The curious system of government by Party is so widespread, and has held the field—almost unchallenged—for so long, that we are apt to regard it as synonymous with parliamentary government. It is so completely in possession of all British parliamentary procedure, that the majority of people overlook both its purely accidental origin and its intrinsic absurdity; and, in spite of the fact, that it is quite unknown to any other of our representative institutions, they have come to look on it as an essential factor in "responsible government." That the system is so widespread, is mainly due to the fact that the British political model has been closely copied (as pointed out by Sir Henry Maine) by other civilised countries in search of a Liberal constitution. As to Party government having been almost unchallenged, that is, strictly speaking, only correct in reference to party politicians and the political Press—that is to say, by those who profit by the system. It is hardly to be expected that the professional politician (a designation which should be one of honour, but Which this very system has made one of disgrace) would strive to upset a method of government which has created him, and by which he lives and moves and has his being. Similarly, a large proportion of the daily Press lives and thrives on party warfare. On the other hand, the non-political Press, most writers on political science, and the most discerning of the general public, Eve long protested against the absurdities and immoralities of the present system. So long since as April, 1858, a writer in the "Westminster Review" begins an able article with the confident remark: "We may without rashness assert, that the nation, as distinct from the public men and from the journalists, is unanimous in desire for the overthrow of government by Party." This page 18 was doubtless an over-statement of the case; but that [unclear: cannot] said of the following extract from the "Quarterly Review" [unclear: of] 1886:—

A growing contempt and impatience of the whole [unclear: machinery] Party; disgust with a method which compels us to accept bad [unclear: rule] instead of good at the hands of a class, which is as yet [unclear: incompetent] distinguish good from bad; and shame at the waste of time, [unclear: the] interminable wrangling, and the ignoble ambitions which, in [unclear: spite] certain splendid exceptions, have marked the course of Party government for some years past, are certainly the most conspicuous [unclear: phenomena] of the present day.

Attempts have been made to trace the origin of [unclear: Party] government as far back as the Revolution of 1688, but [unclear: this] page 19 only be done by ignoring what is the real essence of the system. As recently as 1834 we see William IV. dismissing his Ministry and sending for Sir Robert Peel—an attempt at retaining the old rights of the Crown which the newly-formed Parliament would not brook, and one that has never been made since. Parliamentary government may, roughly speaking, be said to date from 1688; but the dawn of the Party system cannot be placed further back than the accession of the Hanoverian kings, Until that time Whigs and Tories had shared office together, and sat side by side at the Council table. George I., however, owed his throne to the exertions of the Whigs alone, and therefore gave them a monopoly of office, regarding the Tories as his natural enemies. This mere accident was the first step in the direction of Party government. Its most important effect was one that had not been foreseen:

It gradually weakened the monarchy. Under it the King became a sort of ward under the guardianship of the Whig party. And henceforward, if he wished to change his counsellors, it was not easy for him to do it. For the Whigs had only to close their ranks, to adopt the tactics of a trades' union, to impose their terms on the king by threatening a strike, and the king was in danger of a checkmate. He had alienated the Tories by treating them as rebels. Henceforth, he could not throw himself into their hands. He could only appeal from one section of the Whigs to another, and this thrust the Wings might parry by taking pains to efface sectional divisions in their body.^*

It was on this very ground—that the Party system tended deprive the king of all real power—that the ablest and most far-seeing Tories of the day, Swift and Bolingbroke for instance railed against the new system and tried to strangle it at its birth. Circumstances were, however, too strong for them. Aided by the peculiarities of George I., who could not speak the English language and cared little for English politics except that the Whigs should be in power, the Cabinet system and its Offspring, Party government, throve apace. It was early in the reign of George II. that the Party system was brought nearer to a logical perfection by the evolution of a recognised Opposition—a party whose aim and end was to oppose the party in power, and endeavour to turn them out of office. This no doubt inevitable development was due to the brilliant brain of Pulteney. In the words of Mr. Justin McCarthy:

With Pulteney and his tactics began the party organisation which, inside the House of Commons and outside, works unceasingly with

