Extract

Chairman: I believe you are Assistant Under Secretary of State for War?—I am.

Were you a member of the Departmental Committee, to whom was committed the task of preparing a scheme on the military defences in the Colonies in the year 1859?—Yes.

Are you responsible for the Report of that Committee?—I am.

You have also, I believe, written for private circulation, a paper containing remarks on Mr. Elliot's Memorandum, appended to the Committee's Report? Will you put that in?—Yes, with Lord Herbert's sanction.

Those papers, I think, express your opinions upon the subject?—Yes.

I wish to ask you for some explanations on some passages in those papers. Do you not see a difficulty in carrying out the system of a uniform rate of contribution as applied to such differently circumstanced communities as our Colonies?—For my own part, I think it a fair practical compromise; but if anyone thinks otherwise, and proposes a plan for apportioning the joint contribution in a different way, I should make no objection; certainly it docs not form an essential or even an page 309important part of my plan. I wish to say, however, that the plan is not mine; it was proposed to the Colonial Office several years ago by one of the ablest and most experienced of our Colonial Governors, a man who was not at all a doctrinaire, but a working soldier, and one as little likely as anybody to be carried away by a specious theory. I would add, also, that the plan adopted with the old American Colonies, of making the Colonies pay for the whole of their expenditure was equally uniform with that which I propose, and that all the objections to uniformity of joint contribution apply equally to it.

Who is the Governor to whom you refer?—Sir William Denison.

What do you consider the leading and essential principle of your plan for the defence of the Colonies?—Colonial responsibility and management, and, as a rule, the contribution of the Imperial Government, if any, in the shape of money only. This was the system pursued with the old American Colonies; Parliament having been hi the habit of voting sums of money to compensate them for any disproportionate expenditure incurred by them in the common cause.

Do you think that, if Great Britain left it to the Colonies to defend themselves, there would be great danger of the defence being neglected?—If we judge either by our knowledge of human nature, or by history, we shall come, I think, to a different conclusion. Englishmen have never shown themselves slow in defending themselves, and as a matter of fact, the old American Colonies, to whom the responsibility of defending themselves was entirely left, did successfully defend themselves, so that there was not one of them conquered during the period during which that system was pursued.

Are not the Colonies to be considered as military posts, essential to the interests of the Empire, and which, therefore, the Empire cannot afford to risk the loss of?—I have already said that I think the plan of throwing the responsibility of defending themselves on the Colonists, is the most effectual way of defending them, and that they are less effectually page 310defended by our garrisons, which are uniformly inadequate, whilst the fact of their presence renders the Colonists unprepared to defend themselves. A remarkable confirmation of this is to be found in the proceedings of the South Carolinians, at the present time. I feel quite sure that, if they had been in the habit of trusting to a Federal garrison to defend them, they would not have taken half such vigorous, or effectual measures of self-defence, as they have done.

You insist much on the contrast afforded by the system pursued with the old American Colonies; do you not think their circumstances were so different from those of the present day, as to prevent the analogy from being a correct one?—No; I think the analogy is complete as regards the present question.

Did they not treat the Indians more unjustly and aggressively than would be tolerated in England now; and were not wars more frequent then?—I do not think that there is any evidence of their dealing with the Indians more cruelly or aggressively than was not only tolerated, but was the custom at that time; on the contrary, their treatment of them was rather exceptionally fair and just, and they dealt with them more effectually, certainly. The consequence was, that I find only one record of an Indian war in the history of New England, for the first half-century after the New England Colony was founded.

Do you not think a nucleus of British soldiers an important element in the defence of the Colonies, to train, and drill and encourage the militia?—Very possibly; and if the Colonists think so, my plan provides that they should be able to carry such a plan into effect, provided England could spare the troops.

Do you not think that the withdrawal of the troops would cause great irritation and excitement, and perhaps run the risk of causing a separation of the Colony from the mother country?—I think that there would be much loud talking and violent writing, because the Colonists, having long been accus-page 311tomed to have us pay the whole expense, would naturally feel it a hardship to have to pay their share, but I do not think it would involve the slightest risk of a separation.

