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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Rare Volume

Chapter VI

page 46

Chapter VI.

Immediately after the destruction of Kororareka, the colonial brig was sent to the southern settlements with information and instructions. The bishop took the opportunity of hastening to Waikanae, where it seemed probable that his influence with Rauparaha might tend much to prevent disturbance in the south, and thence the brig was sent to Hobarton for troops.

On the 22nd of March H M. S. North Star arrived from Sydney, with 200 of the 58th regiment on board; and the following day 50 more of the same corps arrived in a small transport.

An attack on Auckland being threatened, 200 men were landed and encamped, or quartered in the town, and 50 were sent immediately to Wellington, where hostilities with the natives were likewise apprehended.

Rumours were numerous at this time of general anxiety, and among those more generally believed was a report that Auckland would be attacked by Heke with about two thousand men, at the next full moon.*

This report was given on the best authority, and preparations for defence were made speedily; but a native war broke out at the Bay of Islands, and altogether changed the aspect of affairs. But for this diversion, and another caused by the brisk trade in Kauri gum collected by the natives, a formidable attack would probably have been made on Auckland; partly from motives of a political nature, partly for revenge, though chiefly for the sake of plunder. This warfare, between parties of natives themselves, occupied those who sought to attack the government, and to seek revenge for their losses at Kororareka, while the profitable gathering of Kauri gum fully employed all other natives, who would otherwise have been in arms for plunder.

This war between parties of the same large tribe of natives, the Ngapuhi, (companions of Honghi) was said by some to have been caused by the death of a half-caste child, killed by Heke's party at Kororareka. This child was nearly related to Nene (Thomas Walker Nene, the excellent chief now so

* April 22nd.

Early in April.

page 47 well known), but Nene himself always denied having taken up arms on that account. He asserted from the firsts that he made war against Heke and Kawiti, because he promised the governor, at Waimate, to fight for and defend the flag staff (meaning the flag, or the government).* With Nene several principal chiefs, namely Taonui, Tawhai, Paratene, Repa, and others, united to attack Heke and Kawiti, who were thus not only deterred from advancing towards Auckland, but obliged to defend themselves on their own ground.

These hostilities between the natives were in no way encouraged by the government, until a subsequent period, when Nene was very hard pressed by his opponents: but on the contrary, when application was made to the governor for his sanction to these natives making an aggressive and retaliatory warfare against Heke, he invariably refused, believing that such a war, without the control of government, would degenerate into interminable hostilities between various tribes, and speedily ruin what the missionaries had effected during a long course of years. It was, however, soon afterwards discovered that to the assistance of the loyal natives we owed so much that our troops could not act without their constant presence; and that, as the less of two evils, they must be engaged to co-operate with the troops.

Towards the end of April the chief Paratene went to Auckland, on behalf of Nene and his adherents, to urge the governor to send a force against Heke as soon as possible, lest Nene should be unable to cope with him and keep him in check until the expedition arrived which government was preparing. Finding the case to be very urgent, admitting of no delay, the governor dispatched all the force he could muster to the Bay of Islands, with discretionary instructions to attack Kawiti, or Heke, in conjunction with Nene's native force, in the event of a fair opportunity occurring.

The sequel is well known by the published accounts; but the fidelity of the natives, and their courage, have hardly been enough noticed. The daring of Kawiti and his party could scarcely have been exceeded. The bayonet alone overcame them.

* Nene, the principal chief of Hokianga, with his brother Patuone, took the most decided part in advocating and signing the treaty of Waitangi.

Under Lieut. Col. Hulme, and Captain Sir J. Everard Home.

Bayonets have not yet been used by the natives, except on poles, or lances.

page 48

The result of this expedition—however unsatisfactory to those engaged, who expected to carry all before them, almost unopposed, was the complete dispersion, for the time, of the rebel force, and the loss of some of their most desperate chiefs.*

* In England, where the peculiar circumstances of New Zealand had been so little known, it has been asked why the governor was not at the defence of Kororareka. Perhaps it has been also asked why he was not with the force under Colonel Hulme, and afterwards with Colonel Despard; therefore it may not he superfluous to say, that the following are some of Captain Fitz-Roy's reasons for remaining at Auckland on those occasions.

