I greatly lament that I cannot join with my colleagues in their Report on the military expenditure in the Colonies. If we have not been able to agree upon every portion of our inquiries, it has not been for want of an unfailing cordiality in their pursuit, nor of a perfectly frank interchange of all our opinions and information. But the truth perhaps is, that the topics of the Report, involving as they do some of the deepest and most debateable points in the relations of Colonies to a mother country, could hardly be expected to command an undivided judgment. These are questions on which no doctrines have yet attained the rank of established principles, and on which different opinions will probably long prevail. I hope that this may somewhat alleviate my responsibility as an unwilling dissentient from part of the Report; for even had it been unanimous, these large and delicate questions could still never have been settled otherwise than by the direct examination and authority of the Queen's Government.

Considering the importance of the subject, and the number of years during which it has been my duty to watch Colonial affairs, I hope I may not err in believing it right to lay before Her Majesty's Government, for what they may be worth, the grounds of my dissent, and the nature of the opinions which I should have been prepared to submit.

Three main principles appear to me to be laid down in the Report; first, that we cannot expect our Colonial possessions to be made defensible at all points, and at all times; secondly, that some few posts, especially valuable for Imperial purposes, should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any general scheme of colonial contribution; but, thirdly, that the page 279whole remainder of our Colonies, without distinction or exception, ought to pay one uniform proportion of their military expenditure.

In the first of these propositions I cordially concur. No success in war, hut rather disaster, would he likely to ensue from scattering the land forces of the Empire over the numerous outlying possessions of a great maritime and colonising State, such as Great Britain. Her Colonial dominion rests on her naval supremacy. The mistress of the seas is mistress of whatever Colonies she pleases to hold or to take; and if ever she ceases to be mistress of the seas it is not forts or garrisons which will save her Colonies.

To that important section of the Report, in which these views are illustrated and enforced, I fully subscribe. It appears to me the more material, inasmuch as, should it meet with approval, it must discourage schemes of Colonial fortification, which I cannot help believing to be often extravagant. The Government offices are, at the present moment, full of such projects. I will take the liberty to quote two which have recently fallen within my own observation.

When the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria went to war in Italy, it was immediately proposed that we should construct new batteries at the Cape of Good Hope, demanding a large additional garrison. The particulars appear in the Report. This was a proposal to strengthen England in the event of her being involved in a European war, by locking up, in addition to the present force, 800 artillerymen, and four regiments of the line, at the furthest extremity of South Africa.

The different channels through the Bahamas form considerable outlets from the Gulf of Mexico, and in time of war commerce will be liable to suffer in them from the cruisers of any hostile naval power. This is a motive for endeavouring to keep, as far as other claims will admit, a naval superiority in that region; but the islands themselves are of no value. We must not for a moment be misled by the importance of the page 280situation: for, though important on the water, it is not important on land. And, if a new plan of fortification be proposed, the single test of its merit must be whether it will protect a rendezvous useful to the Queen's vessels in time of war. Now we are told, for reasons which I do not question, that New Providence is the only one of these islands at which the idea of building fresh works could be entertained, and a plan of such works has been submitted accordingly. But I find that the harbour of New Providence is contracted in extent, wanting in depth of water, and difficult of access. I cannot suppose, then, that for the high-sounding, but inapplicable reason, of its being a commanding site on the globe, we ought to be led into adopting a plan to expend £85,000, to plant 120 guns, and to detain at a remote place a company of artillery and a whole regiment of infantry, in order to watch over a narrow basin obstructed by a bar.

In these remarks, I am not so presuming or unjust as to impugn the merits of the officers by whom the projects have been prepared. If called upon for plans of land defences, they must furnish such plans; and I doubt not that they have drawn them with the best professional skill. What I am desirous to submit is, that such extensive land defences are in themselves inappropriate and unadvisable.

The second proposition states that the military posts are exceptional, but does not state whether it is meant that they ought to be exempt from contribution. On this point, however, an expression of opinion seems to me desirable, and I will venture to offer one. All of the following appear to me places, which, irrespectively of any intrinsic value as Colonies, may be deemed stations important to the general strength of the Empire:—

The Mediterranean Possessions.	Cape of Good Hope.
Mauritius.	Bermuda.
Ceylon.	St. Helena.
Hong Kong.