^* "Introduction to Political Science."—Sir J. R. Seeley, K.C.M.G.

page 20 tongue and pen, with open antagonism and underhand intrigue, with all the various social as well as political influences—the pamphlet, the Press, the petticoat, even the pulpit—to discredit everything done by the men in office, to turn public opinion against them, and, if possible, to overthrow them. . . . Inside the House he made it his business to form a party which should assail the Ministry on all points, lie in was to find occasion for attacking it, attack it rightly or wrongly, attacks even at the risk of exposing national weakness or bringing on national danger, keep attacking it always. . . Pulteney and his companion set themselves to appeal especially to the prejudices, passions, and ignorance of the vulgar herd. They made it their business to create a public opinion of their own. They dealt in the manufacture of public opinion.^*

This assumption of legislative power by the Cabinet is clearly opposed to the best interests of the people. The words of Blaekstone are as true now as when he wrote them:

Whenever the power of making anil that of enforcing the laws are united together, there can be no public liberty . . . Where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power as may tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject.^*

The question now arises, Why is it that Party government, which in its early stages did England good service, should have developed rapidly in England, and much more rapidly elsewhere, into the harmful and immoral system we now know so well? The answer is, that the seeds of decay were in the system from the first, At the time of its birth, England was divided into two great parties, Whigs and Tories, parties to which the well-known definition of Burke might fairly be applied—"A body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all I agreed." So long as principle was the foundation of the parties, little harm was done by Party government. Burke himself (in spite of Goldsmith's accusation that he "narrowed his mind, and to party gave up what was meant for mankind") deserted his party as soon as, in his opinion, his party proved false to its principles. Parties based on principle are, by their very nature, temporary. Perhaps the reform desired is effected, and the page 22 raison d'être of the party is no more. If the unifying principle is mainly a negative one, such as the preservation of ancient time honoured institutions and a general dislike for change, the party has a longer chance of life, and we see at once why the Conservative Party in England exhibits more continuity and cohesion than the Liberals. But, even then, new times demand new method and members of the party will differ on every new question which comes to the front. Now, Party government could not work on these terms. It must have permanent parties; these must be divided by as sharp a line as possible, and their members must look upon "party loyalty" as the supreme virtue, regardless of their personal opinions. Such parties being essential to the working of the system, have accordingly, sooner or latter, been evolved, and may fairly be called artificial parties in contradistinction to Burke's natural parties of men united by principle.

The most completely-developed organisations of this nature are, no doubt, the two great parties in America—the Republicans and Democrats. They were once supposed to represent respectively, the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in government; but for a long time they have been without any definite discoverable principles. As Mr. Bryce says:

The chief practical issues which once divided them have been settled. Some others have not been settled; but as regards these, one or other party has so departed from its former attitude, that we cannot [unclear: nov] speak of any conflict of principles. . . . Neither party has any principles, any distinctive tenets. Both have traditions; both claim to have tendencies. Both have certainly war cries, organisation, interests enlisted in their support. But those interests are in the main the interests of getting or keeping the patronage of the Government. Tenets and politics, points of political doctrine and points of political practice, [unclear: have] all but vanished. They have not been thrown away, but have been stripped away by time and the progress of events, fulfilling some policies, blotting out others. All have been lost, except office, or the hope of it.^*

In England the two historic parties retain some of their old principles, and still more of their traditions; and this, by itself, is sufficient to account for the evils of Party government being [unclear: so] much less striking there than in the Colonies, in France, or in America; nevertheless, the steady advance towards the artificial political party is very marked. The Tories have a larger residum of original principles than their opponents; yet we have seen them, in 1867, pass a Reform Bill, for widening the [unclear: suffnge] page 23 on more democratic lines than Mr. Gladstone's Bill, which they had previously opposed on the ground of its ultra-democratic character. We have seen them again, in their anxiety to "dish the Whigs," pass a Free Education Bill in 1891, which must have been gall and bitterness to a large proportion of their party. But there is no need to accumulate proof of a fact so generally recognised. This gradual transition towards the purely artificial party demanded by this system of government has often been noticed and deplored by writers on such subjects, and by the Lore conscientious politicians. The manner in which the change has been brought about, and its general effect on public life, are well expressed in the following few lines by Mr. Auberon Herbert:—

