Philosophy Should Integrate Sciences

Mr. Congalton proposes to deal with the necessity stressed by Mr. Sutton-Smith by making philosophy and psychology (and sociology) compulsory subjects in the first year of any University course. This does not seem to me to be a useful proposal at all. Its effect would be trivial. As a course it would lack meaning—because fundamental ideas are notoriously unmeaningful and useless when merely trayersed, and not reached by working through the body of knowledge to which they are fundamental. Because of that, it would lack interest. It might titillate the intellect of those with a taste for paradox and generalisation, but it would not be important for them as people; more usually it would be just plain boring or enervating.

The whole point of requiring the specialist to consider the philosophical, psychological (and sociological) implications of his subject is that these are the three subjects which can do most to alleviate the isolated state of specialist studies. There is no particular mystery about this, although Mr. Congalton thinks there is. For example, philosophy is concerned with generalities, and generalities have a habit of bringing isolated particulars together. The idea of a large number of isolated philosophies is ridiculous, unless their subjects are already too far gone in their specialism. And, for that matter, they may very well be-too far gone—Miss Watt seems to think so; also there must be something to explain the silence to date, of the scientists on this problem.

If, however, we treat it as a problem, that is, something which may be solved, it is clear now that Mr. Congalton's suggestion does not get us far. This says nothing against having a sort of central meeting-house arrangement for making the philosophical aspects more public and for following up the most general of the problems; but it would be silly to have this meeting-house without relating the philosophy to the primary concern of the people concerned.