all eternity prevent him who will, seeing in its principal historic character an unique model of transcendent moral worth—a being surcharged with Divine love, and in his glorious person our highest manifestation of God, a hero indeed, battling single-handed against hypocrisy in high places, against religious shams, against all the narrow dogmas of his day, for the sake of the All Father, and for ourselves. Alas! that the history of such a life should be so marred by the inaccuracies of those biographers who wrote it, that at present it is more a mark for criticism than for morality and philanthropy.

This as to the literal meaning of a large portion of the Bible—a book which we are called upon to believe, as to its "every statement"—a wonderful unique medley of fact and fiction, lofty poetry and the plainest, the meanest of prose, and partaking in its tone of the lowest immorality, and the highest virtue. But what if, for all this, there is a Divine element permeating it evenly throughout! if there is an infinite, a hidden meaning underlying it or enfolded in its literal sense, one which our present most popular Christian teachers have failed to comprehend, or form the least conception of! That there is this running through it as a silver thread, binding it altogether in one harmonious coherent whole, appears certain to me, if it is a Divine book. For surely the Infinite One would never talk twaddle; a book written or inspired by Him must have an infinite meaning running through every part of it. Having these opinions, it is proper I should state them unreservedly, and I hope, that, by this, the flood of opprobrium, which has no doubt been setting strongly, but unjustly, toward me of late will be stemmed.

This internal or plenary sense, then, of the Bible is actually acknowledged, and even now promulgated by certain unpopular theologians, and creeds have been constructed in harmony with this internal sense, one of which is the Swedenborgian, According to these persons, the literal sense of the Bible is quite subordinate, to this internal sense, and frequently, especially in the older portions, was never intended to be accepted as true; the whole of the Bible being said by them to have been written according to some law of correspondence, supposed to obtain between earthly and heavenly things. Although, of course, my opinion is worth little on theological questions, still, if I might offer it to our champions of Christianity, I would state that it appears to me, that if their religion is to stand and the Bible as we have it to be preserved other than as a relic of antique literature, it must be by the aid of doctrines somewhat similar to those I have here in part described. These are, I may say, pre-eminently christian, and, for theological ones, philosophical, so much so, that they compare with our popular ones, as Protestantism does with Romanism, or civilization with barbarism, or as the modern steam engine does with the old stage coach.

I would not, however, like to be thought of as associating myself with doctrines so heterodox as these, or any of the same kind, but I feel compelled most respectfully and earnestly to advise our religious teachers of the popular creeds in their endeavour to preserve something of them, to study doctrines of a similar nature to these I have noted, in place of foolishly attempting to confound modern science by the use of ancient fables and allegories. I also, feel compelled to remark further, that an attempt to realize the life they inculcate would prevent those unchristian fulminations against people who cannot control their belief, and whose wretched fate therefore as doomed victims of eternal wrath, should rather evoke some of the commiseration and pity inculcated by a creed professedly humane than those anathemas and revilings which these unfortunate people now get.

And here, I feel bound to remark, that we can never be held to any theological creed which from structural defects is incapable of expansion or development correlative with that of the human mind, or which as to its tenets dares not or will not admit of rational, of scientific discussion; for *progress* is the watchword and the life of philosophy *whatever* direction or subject she takes, *fixity* the watchword, the death, of such creeds.

Philosophy will not, cannot be stultified by self-immolation on the altar of dogma, from the stepping stone of fact, upon the wings of faith—a faith indeed—she flies over all those petty boundaries which formal creeds impose, and in her free and glorious career is only barred by the Infinite. Woe to any monstrous concoction of superstition and ignorance darkening the air and disputing her right to rise. For if in carrying us to those regions of upper space she has run counter to any thing of this sort, (to use the celebrated words, slightly modified, of the great Stephenson, in answer to the petty obstructionists of his time) "it would be a bad job for" her opponent.

No, philosophy leaves such unnatural and artificial limitations of thought as dogma sets, to those who dare not or cannot think; to those who prefer walking by night, and so require check ropes and safety-lights. Death to dogma is her war cry. Philosophy as now developed cannot adjust her huge form to the habiliments of any fixed creed, nor repress her growth to a determinate size, nor stay her course to suit a laggard in the race. Having broken away from these in her youth after infinite difficulty, she cannot give her hand to any such theological creed now. It is not for this she has passed through the throes of a bloody birth and left her martyrs on the road of her progress; from experience she knows what it is to be a slave, she forgives but she cannot forget. Herself comprehending the sum of all certified experience, and the faith which builds on this, the proper repertory of every fact known as fact, of every known truth—and of which theological truth forms indeed as yet, but a very minute portion—how can she say to this, or that, or indeed to any part, thou art the greater; would not this be a violation as it were of some "geometric axiom."

She stands aloof from all sects in the conscious strength which truth gives, courting no encounter, but, on the other hand, fearing none; yet, in putting away the "cursed thing," she yearns with an infinite tenderness for those who still partake of it, excusing every fault of the head, and making due allowance for accident of birth, or the enslaving effect of circumstances. No, philosophy will neither prostitute her-self to such creeds, not even the comprehensive, philosophical and moral one I have alluded to, nor go back to swaddling clothes to suit those who cannot or will not keep pace with her growth. And as to this Bible, which it has been attempted to palm upon her as a very repertory of scientific knowledge, she will not have belief in an ancient faith that violates all the experiences which have been accumulated and recorded for her, and so have science proved a delusion and a snare. Thus she rejects the literal sense of the Word as a whole, that rock ahead on to which our present creeds, like cumbrously appointed, and fated ships, are now rushing to their destruction. In doing this she cannot be passive, she is assailed upon this point, therefore she must fight on it, and in so doing this, is certainly performing for true religion a very great kindness, since if this literal sense is indeed a veil which hides an internal one, the sooner will this veil be lifted and the Divine language appear, the sooner will "the book" prove worthy of its reputed Author. When this is accomplished depend upon it she will be the first to do it homage.

And here, as the most fitting opportunity, I must beg to deprecate the strange theological fallacy that philosophy is antagonistic to true religion. She does certainly set her face mildly, but determinately against all spurious religion and its pseudo-truths; indeed, she would not be true to herself were she not to do this. But on the other hand, she yearns with an infinite tenderness for all that is lovely, all that is good, and most heartily appropriates within her ample folds every truth presented to her, whether of a theological, ethical, or physical nature.

In the high position of trust she now holds with human destiny almost in her hands, and love and duty prompting her, there is nothing suits her so well as to be like unto the faithful shepherds of old "watching their flocks by night," the first "to know the glad tidings;" nothing that pleases her so well as to be able with the wise men of Herod to lay her treasures at the feet of new-born truth and worship it. Why then these revilings of her? Wherefore this insensate conduct of theology towards her? Why does religion curse philosophy and run the terrible risk of dying by her own hand? For curses, the refuge of the weak or the venom of the malignant, have

never yet been of any avail: like "chickens they always go home to roost," and those who indulge in them harbour within their breasts a spark from hell, which may, at any moment, burst into flames and consume every good feeling they possess.

In conclusion, I am aware that these opinions are not popular; were they popular, I should not have had any occasion to state them, and as I shall in all probability never appear before our little circle again in the character of a religious teacher, one which neither befits me nor is, in accordance with my tastes, I will crave my reader's kind attention a little longer for some further remarks.

I will then here state, that these opinions, however they may be spurned, are the result of careful and dispassionate inquiry; after due consideration, and with due consideration, I state them. I take upon myself the onus of their expression simply for the sake of truth, and for those noble ones who in search of it, and in the legitimate exercise of their genius, are traduced, anathematized, and made marks for derision; and I do so under the profound conviction that to remain any longer a passive spectator of the mortal fray now going on—between doctrinal religion in its *present phase*, and science in its now truly grand development—would be cowardice indeed, a reproach to the manes of the mighty dead, dastardly behaviour to those who in the midst of tremendous labours for us have, in the serial unfolding of the results of these, to bear the burden and heat of the day, a poor acknowledgment in truth, of what we owe alike to those who have gone before, and those who now represent us. Knowing that it is the duty of a man suffering under strong religious convictions to confess them publicly ere the grave can prevent him, I have taken the opportunity which the Bishop's pamphlet afforded me of doing so. Nor has the opportunity come too soon. I am not ashamed to own I have been greatly tortured by seeing the one-sided game played, which we have had here of late, and have longed in the absence of those attacked to take it up for them, feebly equipped as I am, even though at the cost of much trouble, at some pecuniary loss, and at the risk of being misunderstood, and abused, as only a dogmatist can abuse, when under cover of a pseudonym.

I have seen every now and then in our newspaper correspondence revilings and mutterings against scientific thought and those who represent it. I have seen that characterized as "dangerous," as "infidelity," as "stuff and nonsense," which ministers directly to our material welfare and in its higher sphere positively forbids atheism, by enlarging our conceptions, by shewing the oneness of purpose and the consistency which runs throughout creation, and which as much as can be done, raises us to a knowledge of God, and does this in such a tremendous and convincing manner, in such a variety of ways, that our mind staggers under the realization of the Truth, and becomes awe stricken by its grand its overwhelming array; so that perforce we cry out "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come." Or if perchance we have been before at all unbelieving we cry out with Thomas Didymus, when disbelief with him was no longer possible—"My Lord and my God." I have seen men, who, by the aid of faith, genius and daring combined, have thus under Providence been the instruments for the discovery of truths of this nature, reviled and bespattered with every opprobrious epithet for merely stating these discoveries and generalizing from them; men who would not injure any useful thing purposely, and who are anxious, and professedly so, to provide in their unfoldings of intellectual truths for the emotional side of human nature; men who perchance while their traducers ply at their evil work are toiling for them, possibly endeavouring to give a finishing touch to some grand and useful labour for their benefit, or initiating another series of discoveries.

I have seen and heard a great philosopher reproached, merely because in his inaugural address to the British Association at Belfast, as the exponent of a high philosophy, in the spirit of justice and veneration for the noble far-reaching intellects of ancient times, he reproduced their thoughts in the exact language of modern science, and supported them by those teeming facts which this science had placed at his disposal; and because in this he had to claim for matter a more noble use, and a higher destiny than some are as yet willing to accord it: because of this, I have seen and heard such an one reviled with every opprobrious epithet: as if forsooth we, the sport of circumstances, the ephemeral creatures of the hour, as if we know all about matter, this our eldest-born, born in the earliest dawn of time; what it should be, and what it should not be; as if we know where matter leaves off and man begins: this matter, this external world, the very existence of which, according to the Bishop's own admission, cannot be proved; one would surely think that with such a very imperfect acquaintance on our part with matter as this admission implies, no person would be so foolish and ill-natured as to rate those who theorize upon it in any other than the usual way.

The fact of it is, we do not know what we are quarrelling about, whether, indeed, there is really anything to quarrel about; yet, as I say, a person stating an opinion upon it, other than the current one, gets into bad repute, and is lashed with the whip of scorn. Not that the lash, as applied by those mistaken people who use it, affects such men, except only as indicating on the part of these flagellators, that inappreciation of truth, that ungratefulness for favors received, which will make despondent the most powerful intellect, and the most affectionate nature; must it not seem to these men that, like illbred hounds, we snap at the hand that feeds us, and then whine for more. But the memories and the deeds of such men will live and bear fruit, when those

of their traducers will have been long forgotten, or, if remembered, remembered only to point a moral to obstructionists of the future.

Through all this, however, it must ever be a source of congratulation, an occasion for gratitude to them and to us, that the impregnable position has been won which we now have the fortune to occupy; won for us, though it has been at a fearful cost of life, and by so much suffering; that the bloody part of progress is nigh over; that the rack, the stake, and the dungeon of the inquisition are now things of the past; that we live our happy life in an age which, though using the lash freely in the figurative sense as I have shown, still, to the demands of philosophy and humanity, restricts the use of it in the literal one, to its proper object, that is the back of the human brute who lets loose his savage instincts upon society.

And now without intending any disrespect to the Bishop, in regard to the construction of the closing paragraph of his pamphlet, I would fain use it to model mine by, as with a few slight substitutions, this one very aptly conveys what I desire to close mine with. "I have no confidence in the potency of arguments such as I have used, even though advanced with ten-fold the ability to which I could lay any claim, to draw any human heart from" *superstition*, to believe in "God as He is," and, therefore, *against* "miracles," knowing, as I do, how hard it is for any one cradled in superstition to trust to God and look it bravely in the face. "All that I have ventured to hope I might do in these few pages is, to guard the young and unwary against being led away from the faith of" *experiential philosophy* "by the positive assertions, made with such astonishing audacity, by many modern" theologians that miracles are *not* opposed to reason. "The arrogant manner in which," *pietists* and *priests* "whose writings make patent their very imperfect acquaintance with mental" and physical "science practically assert their own infallibility on" physico-theological questions, "although it may appear almost ludicrous to some persons, not unfrequently staggers the" *simple* "and too often leads them to acquiesce in their dogmatical assertions. My object has simply been to show that the positive statements referred to are not altogether trustworthy, If through the blessing of God what I have written should produce even this effect in the mind of any one of my readers, I commend him to God," and to active, thoughtful, loving search after Him, "for His thorough confirmation in the faith"

Appendix, B.

; that consistent, glorious, elevating, and true faith, which holds to a God who "changes not" and to the immutability of His laws.

Appendix.

A

In regard to the constitution of matter, the nucleus of it as it were which as yet no power of the imagination can enable us to conceive of as absent therefrom, I will here express an idea which just occurs to me, and enables us, I think, to remove a great part of that difficulty we now experience in forming a conception of force without a material, a solid something as it were, to give body to it.

Taking the fruitful idea of the similarity of world systems to chemical compounds as regards the motions involved; and the similarity again in this respect of the structure of these compounds to that of our so termed elementary molecules as manifested to us by chemical researches; I would suppose that each molecule itself is composed of a system of entities, every one of which has a motion of its own; these subdivisions of the hypothetical elementary molecule I again imagine to be in their turn divided, and that each further subdivision of it has a proper inter-motion of its own, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Thus I am able to conceive of a maximum, almost an infinity of force, with a minimum, or an infinitely little of what we at present must think of as a solid.

Thus if we must conceive of a solid at all, that is of something without inter-motion, we have it as a something we may never hope to find, a point as it were, ever receding as we attempt to approach it.

We can look upon matter practically as force infinitely interinvolved, solid congeries of force. By such conceptions I think we are raised, besides, to form truer ideas of what we term matter than we can now; and so we are put on the way to consider what I believe is correct, that this world is more of a spirit-world than we now hold it to be; that it has an infinitely higher status than we now believe it to have; and that it has a nearer bond of union with God than a lifeless motionless inert mass can be supposed by us to have.

B

Faith, "the faith," is here written of in such a way as to imply that there is no true faith outside the fashionable theologies of Christian lands, and further, (when taken in connection with the Bishop's tenets) that God cannot be approached or worshipped except through one or other of these.

I will ask, however, if it is not a tremendous exertion of faith, a most righteous and saving one, that in spite

of these fashionable creeds, and the eloquence and power with which their champions support them, in spite of the literal sense of the Word even, we believe in a God infinitely majestic, noble, just, and consistent. Should not such a faith as this be styled "the faith," rather than the one his Lordship has gone out of his way to broach!

Further, I will ask, if it is not also a tremendous exertion of faith in the infinite power of God, to give up our hereditary notions of matter for one which holds it to have even, as to its minutest portion, a proper motion of its own, one of inconceivable, rapidity—for one which holds that the minutest atom is itself an inexhaustible store of force and of the most diverse kinds.

Again, I ask, do not the development doctrines as now so profitably applied to the elucidation of nature require, of those who believe them, faith? faith to throw off the Biblical idea that God works by spurts, that is by *sudden* creations.