An attack on Kororareka was not expected to be of much consequence, neither was the time at all certain. The place was supposed to be so well defended that no doubt existed as to the result of any collision, an event which was rather hoped for as a means of punishing Heke by the reception he would meet with. It would have been lowering the governor's station, in the estimation of the natives, had he waited at Kororareka till it pleased so inferior a chief as Heke to make an attack. It was not thought necessary even for Colonel Hulme to be there.

The regular annual meeting of the legislative council took place on the 4th of March (Kororareka was burned on the 11th), and the governor's presence at Auckland was indispensable, unless a stop were put to all the ordinary public business, during his absence for a very indefinite time. Troops were expected hourly from Sydney,—and, until they arrived, Auckland was in so precarious a condition, that the governor would not have felt justified in leaving that principal place, where all the public documents and offices were exposed to destruction in case of any accidental quarrel. The personal character of individuals in command on such occasions was of the utmost consequence; a hasty or prejudiced man might have provoked a collision, where another might have allayed the ferment. But there was a reason of more importance, in the governor's estimation, than even these. It was his opinion, that, as the principal civil authority to whom the natives were to look as an impartial person, he ought never to take part personally in hostilities against them, except in self defence. To have become the personal enemy of any chief or tribe in New Zealand, must have placed the governor of that colony in a false position with respect to that portion of the people under his jurisdiction.

The governor's expedition to the Bay of Islands in August 1844, was not expected to end in hostilities. It was intended to be merely a demonstration. Not so the operations executed by Colonel Hulme and Colonel Despard. Hostilities, perhaps prolonged for several months, were then anticipated. The governor could not have taken part in them, or have been even at the Bay of Islands, without delaying and interrupting the public business of the other settlements, and his correspondence with England (already inevitably in arrear) to an unwarrantable degree. He therefore remained at what he considered to be his proper station.

page 49

But scarcely had the ships and troops returned to Auckland, when information was received that Heke was again collecting men, and was actively engaged in building a new pah, which would be stronger than any yet constructed in New Zealand. It was evident therefore that the principal rebel was not humbled, and that farther exertions would be necessary before British authority could be firmly established at the Bay of Islands and its vicinity, without reference to other parts of New Zealand, the condition of which would depend on the state of affairs in the north.

Reinforcements continued to arrive from Sydney, where Sir George Gipps and the commander of the forces* were making every exertion in their power to assist the local government of New Zealand. It was of the utmost importance to prevent the rebels from making head and collecting the disaffected from other parts of the island; therefore, without delay, another expedition was prepared, on a larger scale, and better provided, having received some light guns and a supply of ordnance stores from Sydney and Hobarton.

In June this second expedition left Auckland; but the rebels' strength was again undervalued, and, although successful in the main, a lamentable loss of life was incurred by our gallant soldiers and seamen.

After destroying this strong pah and several inferior ones, the troops took up winter quarters at Waimate, to remain there until the weather would admit of further operations in

* Sir Maurice O'Connell, K.C.B.

Under Colonel Despard and Sir Everard Home.

Belonging to Haratua and other adherents of Heke and Kawiti.

page 50 the field, and additional force should have arrived from Sydney or England.

Meanwhile Kawiti was fortifying a very strong pah in a position supposed to be impregnable, where Heke, (then recovering from a severe wound*) was to join him, if attacked by our forces.

In September the troops moved from Waimate to Russell, to be in readiness for advancing towards Kawiti's new pah, and to be in a more commanding position, better for general communication under any possible circumstances.

About this time reports reached the colony that the governor was recalled, and that his successor would soon arrive. Rumour said that the governor had been too considerate and lenient with the natives, and that his successor would treat them differently. This rumour had an injurious effect among a jealous people, indisposed to have any authority at all over them; and they shewed much feeling on the subject.

Official intimation of the governor's recall arrived at the beginning of October:—in the middle of November his successor. Captain Grey, arrived; and on the 18th he was duly installed.