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In the year 1857, these places contributed the following sums towards their military expenses:—

Malta	£ 6,237
Ionian Islands	19,000
Mauritius	17,795
Ceylon	74,359
Hong Kong	—
Cape	34,403
Bermuda	—
St. Helena	625
	£152,419

My opinion is, that we are not called upon to strike off this class of receipts from the British Exchequer. There appears to me no injustice in accepting a contribution from such of these places as contain prosperous communities, so long as the amount falls short of the cost of the number of troops which they would require for their own purposes. Mauritius, for instance, is one of the most flourishing Colonies which we possess, tenanted by an immense fluctuating population of coloured labourers of various races. There seems to be no good reason why this wealthy island should not contribute, as it does, a moderate quota towards the expense of troops which are indispensable to its internal security.

From the third proposition I am compelled to differ. I cannot think that the same fixed proportion ought to be contributed by all Colonies whatsoever, regardless of their inherent differences.

Suppose that some of the richer Colonies, such as those in Australia, particularly require troops, and are willing to contribute two-thirds of the expense, must we reject the offer if others contribute only one half? Or, again, suppose that some of the minor Colonies urgently need troops, but are unable to contribute more than a quarter of their expense, must we either refuse the troops, or reject the contribution, merely because other Colonies pay more?

Uniformity is good, where circumstances are uniform; but where they differ it seems to me reasonable that practice page 282should differ also; and, as to the equity of the matter, surely it is quite as unjust to apply a uniform rule to different cases, as to apply a varying rule to cases which are alike.

Now, nothing can be more diversified, and, especially more unequal, than the condition of the British Colonies; they are exposed, some more, some less, to foreign invasion; some more and others less to perils from natives; the population in one hind of Colonies is dense, in another scattered, in some it is peaceful, in others troublesome, and in a few it sprang from convicts sent out for the convenience of this country; again, in certain Colonies this population is British, in others foreign; in part of them it is wholly white, in part almost wholly coloured, and in many it consists of a large proportion of both; above all, some are rich, and some are poor; is it surprising with Colonies of such an infinite variety of condition, that both their demands for military assistance should be different, and their power of contribution unequal?

"We are not bound, it is said, to equalise their advantages and disadvantages; poor nations, like poor individuals, must be content to be less well off than rich ones. This is perfectly true; but then the Colonies, especially the lesser Colonies, which must call for assistance, are not separate nations; they are members of one immensely powerful and wealthy nation, from which they believe that they are entitled to some share of general protection. The question is what that share should be.

The Report admits, in handsome terms, the claims of the Colonies to receive aid in their defence, but rests it solely on the ground that the Imperial Government has the control of peace and war, and is, therefore, bound in honour to assist in guarding others from suffering by its policy. I cannot think that this is the only ground, and that we must discard that of interest. Suppose that one of our Colonies should yield the long-desired advantage of a field for the supply of cotton, would not England have a direct interest in its defence, even though it did not contribute a shilling or a man towards the struggle of a European war? Nor is it necessary to take only page 283an immaginary illustration. Australia, in the latest year reported, sent into this country imports to the value of nearly fifteen millions, and received from it exports of thirteen millions, of which more than eleven were of home produce. Would there not he an interest in defending the countries which afford such a trade as this, even though the assistance is not reciprocal, and though they lend no direct aid to the defence of Portsmouth or of London? If it is said that the trade would exist at all events, I reply that the exports received from us by Australia, compared with its population, are at the rate of nearly twelve pounds a-head, whilst the exports received from us by the United States are at the rate of less than one. The figures are appended in a Table. They show how much larger, in proportion, is the commerce with countries which remain part of the Empire. Nor can it be maintained that this striking difference is accidental; it is the natural result, which would occur in any similar case, of unfavourable tariffs on the one hand, and of the habit, on the other hand, of resorting to a particular market. This last influence is by no means to be undervalued. It will be found as a matter of fact, that an English Colony, having all its correspondence with England, leans to the use of English supplies.