Organisation, like many other things, is an excellent servant, but a most evil master. So long as we use organisation to push some definite opinion—in other words, so long as it expresses true agreement among the organised—it is a right instrument to use; but the moment we subordinate opinions and ends to organisation, giving up a part of ourselves, Acquiescing where we have no real sympathy, adding our personal weight and force to measures or doctrines which are not a truthful expression of ourselves, it becomes a most evil and soul-destroying thing. . . Professedly existing merely to express opinion, it (i e., political organisation) has encroached and encroached, until, to a large extent, it dictates opinion. We have been learning far too much to shape our opinions to give effect to our organisations, instead of shaping our organisations to give effect to our opinions.^*

We have now traced the origin of the Party system of government, and of the political or artificial party which that Eastern inevitably develops—a party united merely for the purpose of obtaining or retaining power. We have still to Examine what are the effects of this system. In brief, the effects are little short of disastrous both to administration and legislation; while the general tone of the political world is lowered and demoralised. Self-preservation being the first law of nature, the greater part of the energies of the Government is necessarily devoted to maintaining its own existence against the attacks of the Opposition; and the main desire of the outs is not to see that She ins govern well, but to make it impossible for them to govern at all, to demonstrate their incapacity to the country, and to secure the power for themselves. Moreover, the main reasons which must influence a Premier in the selection of his colleagues I makes it little more than an accident if any of them have any page 24 marked administrative ability. He is obliged to look on [unclear: goo] fighting power in debate^* and tact in Party management as [unclear: the] first qualifications; he has to consider past services rendered [unclear: to] the party: he has personal friends to promote, and [unclear: not] infrequently he feels compelled to try, by an otter of office, [unclear: to] secure the adherence of some waverer. The main [unclear: consideration] all through is the Party, and not the country. Even if, by [unclear: some] lucky chance, one or two good administrators should be selected, the necessary struggle to keep their places and to "keep the party together" leaves them little leisure to attend properly [unclear: to] their duties. In addition to this, the uncertain and usually [unclear: brief] life of ministries assists to prevent even the most [unclear: conscientious] minister from obtaining that thorough mastery of the details [unclear: of] his department, which we all, in private life, know to [unclear: be] essential to the successful management of any business.

The result of this intrigue and favouritism in the [unclear: appointment] of ministers, and of their subsequent want of knowledge [unclear: and] experience, is that the real government of the country [unclear: is] excepting under exceptional circumstances, left to the [unclear: permanent] heads of the departments, subject to a little interference for Party reasons. That this leads directly to extravagance, inefficiency bureaucracy, is obvious, and need not be enlarged upon. The effect on foreign policy is even more dangerous, and [unclear: show] clearly the folly of the real principle of Party government—namely, that "Unless a house be divided against itself, it cannot stand." Lord Salisbury, in a speech at Glasgow some years [unclear: ago], pointed out the great difficulty of managing Foreign affairs, [unclear: and] even the Government of India, with Party feeling "so [unclear: much] more bitter" than it used to be. He said:

Combination of the Party system and the electric telegraph [unclear: will] shake your Empire to its base. . . . And therefore, thought the diminution of Party action in domestic affairs is a counsel of [unclear: perfection]

^* The system of debating (originally, one would presume, a [unclear: me] aid to legislation) has grown out into a principal object, a great end [unclear: in] itself, with a special set of rules and notions which have no [unclear: connection] whatever with efficient law-making. Men are made Ministers, [unclear: Und] Ministers, and Secretaries, judges, ambassadors, governors, [unclear: cons] anything in the world, by more or less readiness in putting together [unclear: a] few adroit sentences. . . . The thing is too ancient a by-word to [unclear: be] dwelt on here. All that is now suggested is the doubt if the system [unclear: has] not been abused almost till it bursts. Can any qualities of [unclear: mind] character be less like those which are needed to carry through the [unclear: most] arduous of political tasks?—"Order and Progress," by Frederic [unclear: Harrison].