Governor Grey brought money and additional forces, both military and naval. He soon repaired to the Bay of Islands, and there offered the rebels terms : his overtures were refused, and an attack on Kawiti's pah determined on. Preparation, were forthwith commenced, and on the 11th of January that strong hold (called Ruapekapeka) was taken, Pardon and peace were then proclaimed, and the greater part of the forces were withdrawn. Early in February the new governor sailed for Wellington, with the whole disposable force, intending, it was said, to settle the land question in the Hutt valley.§

It is very remarkable that during the hostilities which took

* Received in attacking Nene's pah, June 11.

Many letters were written to the governor from chiefs in different quarters of the island.

At this affair there were about 1000 troops, besides a detachment of seamen and marines from H. M. Ships Castor, North Star, Racehorse, Calliope, and E. L C. Ship Elphinstone.

§ For further information on these and other preceding subjects reference may be made to the series of despatches from Governor Fitz-Roy, published in the Parliamentary proceedings of 1845, and 1846.

page 51 place in New Zealand in 1845, only four acts of savage barbarity are said to have been committed by the natives; and not one instance of retaliation upon unarmed persons, not engaged in hostilities, was known. Yet only a few years have passed since these people were habitually cannibals under their notorious leader Honghi, who was said to have "ate his way" into the middle of the island. (Alluding to the numbers killed and devoured in his murderous excursions towards the south.)

As the four acts above mentioned have been much exaggerated, it may be right to state explicitly that two dead bodies were partly mutilated by heathen natives, portions of flesh having been cut from the back part of the thighs, and that the scalp was taken off another. It is asserted by the natives that these were for offerings to their Atua or deity. The fourth was indeed barbarous cruelty, A soldier was caught straggling, he was taking provisions from the enemy's ground close to the pah. His cries were dreadful; they were heard distinctly in the camp, and there is no doubt that he was tortured before being put to death. His body was afterwards found, seared by a hot iron. These atrocious acts, perpetrated by a few heathen natives, occasioned so much dissension among the rebels, that many left them. One should not look at these barbarities without reflecting on the change that has taken place since every native was a bloodthirsty cannibal.*

It is a very singular fact, and one which will hardly be credited by those who hold the popular opinion of these aborigines, that during the continual intercourse kept up with their chiefs by the governor during 1844 and 1845, not only verbally, but by very frequent correspondence, not one deviation from truth—not one instance of deception occurred. During the general excitement caused by Heke's attack on Kororareka and the possible consequences, nearly all the principal chiefs (excepting those implicated with the rebels) wrote to or visited the governor to assure him of their fidelity. Not one failed to act up to his professions: not even Parore, Heke's nearest relation,—nor Tiraran, a connection and ally of the chief Kawiti, whose position between the Bay of

* Within the last few years Archdeacon Brown saw thirty native ovens in one row, all filled with human flesh.

This correspondence occupied at least two persons constantly, in translating and copying for the governor.

Te Whero Whero, and others of the Waikato tribes, told the governor that they would die for the British flag.

page 52 Islands and Auckland made his allegiance of the utmost importance, But these influential chiefs, who still retained a considerable hold over their clansmen, wrote freely to the governor respecting their conduct in the event of the government violating its professions. Parore, a quiet sensible man, of superior intellect, wrote to the governor—referring to the rumour of his recall,—saying, that he himself would remain loyal, as long as the government continued to act justly; but if an attempt should be made to take away their lands by force, and degrade the natives, he and they would all rise and fight.*

Among the principal chiefs a regard for truth, and a sense of honour prevail to a degree which one can hardly believe to be compatible with the dirty habits and uninformed condition in which they live. Moreover they are not treacherous: on the contrary, they give notice of their intentions, and do not, in ordinary warfare, make attacks by night. They are as sagacious and enterprising as they are hardy and courageous, During former years when they had no fire-arms, the flash and report of a musket may have had a mysterious character which caused a superstitious alarm; but now, well accustomed even to rifles and double-barrelled percussion guns, their natural bravery is displayed. Of late years superstition has had only diminished effects on their minds, which has rendered them less liable to be influenced by any sudden panic. They are extremely clever in expedients and stratagems: particularly in war.