How do you think that any change could he effected practically in the present system?—In the same way in which Lord Grey effected the change in the plan of defending the Australian Colonies, which in that case produced no permanent discontent.

Do you think that the Colonies generally would acquiesce in such an arrangement?—They would, of course, have to acquiesce, if the same plan which Lord Grey pursued was pursued generally; and I think after a little time they would consider it as the old Colonists did, a matter of pride and privilege to defend themselves.

Mr. Ellice: You are acquainted with the Colony of North America?—Yes.

You know the state of the defences in Canada?—No, I do not.

Do you believe that if the English Government were to withdraw the garrisons from the forts of Quebec and Kingston, the inhabitants of Canada would undertake the defence of them?—I think they would.

Do you know anything of the expense of stores and artillery required for the defence of those forts?—No, I do not.

Generally speaking, do you think that the inhabitants of Canada, if the garrisons were withdrawn, would undertake the defence of the large forts now in existence in Canada?—I do not know whether they would undertake the defence of those particular forts, but I think they would take steps for effectually defending the province against foreign aggression.

But if they did not undertake the defence of those forts, is it your opinion that they should be abandoned by this country?—Yes.

Chairman: Do you think, if negotiations were opened with the different Colonies to obtain their consent, the result would be likely to be satisfactory?—No, quite the contrary.

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Will they not strongly protest against the change which would involve throwing upon them the responsibility and cost of their own defence?—Most Colonies undoubtedly would, and probably refuse to negotiate on the subject at all.

If it is not to be done by negotiation, in what way, practically, would you have the overtures made by the Imperial Government to the Colonies, with a view to carry out any arrangement?—I have always said I would do what Lord Grey did in dealing with the Australian Colonies, that is, propose the conditions on which the Imperial Government would give assistance, and say, that if they were not accepted, the troops would be withdrawn. I may add, that a similar intimation has since been made to the Government of New Zealand.

Mr. Ellice: And do you think that the Colonies of North America were in the same relative condition with respect to the military defences with the Colonies of Australia and New Zealand?—There are various differences between them, undoubtedly; but I do not know exactly to what differences you refer.

Have not the North American Colonies, especially Canada, an immense length of frontier to defend against a thickly populated country in the immediate neighbourhood?—Yes; but, on the other hand, they have much greater resources of a military kind from their superior population.

Against what danger have the Australian and New Zealand Colonies to defend themselves?—The danger of an attack by a hostile expedition from a nation with which they might be at war, say France, or America, or Russia.

Have not the North American Colonies to defend themselves against the same danger of an attack by land on an extended frontier?—Yes.

Chairman: Do you not think that, in the case of war, there are some Colonies which would afford valuable stations for coaling and refitting our ships, such as the Bahamas; is it not worth while to retain such places as the Bahamas, for instance? page 313—It appears to me, that if those points are essential to the interests of the Empire, the better plan would be, if we were stronger at sea, to occupy them when war broke out; if we were not stronger at sea, our garrisons would be ineffectual in defending them; the plan now is, to scatter garrisons over the world, on the chance that they may be wanted; I should propose keeping the troops at home, and sending them to the places where they were wanted when war broke out; the Bahamas happen to be a case peculiarly in point; I find that we spend about £40,000 a-year upon their defences; so that, since the peace of 1814, we have spent nearly two millions of money in defending the Bahamas, and during all that time, we have never had a force there that could have resisted the crews of two frigates.

I see that in one of your papers, you say that no British Colony, left to defend itself, has ever been conquered; and that, on the other hand, no Colony, of which the defence was entrusted to the mother country, has ever successfully resisted a hostile expedition. Is that actually the case?—As far as I recollect, it is.

Do you think that the presence of the British flag on these stations all over the world adds to the prestige, and consequently to the power of England?—I believe that it adds very much to our weakness. I have never seen a foreign criticism upon the power and troops of England, without observing that the writer considered the necessity of protecting Colonies all over the world as the main element of our weakness.