page 25 to which I do not for a moment aspire, I do venture to impress upon you the paramount duty of discouraging, as far as possible, the operation of our Party system upon the vast and tremendous interests which we have at all events abroad, whether they are in countries where our own dominions are concerned, or whether they are in countries that live under other potentates.^*

Lord Salisbury was, of course, referring to the difficulties caused by an Opposition anxious to discredit and defeat the Government. A somewhat different source of danger to our Foreign policy, under the Party system, is well exemplified by the following extract from a private letter, written in April, 1879, by the late Lord Derby—a patriotic statesman of the first bank, who, it will be remembered, severed himself from the Disraeli Government in 1878, owing to the Premier's "Jingo Policy," by which he drove England to the very verge of war with Russia. Lord Derby writes:—

I do not believe that Lord Beaconsfield ever wished for a war, or that he cared really to alter materially the conditions of the San Stefano arrangement. But without a diplomatic success—no matter how short lived-his Ministry would have been in great danger, and he preferred the risk of war to that of personal failure. . . . Perhaps it is impossible to be for thirty years a party leader without coming to consider that keeping the party together is the one result for which everything else must be risked. At any rate, I am sure that has been the object of the proceedings of 1878; and as a Party move they seem to have answered. But I cannot think them safe or wise in a national mint of view.^†

It is an old saying that "bad laws well administered are better than good laws badly administered." Unfortunately, however, the Party system makes the existence of the Government depend more on its legislation than its administration. It necessitates each Government having a "policy," which is usually framed more in the interests of the party than the country, whether important legislative measures are really necessary for the country or not, they are always necessary for the Party, for no Party can hope to succeed without a "live policy" and a good battle-cry. The very basis of Party government is the wholly fallacious idea that in every country there must always be some "question" before the public of sufficient importance to keep two opposing parties compact and distinct. As this is seldom really page 26 the case, the main work of Party leaders is to provide [unclear: such] questions, and to try and excite throughout the country [unclear: a] artificial enthusiasm for and against them.^* This is the explanation, not only of the amazing hollowness of Party fights, but [unclear: al] of the extraordinary number of legislative measures [unclear: brought] forward by every Government under the Party system—[unclear: manures] which, not infrequently, it is never intended or desired should [unclear: be] passed. Artificial questions, indeed, suit the system much [unclear: better] than real ones, for enthusiastic convictions and honest principles interfere sadly with the smooth working of the Party machine. On the rare occasions when a nation is stirred to [unclear: its] depths by some great issue—like that before America the other day as to the advisability of returning to the "dollar of their forefathers "—the outlines of the artificial parties are temporarily obliterated, and the new lines of cleavage disturb and annoy the professional Party leader, and may even engulf him altogether.

The "policy measures" are therefore necessarily decided upon with great care. They are then discussed in Cabinet meetings—an ordeal from which a bill often emerges robbed of any consistency it might have had if it had been the sole work of one man, and sometimes in such a changed form as to cause its originator to hope it may never pass. The key of the [unclear: situati] is, of course, with the premier. He has chosen his colleagues, and can dismiss them, or even threaten to resign. If a strong man, he has probably taken good care to have no rival in the Cabinet. There are strong ministers and weak ones. The latter will sacrifice their own principles at the bidding of any small [unclear: but] irreconcilable faction of their Party. The former will decide on page 27 the outlines and details of their measures, and then force them on the House with almost as little regard for the feelings of their followers as they have for those of the Opposition. As John Morley says:—

On the one hand, a leader is lavishly panegyrised for his high-mindedness in suffering himself to be driven into his convictions by his Party. On the other, a Party is extolled for its political tact in suffering itself to be forced out of its convictions by its leader. It is hard to decide which is the more discreditable and demoralising sight.^*