Truly it must at least be owned that these are mighty and majestic movements of faith, the most elevating and glorious of philosophical reformations, nay, of all reformations, this rising on our part to entertain these lofty ideas of God, of the infinite power of His works, and of the one grand method by which they are being eternally evolved.

Printed by James Hughes, Lambton Quay, Wellington.

A Reply to the Bishop's Reply,

By "Zetales." "

"When men are ignorant of the natural causes of things, they attribute to things their own nature. The Physics of the ignorant are but vulgar Metaphysics, by which they attribute to the will of GOD the cause of the things they are ignorant of, without considering the means employed by the Divine Will."

Vico: "Scienza Nuova."

Printed by Lyon and Blair Wellington Lambton Quay. 1875

A Reply to the Bishop's Reply,

By "Zetales."

THE Bishop of Wellington is, I hear, very anxious that some person should reply to his "Reply." The old fighting instinct, so conspicuous in the days of Philo-Maoriism and "the three F.'s," though dormant, is not yet extinct. Well, I am not fond of controversy of this kind. I have a special horror of the *odium theologicum*, and I may say that I did not write any of the letters that appeared in the papers on this subject, nor did I indeed read many of them. But I read the little *brochure*, of the Bishop, and while it appeared to me (with one or two exceptions which I shall note) to be written with candour and moderation, it also seemed to be fairly open to very grave logical objections.

The ground of debate circumscribed by the Bishop is a very narrow one; it is not, mark, whether miracles are true—a larger question, and involving other evidence which by the definition is excluded. The question here is: "Is a miracle opposed to reason?" Let him define his ground for himself:—"What I propose is to endeavour to show that the objection commonly advanced by persons laying claim to some intellectual superiority over their neighbours, against miracles—that they are repugnant to reason—is untenable. * * I purposely leave out of consideration all collateral questions—all questions of greater or lesser probability. I wish to raise the simple issue—Is a miracle, *as such*, incredible, or, in other words, impossible?"—(p. 5.) Again, "If a miracle had never been wrought or even pretended, my argument would remain substantially the same; the scientific question relates to the possibility of supernatural occurrences at all."—(p. 20.) Thus, then, it is clear that the only question is whether, according to the laws of the human mind in the investigation of truth and the laws or order of external nature, miracles are, ("*as such*," mark this,) in themselves, without regard to other evidence, more credible than otherwise? It is then plainly a question, to be determined by the tests so prescribed, of greater or lesser antecedent probability between the constancy of natural laws or order and "a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose." How can the Bishop, after putting the case on the ground of reason pretend to treat questions of greater or lesser probability as collateral? No arguments are more legitimate or better known in logic than probable arguments; surely no logician will dispute this, and as I shall show, these are the precise kind of arguments proper to this discussion. This is an inconsistency of the Bishop at the start, and there are other very grave ones besides. The Bishop gives (at page 20) a summary of his argument:—"I have briefly endeavored to show that a miracle cannot be contradictory to any intuition of reason, which is concerned only with individual objects; nor to any necessary truths of reason, because these are only necessarily true within the mind itself; nor to any deduction of reason from observed facts, because the mind possesses no absolute criterion of the conformity of intellectual notions to such observed facts. I have further striven to make it clear that the invariability of the order or laws of nature, although a practical regulative truth, cannot be converted into, and established as a universal proposition, in the sense of a truth of

geometry, so that its denial should involve either a contradiction or an obvious absurdity." Any one can see that, in such a question as this, and on the narrow ground on which it is put, if you allow a man to define his terms for himself and to make his own assumptions, he could prove, and prove logically too, any conclusion whatever. Given the premises, the conclusion would follow straight enough. Now the Bishop has, as might be expected, defined his terms to suit himself; he has also made his assumptions in the same way. He has throughout made a use of the word "reason" which, as applied to such a subject matter, *i.e.*, the interpretation of external nature, is quite illegitimate. There are, in the first part of the last quotation or elsewhere, certain expressions: "intuition of reason," "absolute truth of reason," "necessity as an absolute truth of reason," "deduction of reason," &c., on which the changes are throughout rung, and to which I shall hereafter object. But it is in the last sentence of the summary that the main argument, so far as there is any such, is indicated. "The invariability, &c., of nature "cannot be proved as a truth of geometry, &c." This invariability of nature is, then, says the Bishop, a pure assumption. Granting, for the sake of argument, (which I certainly do not in any other sense admit,) that it is an assumption, let us see how he goes about his argument. On recurring to the definition of a miracle (p. 5.) it is seen that in the very term of it: "an interruption of the order of nature "for a providential purpose," there is made the great assumption of a personal GOD. This the Bishop admits at p. 16. "When it is admitted that we cannot 'prove' the existence of a personal GOD, this admission is made just in the same sense, and in no other, in which it is admitted we cannot 'prove' our own existence or that of an external world." But then, says he, "human consciousness prevents us from calling in question the assumption of a GOD." With this argument from consciousness, I shall deal hereafter, but now let me point out a piece of extraordinary inconsistency. There are, by admission of both parties for the moment, two assumptions, the one the constancy of the order of nature, the other the existence of a personal GOD; neither of which can be "proved" geometrically. The Bishop began by marking out a very narrow circle, "are" miracles to be believed on grounds of reason alone?"—(see pp. 5, 20.) And into this circle he invites all and sundry, without reference to religious belief, to try conclusions with him on rational grounds only, and with the weapons of reason. Having got people into the ring he coolly turns upon them, and says in effect:—"By your leave—just permit me to step outside a little for a weapon of mine which I have found very convenient before;" the opponent demurs; then mark what happens. Sir, you are an atheist—do you suppose for an instant a Christian would enter into a serious discussion about miracles with an avowed atheist?" This is not merely inconsistent; it would be, if addressed to an individual, gratuitously offensive; for what right has he when any person takes him up on his own ground, to make imputations which by the conditions of battle are out of the case? Page 16 comes simply to this—that of two assumptions, the Bishop makes the one favorable to him, and when you demur you are "an atheist" and he won't fight. By the Bishop's own terms of combat any person has a complete right to deny, for argument's sake, the assumption of a personal GOD without being branded with an opprobrious epithet.

But now let us inquire a little more carefully into the meaning of "reason" &c., as applied to investigations and interrogations of nature, and into the comparative validity of the grounds for our belief in the invariability of the order of nature, and the belief in a personal GOD as a sufficient cause to sanction the credibility of miracles. It is assuredly, evade the point as you may, a case of greater or lesser antecedent probability. In this inquiry I shall call the same witnesses whose testimony the Bishop has used: these are, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Dr. Thomas Brown, and to these I shall add a couple of experts of the Bishop's own cloth, viz:—Dr. Thomson, Archbishop of York, and the Rev. A. H. Killick, Fellow of University of Durham, and author of the admirable *Handbook to Mill's Logic*. I shall also make use of the researches of the antiquary, Sir John Lubbock.

The changes are rung so repeatedly through the first half of the pamphlet on the terms "reason," "necessary truths of reason," &c., and so much of the argument is made to turn on the sense in which these phrases are used, that although I have not space to enter fully into the question, some notice must be taken of these definitions, and the inferences attempted to be drawn from them. We are told that there are "certain necessary truths of reason, generally accepted," that "the only necessary truths of which the human reason is cognisant, are the proper axioms of geometry—that if such axioms are the only necessary truths of the reason, it might be thought scarcely needful to show that inferences from observed facts, or, in other words, the results of inductive science cannot establish a claim to be such."—(p.p. 7, 8.) He then goes on through several pages, indeed the greater part of the pamphlet, to infer that as the belief in the invariability of the order of nature—the conviction that the future will resemble the past—while it may be a good guide for practical conduct in life—"has no foundation in reason. All we can say is, that previous past recurrence of the facts leads to the expectation of a similar recurrence in the future. But an expectation—a mere blind expectation—is not a rational answer; it is not a rational solution of the difficulty; such an expectation rests on no ground of reason, and cannot satisfy the requirements of reason. That the sun has risen everyday throughout past ages leads to the expectation that it will rise to-morrow, and we all act on this belief and expectation. But if a reason is asked for this expectation, what reason can be given? None. * * We believe it, we act upon the belief and expectation. But it is not a truth of reason."—(p. 9.) This passage is the key-note to much that follows, indeed it is the pith and essence of the

whole argument, if it can be called such. Now let us see what is "reason"? And what are necessary truths and in what sense are the axioms of geometry such? What are "laws of nature," or "uniformity of nature," and how proved, and what is the ground and the amount of cogency of our belief in them? The answers to these questions will bring us far on in our inquiry. Mr. J. S. Mill lays down the universal type of reasoning thus:—"1. Certain individuals (having a certain attribute, A) have also a given attribute, B; 2. An individual, or individuals, resemble the former in having attribute A; 3. Therefore, they resemble them also in possessing the given attribute, B."—(*Mill, Logic*, i., 226. *Killick*, 65.) To this type it will be seen that all reasoning, that establishing the axioms of geometry, the laws of nature, and everything else, ultimately conforms. The character of necessity," says Mill, "(and even with some reservations, the peculiar certainty) attributed to mathematical truths is an illusion. As to their peculiar certainty, it only consists in this, that mathematical conclusions are not liable to be interfered with by counteracting causes. In themselves they are not more certain or exact than those of any other sciences; * * the necessity, too, of geometrical truths consists only in this,—that they necessarily follow from the granting of hypotheses from which they are deduced. Their necessity in fact is *certainty of inference*. The primary suppositions or hypotheses are—(1.) Definitions; (2.) Axioms. Some of these suppositions are not only not necessary, they are not even strictly true. Axioms are experimental truths; inductions from the evidence of our senses. That is, the evidence on which we believe axioms is of the same kind as the evidence on which we believe any other fact of external nature—our experience of their truth." These views of Mill have been controverted by Dr. Whewell, but he replies to all the objections, and has by far the best of the argument. In these views of the nature and ultimate grounds of mathematical truths, Mill is supported by such men as Sir John Herschell and Mr. H. Spencer.—(*Logic* i., 279, 294.). So much, then, for the necessary truths of reason in geometry—they rest on precisely the same grounds and on the same type of reason as the belief in the constancy of the order of nature, *viz.*: induction from experience. Now let us look into the nature and mode of proof of these laws or order of nature. "The uniformity of nature is proved by a generalisation of all our inductions, it is a conclusion by an induction *per enumerationem, simplicem* from a large number of inductions. Thus if we knew not whether nature were uniform or not, we could still reason that since all the men that ever lived have died, all men yet to be born will die, and, therefore, in this respect nature is uniform; so, again, we reason that because the sun has risen ever since time began it will do the same to-morrow, and again conclude that nature is uniform; so, again, we reason that since water was always found to run down hill and not up, it will, unless something intervenes to prevent it, always do so, and again nature is uniform; and thus when finally, age after age passes away and innumerable inductions are made, every one of which adds its item of proof without a single contradictory instance, the inference by one grand induction of the universality of the principle is irresistible. The condition which renders this induction from unanalyzed experience a valid process, is this:—We must know that if any exception had occurred we should be aware of it. This assurance in most cases we cannot have; yet there are certain remarkable cases where, having this certainty, an induction by simple enumeration amounts to a rigorous proof, indeed the only proof of which they are susceptible. These are—(1.) The fundamental principles of mathematics. (2.) The principle of the uniformity of nature. The axiom of the uniformity of nature is proved then by this form of induction, the principle having been found true in every legitimate induction yet made, and these multitudinous inductions having covered the whole face of nature's operations."—(*Killick*, pp. 97, 99; condensed from *Mill*.) So far then from the conviction of the constancy of natural order and law "having no foundation in reason," "no rational answer," &c., the belief according to the greatest of modern logicians rests for its validity on precisely the same grounds as the fundamental principles of mathematics. Now let us see what the Archbishop of York has to say on the subject. This eminent ecclesiastic (the second in dignity in the empire, I believe) and equally eminent logician, classifies the degrees of belief or modality of judgments, as follows: He reduces them all to three great classes, each having within it three sub-classes or degrees—(1.) "*Problematical*, containing (a) Possible; (6) Doubtful; (c) Probable. (2.) *Assertive*, with its sub-divisions, (a) morally certain for the thinker himself; (4) morally certain for a class or school; (c) morally certain for all. (8.) *Demonstrable*, with its degrees, (a) physically certain, with a limit; (b) physically certain, without limitation; (c) mathematically certain. The Problematical judgment is neither subjectively nor objectively true; it is mere opinion. The Assertive judgment is one of which we are fully persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief; it is therefore subjectively, but not objectively, certain. The Demonstrative judgment is both subjectively and objectively true." In this last he includes the laws of physical science, as the law of gravitation, of chemical affinity, &c. In another place he speaks directly of the laws of induction, whereby the uniformity of nature is proved:—"On what principle are incomplete inductions, *i.e.*, examinations of facts that stop short of complete enumeration, sufficient to establish general laws? The answer contains the most interesting and important of the principles of logic. All our experience teaches us that in the Universe, the 'Cosmos'—whose very name means order—regularity, and uniformity prevail, and caprice and uncertainty are excluded. Whilst it is conceivable that any one of the natural laws in which we place most confidence might be reversed, while it is

certain that many of them have been miraculously suspended for purposes proportionably great and important, our present belief in their permanence is almost unlimited. * * Our confidence in the uniformity of natural laws is embodied in the canon, that under the same circumstances and with the same substances, the same effects always result from the same causes. This great inductive principle is itself proved by induction, and partakes of the same formal defect that may be charged against other inductive results, viz: that its terms are wider than our experience warrants. * If the canon were the result of a simple enumeration of all possible cases, its present value as a rule would disappear; since it is to unknown and unexamined cases that we chiefly wish to apply to it."—(*Law of Thought*, pp. 300, 308.) Thus then it is clear that Dr. Thomson, while he believes in miracles on other evidence sufficient for him, has no sympathy with a mode of reasoning which asserts that the uniform laws of nature have no rational answer to give for themselves. According to him, so far from our belief in this conformity being "a mere blind expectation," this judgment of ours is not problematical nor even assertive, but "Demonstrative." It is not opinion merely, or belief merely, but science. Now let us hear what says the celebrated metaphysician, Dr. Thomas Brown, of Edinburgh, in his famous book on *Cause and Effect*:—Ignorant as we are of the many bearings of events on each other, it appears to me that we are not entitled, in sound philosophy, to affirm of any sequence, in which the antecedent and consequent are not exactly known to us in their fixed mutual relation—that the DEITY has not operated in this particular case. It may be much more likely indeed that the sequence is in conformity with the ordinary course of events; but the absolute denial of providential agency, as concerned in it, is not allowable; * * But if it be too much to say, in any particular case, that Providence has not interposed, it appears to me equally, or rather, far more unphilosophic, to pronounce positively, in any particular case, that there has been such interposition. * * The more attentively we observe the sequences of events in nature, and the more minutely we analyse them, the more exact do we find the uniformity of the particular consequent which we trace after the particular antecedent which we have traced; and the stronger therefore does the presumption become, that if we were able to analyse with still more discriminating accuracy all the complex appearances of things, we should discover a similar uniformity in the varieties that at present are most perplexing to us. * * Therefore, he who affirms positively, in any case, that an event which is not beyond the ordinary operation of the common powers of nature, was not so produced but was the result of Divine agency, must in this very affirmation, take for granted, that he is acquainted with all the tendencies of things at the time of which he speaks, since he is able to pronounce upon their inadequacy; and that, with this perfect knowledge of every latent circumstance, as insufficient to produce the phenomenon, he is far wiser than the wisest observer that ever looked on nature with the most inquisitive and discriminating eyes."—(*Cause and Effect*, pp. 427, 429.) So then, this great writer, who admitted that if you assume a Divine agency as the author of miracles, there is no contradiction of the law of cause and effect, yet believed that just in direct proportion as our knowledge grows of the sequences of nature, in the same proportion is the presumption strengthened in favour of the invariable uniformity of the connexion of natural antecedent with natural consequent. So far is he from thinking the law of natural uniformity a mere assumption, he believes, like Dr. Thomson, that the vast preponderance of probability is on its side.