Without dwelling further, however, on abstract discussions, it may be more fruitful of practical consequences to examine a little more closely some of the facts in the Colonies which bear on their military requirements. For this purpose, the Colonies may, perhaps, be roughly divided into the following classes:—

• 1st. Great and unmixed European communities, such as those in British North America and in Australia.
• 2nd. European communities which are large and thriving, but in contact with powerful and warlike natives, such as the Colonies of New Zealand and the Cape of Good Hope.
• 3rd. Limited numbers of European planters and settlers situated in the midst of large coloured populations, such as the West Indies and the Eastern Colonies. page 2844th. Mere handfuls of white functionaries and merchants dwelling in the midst of overwhelming numbers of black races, both subject and independent, such as the Colonies on the Western Coast of Africa.

I think it will be seen at a glance, that it would be difficult to frame any general rule which should be equally applicable to all of such dissimilar societies. It seems to me very doubtful whether they ought, on account of any abstract principle, or for mere convenience, to contribute equally to their military expenditure; it is certain that they could not do so in point of fact. If we lay down any rate of contribution which may be equitable for the first or the second of the above classes, and say that the West Indies must either pay the same or else part with the troops, we may as well send the order for their return to-morrow. We know perfectly well that most of those impoverished Colonies cannot find the money. The question then is, whether there is anything in the presence of troops there so essential to the fundamental wants of society that, in default of local resources, the ruling authority is bound to supply the demand. I freely admit that poorer communities will have inferior roads and landing places, schools, gaols, and hospitals, and that the deficiency is not to be supplied from, the Imperial purse. But if, in these islands, the very existence of society depends on having a small military force, may not the provision of it be fairly deemed a duty of the sovereign power? I do not believe that the Government or the people of this country would endure that any places should be called British, and yet fall into a state of helpless, and perhaps sanguinary anarchy.

And this compels me to a short digression on the ends and objects of a military force. I think that we must not assume that their use is to repel a foreign enemy alone; although this, undoubtedly, is their main use. But whilst I entirely agree that troops ought not to be employed in the ordinary duties of police, I cannot help thinking that in almost every country, respect for the civil force is secured by a knowledge, that page 285behind everything else there is a military array to be appealed to in the last resort. The functions of a police are to keep down crime, but it requires soldiers to suppress sedition. Another use, it appears to be, of a regular military force is to assert, by their very presence, the national rights of sovereignty. It is not the handful of soldiers on some particular spot that is material, but the fact that, just as much as the flag that flutters over their heads, they are the emblems of the national force, and that it is well known that any aggression on them will be resented with the whole resources of the Empire. A serjeant's guard is in this light a representative of the entire English army. In exposed parts of our dominions this may be an important consideration.

The views above submitted upon the West Indies apply, with slight modifications, to the settlements on the Western Coast of Africa. Those settlements are maintained for the sake of one of the most cherished objects of English policy. They are too puny to be able to defray even their civil expenditure without assistance from British funds. It appears certain, then, that they could not afford to pay for troops for themselves, whilst without troops it can hardly be supposed that they could subsist in the midst of lawless Europeans pursuing an almost piratical trade, and numerous warlike African tribes. Be this as it may, however, the real question for the Government must be, I apprehend, whether the troops can be reduced, or altogether discarded, but not whether these small settlements can pay any material proportion of their cost.

The foregoing are reasons for which, I think, that an equal rate of contribution from all Colonies is not just, expedient, or practicable, and that any efficient attempt to enforce it would be attended with the risk of serious misfortunes. I prefer the other plan by which Her Majesty's Government determines the amount of force which it deems reasonable to allot to the different Colonies, at British charge, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State, whilst the Colonies themselves must pay for an additional number of troops which they may page 286ask for and obtain. One advantage of this plan is, that instead of requiring us to enter into a long and probably irritating negotiation with all the Colonies, it executes itself, and is settled from time to time by the direct authority of the Queen's Government. It adapts itself to the varying circumstances of the several Colonies. And as regards the two most important collections of them, it is already in operation with the concurrence of their inhabitants. With these remarks, I propose, in the remainder of this paper, to review briefly the principal groups of Colonies, and to show how far this rule already applies.

North American Provinces.

