The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 75
Chapter V. — The Remedy
Chapter V.
The Remedy.
"La Suisse, qui marche a l'avant garde des reformes démocratiques, nous a montré le chemim."—Emile de Laveleye.
Before discussing what is the most thorough and practical method of parliamentary reform, it may be well to meet the objection often raised, and more often dimly felt, that the British Constitution is a sacred institution, against which no impious hand should be uplifted. It might be sufficient to reply that it is the constitution of New Zealand with which we are concerned, and that as it is not yet half a century old, it can hardly be considered an object of reverence even by the most conservative. But we may go further, and point out to these objectors that the British Constitution is continually changing. One of its most valuable characteristics has been its power of alteration and adaptation to new times and circumstances, and, in short (to use the words of the Hon. T. A. Cockburn, Minister of Education, page 62 S.A.), "they are the innovators who would seek rigidly to [unclear: resis] further change."* There has been very considerable alteration even in the short life of the Constitution of this country. [unclear: The] question to be considered is not "Shall we allow any change [unclear: in] our Constitution," but "Shall we allow it to be altered by [unclear: party] managers and dictators to their own advantage, and as they [unclear: se] fit, or shall we reform it with our eyes open, deliberately and intelligently, and in the direction of milking the people, through their representatives, real, and not merely nominal masters of the situation?"
It is objected again, that we cannot do this without passing statutes and inflicting a "Paper Constitution" on the country. We might reply that statutes have already been passed altering the New Zealand Constitution; and that even in England the Constitution is every year becoming more and more a matter [unclear: of] statute law. But we can again take much higher ground [unclear: then] this. Only those who have never studied the question at all [unclear: will] sneer at a "Paper Constitution." The necessary alternative—[unclear: as] omnipotent Parliament—has many obvious dangers, [unclear: mem] especially in a Democracy. "Trust the People," is a good rule [unclear: (If] one could understand it; who it is, for instance, who is to [unclear: trust] us); but "Trust the Politicians," is not a maxim that [unclear: has] hitherto commended itself to the intelligence of their employes. We have recently seen our own Parliament harking back to the [unclear: old] "Star Chamber" days, in the now famous farce of the fining of Mr. Watson £500 for his refusal to answer certain questions before the Banking Committee—a most dangerous precedent to [unclear: review]. Occasions of excitement or panic—in the House or the country—may lead to most injudicious action being taken, or laws being passed, which under a carefully-considered Constitution [unclear: would] have been impossible, at all events without first effecting a [unclear: chan] in the Constitution—a process which would allow time for [unclear: cah] reason and sound judgment to re-assert their sway. It is [unclear: worth] of note that in the United Suites men of all parties and [unclear: schol] of thought are agreed on this one point—that a written [unclear: as] statutory Constitution, to be interpreted by the highest [unclear: leg] court in the Republic, is absolutely necessary in the interests [unclear: of] sound and stable government. This opinion is well expressed [unclear: in] the following extract from a letter by "an eminent [unclear: America] publicist, Mr. Seth Low"—
* "Review of Reviews," Australian Edition, April, 1895.
So long as England's problem continues to be largely of this character (i.e., democratising her system of government), her omnipotent Parliament will continue to be of service to her. When, however, this process is substantially completed, so that all men in England are politically equal, and all men equally enjoy the right to take part in the government of the country, the experience of the United States would indicate that an omnipotent Parliament would then be full of peril. The United States have enjoyed the measure of prosperity which they have had by trusting completely the whole of society. But written Constitutions, in the nation and in each of the States, protect at once the individual, the State, and the nation from hasty and ill-considered action on the part of the majorities as to matters fundamental. Laws may be passed by majorities, and may be removed by majorities; but majorities cannot change in a moment the fundamental relations of government to the people. In other words, written Constitutions interpose effectual bars of delay to the passions and prejudices of the people. The people have it in their power in the United States, as surely as in England, to change even the fundamental features of government. But they cannot do this under the impulse of a mere whim. They can do it only by prolonged and intelligent effort directed to this end through a series of years.*
It is only necessary to add, that these arguments are obviously of far greater force in the case of New Zealand than of England.