The nature of the legislation proposed would not, however, be a matter of so much moment, if every measure introduced were sure of an honest discussion on its merits by both Houses of Parliament. But, unfortunately, this is rarely if ever the case. And it must continue to be rarely the case, so long as Party is the uppermost thought in every member's mind; so long as the downfall of a Ministry, with its wide-spreading consequences, is hanging on the result of the debate; and so long as the power of recommending a dissolution is in the hands of the Premier. A member who would dare to disregard his party, and to speak and vote on a mere consideration of the right and the wrong, would be looked on with indignation and contempt by other public men. If he escaped being termed "traitor," he would at least be considered henceforth as quite unreliable, and, of course, "unfit for office." Such a hopeless perversion of morality as this can only be explained by the fact that even the best of men cannot serve two masters—either Party or Patriotism must be the first consideration. As Thackeray puts it: "We do not call it lying; we all it voting for our party" That this evil is inevitable under the Party system is admitted by no less an authority than Lord Salisbury, who is liable to occasional fits of frankness—or indiscretion, as his fellow-politicians call it. In the speech previously referred to, he says:

The evil of which we have to complain arises from this—that each member of the House of Commons has at the same time to perform two different duties. When you are voting here for a measure for the City of Glasgow, you only think whether the measure is a good one or a bad one according to your judgment, and you give your votes, whatever they may be. But when you are in the House of Commons voting for a measure, do you also think, "How will this effect my principal object, to turn out the Government to which I object, if I pass this Bill, and give the Government the credit of passing a useful measure which may

^* "Compromise."

page 28 confirm them in their seats? I had better oppose this Bill; I [unclear: had] vote for any amendment which may throw out the Bill, or I had [unclear: bo] make a long speech which will occupy the time in which the Bill [unclear: w] otherwise pass." That double object pursues, and necessarily [unclear: a] pursue, all party men, to whatever side they belong, but it his [unclear: a] disastrous effect upon legislation.^*

Much might be said as to the more indirect evils which [unclear: th] Party system entails on legislation, such as the great [unclear: waste] time, ability, and energy it involves. Not infrequently, in [unclear: th] House of Commons, the greater part of the day and [unclear: night] spent in rabid attacks by one side on the other, in [unclear: mut] recriminations, in raising needless points of order and [unclear: question] of privilege; and it is only when the physically weaker [unclear: member] have been obliged to retire, and when those remaining [unclear: are] mind and temper absolutely unfit to criticise carefully [unclear: th] simplest bill, that the real business of the country is a[unclear: approac] Both sides of the House keep their "eternal vigilance" [unclear: f] watching each other—like cat and dog. They use the [unclear: best] their brain power and their animal vitality for party free [unclear: figh] and when at last they come to legitimate business they can [unclear: on] bring to its consideration disordered tempers and jaded [unclear: intellec] page 29 The result is a protracted and expensive session, in which much [unclear: ll]-blood is roused and very little good work done. Acts are [unclear: passed] which can only be interpreted through much litigation; [unclear: and,] even when the meaning is clear, they are often so ill-[unclear: considered] that an amending Act is necessary the next session. Sometimes important measures and estimates are rushed through [unclear: a] worn-out and inattentive House in the last few days of a [unclear: ession] by an unscrupulous Government—measures which would have had no chance before a House alive to its real duties and responsibilities. The choice of bills to be rushed through in this manner is, of course, entirely in the hands of the Government. Those of no immediate interest to the party are ruthlessly sacrificed. They are added to that list of failures—witnesses to the folly of the Party system of legislation—which are abandoned without discussion at the end of every session. So regular has this practice become, that the "massacre of the innocents" is now one of the recognised phrases of political slang.

There is another cause of degradation to politicians [unclear: whi] must not be passed over without notice, and that is the [unclear: growing] tendency to look on members of Parliament as delegates [unclear: rather] than as representatives. This is directly due to the fact that [unclear: th] Party system is slowly but surely transforming Parliament [unclear: from] a deliberative assembly to a mere voting machine. It [unclear: would] impossible to contend that a member should first [unclear: receive] instructions from his constituents as to how he was to vote, [unclear: an] thereafter sit in Parliament and deliberate carefully [unclear: on] measures brought before him. What is the use of his [unclear: forming] honest opinion from the arguments advanced, if he is [unclear: nevertheless] to vote as he is told? Can anything be more absurd than [unclear: that], in the words of Burke, "One set of men should deliberate; [unclear: and] another decide?" But if a member's sole duty is to try and [unclear: keep] in or turn out a Government, he might as well receive [unclear: hi] instructions from his constituents as not. Such a degradation [unclear: of] the once honourable position of Member of Parliament is [unclear: enough] to make Burke turn in his grave. His noble words are as true now as when he spoke them:—