Do you not think that the circumstances of the West Indies are such as to call for special assistance from the mother country?—I do not think they are such as to call for the necessity of our paying for their police, any more than we are called upon to pay for making their roads, or paying their civil officers.

Is there any rule in the War Department, as to granting, gratuitously or otherwise, stores to the Colonies?—I believe there is no rule.

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Mr. T. G. Baring: This is a question which the Director of Stores would probably be able to answer?—I think I know as much about it as he does.

Chairman: As you know something about it, do you think you could procure for the Committee any information upon the subject, or can you inform us, in order to ascertain the point, whether in some instances stores are given gratuitously, in others payment being exacted for them, without any rule being laid down on the subject?—I believe so, but you can no doubt obtain full information if Lord Herbert chooses to give it.

Mr. Baxter: Do you advocate the entire withdrawal of British troops from the Colonies of this country?—Not necessarily; I should leave that for the Colonists themselves to settle.

Provided the Colonies are willing to defray the larger proportion, if not the whole, of the expenditure, you would not object to British troops being scattered over the world, as they are at present?—I should not think it a good plan; but if we could spare the troops I should acquiesce in it, in deference to the general principle of letting the Colonists settle for themselves what is the best way of defending themselves.

Why do you not think it a good plan?—Because I think it would be better for them to arm and train their own people; but that is more a military question, and is not one upon which my opinion is worth having.

Your main object is to diminish the Imperial expenditure in respect to the military defences of the Colonies?—No; my main object is to throw upon the Colonists the habit and responsibility of self-defence; it is a secondary but very important object to diminish the Imperial expenditure.

Have not the Australian Colonies acted very liberally in their negotiations upon the subject of contributions?—Most remarkably so; I think they have paid more than their full share.

Then your former remarks with reference to the difficulty of treating by negotiation do not apply to the Australian page 315Colonies?—No. I do not think it would be a good plan to adopt it in any case; I do not think that you could make exceptions, but I feel sure that the Australian Colonies would object to no such plan; in fact, my plan originated with themselves; it originated with the ministers of Sir W. Denison.

In point of fact, no such difficulties as those to which you have adverted have occurred in regard to the Australian Colonies?—Not at all.

Chairman: Do I understand you to draw a distinction between negotiation and that mode of action which you suggested on the part of the Imperial Government?—Yes.

Do you characterise the communication which passed between Lord Grey and the Government of the Australian Colonies as negotiation?—No.

Mr. Fortescue: It is the case, is it not, that a dependency of the Empire has no control over its foreign policy, but that all its relations with foreign powers are settled for it by the mother country?—Yes.

Does not that fact appear to you to be one of the most important in discussing this question, as giving a dependency a strong claim upon the mother country for protection against those dangers which are produced by her policy?—Certainly; it is the only one that makes it a question at all.

Then are we to understand you fully to admit that amount of claim?—I fully admit it as a claim to the protection of the mother country.

You think that a dependency has a claim to the advantages, as it must submit to the disadvantages, of its dependent position?—Certainly.

Then admitting that claim on the part of the Colonists, and the corresponding duties on the part of the mother country, is it your meaning that the mother country should afford her proper amount of protection to a Colony, not by the supply of Imperial troops but by a contribution of Imperial money page 316towards the expenses of a local force?—Not necessarily or always, but as a rule; if the Colonists require the presence of troops, I have already explained I would let them have them.

Do you think that the local forces raised in our numerous Colonies, many of which are very small, many inhabited by foreign and mixed races, can ever be brought up to anything like the efficiency of Imperial troops?—Certainly not; by which I mean that undisciplined militia will not be so good as Imperial troops; but if they choose, I have no doubt they could raise, train, and drill, at a certain expense, as good troops as we have; it is a mere question of money. I do not think it would be a good plan for them to do so.