Having thus inquired into the validity of the grounds of our "assumption" of the constancy of natural laws, let us now turn to the other "assumption" of a personal GOD, and see how far the argument is valid on which it is based. The Bishop tells us:—"Man cannot be more conscious of his own personal existence than he is of the existence of GOD. His assurance as to the existence of an external world is not so certain. The belief in conscious life in other than his own individual life, * * is now deeply rooted in every man's mental organism, &c."—(p. 16.) Then in a note we have a specimen of the German method of argument from consciousness. Now this argument from consciousness unluckily proves far too much for those who use it. It, like many other fine ways of accounting for difficult things, has fared badly at the hands of the historical method of investigating human phenomena. For, two things have been made clear: (1st.) That man in his lowest condition, that in which his "consciousness" is undeveloped, brutish, and sluggish, has absolutely no definite ideas at all of either GOD or religion. (2nd.) As consciousness is evolved and intelligence grows, his notions of GOD and religion undergo a steady process of development from the grosser to the less gross forms. See for the evidence of the former statement, Sir John Lubbock's *Origin of Civilization*, pp. 139, 142, 236 to 240. For the general character of the lowest forms of religious ideas, if they can be called such at all, among savages, see the same work, pp. 133-4, 264, 290, 895. I have not space to indulge in these most interesting extracts, but they will well repay a reference to them. The author, at p. 137, thus classifies the stages of religious thought:—"(1. Atheism: absence of any definite ideas on the subject. (2.) Fetishism: in which man supposes he can force the DEITY (if such it can be called) to comply with his wishes. (3.) Totemism: worship of natural objects as symbols of ancestors. (4.) Shamanism: superior deities more powerful than man. (5.) Idolatry, or Anthropomorphism: in which the gods become still more like man, but more powerful; being a part of nature and not creation. (6.) DEITY: regarded as the author, not a part of nature; being, in this stage, first a really supernatural being. (7.) Morality at last, becomes associated with religion. (See also this subject on pp. 242, 248, 253, 256, 395.)

"Gradually," says Sir J. Lubbock, "an increased acquaintance with the laws of nature enlarged the mind of man. He first supposed that the Deity fashioned the earth, raising it out of the water, and preparing it as the dwelling place of man; subsequently he realized the idea that land and water were alike created by Divine power. After regarding spirits as entirely evil, he rose to a belief in good as well as in evil deities, and gradually subordinating the latter to the former, worshipped the good spirits alone as gods, the evil sinking to the level of demons. From believing only in ghosts, he came gradually to the recognition of the soul; although uniting this belief with that in a beneficent and just being, he connected morality with religion. Thus we see that as men rise in civilization their religion rises with them. * * Every increase in science—that is, in positive and ascertained knowledge—brings with it an elevation of religion. * * The immense services which science has thus rendered to the cause of religion and humanity has not yet received the recognition which it deserves. Science is still regarded by many excellent but narrow-minded persons, as hostile to religious truth, while in fact she is only opposed to religious error. The time is approaching when it will be generally perceived that, so far from science being opposed to religion, true religion without science is impossible."—(pp. 291, 292.) As soon as man begins to have anything that can be called "consciousness," and to have any definite religious ideas at all, he at once begins to cast the image of himself, his volition, the form and pressure of his own mind into the blank of nature, which he is as yet unable otherwise to explain. "A more or less idealised humanity," says Herbert Spencer, "is the form which every conception of a personal GOD must take. Anthropomorphism is an inevitable result of the laws of thought. We cannot take a step towards constructing an idea of GOD without the ascription of human attributes. We cannot even speak of a Divine will without assimilating the Divine nature to our own; for we know nothing of volition, save as a property of our own minds."—(*Essays*, vol. i., p. 442.) So, then, as civilization advances, as "knowledge grows from more to more," man's consciousness of GOD as a mode of interpreting nature, undergoes a gradual transition from the insensate Fetishism of the negro—who carries his god in his waist-cloth, takes him out to beat him when ill befalls him and puts him in, when he is about to do something naughty, that he may not see him—to the conception of an omnipotent and beneficent author of nature, who governs the Cosmos through the medium of uniform laws which, however, he can and has, as assumed, for providential reasons, suspended at his sovereign will. I may here refer to the celebrated law of the three stages, whereby M. Comte has formulated this transition: (1st.) The Theological; (2nd.) The Metaphysical; (3rd.) The Positive, or Scientific. The first and third of these are the extremes, for whereas in the theological stage of the human mind, man interprets phenomena by analogies from his own nature, in the latter he recognises nothing but the "reign of law." The metaphysical stage is intermediate and transitional between the other two. I have not space to illustrate the law, but the reader who may be curious on the matter will find it beautifully expounded in Mr. Mill's book, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*. He will also see it most ably applied to the history of the Hellenic mind, in the magnificent 16th chapter of Part I, of *Grote's History of Greece*, and indeed all through the psychological parts of that superb book.

So, then, if we find this "consciousness"—this conception of personal authorship and governance of nature directly and steadily, under the pressure of growing intelligence, modifying its forms from gross to less gross—steadily, and in proportion to the access of light, shrinking and receding before its approaches, what is the natural conclusion? According to the inductive law of "concomitant variations" or, as Whately calls it, "the argument from progressive approach," the conclusion is inevitable, that this mode of accounting for the authorship and the changes of nature, is one that is congenial to darkness and the result of ignorance. If, again, we see the conception of invariable sequence—the assumption, if you like, of uniformity of nature—yet existing in the background in the heroic age of Greece, itself taking the pervading colour of the time and personified under the form and name of the *Mara*, or Fates, independent of the personal rule of *Zeus*, acquiring ever-increasing strength and consistence from the time when the Hellenic thought, through the minds of Thales, Xenophanes and Pythagoras, first broke through the mythopæic gloom down to this time, the conclusion is the same. From that time to this all our enterprises, all our encroachments on the domain of nature, all our inductions, and deductions, and discoveries, have been just so many verifications of this assumption of the constancy of the order of nature. On this assumption we have predicted the eclipses and the return of comets; on this assumption Messrs. Leverrier, in France, and Adams, in England, reasoning on physical laws, independent and unknown to each other, searched the realms of infinite space, fixed the place in them of a planet (Neptune) the light of which never yet had reached human eye, and, acting on the instructions of M. Leverrier, on the 23rd September, 1846, Dr. Galle turned his telescope on that night to the spot indicated and Neptune was discovered. On this same assumption, a few months ago, scientific expeditions came to this hemisphere to observe the transit of Venus, and on a given day the citizens of this place saw in the little black velvet spot on the sun, a marvellous testimony to the unerring constancy of nature to the uniformity of her laws. So consistent and continuous from age to age have been these testimonies, that man's belief in the order of nature is now little short of an instinct. Which then is the more reasonable, an assumption which increasing knowledge has been uniformly modifying, or an assumption which the same knowledge has been as uniformly confirming? Surely

to men like us "heirs of all the ages in the foremost files of time," the question is idle. When put on this ground of reason alone it simply revolts our rational instincts. The preponderance of probability on the side of the uninterrupted order of nature is so vast as to make the so-called "assumption" a presumption of the most overwhelming description. This being so, it is the nature of all presumptions to shift the burthen of proof upon the other side, who therefore must find the proof of miracles in some other evidence than reason. This is the conclusion of J. S. Mill, in that most candid and able essay on Theism:—"There is, therefore, a vast preponderance of probability against a miracle, to counterbalance which would require a very extraordinary and indisputable congruity in the supposed miracle and its circumstances with something which we conceive ourselves to know or to have grounds for believing, with regard to the Divine attributes. * * Thus, then, stands the balance of evidence in respect to the reality of miracles, assuming the existence and government of GOD to be proved by other evidence. On the one side, the great negative presumption arising from the whole of what the course of nature discloses to us of the Divine government, as carried on through second causes and by invariable sequences of physical effects upon constant antecedents. On the other side, a few exceptional instances, attested by evidence not of a character to warrant belief in any facts in the smallest degree unusual or improbable."—(*Essays*, p.p. 235, 239.) This, it will be seen, puts the case even on the assumption of the existence of a personal GOD. His conclusion is:—"That miracles have no claim whatever to the character of historical facts, and are wholly invalid as evidences of any revelation."

Having carried the general connected argument thus far, I shall now make certain incidental criticisms on detached portions of the pamphlet. On pages 10, 15, 21, appears a fallacy that colours the whole throughout. Hume is quoted (p. 10.) to show that there is a mental process in inductive inference, and on page 15, Dean Mansel tells us "that our belief in the constancy of natural order is explained by a law of our mental constitution, and that it is a law of mind and not of matter." Again, on page 21, the Bishop is angry with the physicists and physiologists for their ignorance, of "mental science." Now, in the first place, who denies that there is a step taken by the mind in the inductive process; in what operation of logic is not that involved? Next, it is not true that our belief in the constancy of natural order is a law of mind and not of matter. There are two sorts of inference: Objective and Subjective, or Inductive and Syllogistic. "In Objective Inference," says Killick, "the fact stated in the conclusion is a *bond fide new truth*, a distinct fact, and not merely a part of the same fact or facts stated in the premises. * * In all cases of Objective Inference the conclusion follows in virtue of a *law of External Nature* and not by a mere law of mind; and whether it does or does not will be a mere question of physical law. *Subjective Inference*, on the other hand, affords a contrast in all these respects. * * The mind being in possession of the premises can by a mere comparison of their expression in words, evolve the conclusion—the fact stated in that conclusion being really included in the fact stated in the premises."—(Preface to *Handbook*, p. 5.) The Bishop, all through, seems quite unaware of this most important distinction, and, therefore, the charge of arrogance and ignorance which, on page 21, he hurls at physicists, recoils on himself. Surely anyone, by force of plain sense, can understand that the proper mental processes to employ in interpreting any phenomena of nature, normal or abnormal, such as miracles, should be those which have so eminently contributed to make man the master and lord of nature, viz:—the inductive methods. The Bishop is again very angry at pages 13, 14, with Mr. Buskin and the author of *Supernatural Religion*, for a couple of remarks made by those gentlemen. Mr. Buskin maintains that "the uniformity of nature *not* being established, the most startling apparent departures from it would be attended by *no* evidential effect." Again the Bishop quotes from the gentleman secondly named above:—"Any argument which could destroy faith in the order of nature would be equally destructive to miracles. If we have no right to believe in a rule, there can be no right to speak of exceptions, &c." I do not wonder at the Bishop losing his mental balance when brought up short by this very neat dilemma of these two gentlemen. But really I am quite unable to give him credit in the remarks on page 14, for both candour and intelligence. Surely this dilemma is as clear as crystal. For if you deny the constancy of natural sequence, what inevitably follows is chance or chaos, and how, in that case, could anything whatever that happens be an exception or suspension of a rule or order that did not exist, which by your own definition is the essence of miracle? If there were no order of nature, no law of causation, how could this be a providential interruption of it, and where would be the need to bring in *Deus ex machinâ* as a cause for an event that might, by the supposition, happen at any moment without a cause? In my opinion the sneer of the Bishop is sadly out of place. It is one or other—eminently uncandid or silly.

On page 11 a point is made by "the unanswerable" Canon Mozley. We are told that as science has proclaimed there are no causes in nature, that the chain of physical succession is "a rope of sand consisting of antecedents and consequents, but *without a rational link or trace of necessary connection* between them—a chain of which the junction not being reducible to reason the interruption is not against reason." A very pretty point indeed: if this is a specimen of the unanswerable *Bampton Lectures* I do not think much of them. For, first, science has not said there are "no causes" in nature—she says that causation is nothing more than "the invariable, unconditional antecedents," which is a different thing. Then mark the way in which the term

"rational link" is coupled by the conjunction "or" to the term "necessary connection." The word "or" in English is ambiguous: It may be= "or, which is the same thing," Latin "*vel*;" or it may be= "or, which is another thing," Latin "*aut*," the effect being quite different as the one or the other meaning is conveyed. Here the first is plainly the meaning insinuated, and the effect is to assume in this underhand way that "necessary connection" and "rational link" are the same thing. The writer knowing that science has successfully attacked the so-called "necessary connection" of cause and effect, in one of the senses of "necessity," *i. e.*, "unavoid-ability" as opposed to "invariableness," or constancy of sequence, immediately proceeds below to avail himself of this use of "necessary" above as a convertible term with "rational," and infers that as science has destroyed "necessary connection," (in his sense of the term,) therefore she has also removed any "rational link" (which he assumes as the equivalent) and, therefore, on her own showing, miracles can be no interruption, forsooth of a link that does not exist I A sophism, worthy only of a pettifogger in a police court.

Then on page 19 there is another little point much of a piece with this one. Is it seriously pretended that the *putting into action new natural laws* by the agency of human volition as, *e.g.*, by cutting down the forests, and thus acting through second causes, is the same thing as "a miraculous suspension and interruption of some laws of nature?" Surely this fallacy could not mislead a child. See it exposed in *Mill's Essay on Theism*, pp. 226, 228.

Thus I have, on grounds of reason, to which he himself has appealed, combated the Bishop's propositions. I repeat, that within the limits of the question "Is a miracle reasonable?" anyone is at liberty to argue on rational grounds alone. After thus defining the ground the Bishop has no right whatever to go outside of it or to fling any imputation. This question as stated, is a challenge to rationalists, and when they meet it on the ground on which it is placed by the challenger he has no reason to complain. The question of the existence of a Personal GOD, let it be clearly understood, is not here discussed in any other sense, or with any other view, than so far as it was an assumption made by the Bishop, which by the terms of his Thesis he had no right to make. Whether, *as an independent question*, it is true or false I here say nothing.

I may say that I have never read a word of *Supernatural Religion*, or of Hume's famous *Essay on Miracles*. I know nothing of the former book but what I see in the pamphlet. I deprecate wanton attacks on the unobtrusive exercise of religious faith and duties; but such great and all-absorbing questions as this are engaging the earnest reflection of thinking men everywhere, and when they are pushed forward anyone may fairly criticise them. Clergymen from the habit of treating all questions from the pulpit, without hearing the other side, are apt, above all men, to take a one-sided view and criticism is wholesome to them. I trust I have not exceeded its legitimate bounds.

Vignette

Lyon and Blair, Printers, Lambton Quay, Wellington.

A Few Remarks in Answer to "Zetales." "

"Logical consequences are the scarecrows of fools and the beacons of wise men."

Professor Huxley.

By Octavius,

Bishop of Wellington.

Printed by Lyon and Blair Wellington Lambton Quay. 1875

A Few Remarks in Answer to "Zetales."

ZETALES has published a criticism on my small pamphlet, entitled—"A Reply to the Question, is a Miracle opposed to Reason?" In the few observations I am about to make I have no intention of either adding to, or retracting anything I have said; nor even of either qualifying or enforcing any argument I have used. I merely wish to show that my meaning has been unaccountably missed, and that in several instances a construction has been put upon my language which it was not intended to convey, and of which I think it does not admit. I shall, therefore, confine myself to commenting upon those parts of my critic's reply in which he most obviously seems to have misunderstood me. I shall not follow him into any consideration of the theories of Comte and Lubbock, which have no tendency to establish the only point which would be fatal to my position, namely, that the immutability of the order of nature admits of demonstration, and is a necessary truth of reason. I am, so far at least as my present argument is concerned, altogether indifferent as to any collateral issues.