These great countries contain three millions of people, and are for thousands of miles conterminous with the United States. It is evident that no forces sent from home can be supposed to undertake the defence of this vast line of territory. The security of the inhabitants rests chiefly on their own patriotism and valour, of which they have already, whenever required, afforded brilliant and successful examples. The principle was propounded by Earl Grey in 1854, and was repeated by the Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary for War, and Sir George Grey, as Colonial Secretary in 1854, that in Canada the fortified city of Quebec, and the fort of Kingston, with perhaps one or two outlying posts between Montreal and the frontier, should be garrisoned by the general troops of the Empire, but that no more ought to devolve on the General Government. This proposition was acquiesced in by the authorities of Canada without a murmur, and they have set about active measures, at a considerable charge to themselves, for rendering their militia efficient. The harbour of Halifax is as much a station important to the general power of the nation as any of the places which have been enumerated in the list of military posts. It is only just that its garrison should be provided for out of Imperial funds; nor could the province of Nova Scotia, which is far from wealthy, be expected to tax page 287itself for such a purpose, merely because this valuable Imperial post happens to be situated within its limits. Small parties of troops are at present stationed at the seats of government in Canada, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland. How far there may be sufficient motives to maintain these in connection with Her Majesty's representatives, and as marks of the common tie which unites the Empire, as well as what amount of inconvenience such detachments may occasion in the detail of military duty, are questions for the judgment of Her Majesty's Government. But, with this exception, it seems to be understood that this country is only to garrison the forts, and that for any additional force the provinces are to rely on themselves. If this view has not yet been carried into full effect, the time and mode of doing it must depend on the discretion of Her Majesty's Government.

Australian Colonies.

In this group, and although dwelling in different Colonies, yet the majority of them in close neighbourhood, there are now no less than one million of settlers. It is needless to say that they can be in no danger of subjugation. That European power would be very strong which undertook to conquer a million of Englishmen living at the antipodes. But they very properly desire to protect themselves against partial descents, and injury to their homes and property, and since the rumours of European war they have shown great ardour and resolution on the subject. It would be the greatest mistake, in my opinion, to doubt the spirit and the self-reliance of any of our large European settlements.

In the Australian Colonies the principle has been laid down, that after fixing a number of troops to be assumed as the quota required for Imperial purposes, all additional force sought for by the local governments should be paid for (provided that this country can spare them) by the Colonies themselves. Accordingly, four companies have been assigned to New South Wales and four to Victoria, and those Colonies page 288are to pay for the whole of the expense beyond that strength. South Australia has just asked for troops, and has been apprised that it must submit to the same rule, which there seems no reason to expect that it will dispute. Tasmania does not pay, because it still comprises a large population of convict origin, and it has been thought fair that its security should be provided for at the Imperial charge. For how long a time and to what extent this ground should continue to be admitted will be practical questions, on the recurrence of each successive year, for the discretion of Her Majesty advisers. In Western Australia there are only a company of the line, part of a company of sappers, and a few enrolled pensioners, employed to guard English convicts.

New Zealand.

Setting aside convict settlements, this is the only Colony connected with the Australian group to which the principle has not been applied, that an English quota being fixed, all additional troops are to be defrayed from local sources. New Zealand has hitherto been less wealthy than the others, and is in peculiar circumstances on account of its aboriginal inhabitants The proportion of Europeans to Maories is, however, continually increasing, and the longer that our rule is maintained in tranquillity, the more must the natives be supposed to become confirmed in habits of peace and order. This would be a reason, for reducing the Imperial garrison, and for entrusting the security of the European inhabitants chiefly to their own prudence and justice in dealing with the natives in time of quiet, and to their spirit in case of disturbance. On the other hand, if a premature or excessive diminution of troops should be followed by disaster to our countrymen in New Zealand, public opinion would probably condemn the measure. Between these conflicting considerations, it appears to me to be the task of statesmen to divine the course which may be best suited to the circumstances of the time at which they have to form their decision.

page 289

The Mediterranean Dependencies.

These speak for themselves; they are garrisoned for Imperial purposes. The Ionian Islands are bound by convention, executed under the Treaty of Paris, to contribute a yearly sum of 25,000l. towards their military expenses, and Malta contributes a sum of 6,200l.

The West Indies.