Do you think it possible, at all events in the smaller dependencies of the Empire, that local forces should be created which should attain to anything like the efficiency and esprit de corps of the British regiments?—I think it highly improbable that they ever should do so; but I do not think it impossible. I repeat, I should consider it an exceedingly inexpedient plan, for the smaller Colonies at any rate, to attempt.

Then you confine your proposal to the larger Colonies?—Not at all; I should leave it to the Colonies themselves to settle the details of their responsibility and management. I simply propose to acquiesce in their arrangements.

These local forces would, of course, be confined to the Colonies in which they were raised?—That would depend upon the Colonies themselves. In the times of the old Colonies of North America they were not so confined, but made war on the king's enemies in other parts of the world, West Indies as well as in other parts of America.

Do you think it would be a good bargain for the Imperial Government to contribute sums of money towards the expense of local forces throughout the Colonies, which you admit must be inferior to the Imperial troops, and which, at all events, as a general rule, must be confined to their own Colony, and could not admit of being moved and handled by the Imperial Government for the general purposes of the Empire?—I should page 317consider it a very good bargain, under the conditions I have stated repeatedly, both in this examination and in the papers I have put in. I am sure the saving of money would be very large, and I think the Colony would be better defended.

Do you think that the entire withdrawal of the presence of British soldiers from any part of the Colonial Empire would not mainly tend to check and lessen the Imperial feeling in our different Colonies?—I do not think so.

Are you aware that in many cases the Colonists themselves entirely differ with you upon that point?—My only surprise is that all do not differ from me; people generally do differ from every one who asks them to pay.

Are you aware that when the question has been put to the Australian Colonies whether they preferred to raise a local force, or to pay for a certain quota of Imperial troops, they have given reasons, entirely irrespective of the party who is to pay, in favour of the presence of a small body of Imperial troops rather than of an attempt to raise a local corps?—I am quite aware of it, and my plan provides that they should be able to do so if they like.

You said just now that Englishmen are never slow to defend themselves; has it escaped your notice that a considerable portion of our dependencies are inhabited mainly, not by Englishmen, but by people of foreign races, either European or aboriginal, and do you think that one uniform scheme can equally apply to dependencies of such different origins?—I have not proposed that it should; in those places which are not properly Colonies, but only garrisons, I have proposed that the whole expense should be defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer. I allude to such places as Malta, Bermuda, and others.

Would you be prepared to withdraw the Imperial garrison from such a Colony as the Mauritius, in case the Colony of Mauritius declined to accede to the proposed scheme?—The Mauritius is another doubtful case upon which a military opinion would be more useful than mine; but my own opinion page 318is, that it would be better to trust to occupying the Mauritius when war broke out, than to keeping a garrison in peace time in case it should be wanted, because I feel sure (as the question implies) that the population of Mauritius are not inclined to defend themselves. It would, therefore, be merely in that case a question of economy with me whether it would be better to garrison it now, or to take it afterwards; at any rate, the best military authorities tell us that the garrisons and the fortifications we now maintain are inadequate; so we have the expense without the security.

Supposing the dependencies of the Empire, finding themselves left without that amount of protection from the mother country to which they consider themselves equally entitled in all the dangers that may be created by the policy of the mother country, should be prepared to place themselves under the protection of some other power, do you think that in that case the mother country would be fairly in a position to refuse her consent to that course?—I do not think it would ever be expedient or desirable for the mother country to retain her dominion over any Colony that deliberately wished to withdraw itself from it.

But in the case I suppose, would not the inclination to transfer themselves from this country to another, have been directly produced by the policy of the mother country herself?—I think the motive does not signify at all, if any Colony deliberately, and after proper means of consideration were given, desired to separate itself from this country, I do not think it would be desirable to retain its allegiance by force. I do not of course speak of garrisons, such as Malta or Bermuda.

Although that inclination not now existing would, in the case supposed, have been produced by our own policy?—By whatever motive it might have been produced. I must guard myself, however, from being supposed to admit that it would be the effect of the plan I am proposing.

Do you not think that most of our Colonies are, in the very nature of things, dependencies, and if not dependencies upon page 319this Crown must be upon another?—I can hardly answer that question as you put it; I do not think that all are, but I think some are.