I most assuredly thought, when I defined a miracle in the sense I intended to use it, as "a visible suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose," that my definition would be intelligible enough to any well-informed person. I had no suspicion that I should be misunderstood to imply that this referred to any but a divine action. I took it for granted that I should be understood to mean that this providential interference had reference to the act of GOD who watches over his moral creatures. I candidly confess that I thought it wholly

unnecessary for the information of anyone at all likely to read my pamphlet, that I should insert the words 'by Almighty GOD' between the words "suspension of the laws of nature" and "for a providential purpose." Indeed, a miracle, as distinguished from a marvel, involves the notion of GOD'S action. It was therefore with some surprise that I read—"By the Bishop's own terms of combat any person has a complete right to deny, for argument's sake, the assumption of a personal GOD"—(p. 7); that is to say, deny that which is involved in the very idea of a miracle. Surely I was perfectly justified in saying, that the denial of that which was essential to the very idea of a miracle, would be to leave only a meaningless residuum about which no one would care to argue.

At page 20 there is a passage that I am obliged to cite at length, lest I should be supposed to have misrepresented the writer. "I shall now make certain incidental criticisms on detached portions of the pamphlet. On pages 10, 15, 21, appears a fallacy that colours the whole throughout. Hume is quoted (p. 10.) to show that there is a mental process in inductive inference, and on page 15, Dean Mansel tells us 'that our belief in the constancy of natural order is explained by a law of our mental constitution, and that it is a law of mind and not of matter.' Again, on page 21, the Bishop is angry with the physicists and physiologists for their ignorance of mental science. Now, in the first place, who denies that there is a step taken by the mind in the inductive process; in what operation of logic is not that involved? Next, it is not true that our belief in the constancy of natural order is a law of mind and not of matter." I think this is one of the most remarkable specimens of criticism that has ever come under my observation. The writer has certainly not taken the trouble to understand the very plain words of Hume, usually deemed a lucid writer. What he is cited by me to show, is, that there is *no* legitimate chain of reasoning connecting the conclusion with the premises in inductive inference. His words are—"It must be acknowledged that there is a consequence drawn by the mind, that there is a step taken, a process of thought, and an inference which *wants* to be explained;—as a philosopher I *want* to learn the foundation of this inference." Hume, in fact, contemptuously repudiates the claim of the inductive process to satisfy the requirements of reason. When, therefore, the writer goes on to ask, "Who denies that there is a step taken by the mind in the inductive process?" I am fairly puzzled, because this was the very thing that Hume did deny. It was on account of his denial of this assumption that his testimony was adduced by me. Has the writer, then, been all along criticising my argument without knowing what it really is? What I have asserted, and proved (so far as this can be proved by the candid admission of opponents of miracles, such as Hume, Kant, and Mill,) is that there is no legitimate inference in the inductive process, that the so-called inductive reasoner has jumped to his conclusion. But this evidently is an aspect of the subject with which my learned critic is not very familiar.

Notwithstanding what I have just said, I am not quite satisfied that I have rightly understood my critic. Can he possibly mean, when he says that "there is a step taken," that an inference has been legitimately drawn in spite of a *missing link* in the chain of reasoning? If this is what he means, then he has conceded my point, and my argument is established. He goes on to ask "in what operation of logic is not this involved If he really intends to say, that there is a missing link in every operation of logic or process of reasoning, I can only protest against such an absurdity. But it is obvious to remark, that if this be really the case no possible beneficial result could be derived from any argument whatever. This would seem to be a somewhat unexpected conclusion for a professed "rationalist" to acquiesce in. If he intended to convey, that in ordinary processes of reasoning it was very usual to omit certain links, which, being admitted on all hands, it was desirable for the sake of brevity to suppress, no one would dispute that. But the question now in dispute is the link which involves the main issue of the controversy. To say that this may be dispensed with is absurd.

But let me proceed. He misquotes my extract from Dean mansel: he somewhat carelessly omits the words, "as thus explained," and also substitutes "is" for "may be," very materially altering Dean Mansel's meaning, who did not make a positive assertion. This is not exactly what might have been expected from a philosophical critic. He then asserts, that "it is not true that our belief in the constancy of natural order is a law of mind and not of matter." Let us try, without having recourse to any "handbook" of philosophy, (a class of books far more likely to mislead than to benefit anyone on such subjects,) whether Dean Hansel's meaning cannot be ascertained by some process intelligible to all who will be at the pains of thinking for a few minutes. Any simple illustration will do. There is a piece of ice; it is brought near to the fire; it melts. These external visible facts are directly presented in intuition. This may be repeated a hundred times with the same result. That is all that the facts will give us. But the *mind* postulates a *cause*. Mankind have, as a matter of fact, always assumed a cause. There "may be" some law of mind compelling them to assume a cause. Mr. Mill, and many other writers of his school of thought, distinctly tell us that this cause is imaginary; that we perceive nothing but the sequence of events, and that the hypothesis of a cause, which the mind interposes, is not found in the facts, and is not needed. I contend therefore that Dean Mansel is strictly correct, and that the belief in question "may be" the result of a law of mind; but certainly the notion of cause, or law, or necessary sequence, is not given by the facts themselves.

The following passage requires some notice:—"Thus I have, grounds of reason, to which he himself has appealed, combated the Bishop's proposition. I repeat, that within the limits of the question—'Is a miracle reasonable?' anyone is at liberty to argue on rational grounds alone. After thus defining the ground the Bishop has no right whatever to go outside of it to fling any imputation. This question, as stated, is a challenge to rationalists, and when they meet it on the ground on which it is placed by the challenger, he has no right to complain."—(p. 23.) How a single word of this passage applies to anything I have written, I am wholly unable to imagine. In the first place, I have proposed no such question as—"Is a miracle reasonable?" or (as is attributed to me at page 6)—"Are miracles to be believed on grounds of reason alone?" It would never have occurred to me to write in such loose ambiguous terms. The writer has been drawing on his own imagination. He has set up a man of straw to contend with. In the next place, I "challenge" on one. It is rather those who hold the opinions I do who are challenged. We are taunted with the reiterated assertion, that miracles are repugnant to reason. This is decidedly the tone adopted by a highly lauded book, *Supernatural Religion*, extracts from which work I gave. I am also told a miracle is as absurd as the notion of squaring the circle. I did not come forward in the capacity of a theologian to defend miracles; I distinctly guarded myself from being supposed to do anything of the kind. I accepted the challenge made by others who had appealed to reason as decisive against miracles. My position simply is—*Cæsarem appellasti? ad Cæsarem ibis*. When I strive to ascertain wherein the repugnancy to reason consists, I am told that a miracle implies a contravention of the uniformity of nature, that this is impossible, and therefore that it is repugnant to reason. I admit that the alleged consequence would follow if the uniformity of the order of nature could be established as a necessary truth of reason. I therefore ask to see the premises fairly stated, as well as the logical process by means of which the asserted conclusion is deduced from them. I can obtain no answer from the "rationalists." I ask for proof from reason, or in accordance with reason, and I am told I must be contented with "probability," for the writer says—"How can the Bishop, after putting the case on the ground of reason pretend to treat questions of greater or lesser *probability* as collateral?" Several eminent writers are quoted to prove (what nobody doubted) the probability of the immutability of the order of nature. He then says—"So far is he (Dr. Brown) from thinking the laws of natural uniformity a mere assumption, he believes, like Dr. Thomson, that the vast preponderance of *probability* is on its side." This, as everybody could see, is simply evading the point really at issue. I did not want to know what any man, however great his authority might be, *believed* to be highly *probable*, I asked for a logical proof from the "rationalists" of the immutability of nature, on which the argument for the impossibility of miracles is supposed to rest; but hitherto I have asked in vain. They tell me, after all their boasting and their taunts, that they have nothing to offer me but "preponderance of probability."

It certainly does appear rather too bad after this utter failure, after this ignominious retreat on his part, after confessing that he has no proof to adduce, that the writer should venture to say—"I repeat * anyone is at liberty to argue on rational grounds alone." He evidently has some misgiving as to the validity of his reasoning. After all his parade of authorities, and claim to have refuted my position; after his appeal to reason and to the inductive method, as decisive of the question under discussion, in reference to the ground on which the belief in the immutability of the order of nature rested, no one could have been prepared for the following humble appeal *ad misericordiam*—"Surely anyone by force of plain sense, can understand that the proper mental processes to employ in interpreting any phenomena of nature," &c.—(p. 21.) Here argument seems to be deliberately abandoned; and it is assumed that "anyone" can settle by "plain sense" (whatever in this connection that may mean,) a question which had perplexed philosophers until the subtle intellect of Hume solved the difficulty. This really is, as has been before said, an abandonment of reason and an appeal to ignorant prejudice. It sounds strange as coming from one who avows that he is dealing with the question from a rationalist's point of view.

At page 21, he apparently fails to see my object in bringing forward an argument attributed to Mr. Buskin, "that the uniformity of nature *not* being established, the most startling apparent departures from it would be attended by *no* evidential effect. He seems to think this puts me in a "dilemma." Had I thought so I need hardly have brought the passage to light. And the same may be said of the other passage quoted. The writer seems to forget, what I did not lose sight of, that I was dealing with a "simple issue;" which is the assertion, that a miracle is impossible because the laws of nature are uniform. Ruskin and other modern thinkers perceive that this "uniformity" of nature is no longer tenable. This admission is, coming from the opposite camp, important to my argument. In the estimation of my critic my argument is either "eminently uncandid or silly." Some specimens of his qualifications, as a philosophical critic, have already been adduced. I find it convenient in argument to deal with one subject at a time. When my opponents concede the question of "uniformity," I shall be prepared to deal with the other branch of the "dilemma." He proceeds, "If there were no order of nature," &c., again evading the real issue, which is, not, whether there is "no order of nature," but whether it is a truth having such a basis in reason, that its denial involved a contradiction or obvious absurdity.

Again, Mr. Mill's authority is quoted for the purpose of invalidating my argument. His words are—"The character of necessity * * attributed to mathematical truths is an illusion." I was quite aware of Mr. Mill's

opinion on this subject, and therefore cautiously qualified what I said with the words—"as is generally admitted." Mr. Mill repudiates necessary truth altogether. Nevertheless the human mind recognizes a distinction between necessary and contingent truth. The writer alludes to the discovery of the planet Neptune as an evidence of the uniformity of the laws of nature. This will illustrate the distinction I maintain. Why were astronomers so highly gratified at this discovery? Was it not that additional evidence was thus obtained in confirmation of the truth of the law of gravity? But, let me ask, is any mathematician on the look out for fresh evidence to prove that two straight lines will not inclose a space, or that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles? If not, why not? Simply because these belong to a class of necessary truths, and the other does not. Of course men may shut their eyes to this distinction, as did the author to whom I referred on the subject of squaring the circle; as did also Mr. Mill, who expressed his belief that in some other world 2 and 2 might make 5. But the distinction exists, and will continue to be recognised by all who have no pet theory to prop up and maintain to which it is repugnant. Mr. Mill contends that mathematical ideas, like notions derived from physical facts, are mere generalisations from experience. Having failed, that is, to establish physics on a basis of certitude, he endeavours to lower mathematics down to the level of contingency. But if mathematical ideas, in order to establish their truth, must, as he asserts, be verified by their agreement with the physical phenomena that suggest them, then the independent value of pure scientific truth, hitherto attributed to mathematics by the acutest intellects the world has known, must be deemed an illusion, until, at least, some greater metaphysician than Mr. Mill has proved himself to be, shall have succeeded in refuting Kant's demonstration, that a criterion of external material truth is not only impossible, but contradictory.

At page 23, there is a very strange specimen of criticism. The writer says—"Is it seriously pretended that the *putting into actum new natural laws* (the italics are the writer's) by the agency of human volition as, *e. g.*, by cutting down the forests, and thus acting through second causes, is the same thing as a 'miraculous suspension and interruption of some laws of nature?' Surely the fallacy could not mislead a child." I have heard of a newly discovered law; but who ever before heard of a "*new natural law*?" But passing over this novel and unintelligible mode of dealing with the subject, where, in the passage referred to, have I said that "acting through second causes *is the same thing*" &c.? This is such an evident misrepresentation of what I did say, while merely endeavouring to "illustrate" an argument, complete in itself, but not to add to its force, that I shall leave it to the candid consideration of any reader who may take the trouble to refer to it. If the illustration affords no help, it certainly, as an illustration only, cannot weaken the argument.

I conclude, by again reminding the reader that I have been engaged only on an intellectual question. The assertion is constantly made that the immutability of the order of nature has been so absolutely proved, that a miracle, as such, is impossible. I have not now come forward to prove that a miracle is possible; but I deny the truth of the assertion that the immutability of the order of nature can be so proved, that its denial should involve either a contradiction or an obvious absurdity. Hitherto no such proof has been given. Till such proof has been given I shall continue to deem the assertion an idle boast. Reason may, or may not, be competent to the task of rendering miracles perfectly intelligible to the human mind,—a question I do not enter upon. But reason, at any rate, up to the present time has been able to refute all arguments advanced for the purpose of proving that they are impossible. This, I am aware, may by some be deemed a mere negative result. It is one, however, I venture to think, which may be productive of very important consequences.

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The Saving-Bank in the School

An Account of an Economic Experiment at Ghent.

Adapted to Suit New Zealand,

(From "Macmillan'S Magazine.")

Vignette

For Private Circulation.

Vignette Fergusson & Mitchell Dunedin Princes Street, Printers and Stationers. 1875

Notes in Support.

Vignette

1.—"Habit makes everything easy and casts difficulties upon the deviation from a wonted course."—LORD BROUGHAM.

2.—"A mind trained to reflect on consequences,..... to guide conduct, and to forego immediate enjoyment for the sake of greater good to self or others, may be produced without reading or writing, and is a far nobler product of education than the mere power to read or write, however neat the penmanship, or correct the pronunciation."—DR. HODGSON, *at the Social Science Congress*, 1873.

3.—"Instruction means communicating knowledge; education implies the repetition of certain modes of action until they have become habits..... "Train up (educate) a child in the way he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it, says Scripture; but it does not promise the same result from merely *instructing* the child."—GEO. COMBE, in his *Essay on Education*.

4.—"The power of enjoying the present without anticipation of the future or regard of the past, is the especial privilege of the animal nature, and of human nature in proportion as it has not been developed beyond the animal."—GEO. MACDONALD in *Robert Falconer*.

5.—"What we contend for is this, that habits of prudence and forethought in money matters are far from being common, and that to endeavour to encourage them, is one of the most practical forms, which a really thoughtful benevolence can assume,..... that a large part of the suffering which we all deplore, is caused by want of habits of economy and forethought, and that the habit of saving, so as to be beforehand with the world, if it is to be acquired at all, must be acquired early."—LORD DERBY, on *Thrift*.

6.—"To teach habits, is the very master power of education."—Mrs. W. GRAY, at the *British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1874.

7.—"Education means something more than merely learning lessons out of a book; and habits, early implanted, last longer even than leases, districts, or towns."—*Quoted by* DR. HODGSON *from John Hollingshead in Ragged London*.

8.—"Never treat money affairs with levity: money is character."—*Quoted by* SMILES, in *Self Culture*, from *Sir E. Bulwer Lytton*.

9.—"Action in conduct and in work, is at once the practical expression of the character and the intellect, but find little room to show [*unclear: themselves*] in the ordinary systems of education."—FRÖBEL'S *Kindergarten Schools*.

10.—"L'école ne doit pas seulement instruire, elle doit aussi élever les enfants, et nous insistons sur l'épargne, comme moyen d'éducation, comme instrument de moralisation."—LA CAISSE D'ÉPARGNE dans les *Ecoles de Gand*.

11.—"The extent to which teaching and training can create habits of saving and self-denial, will be seen by comparing the conduct of a well informed and prudent man with that of the untutored savage..... We have no hesitation in enumerating this quality (habit of saving) among the virtues, inasmuch as its prevalence is indispensable for individual and national wellbeing."—RICHARD DAWES, M.A., *Dean of Hereford*.