On this group I have stated by anticipation some of the general views which seem to me to deserve consideration. The West Indian Colonies are divided into two military commands: first, Jamaica, and secondly, the Windward and Leeward Islands. Jamaica must, I apprehend, be admitted as falling more or less within the category of places of which the occupation conduces to the general strength of the Empire abroad. The regular troops in it ought, doubtless, to be reduced within the smallest compass which Her Majesty's Government, assisted by professional advisers, may consider compatible with safety; but so long as a Colonial system is upheld at all, I should think it could not be denied that this great island ought to be the seat of some Imperial forces, maintained at the national charge. In the Windward and Leeward Islands, I quite admit that the troops ought not to be scattered about for purposes of police; but I think that there ought to be some small central force sufficient to protect any arsenals that we possess in this region, and also to be moved in case of need to any scene of insurrection or civil disturbance.

Eastern Colonies.

Ceylon appears to have contained, in 1857, about 2,386 troops. The War Office Return appended to the Report exhibits the charges at home for the troops serving in the Colonies, including a proportion of the whole dead weight of the British army, the cost of transport, and the military expenditure on the spot. This last amounted, for Ceylon, in page 2901857, to 137,776l., or an ample half. Whether it should be required to increase this contribution must be a question for Her Majesty's Government. This Colony at present is spending large sums on railways and other reproductive works. The more, of course, that it may be judged proper to take for military purposes, the less will remain for those other objects which promote the development of wealth.

Mauritius.—The force in 1857 was 850; the military expenditure on the spot, 74,215l.; the contribution of the Colony, 17,705l., which has since been increased. The island could probably afford more, and if symmetry be thought a desirable object, when practicable, this Colony might be able to contribute, as Ceylon has done, a sum equal to about half the cost on the spot of providing for its defence and internal security.

Hong Kong.—The force in 1857 was 826; the expenditure on the spot, 67,180l. This Colony has only recently been able to defray its civil expenditure, it has contributed nothing towards its military expenditure; and I suppose that the garrison will always be within the limit of the amount deemed indispensable for general national objects.

Western Coast of Africa.

On the settlements in this part of the world I have submitted, at an earlier stage, some general observations. The force in 1857 was 1,012; the expenditure on the spot was 58,946l., of which 699l. was locally contributed. It would certainly appear desirable that the forces on this coast should be kept within the smallest amount, consistent with the objects for which they are employed. Whether they can be reduced, and to what extent, is a military question, that can only be dealt with by the Government, with the aid of such military advice as it may deem it necessary to take,

Cape of Good Hope.

One considerable Colony alone has not been noticed in the page 291preceding review, and that is the Cape of Good Hope. At this place we maintain, not a garrison, but rather an army. The average force for five years would seem, by Parliamentary Returns to have been 7,000, and in 1857 is reported by the War Office at upwards of 10,000. Exclusive of all home charges, and of the cost of transport, the military expenditure of 1857 is returned at 649,878l., being nearly two-thirds of a million. In the same year was voted one of a series of annual grants of 40,000l., for civilizing the Kaffirs, and averting disputes with the natives. It is true that these efforts have given us the satisfaction of being able to say that we have not had a Kaffir war, but nine or ten thousand troops constitute such an army as England seldom has to spare for less favoured spots. The direct objects of Imperial concern at the Cape, in a military point of view, are the harbours of Table Bay and Simon's Bay. The subjoined Table will exhibit some of its leading statistics:—

—	Population.	Imports into the Colony.	Exports from the Colony.	Amount of Military Force.	Direct Military Expenditure in the Colonies themselves *
	£	£	£		£
Cape	267,096	2,637,192	1,988,406	10,759	649,878
All other Colonies	7,615,575	56,452,628	48,052,055	36,492	2,325,994
Total	7,882,671	59,089,820	50,040,461	47,251	2,975,872

It is for Her Majesty's Government to determine the relative claims of different parts of the empire to the assistance of the mother country; but supposing that some reduction of the military expenditure abroad is judged indispensable, it seems a grave fact that a Colony of which the population is page 292one twenty-ninth of the whole population of the British Colonies, and of which the imports and exports are respectively one twenty-second and one twenty-fifth, absorbs more than one-fifth of the whole force allotted to the Colonies, and occasions more than a fourth of the whole direct military expenditure.