The main objects to be attained by a reform of our Constitution have already been touched upon incidentally. We have now to consider what the leading features of this reform must be, in order that these desired ends may be achieved. All the [machinery of State is but a means to an end—good government and the welfare of the people. But in order that good government, on honest democratic lines, may be possible, the machinery must be suitable for the purpose. When that is the case, it will be directly our own fault if the country is governed in a corrupt or despotic manner. At present, we can only be blamed for retaining machinery so ill-suited for the work we want done.
* Mr. Bryce's "American Commonwealth."
No one expects nor even desires our politicians to be saints and philosophers. . . . But we have a right to expect that they will exhibit, on the platform and in the Press, the common virtues of every day life, that they will be straightforward and fair dealing, that they will display ordinary courage and sincerity, and above all, abstain from misrepresentation and calumny.*
This reform of the election of Ministers was suggested many years ago for England, by Mr. David Syme, whose argument is worth reproduction. He says—
* " Party and Patriotism," by S. E. Williams.
The nomination of the Executive by Parliament would, in my opinion, bring about a vast and beneficial change in the government of the country. It would put an end to the dominating influence of the Premier, and destroy the unity of the Cabinet. Parliament could then remove at pleasure any Minister whose conduct it disapproved of. It would have the selection of Ministers in its own hands, and the best men of both sides of the House would be eligible for office in the same way as the Speaker is now. The selection would not be from one section of Parliament, but from all sections, and the Ministry would represent all shades of opinion. At present, one half of the best men in Parliament are permanently excluded from office. There would also be a possibility of differentiating the functions of administration and legislation. Both kinds of functions are now exercised by the Cabinet. Ministers attempt too much when they undertake to administer the affairs and, at the same time, to provide legislative measures for a great Empire. The functions of administration are sufficiently onerous and important to engage their undivided attention. By relieving them of the business of legislation, which properly belongs to Parliament, there would be some chance of obtaining an efficient system of departmental supervision; while, by leaving Parliament unhampered by considerations of changes of Government, it would be able to devote itself zealously to the work of legislation. If the heads of departments found it necessary to recommend legislation, their proposals would no doubt be impartially considered by Parliament. In this, as in other matters, Ministers would take their instructions from Parliament, not Parliament from Ministers, as at present. Probably it might be necessary, in order to prevent the time of the House being wasted in discussing the various proposals which might be introduced by private members, to appoint a legislative committee to examine and report, as is now done in France and several Continental States where parliamentary government exists. The whole system of Party government could, in this manner, be quietly and effectually got rid of. There would be no striking at Ministers through their policy; no rejecting of good measures in order to bring about a change of government. Members would be in a position to discuss measures on their merits, or at all events without permitting party questions to influence them. There would be no weak Governments, and no danger to the liberties of the people from too strong ones. As Ministers would not be appointed because they belonged to a party, there would be no motive for turning them out of office. They would be, in deed and in truth, the Ministers, not the masters, of Parliament.*
At various periods in English history Ministers have been elected by Parliament. Among other instances, they were so appointed during the minority of Richard II., and at the commencement of the Common wealth the government of England was carried on by a committeepage 66 elected by Parliament, consisting of forty-one members, of whom [unclear: ni] formed a quorum. That committee was chosen yearly; and, says [unclear: Todd] "it ruled England with singular vigilance and success for four and a-quarter years."* "Representative Government in England."
A British Ministry is an executive committee chosen by the [unclear: House] of Commons to carry on the government of the country. The House of Commons differs from every other public body in choosing its executive exclusively from the majority, assigning to the minority no share of either the pleasures or responsibilities of office. In a model town [unclear: council] the various executive departments are managed by committees, on which the majority and minority are represented roughly in proportion to their strength in the full council. The result of thus associating the [unclear: minority] with the work of administration is to beget good feeling and loyalty, and to minimise factious obstruction. The councillor feels that his first duty is to the council, his second to his party within it. The town [unclear: presents] a proud and united front to outsiders. Progress is continuous and assured. Why not extend this system to the highest of all councils—the House of Commons?