The Savings-Bank in the School.

Vignette

MR. J. G. FITCH, of London, one of her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, on a recent visit to Ghent, made himself familiar with the details of a remarkable experiment now being carried on in connection with the schools of that city. The results of his observations he contributed in a paper to *Macmillan's Magazine*, and of which, the present pamphlet is an adaptation to suit the conditions of life in the Colony, as distinguished from those in England. Here and there, remarks have been suppressed or added as occasion seemed to require; or the phraseology has been merely altered by some slight turn of language to suit existing circumstances. The paper is now published with the desire of enlisting the active sympathy of all who are interested in the grand work of education, and more especially with the earnest hope that it may be the means of diverting attention to that particular phase of it which may be called "moral," the cultivation of which, in the school—to judge from the almost entire absence of allusion to it in the usual codes—is deemed unnecessary, or at least impracticable. By the introduction of the Savings-Bank into the school, an opportunity would be presented which, from information already gathered, the more intelligent of our teachers would gladly avail themselves of, as a means by which they could foster and encourage the formation of habits that would have a life-long influence for good, in those whose training has been committed to their care.

Mr. Fitch sets out by remarking that prudential warnings against thriftlessness and waste, have become so trite, and devices for encouraging the practice of saving are now so familiar to most of us, that a little diffidence may well be felt by one who ventures to again expatiate on this well-worn subject. Not only in the chief cities of the colony, but in remote townships and far "up-country"—be that north or south, or east or west—New Zealand is far from behind in having its Savings-Banks, Building Societies, and numerous other provident associations, and few even of the far out-lying districts remain long unvisited by the Government lecturer on the advantages of life assurance; but the extent to which any or all of these, influence the habits of the people as a whole, is comparatively insignificant. The proportion of earnings drawn from immediate consumption and reserved as part of the capital of the future is very small, and the number of persons who habitually save is relatively still smaller. The constantly recurring instances of pecuniary demands upon us for the support of

families suddenly plunged into the depths of poverty by the death, or temporary suspension from work by accident or illness, of the bread-winner of the household, furnish ready proof of this. It would seem as if all the economic truisms about the sin of improvidence and the duty of saving were spoken to the winds or written on the sands of the sea-shore, so insufficiently are they in practice recognised. The experiment in the Belgium schools furnishes a forcible and striking example of the triumphant results of *practice*, during a period of six or seven years, over many times that number in endeavouring by *precept* merely, to bring about similar results. It is, in fact, a bright and happy illustration of the favourite motto—"Deeds, not Words."

Ghent is a thriving town of about 121,000 souls; it contains a Free (*i.e.*, a non-clerical) University and many Primary Schools, which are said to be very efficient, and are under the supervision of a Communal Council. This Council, though it sustains the schools and periodically inspects them, does not dispense with voluntary aid, and two important societies—the *Société Callier* and the *Cercle pour l'Encouragement de l'Instruction Primaire*—co-operate with the Council, by the offer of prizes to the schools and by various forms of stimulus and help to the teachers. Some seven years ago it occurred to M. Laurent, the Professor of Civil Law in the University, that much might be done through the agency of the Primary Schools to familiarize the people while young with habits of economy and forethought. Accordingly he called the teachers of the Ghent Public Schools together, explained to them his plans, and having inspired them with some of his own enthusiasm on the subject, proceeded, with their full concurrence, to visit the schools one by one, in order to give simple economic lessons to the children. He went from class to class enforcing and illustrating the advantages of saving, and showing how it might be practised. A plan was devised by which the teacher of each division undertook to receive the little savings of the children from day to day, even a single centime (about the tenth part of a penny) at a time. As soon as the deposits of a pupil amount to 1 franc (10d.) he receives a Savings-Bank book, and a deposit account is opened in his name with the State Savings-Bank, which gives interest at the rate of 3 per cent. Each school also opens at the Savings-Bank its own separate account, in which all the smaller deposits are placed from day to day, the pupil's deposit being transferred under an arrangement with the bank into his or her own name as soon as it amounts to a franc. Simple books and cards of account are provided by the administration of the bank, and the children receive duplicates to be carried home from time to time for the information of their parents, but generally to be preserved at the school. The signature of a parent or guardian is required whenever any money is to be withdrawn.

By these simple arrangements the opportunity of making little savings was brought closely within reach of every child of the Ghent Schools, and the moral influences of gentle and kind persuasion were brought to bear by Professor Laurent and the teachers with singular success. The response made by the children and the parents to his appeals, has been marked during the last six years by an emphasis and a steady persistence, which are well deserving the attention of all who have the future well-being of the young people of New Zealand at heart.

The public schools of the city of Ghent fall into four classes: those most numerously attended are the Free Primary Schools, maintained in great part at the expense of the Communal Council. In these there are 4,315 boys and 3,674 girls, in all 7,989. Then there are the *Ecoles Payantes*, primary schools of the same educational character, but not gratuitous, and designed for children of a higher social rank. In these there are 1,079 scholars. In the *Ecoles Gardiennes*, or Free Infant Schools, there are 3,039 children, and in the Adult Schools, which are held in the evening or on the Sunday, there are 3,285 men and women under regular instruction. Out of this total of 15,392 pupils, no less than 13,032 are this year in possession of accounts in the Savings-Bank. The uniformity and steadiness with which the system has taken root in the schools may be estimated from the following tables.

Thus the average sum now standing to the credit of each depositor is about 35 francs. It will be seen that relatively to the numbers, the largest success has been attained in the schools of the first class, the scholars in the ordinary juvenile schools being necessarily more amenable to influences of this kind than those of the second class, older and more thoughtful than those of the third, and with habits of extravagance which, if acquired at all, are less confirmed than those of the fourth. The work has been done without Government authority or pressure of any kind, but simply through the energetic initiation of one earnest man, aided by the sympathy of the teachers and local managers. The reports show that there is also a steady growth in the interest with which the parents regard the experiment. At first the act of economy was mainly that of the child, who was induced to put by the half-pence he would otherwise have spent to indulge his appetite. Now, children are often intrusted by their parents with small sums expressly for the purpose of being added to their store. And the general result, that in a single town of moderate size upwards of 10,000 children have opened separate accounts in the Savings-Bank, and that nearly £15,000 are deposited in their names, is one which is full of encouragement to the thoughtful philanthropists who devised the plan, and which has already produced a very marked effect on the social and moral life of the working classes of Ghent. The experiment has created great interest throughout Belgium.

A mutual friend had requested Professor Laurent to forward to a correspondent in New Zealand the latest

intelligence concerning his interesting work. Writing in March of the present year, he says, "Il m'est impossible de donner des renseignements statistiques sur le mouvement de l'épargne, puisque il se répand partout par une action individuelle sans l'intervention du gouvernement. Je sais seulement que l'épargne à l'école fonctionne dans les Pays Bas, dans le Grand Duché de Wurtemberg, en France, en Italie et dans quelques parties de l'Allemagne." Mr. Fitch also mentions in a recent letter, that since the publication of his paper, every day brings him letters expressive of interest and of further enquiry concerning the movement. See also the *Leisure Hour*, for October of last year.

In Antwerp, in Bruges, and in the the rural districts, successful efforts have been made to secure the adoption of the same plan, and last year a new association for the special encouragement of saving has been formed under distinguished auspices, with its head quarters at Brussels, and designed to operate on all the Communal and State Schools of the country in a systematic manner.

Belgium abounds with associations for promoting healthy recreation and amusement, as elements which tend to foster a sound moral tone among the labouring classes. Many of these societies seek to attain their object by means of rewards and scholarships, designed to encourage children to remain longer at school; others aim at the formation of workmen's clubs for historic readings and discussions, for simple theatrical exhibitions and fêtes, and for organised visits to famous factories, museums, and monuments. But in all of them the plan of explaining and recommending the use of the Savings-Bank, and bringing that institution close to the pupils in the school or the evening class, is now becoming recognised as one of the chief engines of usefulness. For example, there is an active society at Brussels especially designed to improve the education of girls and young women, and the object is attained to a considerable extent by means of prizes to meritorious pupils, and to those governesses whose efforts to raise the standard of instruction have been most successful. But the prizes and bursaries thus distributed always consist, in whole or in part, of a Savings-Bank book, inscribed with the pupil's name, and crediting her with a small sum of money, which is not to be withdrawn till after a given time.

It is surely unnecessary to dwell on the significance of these humble but useful efforts in their bearing on our own social and industrial life in the colony. Our labouring classes are better paid than those of any other country, but they are not richer, perhaps with one exception—the ploughman or yearly agricultural servant—and they do not as a rule economise their resources, and a very small proportion of them make provision for the future. The same remarks may apply to numbers of tradespeople, and many others who regard their social standing as above that of either the tradesman or artisan. Reckless spending is the rule. Compared with Great Britain or the Continent of Europe, money is a plentiful commodity with everyone, but by very many never realized or capitalized in any of those permanent forms by which the dignity of family life is established and sustained. But until a man begins to care about this and some of the many substantial comforts and blessings which accumulated savings can alone procure, he has no motive to put forth his best energies to become a first-rate workman, a respected tradesman, or a confidential and trustworthy clerk, but every temptation to degenerate into a drunkard or a gambler. The degree with which a man cares about such things forms, in fact, the measure of his prosperity, and his self-respect is the surest guarantee for his future industry and happiness. With those who receive their income in the form of weekly wages, economy and thrift may be somewhat difficult, but they are also more necessary when the horizon of a man's resources and of his expenditure is narrowed by the inevitable circumstances of his life; and a man is enriched and ennobled in just the proportion in which this horizon is enlarged, and in which he learns to see the actions and the sacrifices of to-day in their relation to to-morrow. Dr. Johnson's famous sentence, "Whatever makes the past, the distant, or the future predominate over the present, advances us in the dignity of thinking beings," expresses with characteristic solemnity an indisputable truth. The difficulty, however, is to convert a truism like this into a practical maxim for the conduct of daily life.

It is not in the natural order of things for employers, even when they see the need of frugality and temperance, to take measures for urging the duty upon those they employ. In this direction, in the home country, many and various efforts have been made, some employers going so far as to offer a bonus of so much per cent, over that allowed by the banks upon all sums deposited, but nowhere has the experiment succeeded. Motives, it is supposed, were misinterpreted, and the deposits that had been made on the first impressions were generally withdrawn. Perhaps, however, the true cause of failure might be attributed to the fact that, when first yielding to the proposals, the workmen acted under persuasion, not conviction—teaching had begun with them too late in life.

There is one class of teachers who might use their power to much advantage, and these are our ministers of religion; nor are we wholly without outspoken proof that the subject does not entirely escape their attention. At a recent public meeting at Tokomairiro, Otago, the Rev. Mr. Coffey, in speaking of the vice of intemperance, recommended the practice of saving, as tending to lessen it. He said, "the joining of a benefit society would, he thought, encourage thrift, and to encourage thrift was to discourage vice. A benefit society by inculcating habits of saving, encouraged habits of self-control." The Rev. Mr. Stanford, in introducing resolutions for the

discouraging of intemperance, at the meeting of the Anglican Synod, in Dunedin, in October last, used remarks to a similar effect. It must however be owned, that generally speaking, the inculcation of saving as a substantial part of practical morality is, for some unexplained reasons, not dwelt upon with anything like the urgency or frequency which, as a great motive-agency for good, it ought to be. It is, after all, in the schools that the work can be most efficiently done. School committees and teachers have opportunities of constantly bringing the matter before the attention of the children, and can readily furnish to them simple facilities for carrying out the lessons of economy which are learned in the class; moreover, their disinterestedness is unquestionable, and they are less likely than any other persons who are brought into contact with the pupil to be suspected of selfish motives. Much might be done by the help of judicious lessons, by the use of wise and simple text-books, like Mr. Ellis's "Outlines of Social Economy," also Bastiat's little book, "What is Seen and What is not Seen,"

Messrs. Reith and Wilkie, Booksellers, Princes-street, Dunedin, have kindly agreed to procure a supply of these books.

translated into English by Professor Hodgson, of Edinburgh, whose labours in that city and elsewhere to render the principles of economic science interesting and intelligible to young people have been remarkably successful. These textbooks illustrate the need of economy, and the increased power of usefulness and of enjoyment which it gives to those who have learned it. But it must ever be kept in mind that thrift is an act—a habit to be learned like other habits, not mainly by teaching or lecturing, but by *actual practice*. All experience shows that it is hard to learn it for the first time in adult life, but if it be acquired in early life it will probably never be lost. Habit is second nature, and there is as much room for its exercise in the life of a child at school as in that of a grown man who is earning wages. To him, as well as to his elders, there are temptations to waste that might be resisted; there are frequent opportunities for little acts of forethought and self-restraint which ought to be embraced. It may seem a trifle to speak of pence which children spend in sweetmeats and other trash, but economy is essentially a matter of trifles, and even of petty details. Relatively to his resources and to his wants, these are the items which make up the extravagance of a child. The boy or girl who is encouraged to deny himself or herself some immediate gratification and to prefer to it some future permanent advantage, who has once experienced the delight of receiving a letter by post inscribed "On Her Majesty's Service," and containing an acknowledgment from the Postmaster-General for the sum deposited, or who in some temporary trouble of the family has given relief by a draft upon the accumulated store, has learned a lesson in self-sacrifice which will abide in memory for life.

It may seem like special pleading to identify very high qualities too closely with so worldly a matter as the management of money; yet in truth there is no one problem or duty of life that calls into exercise so many moral attributes, or connects itself in so many subtle ways with the growth of the whole character. He who said "that a right habit of getting, of saving, "and of spending money argued a perfect man," was scarcely guilty of exaggeration. From the very beginning of responsible life the inclination to spend the whole of what we possess, becomes a potent temptation to spend or to enjoy a little more than we possess. And the records of our law courts and our police courts show that impecuniosity and extravagance are the parents not merely of much of the crime of the world, but of shiftiness, of evasion, of falsehood, and of the sins which enfeeble and degrade men most. The best remedy for this evil is to train children very early in the habits of distinguishing between real and unreal wants. "Artificial wants," says M. Laurent in his pamphlet, "which are at once the sore and the curse of riches, are not unknown among the humbler classes." Everyone who can refuse to satisfy one of these, however slight, or who puts aside any portion, however small, of the resources of to-day to make part of his supply for future use or enjoyment, is, in a sense, a capitalist; and in this sense not only every man and woman, but every boy and girl who has the command of a single luxury, should be encouraged to become a capitalist.

It may be argued that it is cruel and unwise to interfere with the joyousness of childhood by prematurely burdening the mind with thoughts of the future; but I do not believe that the objection, however natural on a first view, would long be seriously maintained by any careful thinker. The penurious spirit, the calculating, hard, and grasping habit, of mind, has doubtless its dangers; but it is not the fault to which colonists are at all prone, nor against which it is needful to take any elaborate precautions. The tendencies of colonial life are unquestionably in the opposite direction. Our dangers are of another kind; and, in truth, we are not encouraging a hurtful egotism and suppressing generous instincts when we invite children to set aside the pence with which they would otherwise satisfy a craving of the appetite. To spend money for such a purpose is in no sense more generous or unselfish than to reserve it for some future gratification in the choice of which thought and judgment shall be exercised. Both are self-regarding actions; but the one has elements of sacrifice and of wisdom in it, the other is a mere act of careless and short-sighted indulgence.