Your representative owes you not his industry only, [unclear: but] judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you, if he sacrifice [unclear: it] your opinion. . . . Parliament is not a confess of [unclear: ambasa] from different and hostile interests. . . . it is a [unclear: deliberation] assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole, [unclear: where] local purposes nor local prejudices ought to guide, but the [unclear: general] good. . . . You choose a member, indeed; but when yon [unclear: have] chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but a Member [unclear: of] Parliament.

The evils of a Party press are too conspicuous to need much comment. In every country under Party government the news-pipers attach themselves to one side or the other, and consequently—just as with the politicians—the interests of their forty are their first, if not their only, consideration. In many eases, the political parties own, or at least subsidise, the papers, and the more devoid of principle the parties, so much the more degraded and virulent in tone is the Press. The following sketch of the American Press, of more than thirty years ago, might pass, with very little alteration, for that of any country under Party government; except that in England the private characters of public men are hardly considered "fair game" as yet:—

The present vitiated state of the public taste admits of no neutrality, no lukewarmness. The mangling of the public and private character of political men, the debasing of the motives of action of the loftiest and purest to a level with the meanest, the fomenting of party rage and party hate, these are the dishes that are devoured with most avidity. At this (lay no politician cares for the boldness, frankness, or integrity of an individual editor. He buys a paper because it is an agent of his Party, to promote or preserve its elevation. Whenever an editor undertakes to think for himself or to differ from party dictation, the party ceases to sustain him. The editors do but imitate our leading politicians, who themselves imitate the lawyers. They handle all political questions like hired advocates, and consider themselves as standing in that attitude before the country, and as such, feel justified in making the most of the cause in which they are enlisted—good or bad. All this is most pernicious, when we consider the immense influence they exercise over public opinion and public morals. Though a politically debased public Press is rather the consequence than the cause of a vitiated taste of public morals, yet such is the influence of the Press in augmenting such a state of morals, that nothing is better deserving of anxious care than the preserving it pure, independent, and respectable, and the removing from our institutions everything that bears upon it with a contrary tendency.^*

When we consider what a large proportion of the people read hardly anything else than their daily or weekly newspaper, and page 32 that, in avast number of cases, the Press is their pulpit as [unclear: well] their platform, their only teacher in morality as well as [unclear: in] politics, the disastrous results that must needs follow [unclear: su] demoralisation become at once apparent. The argument [unclear: wi] force itself upon even the dullest mind, that if malice, [unclear: intrig] and lying are allowed in the most important matters, and [unclear: a] practised by the foremost men in the country, there can [unclear: be] harm in comparatively insignificant folk employing such tools [unclear: i] the minor matters of everyday life. And so it comes [unclear: about,] use the words of John Morley, "That the coarsest [unclear: political] standard is undoubtedly and finally applied over the whole [unclear: real] of human thought."^*

Still, there is no doubt that the Party system—

"directly tends to give extreme views an undue prominence and Importance, while moderate counsels are left disregarded. It leaves, in short, unrepresented the very views which are most sound, and perhaps post widely accepted. . . . A man may well hesitate to adopt either the immobility of one side, or the recklessness of the other. Yet he is bound to choose one or the other of these extremes, or renounce his share in the government of the country. And it consequently happens that page 34 the majority either hold aloof altogether, or give a lukewarm support [unclear: to] that party which seems to them to entertain the least objectionable views. Such a result cannot be regarded with indifference. To [unclear: alienate] the sympathies and support of the most worthy, and perhaps the [unclear: most] numerous, class of citizens cannot be the part of any good system of government; cannot but lead to serious mischief.^*