Do you think that the small Colonies could ever answer as independent communities, or must they become the dependencies of some other power if they are not retained as ours?—I think that there are very few of them that any other power would take on condition of having to defend them. The Mauritius is almost the only exception I know.

Are two of our Colonies, at least, in the peculiar position of being liable to great and sudden danger, not from foreign forces, but from formidable native tribes within their borders or within their frontier, New Zealand and the Cape?—Yes.

Would you not look at the case of these two Colonies as a peculiar one?—In that respect they are peculiar.

Are you prepared to advise that the defence of such Colonies should be looked upon as a matter of internal police, or of protection against foreign danger?—I think that at the Cape it might be looked upon as protection against foreign danger, but in New Zealand as matter of police. In New Zealand the tribes in theory are, and practically might be made to be, subjects of Her Majesty; at the Cape the Kafirs are foreign nations; but I do not admit, practically, the effect of your question.

Are you not aware that the tribes of New Zealand are, to a great degree, semi-independent?—They are; but they need not be.

Do you think it possible to treat those dangers as a matter exclusively of Colonial arrangement, just as you treat protection against the danger of internal disturbances in an ordinary English community?—I have already drawn a distinction between New Zealand and the Cape. In New Zealand they say, "Give the Colonists the power exclusively, and without "interference from home of dealing with the native question." There I think the responsibility and expense of dealing with the natives may be entirely left to them.

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Do you think that the duty of keeping order amongst the foreign and mixed communities which constitute many of our Colonies, such as the West India Islands and the Mauritius, could be treated simply as a matter of police in a homogeneous English community?—I think it should be so treated, upon condition that the Colony is not interfered with in its management of such races from home.

Mr. Adderley: You say that the relation of a Colony to foreign powers, depending upon the mother country, gives that Colony a claim upon the mother country?—It is the only thing which gives them any claim.

I presume you do not mean that it gives them a claim to the entire protection of the mother country?—Of course not.

It gives them only a limited claim?—A claim to such protection as the mother country may think it right and fair to afford.

In answer to a question just now, you stated that Canada was more exposed to danger than Australia. Do you think that that fact gives Canada a larger claim to the protection of the mother country than Australia?—No.

You do not think that the greater exposure to danger is a ground upon which the claim might be calculated?—No; I think that is one of the necessary incidents to every community of its geographical position, and an evil that it must bear with, and cannot expect some one else to bear. In the case of Canada, if the danger is greater, the means of resisting it are greater too.

The greater exposure to danger does not, in your opinion, increase the claim of the Colony upon the mother country?—I have already answered that.

Would not the present plan of Colonial defence, undertaken by England, require us to increase very much the fortifications and garrisons of the various parts of the Colonies, if it is to be carried out effectually?—Undoubtedly.

Then you think that, to make the present plan of Colonial defence complete, a large expense must be incurred?—Yes.

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It would be a part of that plan to increase the dispersion of British troops in distant parts of the world?—I do not say that; it would increase the force of the garrisons.

And it would increase the number of British troops dispersed through the world in distant places?—Yes.

What would be the effect of that dispersion upon the resources of England, in case of a general war?—Of course it would weaken it.

Would it not amount to England, having a large portion of her forces looked up in distant parts of the world, and her own resources for any general war proportionately diminished?—Yes.

In your opinion, did the plan of scattering troops, during the Russian war, in garrisons of distant Colonies, lead to England being obliged to levy foreign mercenaries to supply the requirements of her own army?—It led to a dimunition of her military powers, and that was one way in which she endeavoured to supply it.

Do you think, that if the garrisons of England in Colonial forts at that time could have been made available, they would have rendered foreign legions needless?—I cannot answer that question.

They would have gone so far towards it?—To that extent they would have strengthened the British army.

Can you state what number of troops England had in South Africa when the Indian mutiny broke out?—I do not know exactly, but, speaking roughly, and from recollection, I think it was about 13,000 of all arms and ranks, but that may be exactly ascertained.