One remark is essential on this Colony. It is commonly said that the Colonists would be willing enough to undertake their own protection, provided that they might deal with the Kaffirs as they themselves consider best, but that this would entail a mode of warfare which would not be tolerated by public opinion in England. On the other hand, so long as British authority restrains the settlers from defending themselves in their own way, it is bound to find some efficient substitute. The result has been to produce an excessive drain of British resources for a single Colony; the expenditure, as above shown, is enormous, and it is not likely ever to be materially reduced except by a radical change of policy. Such a change would relieve this country from a heavy burthen, and, so far as concerns the demands both for men and money, would be a palpable gain. Whether it would be opposed to any just claims of philanthropy, or to the general duties of sovereign States towards their subjects, and whether also it would be irreconcilable with public opinion, are questions of a different kind, lying beyond our province. They can only be determined by statesmen engaged in the actual conduct of affairs.

This completes a review of the principal groups of Colonies. The following results may, I think, be drawn from it:—

First, That in British North America and Australia, being the chief assemblages of European communities, a general and intelligible principle about military expenditure is already established.

Secondly, That in the West Indies and on the Coast of Africa the Colonies can neither pay towards the cost of troops, nor yet exist without them, and hence that if such possessions page 293are to be maintained at all, the only question for Government must be what is the smallest force which will answer its purpose.

Thirdly, That it is quite fair that the richer tropical settlements should contribute towards the expense of their garrisons, but that Ceylon and Mauritius are for the present the only Colonies which come within this category, and that both of these may perhaps, if it is thought of importance, be treated alike.

Fourthly, That the most difficult questions must arise with regard to large European settlements in contact with warlike neighbours, such as New Zealand and the Cape, but that each of these again must be dealt with according to its own condition; the chief of which have been above stated.

I think that the contribution should always be in money and not in kind, such as rations, stores, or barrack accommodation. This plan is shown by former examples to be unsatisfactory, and a fertile source of dispute.

Even if the contribution be calculated as a proportion of the whole military expenditure, I think that the amount should be fixed for periods of some continuance, since practical inconvenience and occasions of difference would arise from its constant fluctuation.

I cannot agree that the defences ought to be placed generally, and as a system, under local management. In the first place, the subject does not admit of being conveniently treated in detached portions; military and naval operations, and the preparations to be made for them, require an extended survey. In the next place, the welfare of the Queen's troops in time of peace, and the provision to be made for the success of the national arms in time of war, appear to me precisely examples of the subjects for which the Imperial Government must remain responsible, and which ought to be dealt with by the authority of the Governor, as Her Majesty's representative, and of the officer commanding the forces.

In conclusion, I must express my regret for the length of page 294this examination of the different Colonies, but it seemed to me that the true nature of the difficulties to be met could not be shown by any shorter process. What has to he solved is not one problem, but many. I despair of discovering upon them any self-acting rule which shall be a substitute for the judgment and firmness of the Ministers of the Crown for the time being. They will doubtless always be guided by a policy, but they can hardly expect to despatch such complicated and arduous questions by a single maxim. To deal with cases on their merits, to labour patiently against opposition in some quarters, and to welcome and reciprocate co-operation from others: these, in so wide and diversified a sphere as the British Colonies, appear to me tasks and duties inseparable from the function of governing, which can never be superseded by the machinery of a system however ably conceived or logically constructed.

Appendix.

Population, Imports and Exports of the under-mentioned Countries, for the Year 1857.

			Exports from the United Kingdom.
—	Population.	Imports into the United Kingdom.	Home Produce.	Colonial and Foreign Produce.	Total.
		£	£	£	£
British America	3,014,051	6,339,110	4,329,035	339,325	4,668,360
Australia	1,107,537	14,991,594	11,632,524	1,542,601	13,175,125
United States	27,797,403	33,647,227	18,935,939	1,090,956	20,076,895
Total	31,918,991	55,037,931	34,947,498	2,972,882	37,920,380

The Imports and Exports are compiled from the Returns of the Board of Trade; the Population of the Colonics from the Blue Books; and of the United States from the Almanac published in 1858.