Having been asked by this Institution to deliver a lecture on the above subject, I think it my duty to do so. Though sensible of the honour conferred by repeated invitations, several considerations deterred me from at once accepting them; even now I am doubtful as to the wisdom of compliance. It is a grave question whether so wide a problem can be adequately treated in one short hour, and whether a matter of the most serious national concern can be publicly discussed without more danger of directing foreign attention to our deficiencies and difficulties, than hope of remedy and removal by ourselves. Public opinion will not apparently turn out of the current of ever-changing, but now, always purely military, theories of insular defence requirements, to a calm, quiet contemplation of the grim realities of modern maritime war to a people dependent on the sea for daily bread. The rapid and increasing diversion of English thought out of the great, broad channels of actual and real national requirements, into little whirlpools and back eddies of abstract military experiments, is to be deplored; it is not, however, to be wondered at. Every volunteer from the Land's End to the Orkneys, every militiaman from Dover to Donegal, is the apostle of a purely insular theory of defence, the practical preacher of purely military precautions; Russell, from nearly all battle-fields of modern times; Hozier, from "the Mountains of Rasselas;" Bracken-bury, from the plains of Italy, and Forbes from the ruins of Sedan, have so stirred the heart of England that her head has well nigh ceased to regard the influence of water as practically ruling the whole principle of her own and that of her Empire's defence. No eloquent descriptions of tactical struggles for strategical positions have yet been dated from "equatorial crossings," or from "off Capo Horn;" no great populations at centres of manufacturing industries in the very heart of England have been thrown out of work by far distant war operations against us interfering with the supply lines of raw material; hunger pangs have not been felt by multitudes through the capture of grain vessels, or by that rise in insurance to cover war risks which will certainly be in direct ratio to the organization, adaptation, and sufficiency of the pre-arranged defence of our sea lines all over the globe.

Every School Board boy in the United Kingdom has some notions, page 2 however vague, relative to soldiers and invasion, but millions of intelligent grown-up Englishmen to-day have no distinct views at all as to the defence of the sea. They dream that that matter was settled once and for all by the victory of Trafalgar, if not by the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Yet, only by methodical, complete, and Imperial pre-arrangements, can England, in days of steam and huge commerce, face maritime war without dread, or hope to emerge from it without disaster. An Empire having thousands of vessels counting millions of tons, annually carrying to and from every corner of the world, its goods in value approaching a thousand millions sterling, cannot hope to localize her naval wars; nor can it be for one moment assumed that a maritime position so constituted and of such extent, can be defended simply by individual skill or even genius of naval Commanders. War fleets must be separated by long sea intervals; however efficient they may be, they are but as flies on the great commercial wheels revolving round the world. They can provide but small security to sea-lines of thousands upon thousands of miles in length, unless they act in combination and are subordinated to a general carefully prepared and preconcerted plan. I shall presently produce some broad facts which it is to be hoped will sufficiently establish the absolute necessity for more public attention being directed to this matter. I shall submit some calculations as to the actual money value of the various divisions of oceans to England and her Empire; I shall do so merely to illustrate relatively what is past all price, viz., the practical, social, and indeed the life and death consequences involved to the English race in the precautions taken for securing in war, the safety and freedom of the sea. It is not too much to say that the loss of a whole British Army on Continental battlefields, could not of itself produce the catastrophe sure to follow as a direct and immediate consequence on the interruption of even one of our main sea-lines of supply. One would cause mental anguish and a fall in the Funds, the other would add to these, physical suffering by a rise in bread. The forcible curtailment of imports of grain and raw material, and of the exports of manufactured articles, means a cry from millions, for bread which could not be given, for work which could not be obtained. No one who hears me or who reads this paper is without influence. Be it little or great, all have some, and my reason for coming here to-day is to appeal for the exercise of that influence to turn attention more towards a true realization of the primary requirements consequent upon our Empire's exceptional position, and to the pre-arrangements necessary for their adequate and complete fulfilment. The few words I think it desirable to say may, I hope, be of some slight use to those whose influence cannot be without some result. That great multitude of Englishmen who sway the defensive policy of our Empire, know nothing at all of what England at war with even one Great Power means in days of steam and gigantic commerce; and while some are enthusiastic about every detail of the last military experiment, nearly all seem placidly content to trust to luck and some powerful ironclads, to make everything quite safe and easy for us on the sea.

It seems to me desirable to make these prefatory, if somewhat personal, remarks, because every year's consideration of this and similar subjects, on which I have so often spoken in this theatre, increases my sense of its awful importance, and, therefore, of the grave responsibility incurred in the method in which it is submitted for discussion and publication. Sixteen years ago I fancied it possible some good might come of venturing to write and speak on these questions, differing as I then did, and do now, with the popular view of the aspects of British defence. Now, finding myself only beginning to approach the verges of true knowledge of its depth, I fear it is more likely such slender contributions to the literature of so great a subject may do more harm than good.

Having thus explained my sense of responsibility, and my reason for overcoming a disinclination to incur it, I proceed to submit some general observations on the necessity for establishing an organized and far-reaching system of naval intelligence.