Such is a sketch of the simple and judicious experiment initiated and carried forward by Professor Laurent and his friends in the Belgian schools. It may be considered as having passed its time of trial. As has been previously stated, it has been introduced to the Home public by Mr. Fitch, who earnestly recommends its

imitation by the thoughtful and benevolent interested in the well-being of the rising population of Great Britain. In a like spirit it is now recommended to the consideration of the same classes of persons in New Zealand; more especially could it be wished that an active interest in it would be taken by our clergymen and teachers, in whose hands rest, it may be said, the training for good or evil of the great majority of our young people. In this movement we see an engine to mould of great might and strength. With the exception of the societies alluded to at the commencement of this paper, little or nothing has been done amongst us to foster and encourage the practice of thrift. Many of the members of these societies, we are aware, feel it as no small hardship to save for their weekly or monthly payments, notwithstanding the indisputable fact that the income of all of them is more, and of most, from two to four times greater, than that of which they were in receipt at home, and this also in the face of the necessities of life being much less expensive. It arises, no doubt, from the single circumstance that the restraint necessary to save has been begun too late in life. What is needed is to make the habit of thrift part of the child's education—to make him store and save up his pence, for, in his eyes, their own sake, but in the eyes of the teacher the far-reaching effects the training to such a habit will have in the future life of the child. Here, indeed, were the practice of this begun in the school, would be introduced that teaching, that education, which is, apart from mere book knowledge, the beginning of the realization of a dream—a fond hope of many a despairing soul. Dr. Hodgson, whose name has already been mentioned, was among the first to urge the teaching of economics in schools to both boys and girls. In one of his lectures on the subject he remarks, most truly, that the evils arising from their ignorance retard our social progress, deform and disgrace our civilization, and make good men despair of any remedy or even serious abatement, I am Utopian enough," he says, "to believe that it is in the school-room that the work of teaching economics can be done. Thirty years' experience of old systems and of new, gives me confidence in the issue of such an extension of the scope of our school teaching, high and low, as shall amount, in spirit and in purpose, to a radical reformation. . . . Some readers may well think that 'I imagine a vain thing;' nevertheless, I know what I am saying. Economics I hold to be a part, and no small or unimportant part, of morality; they are, indeed, at the very root of practical morals, for morals decay alike amid squalid poverty and thriftless waste. Into all social relations does money somehow enter—in getting or spending, in lending or borrowing, in sowing or reaping, as well as buying and selling. Money means independence, leisure, culture, peace of mind, freedom from corroding and debasing care, the power and the right to be generous, to direct and pay labour, individual and social progress; and the disregard of it, so loudly professed by some, is either stupidity or hypocrisy, or both. Few things are, indeed, more important than money, the means by which it is acquired, the ways in which it is employed. Wealth may be abused, and so may health, but that cannot be used which is not possessed. What training then is given in this most vital theme?"

Dr. Hodgson deplures that in schools the subject should be almost ignored. He says that in the few where it is taught, experience goes to prove that no other subject has more interest for the pupils, or is more easily taught without loss, nay even with gain, to other ones. The need of such teaching appears on every hand, to all whose eyes are not blinded that they cannot see. Has not, as Carlyle's Professor would say, has not custom hoodwinked us in New Zealand, and has not prejudice been our lawgiver? There are honourable exceptions, but we cannot find, that generally, the science of economics form any part of the programme of studies in the public schools of the Colony.

But to return to the subject proper of this paper, and to keep more to Mr. Fitch's remarks. Some may say that there are Post-office Savings-Banks everywhere, or at least, that they increase in number as townships make way in outlying districts. This is doubtless true, but it must be remembered that these banks themselves, however numerous, can never be brought close enough to the children while the habits of their life are in process of formation. Nor is it possible that the banks should ever receive sums so small as those by which the habit of saving must be formed. Let the habit be taught in the school, and when the child grows up he is already familiar with that truly useful institution: and this is a great step, indeed, more than half the battle gained.

The last report of the Postmaster-General shows that Savings-Banks were established in New Zealand on the 1st of February, 1867, and on the 31st of December of that year there were 2,156 depositors, with an average of £33 0s. 5d. to the credit of each; in 1870 the number had risen to 8,317, with an average of £35 10s. 3d. to the credit of each; while in 1873 there were 17,132 depositors, or 1 in 17 of the population, with an average of £38 16s. 1d. to the credit of each. This will compare favourably with the published reports of the Victorian Savings-Banks, in which, in 1874, the number of depositors was only 1 in 30 of the population, with an average amount of £37 7s. 10d. to the credit of each. And yet in New Zealand the full development of the Post-office Savings-Bank system is hindered by several causes; there are many districts in which no bank is yet attached to the Post-office, and the rule which limits each deposit to a minimum of 1s., and forbids the receipt of sixpences even when tendered with larger amounts, and which is most noticeable in the case of half-crowns, acts unfavourably in encouraging the practice of the smaller economics; and the fact that the banks are closed in the evenings, especially on the Saturday evenings, when working-men generally receive their wages, is also

very unfavourable for the timid and irresolute. Suggestions for reform and improvement in these matters of minor detail have, however, seldom had a better chance of being favourably regarded than at the present moment. The position of Postmaster-General is held by the Hon. Sir Julius Vogel, whose career has been characterized by so much administrative capacity, and whose readiness to adjust means and measures to suit the circumstances of every class of colonists is proved by the admirable provisions recently made for encouraging life insurance. It is far from likely that he regards the department of the Post-office Savings-Bank as nothing more than a mere source of revenue or an instrument of public convenience; and it is not too much to believe that the present movement will have in him a deep and active sympathiser, and by his help and wise administration the Post-office Savings-Bank of New Zealand may thus be made a potent teacher and an unflinching aid in the grand and glorious work of true education.

That great results can be accomplished with the aid of the teachers, even with the resources at the command of the scholars in the district schools, is manifest from the fact that upwards of 10,000 children in a single town, where the earnings of the parents are far below those of the colony, have saved sums averaging 30s. each. It is probable that very little, if any, of this money would have found its way to the bank but for the agency of the school. The work is one the success of which will much depend on the spontaneous efforts of the teachers, combined with those of the school committees, and the influence brought to bear upon children individually by benevolent and thoughtful people. Each province can now boast of a well-organized system of public instruction, but even with that there is still much room for the exercise of that personal zeal and that affectionate interest in the welfare of the scholars which have always characterized both the parochial and the voluntary systems in the old country, and for the exercise of such exertions, here is one field in which the harvest truly may be great. In proportion as our schools increase in number, and the advantages of education become better understood, so will school attendance be prolonged and the number be greater; in like ratio a larger proportion of children become amenable to such simple reasonings and influences as have proved so efficacious at Ghent. And those who will take the trouble to associate themselves with the teachers in bringing the Savings-Banks into the school, and making the simple arrangements by which the business part of the matter may be done smoothly and in proper order, may fulfil a most useful function. They will aid the work of true education in an effectual way, not only by thus giving practical and experimental lessons in economic science to the scholars, but also by enlarging their comprehensions and increasing their power of self-control. It is, however, not a panacea. If adopted ever so earnestly and successfully, it will leave much improvidence unremedied; but in its daily practice as part of the discipline of life, it may, with the Divine blessing, prove one instrument for establishing such a basis of character in the rising youth of New Zealand as shall elevate the whole of their social and moral life.

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—English Review.

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The above extract is, perhaps, a sufficient apology for introducing a system of Shorthand which the experience of twenty-nine years, and the practice of thousands of persons in England and America, embracing both private and professional circles, have shown to be eminently successful in "bringing the operations of the mind and of the hand into closer correspondence."

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peculiarity is, that by shorthand characters it represents the sounds rather than the letters of the English language,—the characters themselves having at the same time a direct relation to the sounds, according to a just and philosophical analysis of the English tongue.

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It is worthy of observation that Phonography is the only system of shorthand which has ever yet achieved a literature.

Various monthly magazines are lithographed in the shorthand characters, and circulate widely. To the initiated they are as legible as common print to ordinary readers. This circumstance, once estimated and considered, renders further comment superfluous.

To literary writers Phonography holds out advantages, the value of which can hardly be estimated. Thoughts and ideas are never perfected until they are clothed in words; but when so clothed, they should be secured. The more brilliant and beautiful a thought, the more fleeting and evanescent is its nature. The thoughts of genius are oftentimes like the spires of auroral light—they shoot up, and while you gaze, they fade and disappear. To secure them, if they are secured at all, we must catch them at the moment they spring into being. If they are obliged to dribble from the nib of a slow, struggling, longhand pen, most of them die and become cold, and many are entirely lost. All this great waste of intellectual wealth would be checked if our literary writers availed themselves of Phonography. They would also save a vast amount of time now consumed in making memoranda and extracts.

Physicians, too, would find the art of shorthand of great value in making a full and exact record of the diagnosis of each case immediately on leaving the sick room. Oftentimes a physician is constantly engaged through the day, and sometimes far into the night, in making visits to his patients, so that he scarcely has time to make as full a record as he would like. By using shorthand this might easily be done; and thus benefit would accrue to the public, and the cause of medical knowledge be advanced.

Again, clergymen would be entirely relieved from the drudgery of the pen if they could write their sermons in Phonography, and deliver them from the phonographic notes. This, however, has already been done so often that it no longer requires demonstration.

To LADIES, Phonography is recommended as a pleasing, useful, and improving accomplishment. The facility with which it may be written, renders it a most delightful medium for correspondence; while for noting down the numerous ideas which daily present themselves to the mind, or for transcribing the thoughts of others, when reading, it is truly invaluable.

Like most other systems, however, when involving principles entirely new, it has met, and will perhaps yet meet, with some who, without investigation, will at first think lightly of its claims (and from among these, conviction has gained, and will yet gain, more than one apostle for the cause); but, once fairly studied, its excellence becomes apparent, and the beauty of its pervading principle delights, while its practical application confirms all the hopes which so true a theory at first excited.

Educational Purposes.

Of the utility of shorthand for educational purposes, little need be said, so evident have at all times been its tendencies "in improving the memory, exciting invention, maturing the judgment, inculcating habits of regularity and order, and training the mind and hand to precision, vigilance, and perseverance."

Such are the benefits which observant minds beheld even in the imperfect systems of former days. How

much more extensively may we not hope to see them developed and applied in a system, the superior excellence of which has for a considerable time been permanently established! Here again the words of Mr Moat may not be out of place. Though in his system he concentrated the result of five and thirty years' attention to the subject, he nevertheless looked forward to a time when the Art would arrive at a much higher degree of perfection than it could then pretend to. He says:—

"When such a system shall appear, it will be the nation's honor (as it must be its pride,) which gave it birth, to foster it with parental care, and make it generally useful by introducing it as a necessary branch of modern education."

Professional Reporting.

Of its value, in a public point of view, each day is in itself a sufficient record. A morning paper, with the parliamentary debates of the night before continued down to, perhaps, an early hour on that same morning, is a fact too plain and palpable to require many words in proof of the assertion that "Shorthand, like a generous benefactor, bestows blessings indiscriminately on the world at large." We need only add, with Mr Gawtress:—

"Were the operations of those who are professionally engaged in exercising this art to be suspended but for a single week, a blank would be left in the political and judicial history of our country, an impulse would be wanting to the public mind, and the nation would be taught to feel and acknowledge the important purposes it answers in the great business of life."

The Reading, Writing and Spelling Reform.

The Reading and Writing Reform consists in the introduction of a phonetic alphabet of thirty-eight letters, to represent all the sounds of the English language. This alphabet is adapted to Shorthand and Longhand Writing, and to Printing. Phonetic Shorthand is as legible as common writing; while it is written in one-fourth of the time, and with half the labour. By means of Phonetic Printing, children and ignorant adults may be taught to read accurately in phonetic books, in from twenty to fifty hours' instruction; and a few lessons will then render them capable of reading books printed in the common spelling. The education of the poor is thus rendered not only possible, but easy.

Phonetic Publications.

Phonetic Shorthand.

- Phonographic Teacher, or First Book of Instruction in Phonetic Shorthand, 6*d*.
- Phonographic Copy Book, 3*d*.
- Phonographic Reader, 6*d*.
- Manual of Phonography, 1*s*. 6*d*.; cloth 2*s*; roan, gilt, 2*s*. 6*d*.
- A Compend of Phonography, giving the Alphabet, Grammalogues, and principal Rules for Writing, 1*d*.
- Exercises in Phonography, 1*d*.
- Phonographic Reporter, 2*s*. 6*d*.; cl, 3*s*.
- Reporting Exercises, 6*d*.
- Phonographic Phrase Book, containing above three thousand useful phrases, 1*s*., cloth, 1*s*. 6*d*.
- List of Phonetic Society for the current year, 2*d*.
- *The members of this Society correct the Exercises of phonographic students through the post, gratuitously.*
- Phonetic Alphabet, containing the Shorthand, Longhand, and Printing Letters, 1*s*. per gross.

In Phonetic Shorthand.

- John Halifax, Gentleman, 2 vols., 5*s*.
- The Reporting Magazine for 1864, with Key; vol. 2, cloth, 1*s*.
- The Psalms, 6*d*., cloth 9*d*.
- History of Shorthand, 1*s*.
- Æsop's Fables, 6*d*.
- Selections from the Best Authors, 4*d*.
- Prize Essay on the Best Method of teaching Phonography, 8*d*. y cl. 1*s*.

In Phonetic Printing.

- Phonetic Journal, published weekly, 1*d.*; monthly, in wrapper, 5*d.* Each number contains four columns of shorthand, in the Learner's, Corresponding, and Reporting Styles, Intelligence of the progress or the Phonetic Reform printed in the usual spelling, and articles of general interest printed phonetically.
- Chart of the Phonetic Alphabet, containing the Shorthand and Printing Letters, 23 inches by 35, 4*d.*
- Tablets, or the letters of the Phonetic Alphabet, printed on card-board; *Small* 3*d.*, *Medium* 1*s.* 6*d.*, *Large* 4*s.*
- Sheet Lessons, (16,) for classes, 1*s.*
- First Book in Phonetic Reading, 1*d*
- Second Book, 2*d.* Third Book, 3*d.*
- Fourth Book (Transition), 4*d.*
- Edward's Dream, or Good for Evil, 1*d*,
- Parables, from the Testament, 1*d.*
- Miracles, ditto, 1*d.* Discourses, 1*d.*
- A Persuasive to the Study and Practice of Phonography, ½*d.*; 4*d.* per dozen; 3*s.* per gross. (In the common spelling.)
- A Recommendation of Phonetic Shorthand, by the Rev. D. D. Whedon, ½*d.*; 4*d.* per doz., 3*s.* per gross. (In the common spelling.)
- A Glance at Phonotypy, or Phonetic Printing, ½*d.*; 4*d.* per dozen; 3*s.* per gross. (In the common spelling with a specimen of phonotypy.)
- History of Phonography—how it came about, 1*d.*

*Books of the value of 1*s.* and upwards are sent post free: on books under 1*s.*, postage is charged at the rate of ½*d.* for 2oz.*

The books recommended to the student on commencing the study of Phonetic Shorthand, are the Phonographic Teacher and Copy Book.

See Pitman's Complete Catalogue of Phonetic Publications.

London: Fred. Pitman, 20 Paternoster row, *E.C.*

Bath: Isaac Pitman, Phonetic Institute.

Balance Sheet and Report of the Standard Property Investment Society.

Instituted 1st March, 1867.

Registered Under "the Building and Land Societies Act, 1866."

Printed at "Daily Times" Office Dunedin Princes-Street.

Standard Proper Investment Society.

Abstract Balance Sheet Ending March 2nd, 1870.