In my judgment, the institutions of Parliament and the [unclear: institutions] of the municipalities of this country are rather running a race [unclear: against] each other. They both of them have to provide laws for the government and comfort of the people. To the municipalities undoubtedly are [unclear: a] signed the less important laws, and to Parliament the more [unclear: important]. But that is not the only difference between them. There is [unclear: another] difference: that the laws which the municipalities within their [unclear: pow] pass are quickly despatched, carefully considered, conceived in a [unclear: week] manlike shape, and effect the results for which they were designed. [unclear: The] laws that Parliament passes are only passed after infinite and [unclear: hes] rending delay. They appear in a crude and mutilated form. [unclear: Every] salient point is rubbed down, in order to enable them to pass [unclear: through] the narrow channel that is open to them, and the result at the end [unclear: is] that they have been so well arranged and so well conceived that [unclear: as] amending act is necessary next year.
The most noteworthy precedent, however, is of [unclear: cou] Switzerland. It is a great advantage, as a reply to the [unclear: charge] page 67 that we are merely theorising, to be able to point to a country to whose truly democratic institutions the absurdities and corruptions of the Party system are absolutely unknown, and where, consequently, the government is successful, enlightened, and dignified. A radically sound system of government may be said to be a necessity in Switzerland; for it is by no means a country easily governed. It comprises three nationalities and two hostile religions, and is, moreover, a veritable Cave of Adullam, whereunto resort all the extreme socialists, the anarchists and nihilists of Europe when their own countries become too hot for them. It is worthy of note, by the way, that Switzerland has no such foes of society of her own. Even the demagogue and the professional agitator are not natural products of a democracy, but of an incomplete or a burked democracy. It is when the body politic is out of health and knows not what ails it that the quack doctor finds his opportunity. It would be reasonable to expect to find Party government in its most virulent form in a country divided into inevitable and permanent parties by national and religious differences. Its complete absence from Switzerland is conclusive proof, if any were needed, that it is unnecessary in any country; and in a country where parties have to be created, where a homogeneous people have to be stirred up into two rival factions in order to enable the system to work, that it is not only unnecessary but ridiculous.
"The Federal Assembly consists of two chambers—viz., the National Council and the Council for the States. The former emanates from the people the latter from the cantons," and together they form the legislative government of the country. "The National Council is elected for a period of three years, in the month of October. After the commencement of the session at Berne the following December, the two Chambers meet together and elect the seven members of the Federal Council or page 68 Executive Government of the Confederation, chosen also for three years, from all Swiss citizens eligible for the National Council. . . . If during his three years of office any member resigns or dies, his place [unclear: is] filled up for the remainder of the triennial period by the Assembly at [unclear: its] next meeting." It is noticeable that the choice of members of the Federal Council is not limited to members of the Assembly. Still, "the constant though not invariable practice since 1848 has been for each member [unclear: to] be chosen out of the Assembly. . . . This previous election [unclear: is] considered to be proof of the confidence and attachment of the voters [unclear: to] a fellow citizen, and he takes his place in the Executive Government—holding his office, indeed, direct from the Assembly, but at the same time vested with popular confidence equally with the other [unclear: deputies]. Supplementary elections are then held in order to fill up the [unclear: seats] vacated by those deputies who have become Federal Councillors, as they cannot during their term of office as such be deputies as well."
This appears to be a sensible provision, for undoubtedly the constituents of a member of the Government should be the people of the colony and not the electors of any particular district. These members of the Executive are, moreover, debarred from engaging in any way in any other business or profession so long as they retain office—a clause that should certainly be adopted in New Zealand. Not only should a Minister devote his whole time and energies to the public service; but, also, it is surely as unseemly for him to be a director of a trading company or chairman of a foreign mining syndicate as it would be for a judge of the Supreme Court to be director of a company whose affairs might have to be brought before him in his judicial capacity.
It is unnecessary to give details of the mode of electing the President and Vice-President. The account of the special duties of the former conclude with the remark that "He may, indeed, without any disrespect, be likened to the chairman of a board." It should be noted, however, that care has been taken that [unclear: this] office should be a rolling one. In order to prevent any [unclear: undue] ascendancy of one member of the Council, it is specially provided that a retiring President, at the end of his year of office, shall be ineligible for re-election; he may not even become Vice President.