Upon the news of the Indian mutiny arriving at the Cape, does it appear that the troops, at that time in South Africa, were made available towards its suppression?—I do not remember the dates exactly; a considerable number of troops were sent.

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You have stated that, under the Colonial system of England in the last century, the Colonies of America undertook their own defence, both internal and external?—Yes.

Do you see any reason why the Colonies of England, at the present moment, should not act exactly in the same manner?—Absolutely none; all the same arguments which apply to the Colonies now, applied to the Colonies then.

There is no reason to suppose that English Colonists now are degenerated in spirit from the English Colonists of the last century?—No.

Have American Colonists kept in check all attacks upon them by the American Indians?—Yes.

And also sometimes from the regular armies of France?—Yes.

Are you aware that during the Spanish Succession War the English Colonists added Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to the possessions of the English Crown?—Yes.

Are you aware that in the subsequent Austrian Succession War of 1745 the Colonial troops reduced the great fortress of Louisbourg?—Yes.

Are you aware that in the Seven Years' War the French regular army attacked the Virginian Settlement, and that the Virginian militia alone repulsed them?—Yes.

Can you state when English troops were first sent to the assistance of Colonial forces in America?—The first time I recollect to have observed that was in the expedition that took New York in 1654. I have given these instances at large in the paper which has been put in, and I would rather refer to that than speak from recollection.

Can you say when it became the habit of England to send troops there?—When Braddock went to America in 1757; I think that was the commencement of the system of keeping standing armies in America; and, just at that time, the provisions of the Mutiny Act were extended to America.

Which of those considerations tended most, in your opinion, page 323to the ultimate separation of those Colonies from England?—Neither of them otherwise than indirectly; but I do not think that the English Government would ever have attempted to infringe upon the rights of the Colony, or to tax them without their consent, unless they had had a standing army in the Colony; and, therefore, indirectly, the presence of a standing army there was the cause of the American war; besides which, the necessity of billeting and providing transport for the troops was felt as a grievance by the Colonists.

Do you think that the Colonists, before the introduction of the Munity Act, being still entitled to the defence of their own Colony, any discontent was produced which led to the final separation of the Colonies?—Absolutely none; there is not the remotest particle of evidence of it. They considered it a privilege to provide for their own defence, and considered the presence of a British army a grievance.

What was the feeling of the Colonists towards England when the war first broke out?—That of enthusiastic loyalty.

Can you state at all with regard to the Colony with which you are personally acquainted, New Zealand, whether the action of the troops there recently in connection with the local force, has been satisfactory?—Very much the reverse, as my own accounts lead me to believe. I was going to ask leave just now in answer to a question that was put to me, to read an extract from a letter which I have received from Mr. FitzGerald, who is Superintendent of Canterbury, and was Prime Minister of the Colony at one time.

Will you read that extract?—It is to this effect: "Government "formally declines our offer to volunteer to the Taranaki "war. The Queen's army is hanging like an incubus on the "Colony, doing nothing itself, and preventing any one else." That is the opinion of a very intelligent Colonist.

Do you believe that that Colony would be both willing and able to develope volunteer forces to a large extent?—I am quite sure it is able, but I do not say that it is willing, unless we make it imperative.

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Chairman: Do you know whether the force in the Province of Canterbury has been paid for out of the funds of the province, or entirely by private efforts?—I am not quite certain; I think it has been armed by the province, but I am not sure that it has been so paid.

Mr. Adderley: Supposing the evidence to be true, which we have heard from the two Governors of the West India Islands, that the British troops in those Islands are utterly valueless against external attack, and can only be of any use in preserving internal peace both against the population, and against the doubtful fidelity of the black troops, would your views upon Colonial policy lead you to recommend the entire withdrawal of the British troops from those islands?—Certainly.

Do you see the necessity for retaining troops in any one of them, in Jamaica, for instance?—No.

