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Salient: Victoria University Students' Paper. Vol. 25, No. 10. 1962.

We Protest [Letter to the editor by Con O'Leary]

Sir, the Eichmann editorial which emblazoned the front page of the last issue of Salient, deserves comment.

Its headline "We Protest", was to say the least, ambiguous. The use of the front page for such an article constituted a distortion in editorial format. Nevertheless, it is the content of the article with which I am most seriously concerned.

The protest was based on two assertions:—
1.That human life is inviolable.
2.That the execution of Eichmann was a symptom of the Israeli's primeval revenge instinct.

The sanctitiy of human life is a reasonable judgment for any man to have. As an absolute through which all political and social issues must be viewed it is extremely shaky and almost impossible to apply. Nevertheless, I can grant that a man may assert this absolute as long as he asserts it consistently.

Where were the articles about N.Z.'s abolition of capital punishment, the discussions of the principles involved in Eichmann's execution during the length of his trial, protest at the execution of innocents in "rape" cases in the American south, the attack on status which can only exist by having the death penalty incorporated into their legal system? Surely while men are being executed, Eichmann, with his tally of 6 million, was a reasonable candidate?

The execution was not an example of the application of the revenge instinct. Even if it had been, this would hardly be a reasonable basis for attack. A member of any race conscious of his group identity which had undergone the horrible and bestial treatment to which the Jewish was subjected under Nazi-ism, and under continual pressure from racial persecution, whether actual or implied would hardly be human if he did not feel some stirring of revenge feelings.

Moreover it is my assertion that the decision to try Eichmann was a political one, to execute him a legal one. These two are distinct, and it is only the first which is open to examination as to motive. The motives which prompted Ben Gurion to try Eichmann were those: to re-enact the atrocities of Nazi-ism, so as to show the world where anti-semitism can and, to show the new generation in Germany and other countries the evils of Fascism to enable young Jewry to identify themselves with the victims.

The new generation in Israel is reported d to generally have felt shame at the apparent ease with which the Jews succumbed to the Nazis rather than sympathise with them. To arouse their sympathy in the interests of national solidarity was undoubtedly one of the prime motives for the long public trial.

One may be critical of Ben Gurion's assessment of the issues involved and of the decision to try Eichmann. However, think it is pointless to criticise a statesman in the void, for not acting like an advanced moralist or genial monk. It is quite clear anyway that this decision can not be classified as one inspired solely by the dictates of primeval revenge instincts.

As to whether Eichmann should or should not have been executed, this car, also be more meaningfully discussed : as a question of policy rather than principle. As a policy decision, the Israel: State can be criticised for it but not condemned. One may assert that it was not in the best interests of Israel to kill Eichmann.

As a matter of principle, there are several important questions to be settled before discussion can proceed. The question of capital punishment the question of free will and conditioning for instance. Most important of all, the question of bureaucratic responsibility of how far the bureaucrat's abdication of the whole can be tolerated.

These are questions which you did not attempt to raise.—Yours etc.,

Con O'Leary