The business of the Federal Council is divided among seven departments, each presided over by one of its seven members, who probably keeps his particular post for several years, and who lias for his substitute, during absence, another member of the Council, appointed as such by that body. . . . Matters of importance are discussed and decided [unclear: at] the regular Council meetings, which are generally held twice a week. page 69 . . . . All the members (of the Council) have the right to speak in either Chamber, of which they avail themselves whenever their presence is required, or indeed whenever they wish to take part in the debates, but they cannot vote. Perhaps the most remarkable sight is that which occasionally occurs, when a debate arises in either Chamber upon a question where the difference of opinion of members of the Federal Council is very marked; and it has happened that two of the body have pen in succession to support dissimilar views. The debate once over, no particular friction results between the two colleagues; both victor and vanquished may spend the evening at the same café, continue their discussion amicably, or not at all; and they will sit serenely together on the morrow in Cabinet Council as if nothing particular had happened.
That our authors should consider such a simple occurrence as this a "most remarkable sight," speaks volumes for the virulence which the Party system has imported into the political world.
The members of the Federal Council are re-eligible, and in point of fact the same individuals remain in office for a number of years, notwithstanding the existence of well-known differences among themselves, and between some of them and a majority in the Assembly. There have been hitherto only two instances of a member willing to serve not being re-elected. . . . . The Federal Council, having been elected by the Federal Assembly for three years, cannot be dissolved by that body in the interim, any more than it can itself dissolve the Assembly. It does not in any way depend on the majority in the Assembly. Its members, each in their own department, prepare bills and resolutions, either suggested by one of the Chambers or on their own initiative, and these measures, when agreed to by the Council, or even by a majority of its members, are submitted to the Chambers. . . . Federal Councillors do not represent the majority in the Assembly, otherwise they would be all Democrats or Radicals. There is a certain understanding, one might aImost say a certain feeling of fair play, which leads the majority in the Chambers to concede the principle, that other parties should at least be represented in the executive government; and, again, a conservative vice-president, who is almost certain in any case to be elected president for the ensuing year, often succeeds to that office by an almost unanimous vote. . . . The practical harmony between the members is secured by the minority giving way to the majority, if the whole body cannot agree among themselves to a compromise.
Collisions between the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly do not exist. If any measure proposed by the former is rejected by both Chambers, or by one, and thus does not become valid, the Federal Council . . . accepts the rejection; it asks for no vote of confidence, nor does anything ensue in the shape of what we should call a Ministerial crisis. Similarly, there is no question of a dissolution of the Chambers, when the people reject measures passed by them. The Federal authorities whether legislative or executive, being chosen for a fixed term, remain at their posts during that term. In 1882, a measure relating to education, . . . which was avowedly the work of one member of the Federal Council, had passed both Chambers with some modifications, but was, nevertheless, rejected when submitted to the Referendum. There page 70 was, however, no question of its author giving in his resignation, [unclear: a] might well have been expected by many foreigners. So far, indeed, [unclear: from] this being the cane, an influential Swiss newspaper, totally opposed [unclear: to] him in politics, remarked that it was lucky the parliamentary system [unclear: on] not exist in Switzerland, as otherwise there would have been [unclear: an] immediate resignation of a capable, honest, and devoted administrator.
The members of the Federal Council, we will venture to [unclear: affirm] yield to no other Government in Europe in devotion to their country, [unclear: is] incessant hard work for a poor salary, and in thorough honesty and [unclear: in] ruptibility.