Dr. BALANCE ACCONNT. Cr. £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. To Balance of Profit and Loss Account in March, 1869... .. 3288 17 7 By sundry Debits, Loans on Mortgages 24103 11 4 " Loans on Security of Shares 637 0 0 " Entry Money 96 7 6 In hands of Secretary 0 10 2 " Fines, and Fees of Transfer 29 0 4 " Forfeitures on withdrawals 6 5 6 " Commission on Loans ... 113 5 0 " Interest on Loans 5469 3 0 5714 1 4 LESS CHARGES. 9002 18 1 " Interest to Investors, 1869 326 2 9 " Contingent Fund, 1869 ... 393 14 10 " Fines due, then taken to Account 5 7 1 " Expenses of Management in 1870 244 4 0 " Interest and Discount ... 415 17 7 1385 6 3 Profit and Loss Account 7617 12 3 " Sundry Credits—Investors 7841 1 3 " Bank 2065 11 4 " Cash Account 0 9 10 " Contingent Fund 516 6 0 " Debentures 6700 0 0 £24,741 1 6 £24,741 1 6 Dr. PROFIT ACCOUNT. Cr. To Discount of repayments to grow due 5671 14 2 By Balance as above 7617 12 8 " Interest to Investors 559 16 0 " Fines and Interest due 54 4 2 " Interest due to Bank and Debenture holders ... 120 16 8 " Balance to Contingent Fund 1319 10 0 £7671 16 10 £7671 16 10 RECEIVED. CASH ACCOUNT. PAID. To Subscriptions 3618 0 0 By advanced on Mortgage 11211 15 0 " Repayments 2924 0 6 " advanced on security of Shares 637 0 6 " Fines and Fees of Transfer... .. 29 0 4 " Refunded to with drawers 1203 1 11 ., Entry Money 96 7 6 " Debentures—Principal 750 0 0 " Debentures 7450 0 0 " Do.—Interest 223 2 6 973 2 6 " Interest... .. 1 0 10 " Bank Interest on overdraft 94 18 4 " Union Bank of Australia 13913 11 9 " Discount of payments in advance 98 17 7 " Auditors' Fees 6 6 0 " Directors, for services 37 15 0 " Secretary, salary 150 0 0 " Fire-proof Safe 25 0 0 " Sundry Accounts 25 3 0 244 4 0 " Union Bank of Australia 11 5 In

hands of Secretary 0 10 2 £28,032 0 11 £28,032 0 11 We have carefully examined the foregoing accounts, and find them correctly stated and properly vouched. A. H. SHURY Auditors. JAMES P. MILLAR, CHAS. REID, Secretary.

Report.

The Directors are much pleased in meeting the Shareholders, and being able again to congratulate them on the steady and satisfactory progress made by the Society, as evidenced by the annexed Balance Sheet.

Since the last Annual Meeting 771 fresh Shares have been issued. There has been advanced on mortgages, £11,211 15s.; by way of loans on security of Shares, £637; and refunded to with drawers and investing Members on becoming borrowers, £1213 1s. 11d.

After discounting accruing repayments, crediting investors with interest at the rate of 10 per cent., and providing for contingent liabilities, there remains a net profit, to be carried to credit of contingent fund, of £1319 10s. The amount to credit of this fund is now £1835 16s.

The sound position of the Society has enabled the Directors to obtain money on debentures, at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum. By this means a profit of 2 per cent, per annum has accrued to the Society on the money so borrowed, which accounts in some measure for the large surplus profit made this year.

It is also noteworthy that the entire expense of management (£244 4s.) has been covered by the commissions on loans, fines, entry money, &c., without any charge to the ordinary profits.

Great care has been exercised by your Directors in the selection of securities, and they feel confident that no loss need be apprehended through insufficient security. They have been greatly aided in their duties by the care and attention exercised by the Secretary; and considering the increase of work entailed on that officer in consequence of the increase of Members, they recommend that an advance be made in his salary.

Messrs. Bagley and Campbell are the two retiring Directors for the present year. Retiring Members are eligible for re-election.

Thomas Dick, *President*.

Standard Property Investment Society,

(Established March, 1807.)

Registered under the "Building and Land Societies' Act, 1866."

Office-Bearers:

Trustees—

- Thomas Dick ESQUIRE
- George Turnbull, ESQUIRE
- W. H. Reynolds, ESQUIRE

Directors—

- Thomas Dick, ESQUIRE (*President*.)
- MESSRS. J. F. Watson
- Thos. Birch
- W. H. Reynolds
- MESSRS. Benjamin Bagley
- Daniel Campbell
- A. R. Livingston

Bankers—

- Union Bank of Australia.

Surveyor and Valuator—

- Mr. William Langlands.

Solicitor—

- Henry Howorth, ESQUIRE.

Secretary—

- Charles Reid.

Offices: Princes Street, Next Bank of Otago.

ENTRANCE FEE, 2s. 6d. PER SHARE; TRANSFER FEE, 6d. PER SHARE.

THE SHARES OF THIS SOCIETY will be of the ultimate value of £25, to be realised by Monthly Subscriptions of 4s. per Share, and interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, to be accumulated till the Shares are fully realised (about seven years.)

This Society has been established on the PERMANENT PRINCIPLE. Advances to Members are not determined by competition, nor are Borrowers charged more than will defray the cost of management, and pay Investors a fair rate of interest on the amount of their Subscriptions. The surplus Profits (if any) are carried to the credit of a Contingent Fund, and any accumulation thereof may, at the discretion of the Directors, be divided equitably and equally, at the end of every Five Years from the commencement of the Society, between Borrowers and Investors by way of Bonus. At the Annual Balance in March, 1870, there was a surplus Profit of £1835 16s. carried to the credit of this Fund. The distinctive features of this Society are:—

- Economy in Management.
- Encouragement to Borrowers.
- Safe and Profitable Investment of Savings.
- Periodical Division of Profits.

The Rules will be found to have been carefully compiled on the bases of similar Societies in the Home country (so far as applicable to the colony.)

The mode of taking securities for Advances to Members, while effectually securing the Society against the possibility of loss, is such as to entail the least possible expense to Borrowers. And provision has been made to enable Investors to borrow money on security of Shares of not less than two years standing.

Discount at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum will be allowed on payments made in advance for periods of not less than six months. Any Shareholder withdrawing is entitled to receive the full amount of Subscriptions and Profits standing to his credit in the books of the Society, on payment of 5s. per Share withdrawal fee.

Shares may be taken up at any time. Subscriptions to commence from date of entry; and the owners of realised Shares will be paid out in rotation, according to the dates of their respective entries.

This Society has now been established for the space of three years, during which time 2666 Shares have been taken up; and substantial securities for advances have been accepted to the extent of £19,892 10s.

Redemption Payments for a Loan of £100, Including Interest.

A commission of 1 per cent. is charged on Advanced.

Provision has been made for the establishment of Agencies in Country Districts.

Dunedin,

21st March, 1870.

Rules of the Standard Property Investment Society.

Instituted 1st March, 1867.

Registered Under "The Building and Land Societies act, 1866."

Printed at "Daily Times" Office Dunedin Princes-Street.

THE extension and good honest management of such Societies, . . if less tainted with the spirit of realizing a large percentage, would, in a short time, greatly promote the comfort, social happiness, and independence of the working classes. If, through these Societies, by means of easy weekly payments, a freehold site for a garden and

a house, and money sufficient for the erection of the latter, can be procured, what is there but the want of prudence, self-denial, and good management, to prevent many artisans from living *in their own houses*, digging *in their own gardens*, and doing that which Charles II. said was the best preservative of health—taking exercise every morning *on their own land*?—CHAMBERS'S PAPERS FOR THE PEOPLE, No. 87.

Contents.

Forms.

Constitution and Rules.

Formation, Name, and Object of the Society.

1. THE Society shall be established under the provisions of an Act of the General Assembly of New Zealand, entitled "The Building and Land Societies' Act, 1866," and shall be called the STANDARD PROPERTY INVESTMENT SOCIETY, and shall have for its object the raising, by Monthly Subscriptions, a stock or fund for the purpose of enabling any Member to receive out of the same the amount or value of his shares on security of real or leasehold estate, to be secured by mortgage to the Society for the purpose of securing the repayments, &c., by these Rules provided, and to facilitate the accumulation of small sums of money for those purposes, and others provided for in the following Rules.

Entrance Fees.

2. Each Member, on admission, shall pay an Entrance Fee of 2s. 6d. per share.

Value of Shares.

3. The Shares of the Society shall be of the ultimate value of £25 each.

Minors.

4. Minors (with the consent of their parents or guardians) may become investing Members of the Society; but shall not be allowed to vote or hold any office; and may sell out or withdraw, and their receipts shall be good discharges to the Society for all monies therein expressed to be received; and such guardians may vote at meetings.

5. Females (not being married) may also become Members; but shall not be entitled to vote or hold any office.

Certificate of Shares.

6. Each Member shall be entitled to a Certificate, in the Form No. 2, of the Share or Shares held by him, signed by two Directors, and countersigned by the Secretary.

Subscriptions.

7. Monthly Subscriptions, and all redemption payments, fines, and other payments due under these Rules, shall be paid at the office of the Society, Princes-street, Dunedin, between the hours of six and eight o'clock on the evening of the first Wednesday in each month.

8. The Subscriptions for each Share shall be four shillings per month, to commence and be paid on the first Wednesday in the month in which, or next after which, the Member shall be admitted, in respect of each Share, on which day the Subscriptions shall be deemed to be due and payable.

9. Payments may be made in advance, on which discount at the rate of five per cent, per annum will be allowed for periods of not less than six months.

Fines.

10. The fines for the non-payment of monthly subscriptions shall be fourpence per share per month during the first half-year the same may be in arrears; eightpence per share per month during the second half-year; one shilling per share per month during the third half-year; and so on, increasing fourpence per share per month for every succeeding half-year. And any Shareholder continuing to neglect the payment of his subscriptions until the fines incurred thereby shall equal all the payments actually paid by him, shall thereupon cease to be a Shareholder, and shall forfeit all his interest in the Society. The fines on nonpayment of redemption payments shall be calculated in the same proportion, and increase at the same rates, as for non-payment of subscriptions.

11. All Shares on which the entry-money only has been paid shall be deemed to be forfeited in two months after the same have been taken up.

Management.

12. The business of the Society shall be conducted by the Directors, Trustees, Auditors, Solicitor, and Secretary.

Directors.

13. Seven Directors shall be elected by the Shareholders at the first General Meeting of the Society, of whom two shall retire annually, but shall be eligible for re-election.

14. Any vacancy occurring in the course of the year shall be filled up by the remaining Directors, but every person elected by the Directors shall retire at the first ensuing Annual Meeting of the Society.

15. A list shall be kept by the Secretary, of the order in which Directors are elected; and the retiring Members shall be struck off from the top of the list.

16. At the first Meeting of the Directors, after their election, they shall elect one of their own body as President for the current year; and in the event of his absence at any of the subsequent Meetings of the Directors or Society, a Chairman, for the evening, shall be appointed by the Directors present.

17. Two Directors shall attend, in rotation, every subscription night, and shall keep a check on the Secretary.

18. A General Meeting of the Directors shall be held on each subscription night, but the Secretary may call a Special Meeting of the Directors at any time he may consider necessary; four shall be a quorum, and the President, or in his absence the Chairman presiding, shall have a deliberative as well as a casting vote.

19. The Directors shall have power to examine and decide upon the securities offered by any Member for an advance; to order all sums of money to be paid; and generally to carry the purposes of these Rules into effect on behalf of the Shareholders.

20. The Directors shall be paid for their services, and fined for non-attendance, as may be agreed to by the Shareholders.

21. Any Director may be held to have resigned his office, if absent from two consecutive Meetings of the Directory.

22. If the Directors shall deem it advantageous to the Society to borrow money for the purposes of the Society, it shall be lawful for them to do so; provided the amount so borrowed at any one time does not exceed the prospective amount of six months' receipts.

23. All monies belonging to the Society shall be lodged in the names of the Trustees of the Society, in such bank as the Directors may from time to time appoint; and all drafts on the Society's Bankers shall be countersigned by the President.

Trustees.

24. Thomas Dick, George Turnbull, and William Hunter Reynolds shall be the Trustees of the Society; and, in case of the death or resignation of any or all of the before-named Trustees, the Directors shall cause to be called a Special Meeting of the Shareholders, who may then appoint a Trustee or Trustees in his or their stead; and all the interest and power of the original Trustee or Trustees shall vest in such new Trustee or Trustees immediate on his or their appointment, alone or jointly with the surviving or continuing Trustee or Trustees, as the case may be.

25. All deeds, writings, and securities, to and from the Society shall be made and taken in the name of the Trustees for the time being; those in favor of the Society shall be deposited in a box or iron chest, to be lodged with the Society's Bankers, or such person as the Directors may appoint.

26. The Trustees shall not be answerable for the other or others of them, or for the acts, deeds, neglects, or defaults of the other or others of them; but each of them only for his own acts, deeds, neglects, or defaults, respectively; and they or any of them shall not be accountable for any banker or other person with whom any part of the money or property belonging to this Society shall be deposited, or for any misfortune, loss, or damage which may happen in the execution of the powers and trusts herein contained, or in relation thereto, except the same shall happen by or through their own wilful default, respectively.

27. In case it shall be necessary or expedient to bring or defend any action, suit, or other proceedings, at law or in equity, touching or concerning the property or assets, rights, or claims of the Society, or touching or concerning the breach or non-performance of any of the articles, matters, and things herein contained, or of the conduct of any Member or Officer of the Society, the same shall be brought or defended by or in the name of the Trustees for the time being, and they shall be indemnified from all loss or damage that may be sustained by them in consequence thereof.

28. If upon the resignation of any Trustee or Trustees, he or they shall require a bond or other deed of release and indemnity from the Society, securing him or them from all future liability on account thereof, such bond or deed the Directors for the time being are hereby authorised to execute and deliver, signed by the President and two of their number, for and on account and behalf of all the Shareholders of this Society, and which shall be as effectual to bind the Society, as if made, executed, and delivered by each Member thereof.

Auditors.

29. At every Annual Meeting of the Society, one Auditor shall be appointed by the Shareholders, and one by the Directors, who shall audit the Accounts for the ensuing year. The Auditors for the first year shall be appointed by the Directors.

Solicitor.

30. A Solicitor or Legal Agent shall be appointed by the Directors, who shall examine the title deeds of all property offered as security to the Society, and shall in all cases render to the Directors a report in writing whether such titles be deemed by him to be good and sufficient for the purposes of the Society. He shall prepare all mortgages and other instruments in favour of the Society; and the cost and charges of, and relating thereto, and of any investigation of title connected therewith, shall be paid by the Member requiring the advance, or deducted out of the money he may be entitled to receive for any Share or Shares in advance, in the manner hereinafter prescribed.

Surveyor.

31. A Surveyor, or Valuator, may be appointed by the Directors, who shall examine all properties on which his opinion may be required; and within one week after he has been requested to value any property, he shall report thereon, in writing, to the Directors: he shall receive such remuneration for his services as the Directors may agree upon. Such remuneration shall be paid by the Member whose property has been examined by such Surveyor or Valuator.

Secretary.

32. A properly qualified person shall be appointed by the Society to act as Secretary, who shall receive such salary as the Society may appoint. He shall also act as Treasurer, pay into the bank on the day after collection all monies received by the Society, sign all cheques or orders for money upon the Society's Bankers, keep all the books of the Society, attend the meetings, take minutes of the proceedings thereat, conduct the correspondence of the Society, assist the Auditors in preparing the report on the state of the Society's funds, and perform such other duties as, in virtue of his office, may devolve upon him under the instructions of the Directors. He shall give such security as may be required by the Directors.

Financial Statement.

33. The Directors shall, once in every year, prepare, or cause to be prepared, a General Statement of the funds and effects of the Society, specifying in whose custody the said funds or effects are then remaining, together with an account of all sums of money received and expended on account of the Society since the preceding Annual Statement; and every such Annual Statement shall be attested by the two Auditors, and countersigned by the Secretary, and every Member shall be entitled to receive a copy of such Statement.

Annual Balance of Books.

34. The books of the Society shall be brought to a balance, and the profits ascertained as on the subscription meeting day in the month of March, in each year; such profits shall be placed to the credit of investing Shareholders to an extent not exceeding ten per cent, per annum on the amount then standing to their credit in the books of the Society, except subscriptions paid in advance.

