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Salient. An Organ of Student Opinion at Victoria College, Wellington, N.Z. Vol. 10, No. 11. July 30, 1947

We Set Them Up Brian Knocks Them Down

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We Set Them Up Brian Knocks Them Down

It would appear that to some extent philosophers cannot read—or at least the sample at hand. At the risk of boredom therefore I will re-state my problems:
(1)The first concerned the defects of specialism;
(2)The second the defects of academic isolation.

I considered these problems sufficiently important to seek enlightenment, and did this by the only method yet known to stir the Victoria intellectuals about something intellectual, i.e., by insulting some of them and playing on the prejudices of the rest. The rest, in this case the men of science and others, have shown greater forbearance—or was it "logorrhoea"—than I had imagined possible. The insulted, the philosophers, on the other hand, have been singularly disappointing in their lack of constructiveness. For my part I modestly suggested that perhaps the solution to both these problems might lie in the more adequate philosophical-psychological-sociological development of the various other specialist departments.

As I have received little further information on the matter, perhaps it is up to me to elaborate more fully my own ideas. I do so with hesitancy, for without doubt I am dealing with what is the most important twentieth century dilemma in the sphere of University education—specialism.

The Plan of Development.

I think it must have been obvious to the discerning reader that I envisage a much more extended role for philo-psych sociology than they have ever had before—despite the red-herring! It seems to me that the study of these subjects is so vital that they cannot be restricted to their separate departments alone. Development I think must take place in two directions: (1) These subjects must become the basis of an orientation course for all students; and (2) they must be developed, probably as options at the honours and research levels, by the specialist sciences, social and natural. We would have, for example, each of the separate sciences use the basic data so far gained in, let us say, sociology, and then, with this knowledge, extend themselves into the social relationships of their particular concrete study. Each science should thus consider itself in relationship to the whole social pattern.

It is my belief that the development of the three subjects under consideration must lie largely in this direction in the future. The knowledge gained would in time become a part of the introductory orientation course. The real source of orientation, however, comes as I have mentioned, further up the scale as the specialists orientate themselves to their common problems through the development of the psycho-socio-philosophic aspects of their disciplines.

Scattering the Philosophers and Others.

In answering the "philosophers" I will attempt to elaborate these points. It is difficult to resist the desire to rend asunder what lies before me, but space would hardly allow a detailed exposure.

(1) Miss Watt gives up the ghost, in her final paragraph and decides the problem of specialism cannot be solved although apparently the problem of academic isolation is to be solved by the establishment of a separate psychology department. I fail completely to see any connection between a psychology department as such and his problem of isolation, but assume that Miss Watt and other student psychologists in the university, feel supremely satisfied that once again they have been able to draw public attention to this desire of theirs, for a separate department. As with the sociology I mentioned above, the real development of psychology in the future seems to me to lie in its identification with the various concrete fields. It is a noticeable feature of the recent years that psychologists are getting more and more specialist training in the fields to which they devote themselves, whether these be medical, anthropological, economical, etc. The need is for less psychology in general and more of a specialist nature. There is a whole body of knowledge urgently awaiting development here, and, let it be emphasized, this cannot be achieved without the grounding in the specialist sphere which takes me to . . . .

(2) Mr. Congalton who indulges in a fine flight of fancy when he says that 'True philosophy will incorporate all the sciences." . . . Who is the speculative philosopher to do this, Mr. C? Presumably some arm-chair gentleman who has just read Hogben's "Science for the Millions" or the like. Surely the specialist nature of present-day knowledge makes such development by the non-specialist impossible? The answer lies, as I see it in the specialist developing in his own sphere as far as it is possible, philosophically, etc., and then working with others on a co-operative panel of specialists to solve those problems he finds sufficiently complex to require co-operative endeavour. The philos., etc., elements give the members of the panel sufficient common ground to focus on the more general problems that confront them.

Organised provision, of course, would have to be made for this work. No one expects any "blue-print" to emerge mysteriously into actuality as Mr. C. seems to imply. Our concern here, however, is with the nature of the necessary reform—not whether the powers that be will actually bring such reform into action and thereby, we might add, disprove the saw of William James, that no priestcraft ever originates its own reform.

The rest of Mr. C.'s letter includes a whole host of despairingly unphilosophic "non sequlturs" and then paradoxically enough in the last paragraph Mr. C. wholeheartedly supports the ideas here advanced and thereby contradicts all the rest of his article not already in agreement with this viewpoint.

(3) Mr. Witten-Hannah in his amusing letter executes some rather interesting manoeuvres in his pursuit of "The Red Herring" but that is about all. In passing one cannot help mention that the cases of Eddington and Jeans he quotes are supreme examples, not of the philosophic development by different disciplines as Mr. W.H. imagines but, rather, of the lack of it. Had the respective sciences of which these men were representative developed their philosophic aspects systematically the amateurish anthropomorphism these men expostulate would not have been acceptable. As it is, that little pomposity, Joad, is able to spread it far and wide as the recrudescence of Idealism. Only the whole-hearted philosophic development of the sciences as has been suggested will prevent this occasional sell-out to religious sentimentalism. Such neurotic episodes are based essentially on ignorance. The combined ignorance of the specialist without philosophy (Jeans) and the philosopher without speciality (Joad). The defects of both these we should seek to overcome. I have suggested a possible way, not, Mr. Congalton, on a purely arbitrary basis, but on the recommendation of possibly the world's leading sociologist

—Robert M. Lynd.

B. Sutton-Smith.