Such, then, is a slight sketch of what is generally admitted to be the most successful and economical administration [unclear: in] Europe. The more closely it is examined, the more clearly [unclear: does] it give "the lie direct" to all Mr. Lecky's charges [unclear: against] Democracy. Reasons more or less fanciful may possibly [unclear: for] adduced why a similar system of Government should not [unclear: produce] similar results in New Zealand; but this can only be urged by admitting that we are less able, practical, and honest men [unclear: than] the Swiss—an admission I, for one, am not prepared to [unclear: make]. All we need is the adoption of the main principles, and the adaptation of the details to our somewhat different circumstances. We should take over the Referendum and the Initiative (which I have not described at length, as their principles are now [unclear: as] generally understood), taking care, however, that they should be sparingly used; that is to say, only on questions of the [unclear: first] importance, or on the occasion of a block between the two [unclear: Houses] of the Legislature. The Referendum is a particularly valuable institution, if placed under regulations which prevent its [unclear: frivo] and improper use. By its means, last year, the Swiss [unclear: nation] decided to nationalise their railways—a reform which in [unclear: any] country under Party government would not have been [unclear: carried] without many years of hard fighting, misrepresentation, [unclear: bit] animosity, and the upsetting of Governments. It would [unclear: of] course, be absurd to copy the Swiss or any other constitution [unclear: t] slavishly. It is still more absurd, however, to decline to [unclear: benefit] from the ideas and the experience of other countries. It is [unclear: an] true of countries as of men, in reforming constitutions as in [unclear: min] matters, that "any fool can learn from his own experience, but page 71 the wise will learn from the experience of others." Yet we have seen a Premier of this Colony so bitter in his opposition to the proposed reform that he did not scruple to attempt, on a public platform, to rouse race-prejudices by "warning" the people "not to be led away by Swiss schemes, or by schemes of any foreign governments," but rather to "stand by the principles of their own Constitution"—with much more fustian of the same sort, artfully mingled with misrepresentations.*
It is curious to notice that it is often the same men who take up this position who clamour for the abolition of the Upper House, although the change to a single legislative chamber would be a far greater divergence from "our glorious British Constitution" than any reforms advocated in these pages.
We have not yet touched upon the necessary reform of the Upper House. To those who would reform it away altogether, as a useless superfluity (and even talk of "replacing" it by the Refercndum), I can only say that this is too large a subject to discuss incidentally, but that both theory and experience are strongly opposed to one-house legislatures. They have been tried and abandoned more than once in the United States. There is, indeed, little to be urged in their favour, excepting a very fictitious economy. A large part of the feeling in favour of a single House in this country is no doubt due to the unsatisfactory nature of our Legislative Council. A nominated chamber is, without doubt, an anomaly in a Democracy. The first statesmen of New Zealand felt this to be so, and there was no nominated chamber in the Constitution which the House of Commons was asked to grant us. That House, however, insisted on inserting this anomaly, and we have had to put up with it ever since.
* Mr. Ballance at the Princess Theatre, Dunedin, October 20, 1891.
If any timid democrat should fear that such an Upper [unclear: Ho] might possibly become a danger to the rights and liberties of [unclear: the] people, I need only point out that any reformed [unclear: Constitut] would certainly include a clause to the effect that any [unclear: means] which had twice passed either House in two consecutive [unclear: sessi] and had twice been rejected by the other House, should be [unclear: refer] to the people by compulsory Referendum.
I would advocate, therefore, an Upper House, elected by the ratepayers, of, say, thirty-five members (to seventy in the [unclear: Low] House)—one for each of the four large towns, and the rest to [unclear: be] divided among constituencies to be defined by the Commissioner appointed for the purpose.
page 73There is no use, however, in discussing the minor details of Parliamentary Reform. A special commission should be appointed to go into the whole matter, and draw up a draft Constitution for New Zealand, taking as a basis the main principles, but not necessarily the details, of Major Steward's Elective Executive Bill, which was agreed to by the House in 1896.
Local government reform has been already referred to. I need only repeat that, in order to be effective and thorough, it must he preceded by the great reform—the abolition of the Party system. The reform of the Upper House is quite a secondary matter, compared with the rehabilitation of representative government. When the Party system is no more, the necessary collateral reforms will be easily effected, for the people's representatives will then be at liberty to consider the welfare of their country, instead of the welfare of their party. The artificial party will have expired with the Cabinet. With the unity of the Cabinet replaced by the individual responsibility of Ministers, there can be no Government Party, and, above all, no Government candidates at elections; and thus the very basis of the corruption with which democracies are taunted will be cut away. This alone will raise the general level of the class and character of candidates very materially; and the position of independence and the added responsibilities with which the reform will endow the members of the House, will act in the same direction.