When you said that if the West Indian Islands ceased to be dependent upon England, they would probably become dependent upon some other powers; I conclude that that opinion was given upon the assumption that other powers had gained the command of the seas?—I did not say that they would be dependencies upon other powers.

Do you think that they would?—I think that the West India Islands would be likely, under any circumstances, to prefer connection with the English to connection with any other power, nor do I believe that even if their connection with England terminated, they would attach themselves to another power.

Do you think that any power could hold the West India Islands against us without the command of the seas if we chose to take them?—I am quite sure they could not.

Have you stated your views as to the value in an Imperial point of view of the garrison of Halifax?—I have not; but the observations I have made generally apply to Nova Scotia as well as to other places. The Nova Scotians are perfectly page 325well able to defend Halifax just as New England, with a smaller population, was able to defend Boston.

We have it in evidence that Halifax, as a strong post upon the American coast, is important to Imperial interests. Supposing we retained Bermuda, and effectually garrisoned her, would it not sufficiently answer these Imperial purposes?—That is hardly a question I can answer; that is a question for naval and military men; but I think that Bermuda could not defend itself, and I think Nova Scotia could.

I see in Mr. Elliot's portion of the Report, in which you have taken a share, that one reason assigned for England contributing towards the expenses of the defence of Ceylon is, that there are large works going on in Ceylon for railways and other purposes, and that if money was defrayed to pay their defences they would have less for their public works. To your mind, does that seem a good reason why the military expenditure in the defence of Ceylon should fall upon this country?—No; that is equivalent to saying that we ought to contribute towards the railways.

I have an extract from a speech which Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape, made in the City of London, before his recent return to that Colony, in which he expresses his opinion that the Colony sufficiently contributes towards the military expenditure of England in its defence, by purchasing commodities from England, which by the taxation on the export brings money into the English Exchequer. Is that a view of the subject which you consider reasonable?—I think it might as well be said that they contributed to the expense of the French army, because when they purchase commodities from France they pay taxes in France.

In fact nothing would satisfy your view of Colonial policy, short of the Colonies themselves undertaking the first responsibility of their own defence, and we contributing such a quota towards their external defences as may be reasonable on the ground that they are involved in England's foreign policy?—That is what I propose.

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Is there not some consideration the other way for England, in the way that England is involved in warfare by Colonial interests and relations?—Undoubtedly, and that should never be forgotten. Within the last twenty years we have been three or four times on the verge of war with America, upon purely Colonial questions in which this country was not interested. I refer to the Maine boundary question, the Fisheries of Newfoundland, and many others.

Should you not say that, in the long run, England incurs as many liabilities by her Colonial relations as the Colonies do by their implication in English foreign policy?—No, I should think not.

In the case of the Cape, where you say you think that the Kafirs may be looked upon to a certain extent as foreign enemies, the expense of all the wars which have been created by the relation of the Cape with the mother country has fallen upon the English Exchequer?—Yes.

Many millions have been so spent?—Yes.

To what extent should you say that the proper claim of the Cape upon England for protection goes towards England defraying the expense of such wars?—I cannot say to what extent. I should be sorry to bind myself to any particular proportion of contribution. I have already said that I think half and half is a fair rough compromise, but I do not adhere to that very particularly. It is quite impossible upon any system to make a theory of joint contribution. You must have a practical compromise, and in the case of the Cape, I should be satisfied to make such a practical compromise.

Do you see any difference in the question as it relates to the Kafir frontier, and as it relates to the garrisoning of Cape Town?—Yes, there is a difference, of course.

Do you think that England is more properly liable to the expense of garrisoning Cape Town than to the expense of defending the frontier?—So far as the Colony has more the means of procuring or avoiding war in one case than in the other.

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Do you see any danger in England undertaking, as she does, with the exception of one force, the whole defence of the frontier of the Cape, leading to extravagance in such wars?—Yes.

Do you see, also, any danger in the way of its keeping up the recurrence of such wars?—I think so.