Between our forces, particularly the seamen, and the natives in arms against Heke, there was uninterrupted cordiality; a state of things that could hardly have been expected, considering the dissimilar elements that were hastily brought

* Some of these letters were highly poetical, even Ossianic.

Unless treated treacherously themselves, in which case they will go to any length in retaliation.

A member of the House of Commons, who had been in Canada, asserted in his place in parliament, that one North American Indian was equal to nine New Zeatanders: but the officers of the United States Frigate St. Louis, who witnessed the fighting at Kororareka, and Lieutenant Henry Eardley Wilmot, R, A., who particularly distinguished himself at Ohaeawae and Ruapekapeka, and had served some years in Canada, expressed opinions nearly the reverse of that above mentioned.

page 53 together.* But this intimate acquaintance with OUT habits, and the knowledge thus acquired of the soldiers' unfitness for warfare in their almost impracticable country, may be turned greatly to their advantage against our forces, should the course of events be unhappily such as to alienate their friendship.

The greatest difficulty under which officers—especially commanding officers—labour in New Zealand must not be overlooked: namely, the want of information, and the means of communicating with the natives.

Faithful and able interpreters are required continually; but they are very few in number, and those few have not been sufficiently appreciated.

Residents in the country are naturally reluctant to compromise their families by taking part in hostilities; yet such persons, especially those who have lived long in the land, are alone competent and trustworthy.

Much natural talent, as well as a readiness to turn the natives' sagacity to account, and a kindly treatment of them, are required in an officer acting against New Zealanders. He will find them accustomed to select the best military positions, to choose the best lines of march, to deceive the enemy by a variety of stratagems. They fortify their pahs scientifically with double or treble stockades, ditches and flanking positions. They are not unacquainted with a method of approaching by parallel trenches, having used it long ago in their own wars, before they had intercourse with Europeans. They know how to avoid shot and shells by underground excavations, and they are accustomed to disperse entirely, when necessary, and

* The presence of native females at the camp was not discouraged by their relatives,—a lamentable feature in the New Zeaiander's character, against which the missionaries have striven almost in vain. It is a sad fact that they seem to entertain so low an opinion of women, that their illicit intercourse with strangers is not prevented, if attended with advantage to their relations. Of course while the women were thus encouraged to frequent the camp, it would have been very difficult for the officers to prevent their visits, but they were dangerous as spies, while prejudicial to strict discipline.

The drill and habits of regular troops are unsuited to guerrilla warfare in such a country, however superior in open ground.

Good guides are always wanted, but they are scarcely to be obtained without a liberal use of money.

page 54 re-assemble again, at a given time and place, with astonishing rapidity and facility.

Much misapprehension has arisen from calling all their stockades, or palisades (some merely slight single palings) pahs, by which the mere "kainga," or place of abode, has been confounded with the well fortified stronghold called "pa."

While Nene and his adherents were before Ruapekapeka, they erected a temporary musket proof pah, for their own use, in ten hours. Heke's pah at Ohaeowae was completed in a month, Kawiti's stronghold at Ruapekapeka occupied his tribe, about six hundred men and women, nearly two months. The timbers (they could not be called palisades, or even posts) of these two pahs, were as large as those of a frigate. Six pound shot lodged in those at Ohaeowae, which were of tough puridi-wood, equal to oak.

The late Captain Bennett, of the engineers, sent plans, sections, and descriptions of some strong pahs to the inspector general of fortifications as early as the beginning of the year 1843. With those plans, he sent his ideas respecting the best mode of attacking them, and he made an official demand for howitzers, shells, and rockets. No public effect was caused by his application, sent carefully through the proper channel, (to the knowledge of the colonial authorities in New Zealand) and the apparent indifference to this and other applications for military aid, caused bad effects in the colony,—where loyalty is not so influential a feeling as at home.*

* Besides the refusals given to verbal applications made to authorities at home—the published correspondence with successive governors of New Zealand (between 1839 and 1846), will prove that there was no prospect of adequate military support until last year, after Kororareka was destroyed.