It is sometimes said that our prominent politicians would decline to accept office on the terms proposed; that the Hon. Mr. Duthie, for instance, as Colonial Treasurer, would be quite unable to work with the Hon. Mr. McKenzie, as Minister of Lands. The simple fact is overlooked, that, under the proposed reform, we shall no longer require Ministers to be, even nominally, "all of one mind." Each Minister will attend to his own department, and their "working together," as at present, is precisely what we wish to avoid. In no period of English history did the Executive Government display more harmony and energy than under Queen Elizabeth; yet the Ministers sitting at her council table were often bitter enemies. The Queen decided the policy, after hearing the advice of her Ministers, and they had to execute it, and did execute it ably. The only necessary difference now is, that the House should determine the policy.
It is also objected that, although the position of members of Parliament will be raised and dignified by the reform, the status page 74 of Ministers will be correspondingly lowered. Certainly, [unclear: the] power and patronage of the Government will be very [unclear: much] decreased, and office will be far less attractive to the [unclear: ambit] power-loving, self-seeking demagogue. This is, indeed, one [unclear: of] the great merits of the reform. But to the man whose [unclear: make] desire is to serve his country and generation, a seat in [unclear: the] Executive will have an attraction which it certainly has not [unclear: now]. Nor will a first qualification then be a robust physique and [unclear: at] iron constitution. We have seen two Premiers' of New Zealand killed, within a very short time of each other, by the work and worries of Party strife. Under any sensible system, there is [unclear: no] reason why the post of Member of the Executive should be any more detrimental to health than any other business or profession.
Democracy allows individual influence, one trusted, to play a larger part than it plays under any other political system; and this fact alone makes it imperative that the highest offices of the State should be both accessible and attractive to our best men which they can never be under the fully-developed Party system.
What is most urgently needed is a truer and higher view of [unclear: politics] And, indeed, it may be said that there is no nobler study for the [unclear: human] intellect, no loftier object for human endeavour, no higher field [unclear: he] human enterprise. On it depend not merely our lives and liberties, [unclear: to] our happiness and our progress. Surely such a subject ought to [unclear: ins] us with the highest purpose and purest zeal. But it is, as we know, [unclear: as] otherwise. There is hardly a profession in which chicanery [unclear: and] insincerity, passion and prejudice, petty arts, and mean ambitions, [unclear: and] so rife.*
* "Party and Patriotism."
I cannot conclude without one word of warning. It must not be supposed that all the advantages which will eventually flow from this reform will be apparent at once. The words of Mr. Bagehot are very true, that "A new Constitution does not produce its full effect as long as its subjects were reared under an old Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by that old Constitution. It is not really tested till it comes to be worked by statesmen, and among a people, neither of whom are guided by a different experience." The fact that the shadow of our present system must needs darken our path for some time to come, is, however, no reason for delaying reform. It is rather a reason for setting to work at once. Although we have no arguments to fight against, we have more troublesome foes—to wit, prejudices and strong vested interests—and nothing will be done, unless the people show themselves thoroughly in earnest on the matter. We need expect no help from the Party leaders. We have to put on one side the politicians who look on politics as a game. They say it is impossible to abolish Party government; but what they mean is, that without the Party fights and and intrigues, they themselves would' take no interest in politics. Whereby we see another benefit the reform has to bestow. In getting rid of Party government, we shall get rid, gradually but surely, of the whole tribe of Party politicians—of those men who make a government "an organised hypocrisy" (as Disraeli, in a moment of candour, once defined a Conservative Government). But in order to effect this, the country must show itself determined to be put off no longer. In the words of Auguste Comte, page 76 "the hypocrisy inherent in English Constitutionalism can [unclear: ne] be effectually suppressed without the intervention of the people. In 1891 Mr. Eugene O'Conor's Committee of the House [unclear: repor] strongly in favour of the abolition of Party government. In [unclear: 188] an "Elective Executive" Bill was allowed to pass its [unclear: second] reading, and was then carefully dropped. And so it will [unclear: continue] until we make our representatives understand clearly that [unclear: w] mean to have, without further loss of time, "the Reform, [unclear: the] whole Reform, and nothing but the Reform."
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