35. The surplus of such profits, if any, shall be carried to an account, to be called The Contingent Fund, from which shall be defrayed all losses or expenses which the Society may sustain or incur; and in the event of any accumulation of such Contingent Fund, after providing for all liabilities, the same shall be appropriated and credited equitably and equally at the expiry of every five years from the commencement of the Society, between the investing and borrowing Members, by way of bonus, in proportion to the amount of the subscriptions or repayments actually paid to the Society. But if the Directors shall consider it for the wellbeing of the Society to set apart the whole, or any portion of such fund for future contingencies, they shall have the power to do so.

Meetings.

36. The President of the Directors shall act as Chairman of all Meetings of the Society. The Monthly Meetings, for receiving subscriptions and other payments under these Rules, will be held at the office of the Society, Princes-street, Dunedin, between the hours of 6 and 8 o'clock on the evening of the first Wednesday in each month. The Annual General Meeting of the Society shall be held at such time and place as the Directors may appoint for that purpose; notice whereof shall be given by advertisement in two consecutive numbers of any local newspaper or newspapers, circulating in Dunedin: at which Meeting the Statement of the funds and effects of the Society, made up to the end of the financial year, shall be submitted to the Shareholders for consideration; and at this Meeting the Office-bearers shall be appointed.

37. A Special Meeting of the Society may be held from time to time, and at any time the Directors may appoint. It shall be competent for seven or more Shareholders to sign a requisition to the President to convene a Special Meeting of the Society; and the President shall do so by advertisement in two consecutive numbers of any local newspaper or newspapers. But should a majority of the Shareholders, so convened, decide that the Meeting has been called on insufficient and frivolous grounds, the parties calling it shall bear the expense thus occasioned. The object of every Special Meeting shall always be distinctly stated, both in the requisition and notice; and no business shall then be entered upon except that for which the Meeting has been convened.

38. Twenty Members shall be a quorum at any General or Special Meeting. It shall be in the power of the Society, at any such General or Special Meeting, to appoint a committee of Shareholders for any special purpose. Each Shareholder present shall have one vote; and the President, or in his absence the Chairman presiding, shall have a deliberative as well as a casting vote.

39. All decisions that may be come to by a majority of Shareholders present at any Meeting, provided such decisions are in conformity with these Rules, shall be binding upon all the Shareholders.

Advances and Repayments.

40. The Society will make advances to its Members, for terms of five, seven, ten, or twelve years, repayable by monthly, quarterly, or yearly contributions, at the rates mentioned in Rule 42.

41. Trustees obtaining advances from the Society on property which they hold in trust, shall not be in any manner personally or otherwise liable beyond the property given in security to the Society; but all fines and other payments made payable by these Rules shall be a charge on the property mortgaged.

42. Redemption payments for the Loan of £100, including Interest.

43. Upon every such advance a commission of one per cent, shall be charged.

44. All advances of Shares to Members shall be under the management of the Directors, and shall be determined at their Monthly or Special Meetings.

45. Every Member entitling himself to an advance by a written notice to the Secretary in the Form No. 3, shall thereon lodge with the Secretary a sum of One Pound per Share as a deposit, and in part payment of the monies payable on such advance; and in the event of his failing within one month (unless the time shall be extended by the Directors) from the receipt of notice from the Secretary, in writing, that the Directors have agreed to make the required advance, to execute a mortgage to the Society, the money so deposited shall be forfeited to the Society, and the Directors shall be at liberty to employ the funds, reserved for such Member making such default, in the payment of advances to other Members; and the application of such defaulting Member shall lapse.

46. Members to whom advances have been allocated may, if they think fit, continue to hold their investing Shares.

47. If any person shall be desirous of ascertaining the amount which the Directors would be willing to advance on any proposed security in the event of his becoming a Member, he shall give a written notice of his desire to the Secretary, and deposit a sum sufficient to defray the cost of a survey of the property. The Directors shall thereon order a survey of the property to be made, and intimate to such person the amount they may consider proper to advance on such security.

48. Whenever any property mortgaged to the Society shall be subject to any ground-rent, assessment, taxes, or other payment, the mortgagor shall produce to the Secretary a receipt or acknowledgment therefor respectively within fourteen days after the same shall have become due and payable; or in default thereof, the mortgagor shall pay a fine of five shillings. And in case any of the said payments shall not be duly made within such period as aforesaid, the Directors may order the same to be paid out of the funds of the Society, and the mortgagor shall repay the same, together with the said fine, on the next Monthly Subscription Meeting; and in default of the payment thereof accordingly, he shall be fined in addition thereto, as for an equal amount of repayments in arrear.

Repairs and Insurance.

49. All buildings held in security by the Society shall be kept in repair by the mortgagor; and in all cases where houses or buildings are taken by the Society in security, the same shall be kept insured by the mortgagor in the name of the Society's Trustees for the time being, until the property is redeemed. And the mortgagor shall pay all premiums of Insurance, and shall lodge in the hands of the Directors both the policy of insurance and receipts for the annual payments of the premium immediately after the same become due; or, in default thereof, the Directors shall be entitled to have such repairs and insurance, respectively, executed or effected; and the Member making default shall be subject to a like fine, and under like conditions, as if in arrear of assessment, tax, ground-rent, or other payment, as provided for in the preceding Rule.

Arrears Upon Property.

50. When any Shareholder, who has obtained an advance upon property, allows his repayments, or any disbursements made on his account, to fall three months in arrear, it shall be in the power of the Trustees or Directors to remove him from the possession or occupancy of the property on which the advance has been made, to enter into possession thereof themselves, to let the same, and to draw the rents thereof, and that by a letter under the hand of the Secretary, addressed to such Shareholder, intimating the same, without any other warning or legal process whatever; of which intimation a certificate under the hand of the Secretary, that such letter was either delivered to such Shareholder, or posted to his address, as entered in the books of the Society, shall be sufficient evidence. But it shall not be necessary for any tenant or purchaser to enquire whether such letter has been written.

51. In the event of the Trustees or Directors entering into possession, they shall have power to appoint a person to draw the rents at the expense of the Shareholder. When any Shareholder who has obtained an advance upon property allows his repayments or any disbursement made on his account to fall in arrear, he shall forfeit all his interest in, and right and claim to, the said property; and the Trustees or Directors shall be at liberty, without any process of law, forthwith to advertise the same for public sale in such paper or papers, and for such number of times, as they shall think fit, and thereafter to sell such property by public auction; the proceeds of such sale to go to liquidating all the Society's claim against such Shareholder, and any balance remaining shall be handed to the Shareholder having so forfeited the property.

52. The Directors shall not be bound to accept of partial payments on account of such arrears or disbursements.

Power to Redeem.

53. Any Member desirous to redeem his property from a mortgage to the Society before the expiration of the full term for which it was given, shall be allowed to do so on the payment of all arrears then due to the Society, and of the present value of the future repayments, calculated to the end of the term, and discounted after the rate of five pounds per centum per annum, together with a redemption fee of twenty shillings per cent, on the balance so due.

Advances to Members on Security of Shares.

54. The Directors may advance by way of loan to Shareholders in this Society, being investors, such sums of money as they may think fit, upon security of Shares of not less than two years' standing, for such term, at such rate of interest, and on such conditions as they may deem proper; provided that no such advance or loan shall exceed 75 per cent, of the amount standing to the credit of such Member in respect of such Shares, and that the interest charged thereon shall not be less than 12½ per cent, per annum.

55. The Member receiving such loan shall transfer the Shares, on which such loan or advance is to be made to the joint names of the President and Treasurer of the Society for the time being, as security for the repayment of such loan or advance, and shall receive from the Secretary an acknowledgment thereof, in the Form No. 5. And in case any borrower shall make default in the repayment of such loan or any part thereof, at the time or times agreed upon, then the Shares so transferred in security as aforesaid, or a sufficient number thereof to represent in value the amount advanced, shall be forfeited to the Society, and considered as withdrawn; and no notice thereof need be given to such defaulting Member.

Reconveyance of Mortgage.

56. So soon as any Shareholder, who has received an advance, shall have repaid the whole instalments, fines, and other payments, incurred in respect thereof, or shall redeem his property, in accordance with Rule 53, the Trustees shall deliver up to such Shareholder, or to his legal representative, the title deeds and other documents which shall have been deposited with them by such Shareholder, and shall execute, at the expense of such Shareholder, a reconveyance and release of the mortgaged property.

Shareholders Withdrawing.

57. Any Shareholder holding investing Shares shall be entitled to withdraw from the Society before the full sum of £25 per Share stands to his credit in the books of the Society; and shall be entitled to receive the amount of the subscriptions actually paid by him to the Society upon such Shares, together with the profits standing to his credit in the books of the Society, as at the immediately preceding annual balance. And if a Member shall withdraw his Shares in the course of the year, interest at such rate as the Directors may from time to time fix shall be allowed on the amount standing to such Shareholder's credit; provided that the date of his notice to withdraw is at least six months subsequent to the date of the said annual balance.

58. A fee of five shillings shall be charged on each Share withdrawn, unless the Member withdrawing is about to take up an advance.

59. Applications for withdrawal shall be considered and granted by the Directors in the order of priority of the dates on which these applications shall have been received by the Secretary, and payment shall be made to such applicants as soon as the Directors shall have sufficient funds at their disposal for that purpose, and not otherwise. In calculating interest, fractional parts of pounds or months shall not be taken into account, neither will fractional parts of a penny be paid.

Compulsory Withdrawals.

60. If at any time the Directors shall be unable to dispose advantageously of the Society's funds, they may appoint a ballot to take place, at such time, and in such form as they may prescribe, to determine whose investing Shares shall be withdrawn. The Shareholder on whom the lot shall fall shall be obliged to accept the amount standing to his credit, as at the immediately preceding annual balance in respect of the Shares to be withdrawn, with the subscriptions subsequently paid and interest thereon. But no Shareholder shall again be subject to such ballot until all the Shares shall have once been subjected to such ballot.

Death of Shareholders.

61. Shares of the Society, on which no advance has been made, shall be deemed to be personal estate; and on the death of a Shareholder holding the same, such Share or Shares shall belong to his or her executors, with all the benefits, and under all the conditions thereto attached.

62. Upon the death of a Shareholder holding Shares on which an advance has been made, the party having right to the property in respect of which the advance has been made shall be deemed to be the Shareholder, and shall be liable to fulfil the whole obligations incumbent on such deceased Shareholder at the time of his death.

Shareholders Becoming Insane.

63. In the event of any Shareholder (not having received an advance) becoming a lunatic, and proof of the

same being furnished to the Directors, they shall instruct the Secretary to intimate to the legal guardians or representatives of such Shareholder that they are entitled to withdraw from the Society at the end of six months, upon the conditions stated in Rules 57, 58, and 59, but under deduction of any fines that may have been incurred by him previous to the time when intimation of his affliction was furnished to the Directors. The Secretary shall at the same time request the representatives to intimate in writing, within four weeks, whether or not the Subscriptions are to be withdrawn. If no intimation be received, it shall be understood that they are not to be withdrawn; and then the representatives shall pay, or cause to be paid, all the Subscriptions as they fall due, subject to the same fines and penalties as specified in Rule 10.

Sale or Transfer of Shares.

64. Any Shareholder, with the sanction of the Directors, shall be at liberty to sell or transfer his Share or Shares, on payment of sixpence per Share Transfer Fee. All transfers must be in the Form No. 4, signed by the transferor and transferee and shall not be valid until duly recorded.

Payment of Realised Shares.

65. Three months after the Shares of Members are realised, they shall be entitled to be paid out in rotation, according to the dates of their respective entries.

Agents.

66. To facilitate the admission of Members residing in the country, and the payment of their subscriptions, &c., the Society will recognise the appointment of Agents by such Members for the transmission of their money.

67. Every application for the recognition of an Agent must be made by at least six Members in any one district, holding collectively not less than thirty Shares.

68. The Directors shall have power to make all necessary arrangements relative to such appointments, but the Society shall not be responsible for the failure of any Member's Agent to remit or account, and no monies will be entered to the credit of any Member's account until actually received by the Secretary.

Books open for Inspection.

69. The Books of the Society shall be open for the inspection of Members on each meeting night during the hours of receiving subscriptions.

Appeals.

70. Any Shareholder who may feel aggrieved by the decision of the Directors may appeal from their decision to the Annual General Meeting of the Society.

Disputes Referred to Justices.

71. Every matter in dispute between the Society, or any person acting under the Society, and any Shareholder or Member thereof, or any person claiming on account of any Member, shall be referred to two Justices of the Peace, in terms of Section XXXII of "The Building and Land Societies' Act, 1866."

Construction of Rules.

72. In construing these Rules every word importing the singular number shall, where necessary, be understood to mean several persons or things, as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masculine gender shall, where necessary, be understood to mean a female, as well as a male; the word "Directors" shall mean the Committee of Management, unless in any of these cases there be something in the context inconsistent with such meaning; the word "month" shall be held to be a calendar month; and the word "year" shall mean the Society's year ending on the first Wednesday in March.

Forms.

No. 1. Application for Shares.

To the Secretary of the Standard Property Investment Society.

SIR—Please register my name as a Subscriber for Shares in the above Society, for which I enclose the Entrance Fee of Two Shillings and Sixpence per Share.

Name.....
Address.....
Profession or Occupation.....
Date.....

No. 2. Share Certificate.

SHARE REGISTERED NO.

THIS is to certify, that _____ of _____ is the Proprietor of _____ Shares of the value of £25 each, in the Capital Stock of the Standard Property Investment Society, subject to the payment of Subscriptions and other Liabilities, according to the Rules of the Society, which may from time to time be in force.

As witness our hands this _____ day of _____ one _____ thousand eight hundred and
Directors.
Secretary.

No. 3. Application for an Advance and Particulars of Security.

To the Secretary of the Standard Property Investment Society.

Sir—I hereby request you to register my name as an applicant for an advance of £_____, being the value of Shares in the above Society; repayable by instalments, in _____ years.

Dated this _____ day of _____ 18

Name.....

Profession.....

Residence.....

What does the Property consist of?

Nature of buildings, if any?

Situation?

Tenure?

If Leasehold, amount of Ground-rent per annum?

When, and to whom Payable?

Is the Property subject to a prior Mortgage?

No. 4. Transfer of Shares.

I _____ of _____ a Shareholder in the Standard Property Investment Society, in consideration of the sum of _____, paid to me by _____, of, do hereby assign and transfer to the said Executors, Administrators, and Assigns _____ Share _____ No. _____ of and in the funds of the said Society, subject to the several rules, obligations, and conditions under which I hold the same at the time of the execution hereof. And I the said do hereby agree to accept the said Share _____ subject to the same rules, obligations, and conditions.

As witness our hands, this _____ day of _____ 18

No. 5. Acknowledgment of Transfer of Shares in Security.

I Hereby acknowledge that _____ Shares, numbered
have been this day transferred by
to the President and Treasurer of the Standard Property Investment Society, as security for the payment of
the sum of £ _____ on the _____ day of _____ next, and the said Shares are subject to the provision of Nos.
54 and 55 of the Rules of the Society.

Dated this _____ day of _____ 18

Secretary.

No. 6. Notice of Compulsory Withdrawal.

To Mr. _____ one of the Members of the Standard Property Investment Society.

I Hereby give you notice that at a Special Meeting of the _____ Members of the said Society, held on
the _____ day of _____ instant, for the purpose of balloting for the compulsory withdrawal of Shares, the
ballot fell on you for the withdrawal of one Share No. _____ for which you are entitled to receive the sum of
£ _____ and I have a cheque in my hands to that amount on the Society's Bankers at your disposal.

Dated, &c.

Secretary to the Society.