Mr. Fortescue: With respect to Mr. FitzGerald's letter, do you think that the people of the Northern Islands, who are exposed to those native dangers from which Mr. FitzGerald is free, would agree with him that the presence of an Imperial force is a mere incubus?—I dare say they would not; many of them would he glad to have the Imperial troops do everything. I am only quoting the opinion of Mr. FitzGerald as a pectator.

Mr. FitzGerald does not mean to say that he does not wish the authority of the Queen to be asserted, and the Colonists to be protected in some way from native dangers?—Certainly not; but he means to say that it would be better done if left to the Colonists themselves.

But those who are really exposed to the dangers in question, you think would not agree with him?—Very likely not; I cannot say to what extent that opinion is held; but I know that all the Colonists are dissatisfied with the way the war has been carried on.

You said just now that we have been several times on the brink of war with the United States, arising out of purely Colonial relations; is it not the case that, upon those occasions, the policy to be pursued was entirely a question for the Imperial Government?—It was wholly for the Imperial Government; but it was a question that had reference solely to Colonial interests.

But whether it was worth while to carry on such a controversy, or to maintain such a claim as might result in war with the United States, was entirely a matter within the discretion of the Imperial Government?—Of course.

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Do I understand you to say that, In allotting a certain amount of Imperial protection to the Colonies, the actual danger to which any Colony is exposed ought not to be any element in the calculation?—I do not think you could estimate that with any precision, especially as the means the Colony might possess of resisting danger would have in that case to he considered too.

So that you would contribute the same amount of protection, and no more, to the Cape, with its formidable native tribes, and to Victoria, where there are none?—I have already explained, that I do not consider the rate of contribution on the part of the Imperial Government essential or even important; and therefore if it is considered better to allow a varying rate, I should be quite satisfied with it; but, as I said before, the essential principle, in my opinion, is that the Colony should be responsible primarily, and that the assistance of the Imperial Government should be only given in the shape of a contribution. Upon the question upon what principles or in what ratio that contribution should be given, I think that half and half is a fair compromise; but I should be quite satisfied with any other ratio of contribution that might be considered more fair.

You say that that is not to vary with the danger to which a particular Colony is exposed?—My opinion is that it should not; but I do not consider that question as at all an essential or important one.

You think, for instance, that the existence upon the frontier of Canada of a first-class foreign power, with which Canada is liable to be involved in war, not by her own act, but by the policy of the Home Government, should be no element in calculating the amount of assistance to be afforded to Canada?—My opinion is that it should not. I have already explained why I think Canada would be better defended without our assistance, as given at present.

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Do you think that there is no difference between the date of things now existing in America, and the condition of things in those times, to which allusion has been made, when that great foreign power in the United States was a dependency?—On the contrary, I think that you had then, as an immediate neighbour, a far more formidable power, viz., the French; and on the other side a more formidable naval and military power, the Spaniards; so that in fact, I think that the danger of our New England Colonies from foreign aggression, was infinitely greater than the danger of Canada from foreign aggression by the United States.

Was not the French power in America at that time insignificant?—On the contrary, it was most formidable.

Was it anything to be compared with the power of the United States?—Certainly; it far exceeded it for aggressive purposes, although not for defensive purposes.

With respect to the practical steps which you would advise should be taken, do I understand you to mean that the Imperial Government is to make up its mind as to the amount of assistance which it will afford to the several Colonies, to say to each of those Colonies that that is the determination, and to abide by that determination irrespective of the effect that may be thereby produced upon the feeling of attachment of the Colonists?—Yes, as Lord Grey did with the Australian Colonies, and with the most complete success.

Do you think that the case you have just alluded to affords at all a parallel to what would be the consequence of such an announcement throughout the various Colonies of the Empire?—I have already explained what I think the consequences would be.

But whatever the consequences may be with respect to the feelings, or the allegiance of the Colonies, that is the course which you think the Imperial Government ought to take?—Yes, as the only practical course.

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Mr. Adderly: Can you draw any such distinction between the case of India, and that of other dependencies, as would justify our requiring India to pay its own military expenses, whilst we pay those of other Colonies?—No; I think there is none.